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PREFACE
"No one who possesses any acquaintance with the his- 
tory of the discussion of free-will", says N. P. Williams, 
"can be under the delusion that he has anything new to say 
on the subject." If this is true, the student who at- 
tempts a doctor's thesis on the subject of theological de- 
terminism finds himself at the outset impaled upon the 
horns of a dilemma: he must admit either that he has nothing 
original to say or that he is poorly acquainted with his 
subject. The present candidate prefers to grasp the first 
horn,- to claim at least enough knowledge of the subject to 
agree in substance with Williams 1 statement. And yet, as 
Williams himself goes on to say, one can at least envisage 
the familiar arguments in the controversy from a fresh point 
of view.
It should be remarked also that one need not attack 
the problems of theological determinism with the feeling that 
one is foredoomed to failure on the ground of their insoluble 
character. The fact that controversy is still raging around 
the notions of freedom and necessity, in philosophy and 
science as well as in theology, has been too readily con- 
strued as indicating that the truth in the matter is unattain-
%. P. Williams, The Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin, p.446.
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able. We need to remind ourselves that truth is not a ques- 
tion of popular agreement. To suppose that it is is to pre- 
pare one's self for the most thoroughgoing agnosticism, 
since no great theological or philosophical principle can 
command for itself universal support. We may, therefore, 
reply to the oft-repeated statement that the questions cen- 
tering roundifreedom and necessity can never be solved, with 
the counter statement that they may have been already solved, 
that one side or the other may be essentially right.
Although it is not to the fore in contemporary dis- 
cussion, the importance of the problem of determinism in 
theology can hardly be overstated. It is of primary signif- 
icance in some of the salient doctrines of Christianity, and 
there is indeed no department of theology in which it does 
not have ramifications. Practically every Christian doctrine 
presupposes the truth either of the deterministic or non- 
deterministic position. The question is therefore eminently 
worthy of careful study by any one interested in theology.
An American student, reared in a Presbyterian Church 
which is still strongly Calvinistic, and interested in the 
deterministic problems/of that system, quite naturally turns 
to Jonathan Edwards as a fruitful source of study. Edwards 
is commonly recognized as the "father of the New England 
Theology", the only real school of theology America has yet 
produced, and one in which the deterministic doctrines of 
Calvinism were the major desiderata.
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Born at Bast Windsor, Connecticut, in 1703, and educa- 
ted at Yale College, where he became for two years a tutor, 
Edwards accepted, in 1726, the pastorate of the Congrega- 
tional Church at Northampton, Masaachusetts. There he spent 
the next twenty-four years, leaving in 1750 as the result of 
differences with his congregation arising over the qualifi- 
cations of communicants. The following year he went to 
Stockbridge, Massachusetts, as a missionary to the Indians, 
and while there produced his two most important deterministic 
works, the Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will, and the 
Treatise on Original Sin. His death occurred in 1757, just 
after his assumption of the presidency of Princeton College.
During his entire life, from about the age of thirteen, 
he was a prolific writer. Bulking large among his writings, 
and constituting, at least until recently, his chief grounds 
for fame, are his deterministic works, the titles of which 
can be found in the Bibliography. Of their influence Frank 
Hugh Poster remarks that "even in the person of its final 
and greatest representative, Professor Edwards A. Park, the 
New England Theology did not break loose from the substantial 
supra-lapsarianism in which Edwards had left it. Every 
great reasoner upon this theme believed himself to be in en- 
tire accord with Edwards. So profound was their admiration 
for their great leader that his successors scarcely conceived 
it possible that they should disagree with him, except in 
some small details of phraseology, or possibly, now and then, 
of thought." 2 The fact that, in the minds of certain contem-
2Frank Hugh Foster, A Genetic History of the New England
Theology, p. 225.
porary writers, the deterministic works of Edwards hare been 
eclipsed in interest and value by his philosophical and psy- 
chological treatises in no wise lessens the former's import- 
ance.
Apart altogether from those considerations which make 
Edwards of special interest to an American student, he is 
worth studying for the intrinsic merit of his thought. His 
genius has been recognized far and near. Sir James Mackin- 
tosh, in an oft-quoted statement, speaks of "his power of
subtle argument, perhaps unmatched, certainly unsurpassed
•* 
among men..." Dugald Stewart says: "There is, however, one
metaphysician, of whom America has to boast, who, in logical 
acuteness and subtility, does not yield to any disputant 
bred in the universities of Europe. I need not say that 1 
allude to Jonathan Edwards." The esteem in which Dr. Thomas 
Chalmers held him is well known: "There is no European divine 
to whom I make such frequent appeals; no book of human com- 
position which I more strenuously recommend than his 
Treatise on the Will.... 11 Professor A. M. Fairbairn gives 
the following estimate of Edwards: "He is not only the great- 
est of all the thinkers that America has produced, but also 
the highest speculative genius of the 18th century." To
James Mackintosh, Dissertation upon the Progress of 
Ethical Philosophy, p. 182.
4Dugald Stewart, quoted by Samuel Miller in "Life of Jonathan 
Edwards", in Jared Sparks* 1 Library of American Biography, 
Vol. VIII, p. 183.
DThomas Chalmers, quoted by A.V.G.Allen, in "Life and Writ- 
ings of Jonathan Edwards", p. 285.
6A. M. ffairbairn, Jonathan Edwards, in The Prophets of the 
Christian Faith, p. 147.
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quote, finally, a thoughtful and judicious statement by Paul 
Elmer More: "He had not the legal ancyexecutive brain of 
Calvin, upon whose Institutes his scheme of theology is man- 
ifestly based, but in subtle resourcefulness of reasoning 
and still more in the scope of his spiritual psychology he
rj
stands above his predecessor."
It would be easy to fill pages with further tributes 
to Edwards, but that is unnecessary,- that he is worthy of 
study cannot be denied. We might also add some of the criti- 
cisms he has drawn down upon himself, such, for instance, as 
Lecky's remark that his Treatise on Original Sin is "one of 
the most revolting books that hasjever proceeded from the
Q
pen of man." 0 The criticisms, however, are directed against 
his views,- they do not deny his genius.
A thesis on the subject of determinism in Edwards is 
appropriate, not only because of the importance of Edwards' 
work, but also because, so far as the writer has been able 
to determine, there is no extant work covering precisely 
this ground. There are numerous works on his theory of the 
willjand other treatments of his theology as a whole, but 
none which stands between these two types, dealing with all 
the deterministic doctrines in his theology, yet limiting
7Paul Elmer More, "Edwards", in Cambridge History of 
American Literature, Vol. I", p. 71.




In our study of Edwards we shall deal with five 
doctrines: the decrees of God, the theory of the human will, 
original sin, efficacious grace, and the perseverance of 
believers. These five doctrines are all expressions of the 
deterministic principle. Others are influenced by this prin- 
ciple, but cannot properly be said to be aspects or express- 
ions of it, and hence do not come within the limits of this 
dissertation. The doctrine of the limited atonement, one of 
the "Five Points" of Calvinism, is a direct outgrowth of 
Calvinistic determinism, but it is not itself a deterministic 
doctrine, and we shall therefore not deal with it here.
The exposition and criticism of the five doctrines 
listed will constitute the second and largest division of 
the thesis. It has seemed wise not to withhold the critical 
portion of the treatment until after the complete presenta- 
tion of Edwards 1 thought, since this would lengthen the 
thesis by necessitating a restatement of many of his posi- 
tions. As it is, they are usually criticized immediately 
after being presented, and thus while fresh in the memory. 
While this method has the virtue of shortening the thesis it 
has one disadvantage. The writer differs fundamentally from 
Edwards, with the result that most of the criticism is ad- 
verse. It may, therefore, sometimes appear that the inter- 
pretation is not as dispassionate and objective as a doctor's 
thesis demands. If there is any seeming bias or lack of de- 
tachment, we can only hope that it is merely apparent and
viii 
not real.
The thesis will contain two other major divisions. 
Part I will consist of a brief history of theological deter- 
minism, beginning with the Bible and leading up to the time 
of Edwards, and also a discussion of Edwards' sources. The 
chapter dealing with determinism in the Scripture will have 
the double purpose of seeking whatever light the Bible can 
throw upon our problems, and of rendering it for the most 
part unnecessary, when we come to examine Edwards* teaching, 
to go into the Biblical arguments in which he abounds. Iflany 
of his points are supported by pages of proof-texts, the 
discussion of which would fill volumes. It would, for this 
reason, be utterly impossible for us to undertake to deal 
with them. And it is likewise unnecessary, inasmuch as his 
way of using the Scripture belongs to a day that is past. As 
Charles R. Brown says: "His methods of BiblicalJinterpreta-
tion as judged by the more competent scholarship ofyour day
9 are hardly worthy of consideration or of respect. 11
Part III will be given to a constructive statement on 
the problems studied in Edwards. In view of the fact that 
the critical portion is practically all included in Part II, 
this statement will be comparatively brief.
Three further things remain to be said. (l) There are 
some philosophical and psychological arguments relating to 
the freedom of the will with which we have not dealt. They
Q
^Charles R. Brown, "Jonathan Edwards", in Encyclopoedia 
Britannica, 14th edition, Vol. VIII, p. 20a.
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have been omitted on the ground that in a theological trea- 
tise considerations which are primarily philosophical and 
psychological should be introduced only as they are involved 
in those which are moral and religious. (2) The thesis is 
written from the standpoint of Christian theism, the entire 
discussion taking place within the area of the theistic 
position. To go beyond these limits would be to open up 
avenues of discussion into which we have not entered and 
which would carry us too far afield. (3) We are assuming 
that the solution of the problems before us is not to be 
found in the affirmation of paradox as constituent of reali- 
ty. To say that man's will is both free and determined, that 
God's will is both arbitrary and controlled by His holy char- 
acter, or that in salvation God's grace does all and man, 
all, is simply to settle questions by denying their reality. 
When we rest content with the affirmation of contradictions, 






CHAPTER I. THE TEACHING OF SCRIPTURE.............
I. Election in the Old Testament 
II. Determinism in the Gospels
III, Determinism in Paul
1. The Argument of Romans ix-xi
2. Paul and the Doctrine of Election
3. Grace and Perseverance in Paul
4. Paul's Teaching on Original Sin
IV. Concluding Remarks
CHAPTER II. DETERMINISM FROM AUGUSTINE TO THE
WESTMINSTER CONFESSION............... 37
I. Augustine
1. The Decrees of God





1. The Decrees of God




6. The Basis of Calvin's Determinism
III. The Arminian Revolt and the Synod of Dort
XI
IV. The Covenant Theory 
V. The Westminster Confession
Page 
CHAPTER III. THE SOURCES OP EDWARDS' DETERMINISM........ 61
I. New England Calvinism
II. Philosophical Sources
1. Edwards and Berkeley
2. Edwards and Other British Philosophers
3. Edwards and Locke
a. Locke 1 s Chapter on Power 
b. Locke's Theory of Identity and 
Diversity
III. Arminianism in New England and Abroad
PART II 
DETERMINISM IN THE SYSTEM OF JONATHAN EDWARDS
CHAPTER IV. THE HEART OP EDWARDS« THEOLOGY. ............. 98
CHAPTER V. THE DIVINE DECREES........................... 108
I. The Decrees in General
II. The Divine Decrees and Human Sin 
III. Predestination, Election, and Reprobation
IV. Arguments Proving the Decrees
V. The Divine Decrees and The Character of God
CHAPTER VI. THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. .................... 143
I. Edwards* Theory of Volition
1. The Nature of Volition
2. The Cause of Volitions
3. The Necessity of Volitions
4. The Freedom of Man
5. The Conditions of Moral Agency
xii
II. The Proof of the Necessity of Volitions
1. The Argument from the Nature of Causation
a. The Impossibility of a Self- 
determining Power in the Will
b. The Impossibility of the Contingency 
of Volitions
c. The Impossibility of a Liberty of 
Indifference in the Will
d. The Necessity of Volitions
2. The Argument from God's Foreknowledge 
a* The Foreknowledge of God 
b. The Foreknowledge of God and the 
Necessity of Volitions
3. The Argument from the Moral Nature of Man 
a. The Consistency of Moral Inability
and Responsibility
b. The Incompatibility of Freedom in 
the Arminian Sense and Moral 
Responsibility
c. Observations on Edwards' Reconcilia- 
tion of Necessity and Accounta- 
bility
Page 
CHAPTER VII. ORIGINAL SIN............................... 263
I. The Proof of Man's Depravity
1. The Proof of Depravity from the 
Universality of Sin
2. Scriptural Proofs of Man's Depravity
II, Original Righteousness and the Fall
1. Edwards' Presentation of these Doctrines
2. Observations on Edwards' Doctrine of
Original Righteousness and the Fall
III. The Federal Headship of Adam
1. Edwards' Exposition and Proof of the 
Doctrine
2. Criticism of the Federal Theory as 
Edwards Presents It
CHAPTER VIII. THE GRACE OF GOD.......................... 318
CHAPTER IX. THE PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS. .....:....... 339




TOWARD AN ADEQUATE THEORY
Page
CHAPTER XI. THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS.............. 354
I. The Sovereignty of God
II. The Character of God
III. The Moral Agency of Man
CHAITER XII. THE PURPOSES AtJD DECREES OF GOD............ 359
I. The Nature of God's Purposes and Decrees 
II. Limited Decrees and the Sovereignty of God
CHAPTER XIII. THE FREEDOM OF MAtf........................ 380
I. The Error in the Method of Determinism 
II. The Nature of Free Volitions 
III. The Relation of Free Volitions and Character
IV. The Limits of Moral Responsibility
V. Freedom and the World of Science
CHAPTER XIV. THE ORIGIN AND PROPAGATION OF SIN.......... 417
I. The Origin of Sin 
II. The Propagation of Sin 
III. God's Relation to Sin
CHAPTER XV. GRACE AND FAITH............................. 436









THE TEACHING OB1 SCRIPTURE
We shall begin our study of theological determinism 
with the Bible. Edwards 1 extensive use of proof texts ren- 
ders it highly worth while to preface our examination of 
his thought with a rapid survey of the Scriptural teaching 
at first-hand, and it is well in any case to have this in 
the background of our mind. We shall glance first at the 
doctrine of election in the Old Testament, then seek for 
any deterministic elements in the Gospels, and finally make 
a brief study of determinism in Paul.
I. Election in the Old Testament
In studying the determinism of the Old Testament we 
shall confine ourselves to the teaching of the great 
prophets, beginning with Amos, in the 8th century B. C., 
both because in them the thought of the Old Testament 
reaches its peak, and because in them "we escape from the 
mists of critical doubt into the daylight of acknowledged 
history."
It cannot be doubted that the conception of the
 "-A. B. Bru'ce, Apologetics, pp 173-174.
election of Israel was one of the leading ideas of the pro- 
phetic mind. Amos, the first of the 8th century prophets
writes: "You only have I known of all the families of the
o 
earth," Hosea represents Jehovah as saying: "When Israel
was a child, then I loved him, and called my son out of
 z
Egypt." The First Isaiah speaks of Israel as the vineyard 
of Jehovah and represents Him as complaining at its unfruit- 
fulness: "For the vineyard of Jehovah of hosts is the house 
of Israel, and the men of Judah his pleasant plant: and he 
looked for justice, "but, "behold, oppression; for righteous- 
ness, but, "behold, a cry." Micah reminds Israel of Jeho- 
vah's special guidance and protection in the past: "For I 
brought thee up out of the land of Egypt, and redeemed thee 
out of the house of bondage; and I sent "before tkee Moses, 
Aaron, and Miriam." The Second Isaiah gives strong express- 
ion to Jehovah's election of Israel and His purpose in so 
doing: "I, Jehovah, have called thee in righteousness, and 
will hold thy hand, and will keep thee, and give thee for a
c
covenant of the people, for a light of the Gentiles."
Two ideas stand out in these statements: (a) God has 
conferred upon Israel certain "blessings, and ("b) these have 
in turn imposed upon her certain obligations. She has been 
singled out among the nations of the earth to be made God's
o 
Amos iii. 2. (All Scripture quotations are from the
Revised Version, American Edition.) 
~Hosea xi, 1. 
4 Isaiah v. 7. ^Ticah vi. 4. 6Isaiah xlii. 6.
peculiar people, the recipient of His special blessings. 
These "blessings, however, are not mere ends in themselves,- 
they lay upon Israel the duty of making herself a blessing 
to others, and justify Jehovah in complaining at her for not 
realizing His expectations. Israel is indeed elected of Je- 
hovah, yet elected not only to special favor, but also to 
special service.
The prophets 1 idea of the nature of Jehovah*s special 
favors to His elect children is indicated at various points 
throughout their writings. They read the past history of 
their people in the light of the idea of election. Micah 
implies that/Jehovah made a special covenant with the patri- 
archs promising them special blessings: "Thou wilt perform
the truth to Jacob, and the lovingkindness to Abraham, which
17 
thou hast sworn unto our fathers from the days of old." '
Hosea indicates that Jehovah had a great part in the exodus 
from the land of Egypt: "Yet I am Jehovah thy God from the 
land of Egypt; and thou shalt know no god but me, and besides
Q
me there is no saviour." As we find in the Pentateuch, so 
we find in the prophets the notion that in Israel's beginning 
as a nation God was exercising a providential protection and 
directing influence, resulting in her consolidation and integ- 
rity as a nation and in her deepening insight, from Abraham 
through Moses, into the true religion. The question of the 
historicity of certain portions of the Pentateuch does not 
concern us here, since our interest is not primarily in the
7Micah vii. 20. 8Hosea xiii. 4.
fact of Israel's election, but in the Old Testament teaching 
concerning it. Jehovah's elective favor, according to the 
prophets, was still active in their day in the development of 
Israel's national and religious life.
It is a fact of great significance that the prophets 
did not teach the doctrine of the election of individuals to 
blessings in the worl^i to come. The future life, in fact, 
had no prominence at all in their writings. The blessings 
of election were blessings for the nation as a whole, and 
for this world. This is true even in those prophecies which 
conceive the blessings as primarily spiritual in nature. The 
prophets' view of election is thus vastly different from the 
doctrine as it subsequently emerged in Calvinistic theology. 
It is not to be denied that Jeremiah and the Second Isaiah 
advanced in their religious insight to the conviction that 
the individual rather than the nation would be the unit with 
which Jehovah would thenceforth deal, but the blessings obe- 
dience would bring were promised for this life.
If such were the privileges to which Israel was 
elected, the general service required of her was that she 
should make herself a holy nation, and convey to other 
nations the knowledge of the true religion. We find in Exo- 
dus a very clear statement of Israel's vocation as given by 
Jehovah through Moses,- a statement which, as A. B. Bruce re- 
marks, has a genuine prophetic ring, whatever the date of 
its writing. "Now therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, 
and keep my covenant, then ye shall be mine own possession 
from among all peoples: for all the earth is mine: and ye
6
q 
shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and a holy nation..." 17
The service required is clearly indicated in Isaiah v. 7 and 
xlii. 6, quoted above. How far, and in exactly what ways, 
Israel carried out the service asked of her is beyond the 
scope of our present interest, the point of significance be- 
ing that the Old Testament, as represented by the prophets, 
did distinctly teach an election to_ service as well as to 
privilege. And here again, just as we have seen in connec- 
tion with the blessings promised, the service required was 
of the nation as a unit.
Such, in brief outline, is the Old Testament doctrine 
of election. The question now arises, Does this involve de- 
terminism? We have already seen that it does not involve a 
predetermination of individuals to eternal life, such as the 
doctrine of election later came to indicate. It is further- 
more true that there is no conscious and explicit teaching 
of determinism by the prophets in connection with their doc- 
trine of election to national privileges and to service in 
this world. There are some scattered statements which seem 
to suggest a determining influence of the divine, upon the 
human will, but these are more than counter-balanced by Je- 
hovah's repeated warnings against falling away, His com- 
plaints over past failures, and the conditional character of 
the promises made,- all of which seem to imply man's 
possession of a power of contrary moral choice. If determin- 
ism is in the prophets' minds, it does not come to the fore.
9Exodus xix. 5,6.
The prophets believed God to be sovereign, but they also be- 
lieved, so far as we can judge by what they actually taught, 
that man is free.
while the explicit teaching of the prophets leaves the 
question open, it may be argued that the principle of theo- 
logical determinism nevertheless underlay their doctrine of 
election. This has been asserted, for instance, by Professor 
H. B. Smith, one of Edwards 1 successors in the line of New 
England theologians, who argues that a national election to 
privileges and service in this world is bound to imply an ef- 
ficient action of God's Spirit on the individual. The 
national blessings designed by Jehovah for the Israelites 
were, it is held, contingent upon the conduct of certain 
leaders, such as the patriarchs, and Moses and David, and 
the conduct of these leaders at least must have been de- 
termined by Him. The religious blessings mediated by the 
prophets and others were even more dependent upon the lives 
of the mediators, and if Jehovah certainly intended that the 
blessings should come, the lives of these men must have been 
the result of His efficacious grace. In short, if Israel was 
elected to certain privileges, this presupposed the appro- 
priate conduct,which must therefore have been foreordained. 
Again, the election of the nation to service implied, in the 
last analysis, the predestination of individuals to certain 
acts, otherwise the election was not certain.
In response to this argument it must be granted th^t 
such might be the implication of the doctrine of Israel's
8
election. One can certainly not defend the position that 
determinism is inconsistent with Old Testanrent teaching. On 
the other hand, it cannot be said that determinism is defin- 
itely implied in the prophetic doctrine of election any more 
than that it is explicitly taught. There are many things in 
the Old Testament, and particularly in the prophets, which 
indicate that Israel was free to obey or disobey Jehovah's 
leading. Jehovah is represented as complaining over her 
failures to do His will,- and there is no suggestion that 
these failures were expressive of His secret, as opposed to 
His revealed will. Further, it is entirely possible to be- 
lieve, from a reading of the prophets, that Israel failed to 
receive all the blessings Jehovah had in store for her, or 
to render all the service He desired, although her gift of 
the prophets and of Christ to the world is sufficient to 
save the doctrine of election from being stultified. Again, 
Jehovah's promises and His calls to service are conditioned 
upon Israel's obedience, and there is no ground for arguing 
that this was not a genuine condition. All these things,- 
Jehovah's complaints, warnings, and conditional promises,- 
indicate on their face that Israel's election did not involve 
a foreordination of her conduct. They imply a conditional 
election, an election which is perfectly consistent with 
God's taking a gracious initiative toward His chosen people, 
without over-riding the freedom with which He had endowed
them.
It is thus possible to regard the election taught in
the Old Testament as either absolute or conditional, either
deterministic or non-deterministic, depending upon which set 
of statements it is from which we draw our inferences. Seek- 
ers of proof-texts on either side of the question can find 
all they wish. As we have observed, the prophets taught the 
sovereignty of God, the divine election, but apparently also 
the freedom of man. "Whether, and how far, they appreciated 
the problem thus raised, we cannot say. It seems to have 
been either not recognized or wisely ignored.
II. Determinism in the Gospels
In the teaching of the Gospels the Old Testament theory 
of Israel's election fades into the background. Jesus is in- 
deed represented, by Matthew particularly, as interested 
first in "the lost sheep of the house of Israel." 1 But in 
His eyes the mere fact of being a Jew guaranteed no special 
favors from God. His attitude was trenchantly expressed by 
John the Baptist: "For I say unto you, that God is able of 
these stones to raise up children unto Abraham." On two
«
occasions Jesus explicitly states that the Jews have for- 
feited their special religious privileges. "And I say unto 
you, that many shall come from the east and the west, and 
shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the 
kingdom of heaven: but the sons of the kingdom shall be cast
T Pforth into the outer darkness...."-1-^ The parable of the 
vineyard closes with this statement: "Therefore say I unto 
you, The kingdom of God shall be taken away from you, and
10 IT
Matthew ix. 6. J"L Matthew iii. 9. -^Matthew viii. 11,12.
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shall "be given to a nation "bringing forth the fruits there-
"L3
of." This constitutes an unquestioned denial of the doc- 
trine of unconditional national election.
In the teaching of Jesus the idea broached by Jere- 
miah and the Second Isaiah that the individual, rather than 
the nation, is the unit with which God deals, becomes prom- 
inent. Cognate with this change from the general teaching 
of the Old Testament is the further idea that the blessings 
promised refer not only to this world but to the next. Salva- 
tion consists in a fellowship with God which begins here, but 
which also continues to eternity.
This changed point of view determines our question as 
follows: Did Jesus teach an unconditional election to final 
salvation? The answer to this question is a most emphatic 
negative,- the whole tenor of Jesus 1 teaching indicates that 
anyone who wills may accept the gospel. The offer of salva- 
tion is universal. In the words of the Fourth Gospel: "For 
God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, 
that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have 
eternal life." Jesus never condemns anyone for conduct 
for which the individual was not responsible and could, 
therefore, presumably have avoided; nor does He make any un- 
conditional promises of blessings. The general form of His 
promises and warnings is illustrated in these words to His 
disciples: "Every one therefore who shall confess me before 
men, him will I also confess before my Father who is in
13Matthew xxi. 43. -^John iii. 16.
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heaven. But whosoever shall deny me before men, him will
15
I also deny before my Father who is in heaven."
It is of course possible to place a deterministic in- 
terpretation on the Gospels. The distinction between God's 
secret and revealed will can be used to account for the sin- 
cerity of Jesus 1 warnings, promises and exhortations. It 
can also be said that responsibility does not imply the 
power of alternative choice,- that if the conduct in question 
is the individual's own, and is performed without coercion, 
he is to be held accountable. It can be argued that while 
the individual may accept or reject the Gospel according as 
he wills, it is nevertheless determined what he shall will. 
Further, the promises can be construed as conditional in the 
sense that certain conduct is prerequisite to them, but as 
absolute from the point of view of God, who decrees according 
to His own good pleasure the line of conduct which the indi- 
vidual will follow. In this manner the determinist can al- 
ways interpret any moral and religious experience in con- 
formity with his deterministic pre-suppositions. It is never- 
theless the case that Jesus 1 teaching, on the face of it, 
seems to assume the power of alternative choice in man.
There are, it is true, a few scattered remarks of 
Jesus which lend themselves more easily to a deterministic 
interpretation. For instance, there is the statement th&t
"no one knoweth the Father except him to whomsoever the Son
L Tfi willeth to revealpim',' although in Matthew's account He
15Matthew x. 32,33. 16 Matthew xi. 27; Luke x. 22.
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goes on immediately to call unto Him all who labor and are 
heavy laden, giving an unconditional and unlimited invita- 
tion. Most of the deterministic passages are in the Fourth 
Gospel. We have,for instance, this statement: "For as the
Father raiseth the dead and giveth them life, even so the
17 Son also giveth life to whom he will." Here Jesus seems
to attribute to Himself the power arbitrarily to determine 
whom He will save. It is significant, however, that three 
sentences below He makes a statement which seems to imply a 
universal offer of salvation: "Verily, verily, I say unto
you, He that heareth my word, and believeth him that sent me,
"Lft hath eternal life..." Elsewhere, Jesus says: "All that
which the Father giveth me shall come unto me." And a
moment later: "No man can come to me, except the Father that
PO sent me draw him." ^ Both these statements might be used as
an argument for the deterministic position, yet they cer- 
tainly do not unambiguously imply it. The first does not 
necessarily indicate the election of a limited number, much 
less state it explicitly. The most that can be said is that 
it is not inconsistent with such a doctrine. All that the 
second states is the necessity of God f s grace in anyone's 
turning to Christ. Man is unable alone to turn, but it is 
not stated that the Father withholds His needed assistance 
from any individual. In another place we have a clear 
statement of God's determining influence upon the unbeliever:
I7 john v. 21. on john Y - 24 * 19 John vi. 37.
vi. 44.
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"For this cause they could not "believe, for that Isaiah said 
again, He hath blinded their eyes, and he hardened their
heart; Lest they should see with their eyes,and perceive
21 
with their heart, And should turn, And I should heal them."
Taken alone this is a very impressive expression of uncon- 
ditional reprobation, but in the light of the rest of the 
Gospels its significance is greatly diminished.
It might be argued that Jesus 1 predictions in regard 
to Judas, Peter and others, indicate that all their actions 
were predetermined. But such an argument, of course, as- 
sumes the impossibility of His foreseeing free events, an 
assumption which is so thoroughly debatable that an argument 
based on it can have little force.
In addition to the fact that the deterministic impli- 
cations of the statements we have quoted are uncertain, it 
must be borne in mind that such statements are extremely 
rare in the Gospels, in contrast to the large number of pas- 
sages in which Jesus seems to recognize man f s freedom. No 
one could possibly conclude from an impartial study of the 
Gospels that His teaching was definitely deterministic. Prof- 
essor James Moffatt has well summed up for us what He actual- 
ly did teach: "From an examination of the gospels we carry 
forward two conclusions about the mission and spirit of 
Jesus in what one writer called 'the days of his flesh 1 : 
that thesaving initiative is with God, and that no man must 
think of facing God on the basis of conscious merit.« 22
ppJohn xii. 39, 40.
22James Moffatt, Grace in the New Testament, p. 94.
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III. Determinism in Paul
In the writings of Paul the problem of theological 
determinism is more sharply defined than elsewhere in 
Scripture, and we find there a more definite teaching on 
the subject. There are relevant statements in many of his 
letters,but the most systematic and definite treatment is 
to be found in thetetter to the Roman Church, particularly 
in chapters ix - xi. We shall, therefore, use Romans as 
our primary source for the study of Paul's teaching, al- 
though we shall advert also to the other letters. Let us 
begin with a brief review of the argument in the chapters 
just mentioned.
1. The Argument of Romans ix -xi
In these chapters Paul takes up a problem which was 
very acute for him and for other Jewish Christians in the 
Apostolic Church, the problem raised by the fact that the 
Jews, who were God's elect people, had almost universally 
rejected Christ. The implication would seem to be either 
that God had turned His back on His elect people, denying 
them salvation, or that the gospel of salvation through 
Christ was false. Neither conclusion was possible for 
Paul. Accordingly he gives, summarily stated, the following 
answer to the difficulty: God is free to save whom He wills   
the Jews as a nation have no special rights before God, no 
inalienable title to salvation (chapter ix); they are at 
present rejected by God because they have wilfully rejected 
the gospel (chapter x); but they eventually will enter the 
Messianic Kingtom by virtue of the fact that the incoming of
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the Gentiles will provoke them to jealousy and thus lead 
them to accept Christ (chapter xi).
Chapter ix begins with a lament over the defection of 
Paul's Jewish brethren. Nevertheless, he goes on to say, it 
cannot be claimed that God has gone back on His promise to 
the Jews, because God has never said that all members of the
Jewish nation are His people. "For they are not all Israel
p 1* 
that are of Israel", - not all the children of the patriarch
are the children of God. Nor did the promise extend to all 
of Abraham's children, but only to Isaac f s posterity. It is 
clear that "it is not the children of the flesh that are
children of God; but the children of the promise are reckoned
?4for a seed." God has thus from the beginning been discrim- 
inating among the children of Abraham, and the fact that 
some Jews reject the gospel no more proves the promise to 
have failed than the fact that God chose Isaac and not Ishnael.
Paul does not stop with showing the fact of this dis- 
crimination, but goes into the deeper question of its basis, 
(verses 10-12) The ground of the distinction, he indicates, 
is perfectly clear in the case of Isaac's children. They 
were twins, yet even before their birth "neither having done 
anything goocJor bad", God said to Rebecca that the elder 
should serve the younger. The distinction was due, there- 
fore, to nothing in the individuals concerned,- obviously 
Paul is here thinking of Jacob and Esau as individuals,- but
23Romans ix. 6. 24Romans ix. 8. 25Romans ix. 11.
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to God's own sovereign freedom. It is a distinction not 
"based on man' s works "but on God, who effectually calls men.
It is the expression of "the purpose of Goaaccording to
? fi 
election," a purpose which involves a choice. And as God
sovereignly distinguished "between Jaco"b and Esau, without 
reference to anything in them, so He may discriminate among 
the Jews, who are Jacob's descendants, without reference to 
their "birth or merit.
In his attempt to exhibit God's independence in the 
bestowal of blessings, Paul thus goes the length of assert- 
ing an unconditional election. He now endeavors to meet an 
anticipated objection that this doctrine represents God as 
unjust. (vss 14-18) The objection he deals with by dismiss- 
ing it as preposterous, quoting Jehovah's words to Moses in
Exodus xxxiii. 19, "I will have mercy on whom I have mercy,
27
and I will have compassion on whom I hrve compassion," as
a proof that God Himself asserts His bestowing of mercy to
be determined by nothing outside of His own pleasure. "So
then", he concludes, "it is not of him that willeth, nor of
pa
him that runneth, but of God that hath mercy." This is 
buttressed by a further quotation from Exodus ix. 16 where 
Jehovah is represented as saying that Pharaoh was rrised up 
solely in order that God might show in him His po\ver. God's 
sovereignty is thus illustrated, not only in the case of 
those who are freely elected, but also of those who do not 
and cannot receive mercy. The matter is then surraed up in
?7 9RRomans ix. 11. ^'Romans ix. 15. ^Romans ix. 15.
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Paul's famous words: "So then he hath mercy on whom he will,
2 Qand vfhom he will he hardeneth."
A further difficulty still remains. If all human 
actions, the evil as well as the good, are referable to the 
sovereign will of God, how can God find fault with those who
e
sin? "To this objection", remarks Dr. Denny, "there is
really no answer, and it ought to "be frankly admitted that
30the Apostle does not answer it." What Paul does is to
deny man the right to raise such a question. The creature 
has no right to complain at the way the Creator has made 
him, just as the clay cannot urge any rights against the 
potter, who may use a lump of it for either noble or ignoble 
purposes. TVhether or not this is an adequate answer to the 
question, it is important to observe that Paul has up to 
this point stated and defended God's sovereign right to 
bestow or withhold mercy without reference to any conditions 
in man. The bearing of this on the problem of the Jewish 
rejection of Christ is that the Jews can make no claim as of 
birth, or right, against God.
At thispoint Paul appears for the moment to recede 
from the absolutist position he has been taking, and to 
point out that God's dealing with men has been in accordance 
with their own desert, not merely with the inscrutable 
action of His own will. As a matter of fact,he says, al- 
though it is God's will to show His wrath, He has shorm
29
el c James Denrjv, St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, in the Ex- 
positor's Greek Testament, Vol. II, p. 663a.
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great patience with sinners (i.e., "vessels of wrath"), giv- 
ing them opportunity to repent. They cannot, therefore, find 
fault with Him. On the other hand, He makes known "the riches
of His glory upon vessels of mercy, which He afore prepared
31 unto glory," and His favor is therefore unmerited. Those
thus favored are Gentiles as well as Jews, a fact which ac- 
cords with the declarations of Scripture in Hosea. Paul also 
quotes Isaiah to the effect that it is only the remnant of 
Israel that shall be saved. If, according to the Scripture, 
some Gentiles are to be called and not all the Jews, the lat- 
ter can have no ground of complaint against God, and no right 
to plead birth as a title to His favor.
Beginning at chapter ix. 30 and continuing through 
chapter x, Paul gives another vindication of God's rejection 
of the Jews. "Whereas he has emphasized God's sovereign free- 
dom in the bestowal of His mercy, and the resultant lack of 
any claim upon His favor, as of right or merit, on the part 
of anyone, including the Jews, he now proceeds to show that 
it was in reality their own guilt which occasioned their re- 
jection. Strange as it may seem, the Gentiles, who were not 
concerned to seek after righteousness, nevertheless found it, 
while the Jews, who strove after righteousness, did not at- 
tain it. The reason for this is that the Gentiles attained 
a righteousness through faith, the righteousness of God ap- 
propriated by faith, while the Jews, seeking the righteous- 
ness of the law through works, were aiming at the unattain-
32 able. "They stumbled at the stone of stumbling" - they
31Romans ix. 23. 32Romans ix. 32.
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they were offended at the cross because it summoned then to 
yield themselves to Christ with a sense of unworthiness.
The failure of the Jews was thus not due to lack of 
religious zeal, but to ignorance of the true way of salva- 
tion. "For being ignorant of God's righteousness, and seek- 
ing to establish their own, they did not subject themselves
33 to the righteousness of God." Paul then describes the two
ways of law and faith more fully, using Old Testament illus- 
trations, and points out that the way of faith is open to
all, "But", he continues, "they did not all harken to the
34 
glad tidings." Belief comes through hearing the Word, but
no one could say that the Jews did not hear,- the gospel has 
been preached in all the world, as withess the statement in 
Psalm xix. 4. Nor could it be said that the Jews did not
•» R t. ft
understand, for if, as Moses and Isaiah said, people be- 
yond the covenant would respond to God's call, surely the 
Jews, with their vastly greater religious privileges, could 
not plead inability to grasp the meaning and truth of the 
gospel. Indeed the very calling of the Gentiles, as Moses 
suggests in Deuteronomy xxxii. 21, should have proved a mes- 
sage to Israel which they could not fail to apprehend, a 
message opening their eyes to the fact that they were for- 
feiting their position as God's chosen people. Paul con- 
cludes his indictment of the Jews with a quotation from 
Isaiah Ixv. 2: "But as to Israel he saith, All the day long
•z*z <5rc
Romans x. 3. ^Deuteronomy xxxii. 21.
^Romans x. 16, ^Isaiah Ixv. 1,
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did I spread out my hands unto a disobedient and gainsaying
37 people." ' Israel has persistently rejected the pleading
love of God, as symbolized by His outstretched hands*
It is clear then that Israel's rejection is due to her 
wilful and unyielding refusal of the gospel, a refusal which
cannot be excused on the ground of ignorance or lack of
38 understanding. They were "ignorant of God's righteousness"
in the final analysis, because of pride and stubbornness, and 
for this ignorance, therefore, they were in every sense cul- 
pable. The only ignorance which excuses unbelief is that of 
men who have never heard the gospel*
Paul's position in this chapter is clearly different 
from, and apparently inconsistent with, that of chapter ix. 
There the rejection of Israel was explained from God's 
standpoint alone and referred to His arbitrary election. 
Here the approach is from man's side, and the reason given 
for their exclusion is the Jews' deliberate rejection of the 
gospel, an act for which they must bear full responsibility.
The solution has now apparently been given to the 
question why God, being just and true to His promises, never- 
theless rejected Israel. Paul, however, cannot let the dis- 
cussion end on a note of hopelessness for the Jews. Hence 
he goes on in chapter x to point out that their defection is 
only a temporary phenomenon and one which eventually will 
bear good fruit.
God has not cast off His people. As in the time of
37 Romans x. 21. 3%omans x. 3.
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Elijah there were seven thousand men who had not bowed the 
knee to Baal, so now there is a remnant which is true to the
gospel* "Even so then at this present time also there is a
39 remnant according to the election of grace* 11 While most
of the Jews have failed of the salvation they sought, those 
of the election have attained it through God's unmerited 
favor, and thus God has been true to His promises* Those 
who failed have been hardened,- just as God has hardened 
Israel in the past in judgment upon her sins. The hardening, 
Paul implies, is the result, not the cause of the sins*
Nevertheless, he continues, the stumbling of the Jews 
is not an irremediable fall. Rather, by their failure, sal- 
vation is coming to the Gentiles, a fact which will ultimate* 
ly provoke the Jews to jealousy and bring them back into the 
fold. For this reason Paul desires faithfully to discharge 
his ministry to the Gentiles. Under the figure of the root 
and branches, he points out that God's choice of the patri- 
archs (the root) applies also to their descendants (the 
branches). The Gentiles are as wild olive branches grafted 
in among the natural ones through their faith. But just as 
God did not spare the natural branches, which were broken
off by unbelief, so He will not spare the Gentiles, if they
40do not "continue in His goodness. 1* They should, there- 
fore, be humble; and by the same token the Jews should take 
hope, for God, whografted wild olive branches, contrary to 
nature, into a good tree, can certainly restore the natural
•ZQ 40
°*Romans xi. 5. Romans xi. 22.
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"branches if He wills. The Jews, if they discontinue their 
unbelief, will certainly be reingrafted. Paul is obviously 
speaking, as he uses this figure, in terms of conditional 
election.
He concludes his discussion by asserting, as a mystery 
or revelation, the truth that Israel has been hardened only 
in part and until the Gentiles in their full strength have 
come into the Kingdom. "And so all Israel shall be saved." 
The meaning is that, as a result of the incoming of the Gen- 
tiles, which will provoke Israel to jealousy, the nation as 
a whole will attain salvation. (There is no reason for re- 
garding 'all Israel' as referring to a group of elect 
Israelites as distinguished from those who were hardened. 
It means rather the historical people as distinct from the 
Gentile world.) The fact that all Israel will be saved is 
substantiated by a quotation from Isaiah lix. 20ff. The 
Jews in rejecting the gospel and thus opening the door to 
Gentiles are for this reason "enemies" of God, nevertheless 
"as touching the election they are beloved for the fathers 1
sake. For the gifts and calling of God are not repented
42 of." God, having elected them, will not go back on His
word, it is difficult of course to reconcile this with 
Paul's argument in chapter ix, to the effect that God had 
from the beginning distinguished between the children ac- 
cording to the flesh and those according to the spirit.
He concludes with the thought that when we look back
41Romans xi. 26. 42Romans xi. 28,29.
22
on the whole development, we can see that (Romans xi. 29-32), 
just as the Gentiles were in the past disobedient and yet 
through the disobedience of the Jews have obtained mercy, so 
the Jews have become disobedient now in order that, through 
the mercy shown the Gentiles, they may(being provoked to 
jealousy) obtain mercy. The will of God controls all things, 
using even disobedience to further His purpose. His ultimate 
object is to show mercy upon all. "For God hath shut up all
A *^
unto disobedience, that he might have mercy upon all."
It is easy to read into thses statements of Paul the 
idea of universal determinism, according to which God is
directly responsible for all things, even sin. This, however,
i \
is not his meaning. Dr. Benny's interpretation is the true
* I
one: "It is within Paul's thought to say that the sin of 
Jews and Gentiles, to whom he preached the Gospel, did not 
lie outside the control, or outside the redeeming purpose, 
of God; but it does not seem to me to be within his thought 
to eay that God ordains sin in general for the sake of, or 
with a view to, redemption. This is a fancy question which 
an apostle would hardly discuss. God subordinates sin to 
His purpose, but it is not a subordinate element in His 
purpose." Nor have we any right to conclude that Paul is 
here teaching the doctrine of universal salvation. The iin-
A <T
^Romans xi. 32.
44James Denny, St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, Expositors 
v Greek Testament, p. 685b.
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mediate and concrete problem before his mind is the future 
of the Jews, and to draw from his prediction of their 
eventual salvation as a nation the inference that all men 
shall eventually receive mercy is to father upon himkn idea 
which is as remote from his mind in this particular instance 
as it is from his eschatology in general.
2. Paul and the Doctrine of Election 
There can be no doubt that in the chapters just ex- 
amined Paul teaches a doctrine of election. It is taught 
clearly in chapter ix, which emphasizes God's selective 
activity toward the Jews of old, based upon His freedom to 
show mercy where He wills; and we find it also in chapter xi, 
where Paul indicates his assurance that the Jews, being 
chosen of God, will finally be saved. The difficulty in 
reconciling completely chapters ix and xi is no argument 
against the fact that Paul believed in a sovereign election. 
Hot only did he teach election, but also election to final 
salvation. It is true that the illustrations drawn from the 
patriarchs and Pharaoh do not refer to final salvation, but 
the core of Paul's problem is the relation of the Jews to 
Christ, and for him that involved the question of their 
eternal destiny. When, in Romans xi. 26, he asserts that 
"all Israel shall be saved", the reference is unquestionably 
to salvation in the life to come.
This teaching can also be found elsewhere in Paul's 
writings. In Romans viii. 29,30 we have a statement which 
cannot be twisted to mean anything else but an individual
24
election to final salvation. "For whom he foreknew, he also 
foreordained to be conformed to the image of his Son, that 
he might be the firstborn among many brethren: and whom he 
foreordained, them he also called: and whom he called, them
he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also
45 
glorified." At the beginning of the Letter to the Ephe-
sians there is an explicit assertion of God's foreordination 
of some to eternal life. "Blessed be the God and Father of 
our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with every 
spiritual blessing in the heavenly places/in Christ: even as 
he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that 
we should be holy and without blemish before him in love: 
having foreordained us unto adoption as sons through Jesus 
Christ unto himself, according to the good pleasure of his
will..." 46 In I Thessalonians i. 4 Paul speaks of knowing
in 
the election of his brethren, and/II Thessalonians he gives
thanks "for that God chose you from the beginning unto 
salvation in sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the 
truth." 4 ''' It is not necessary to cite further instances to 
prove that he taught the doctrine of election.
Election for Paul, however, did not involve a decree 
of reprobation. The hardening spoken of in the chapters we 
have examined is not a hardening which brings everlasting 
punishment in its train. In Pharaoh's case, for instance, 
it has reference to a specific historical situation, and 
certainly bears only indirectly, if at all, on his eternal
45Romans viii. 29,30. 46Ephesians i. 3-5. 47II Thessalon- 
ians ii.13.
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destiny. The hardening of the Jews Paul specifically states 
to be partial and temporary. The "vessels of wrath fitted 
unto destruction" are mentioned as objects of God's patience, 
and there is no implication that they became "vessels of 
wrath" through an immutable decree. Nowhere in his writings 
does Paul represent God as unconditionally foreordaining any 
to destruction.
On the contrary there is good ground for believing 
that Paul taught it to be God's will that all should be 
saved. "For God hath shut up all unto disobedience, that he 
might have mercy upon all." Professor Moffatt says: "His 
real concern in this argument for God as absolutely unbound 
is to magnify His grace." 49 In I Timothy ii. 3,4, he says: 
"This is good and acceptable in the sight of God our 
Saviour; who would have all men to be saved, and come to the 
knowledge of the truth." Another statement to the same ef- 
fect is to be found in Titus ii. 11: "For the grace of God 
hath appeared, bringing salvation to all men",- more 
accurately, "hath appeared to all men, bringing salvation." 
In the well known passage, Romans v. 12-21, Paul makes it 
clear that God's grace in Christ is as wide in extent and 
even greater in power than the sin and death which came
through Adam,- "but where sin abounded grace did abound
50 more exceedingly." "v To say, on the basis of texts such as
these, that Paul taught universal salvation would be to go
4gRomans xi. 32.
James Moffatt, Grace in the New Testament, pp 263-264. 
ouRomans v. 20.
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too far and to ignore passages which speak of God's severity 
toward those who reject the gospel. But they do indicate 
that the saving of all men would be in accordance with God's
will.
It is certainly true that he did not teach a double 
predestination, according to which some are unconditionally 
sent to perdition. A decree of reprobation is a logical im- 
plication of the doctrine of unconditional election; the 
fact that Paul did not definitely teach it may simply mean 
that he did not care to push his logic to that extrs»e. Or 
it may mean that he did not hold, as a fixed conviction, the 
doctrine as it subsequently appeared in Calvinistic theology.
This last thought raises the question of how far Paul 
went in his doctrine of an arbitrary, elective activity on 
the part of God. We have seen that in Romans ix he does as- 
cribe such activity to God, instancing His discrimination 
between Jacob and Esau. The idea of unconditional election 
also apparently underlies the assertion at the end of chap- 
ter xi that all the Jews shall be saved. In addition he 
elsewhere gives strong emphasis to God's sovereignty. The 
other point of view, however, is equally, or more prominent. 
As we have seen, in Romans x, Paul does full justice to the 
fact that the Jews have been rejected on account of wilful 
disobedience. Their own conduct was the condition of God's 
withholding His blessings from them: for that conduct they 
were responsible, and in it, therefore, presumably free. 
Again, in the discussion of Jewish and Gentile relations to 
Christ, under the figure of the tree and branches, it is
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specifically stated that the Gentiles 1 remaining ingrafted 
and the Jews' being reingrafted depends upon their conduct. 
Thus even in Romans ix-xi, where his doctrine of election is 
stated at greatest length and with most clarity, there are 
elements which indicate that Paul had in mind a conditional 
election, and recognized the reality of human freedom. Else- 
where also there are statements which show that he did not 
hold exclusively to an absolutist theory of God. In II Cor- 
inthians vi. 1, for instance, he cautions against receiving 
the grace of God in vain, clearly indicating the possibility 
of this, a possibility implying man's freedom to resist God's 
grace and thwart His will. In Itoilippians ii. 12,13 he 
speaks at the same time of man's and of God's part in salva- 
tion. In verse 12 he says to the Bailippians, "work out your 
own salvation with fear and trembling", clearly implying that 
they were active in the process of receiving grace, and that 
they should fear lest a failure to fulfil the requirements 
might jeopardize their standing with God. Yet in verse 13 
he reminds them that "it is God who worketh in you both to 
will and to work, for His good pleasure." Here we have 
strongly illustrated the apparent fact that God's initiative 
and energy did not mean for Paul that man's free cooperation 
is unessential to his salvation.
Paul's assertions of an arbitrary sovereignty in God 
and a genuine responsibility, apparently implying freedom, 
in man constitute an unresolved antinomy. With the solution 
of this antinomy he is not concerned, and how far he is con- 
scious of it we do not know. He never goes into the fine
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points of the relation of the divine, and the human will. 
His undivided support cannot "be claimed either for uncon- 
ditional election or for the doctrine of conditional 
election and human freedom. Having recognized this much, 
however, it should be pointed out that a doctrine of uncon- 
ditional election is not essential in Paul's theology. It 
is not laid down as a fundamental principle* as it is in 
Calvin's system, nor is it a necessary inference from any- 
thing he taught. Conditional election, involving the 
recognition of a power of contrary choice in man, is at 
least as harmonious with his theology as a whole as is un- 
conditional election, if indeed not more so. He was im- 
pressed above all with the fact that salvation is not due to 
human merit but to God's mercy, and his belief in election 
sprang, not from an abstract notion of God as omnipotent 
will, but from the experience of unmerited divine grace. 
Professor Moffatt has well stated Paul's view: "Predestina- 
tion, leading out into election, means that the good man 
must ever remember that no good actions of his will avail to 
save him, apart from the Will of God. It is a statement of 
the content of the grace-experience." 5^ And just prior to 
this he remarks: "In his view God, to be gracious, must be 
absolutely free to choose the method of His giving and the 
objects of His "boon. The one determining motive must be in 
Himself." ^2 Now a man may still be free to respond or not
51̂t James Moffatt, Grace in the New Testament, p. 255.
D<J ibid, p. 254.
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to the divine grace without robbing God of His saving 
initiative in salvation, His freedom to determine the con- 
ditions in man requisite to salvation, or His independence 
of any constraint due to human merit,- none of these factors 
is inconsistent with a capacity in man to exercise faith or 
not as he chooses. When, therefore, Paul goes the length of 
asserting an arbitrary sovereignty which overrides man's 
freedom, as he does in Romans ix, he is moving beyond any- 
thingpequired by his doctrine of salvation by grace* The 
statementsdn which he recognizes man's responsibility and 
freedom to exercise faith seem to be more in keeping with 
his general teaching as to the process of salvation.
3. Grace and Perseverance in Paul 
Tw» further questions are involved in what we have 
been discussing: (a) Did Paul teach a theory of irresistible 
grace? and (b) Did he teach the final perseverance of all 
Christians? These doctrines hang together with, and indeed 
are implied by, that of unconditional election, and the 
answer to the questions just asked must be the same as we 
have given in regard to Paul's doctrine of unconditional 
election. Certainly he did not teach irresistible grace 
and final perseverance in an explicit form, and if some of 
his language seems to imply the one or the other, we must re- 
member also the statements which indicate man's freedom to 
respond or not to God's grace, and the possibility of his 
defection after he has responded. For instance, if Romans 
viii. 29,30 seems to express a predestination involving the
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exercise of efficacious grace, there is the tenth chapter al- 
so to consider, in which the Jews are unquestionably portrayed 
as wilfully rejecting God's grace. Again, if, in II Thessa- 
lonians ii. 13 and 14, the certain perseverance of the Thes- 
salonian Christians is indicated, a perseverance based on 
the fact that "God chose (them) from the beginning unto sal- 
vation11 and "called (them) through our gospel", there is 
also the exhortation in the next verse which implies the 
possibility of failure on their part: "So then, brethren, 
stand fast, and hold the traditions which ye were taught..." 
We have already noted the warning given the Gentiles in 
Romans xi. 20,21 against a possible falling away. It is 
thus, to say the least, impossible to claim Paul's authority 
unconditionally for the doctrine of efficacious grace and 
certain perseverance.
4. Paul's Teaching on Original Sin
What Paul has to say on the subject of original sin is 
concentrated almost entirely in the passage, Romans v. 12-21, 
and there occurs, not as the primary subject of discussion, 
but as a series of remarks illustrating the nature and ex- 
tent of Christ's grace.
The first three verses of this passage really contain 
the substance of his position: Christ's atonement has a far- 
reaching effect on the world, just as Adam's fall did. The 
significance of his fall is well known,- "as through one man 
sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so 
death passed unto all men, for that all sinned:-" 53 The
Romans v. 12.
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sentence is broken here, but there are two important ideas 
in this verse, (a) Through Adam's fall sin as an active 
principle first gained an entrance into the human race. 
Without saying just how or why, Paul seems to mean that, as 
a result of Adam's sin, all men are born with the liability 
to sin. (b) Adam's fall brought with it death as the pun- 
ishment of sin. Sanday 5* interprets this as primarily 
physical death. Through Adam's fall death came upon all 
his descendants, because they all sinned, as he had sinned, 
and died, as he had died. There is nothing in verse 12 to 
justify the reading, "because all sinned in him. * Benny 55
A
says the aorist should be translated here, "have sinned", 
and that the idea of the sin's being in Adam is an importa- 
tion from beyond the context. Paul goes on to point out 
that even those in the pre-Mbsaic period, who did not sin
C f*
"after the likeness of Adam's transgression", i.e., against 
an express command, and therefore not in the strict sense of 
full responsibility,- even those suffered death as the 
penalty of sin. This must have been due to the fact that it 
was a penalty transmitted from Adam.
The explanation that death came upon all men because 
all sinned implies that, whatever may have been the effects 
of Adam's fall, men are individually responsible for the 
sins they commit. Adam's sin may have connected sin and
William Sanday, The Epistle to the Romans (in International
Critical Commentary), p. 132ff. 
James Denny, op. cit., p. 627b. 
Romans v. 14.
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death inseparably, "but only the individual's sin "brings 
death upon him*
The remainder of the passage,- verses 15-21,- contains 
a number of statements which deal with the effect of the 
fall on Adam's descendants: "By the trespass of the one the
many died", "the judgment came of one unto condemnation",
59 
"by the trespass of the one, death reigned through the one",
"through one trespass the judgment/came unto all men to con-
60 '
demnation", "through the one man's disobedience the many 
were made sinners." There is nothing in these state- 
ments, however, to add any new idea to what has been said in 
verses 12-14, although the repetition of the ideas serves to 
emphasize their hold on Paul's thinking.
With this sketch of Paul's doctrine of original sinbe- 
fore us, we can observe significant differences between him 
and the doctrine as later developed. To begin with, he 
knows nothing of "original righteousness." This is a con- 
ception entirely foreign to his thought. Nor can it be 
claimed that he taught the doctrine of "original guilt." 
James Candlish, defending the doctrine, remarks in connec- 
tion with Paul's view: "By guilt in this connection must be
understood, not moral culpability (culpa), but legal respon-
62 sibility (reatus), or liability to punishment." Candlish
is undoubtedly right in the position that Paul did not teach 
our moral culpability for Adam's sin. Unless we actually
Romans v. 15. ^Romans v. 16. ^Romans v. 17. ^Romans v.18. 
Romans v. 19. 62 James Candlish, The Biblical Doctrine of
Sin, p. 116.
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sinned in Adam, we cannot be held morally "blameworthy for 
his sin, and, as we have seen, Paul did not say that we par- 
ticipated in his sin. But furthermore, he did not teach 
either that we are legally responsible for Adam's sin, as we 
have already seen. It is in keeping with Paul to say that
/by
sin- is punishable/Beath; on account of Adam's fall, but 
not that we are liable to death on the same account, apart 
from our individual sins.
The theory of original sin in the stricter sense of 
a transmitted propensity to evil does find some support in 
Paul. He does teach that "through one man's disobedience
/• <T
the many were made sinners." But, to quote Candlish 
again: "It should be rememberedthat the term imputation, as 
applied to the relation of Adam's sin to mankind, is only an 
inference from, and not an express statement of, Scripture; 
and, therefore, the authority of God's word can only be 
pleaded for the general statement that by the offence of 
the one the many were made sinners, and not for the particu- 
lar notions that may be conceived to be implied in imputa- 
tion." 64 Through Adam, in some way, a tendency to sin was 
transmitted to his descendants,- in other words, there is a 
moral solidarity in the race. But on the all-important 
question whether this was a determining tendency, guarantee- 
ing that each descendant would sin, Paul is silent. And 
there is no reason for assuming that he must be necessarily 
interpreted as holding to such a tendency. On the other
ut supra. 64James Candlish, op. cit., pp 114-115.
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hand, we know Paullregarded us as responsible for our sins 
as they are committed, a fact which, for the average man, 
implies that the sins are freely committed. What Paul 
actually taught is simply the generally recognized fact of 
an inherited tendency to sin.
We might add that in refusing to go further than this
fiR
Paul is not untrue to Genesis. There is no assertion in 
Genesis iii that the sin of Adam and Eve occasioned any cor- 
ruption or dislocation of human nature. Nor is the idea 
there to be found that God withdrew certain divine gifts, 
possessed by man before the fall, which might have enabled 
him to remain innocent. Again, the Genesis account does not 
indicate that Adam's posterity was involved in the conse- 
quences of his sin beyond the fact of exclusion from the 
garden and the tree of life, and the liability to the ordin- 
ary physical ills of life. Nor can we detect in the Jahviit 
compiler's mind any conception of original sin. Later sins, 
such for instance as Cain's, are not represented as connected 
with Adam's. Full responsibility is attributed to the gen- 
erations following Adam, and when, in the Jahvist history, 
their corruption finally evoked the flood, there is no sug- 
gestion that the sin of the first parent was in any way the 
cause of it. It might be pointed out in conclusion that the 
other books of the Old Testament give no place to the idea of 
a connection of Adam's sin and the general sinfulness of man- 
kind.
65See F. R. Tennant, Article, Original Sin, 
Encyclopoedia of Religion and Ethics, $*' 558b.
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IV. Concluding Remarks
From this "brief study of Scripture, as it bears on the 
problem of theological determinism, it is clear that the 
Bible cannot be cited as conclusive evidence either for or 
against the deterministic position. The special pleader can 
find a plethora of material for his purpose; Edwards' works 
abound in proof-texts which apparently indicate that the 
Five Points of Calvinism are definitely taught in Scripture. 
A similar array of counter proof-texts can be found in Armin- 
ian writers. This possibility of drawing from Scripture 
statements on both sides of the controversy is due in part 
to the fact that the Scripture contains some unresolved 
antinomies, as we have seen, for instance, in Romans ix-xi. 
But it isnue in far greater degree to the apologeticalJfer- 
vor in both camps, which reads into Biblical statements far 
reaching implications that were not present to the authors* 
minds. The fine points of the deterministic problem were 
not catered into, and probably not fully grasped, by the 
Biblical writers. The only place in which the fundamental 
ethical problem is squarely faced is the ninth chapter of 
Romans, where Paul's extreme statement of the divine elec- 
tive activity brings to his mind the implications of an ar- 
bitrary election for the character of God and the moral 
agency of man. The difficulties raised are quickly dropped 
and left unsolved. Elsewhere the inferences which can be 
read into statements bearing on the general question of 
determinism are not to be thought of as intended by their 
authors. For the solution of the problems we shall raise
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in this thesis we must, on the whole, go beyond Scripture* 
although we should not run counter to its general teaching. 
The all-important question of the psychology of volition, 
for instance,receives no treatment in Scripture,as is the 
case with certain problems relating to the origin and propa- 
gation of sin, and with other questions we shall face. The 
writers of the Bible were writing for the people, and with 
a practical purpose. The question of theological determin- 
ism, on the other hand, is a speculative problem. We should 
therefore not be surprised that it is not exhaustively dealt 
with in Scripture.
There are certain fundamental truths, bearing on our 
problem, which all will probably agree are taught clearly in 
Scripture: (a) God's power is unlimited, (b) His character 
is without blemish, and His dealings with men are governed 
by justice and mercy. (c) Man is responsible for his atti- 
tude toward the gospel, (d) There is a racial solidarity in 
sin,- our sin is somehow connected with Adam's. (e) Grace 
is wholly unmerited, and the saving initiative is always 
with God. Any theory which would be Scriptural must be in 
conformity with these truths, but it is certain that they do 
not indicate on their face exactly what the true theory must 
be.
CHAPTER II 
DETERMINISM FROM AUGUSTINE TO THE WESTMINSTER CONFESSION
We shall now briefly review the development of deter- 
minism in Christian theology between the time of Paul and 
that of Edwards. Among the ancient fathers the most master- 
ful proponent of this type of thought was Augustine. Some- 
what indeterministic in his earlier Christian writings, he 
later moved to a position of the strictest determinism, the 
influence of which is still felt in the Christian Church. 
We shall begin our survey, therefore, with a cursory state- 
ment of his major deterministic doctrines.
I. Augustine
1. The Decrees of God
Augustine taught that God's plan is universal,- that 
His purpose and will are completely carried out, the goal 
aimed at in creation being attained to its last detail. He 
did not deny that the will of the creature sometimes opposes 
God's will, and the consequent existence of sin, but he in- 
sisted that, when sin exists, God permits it and wills to 
permit it. This permission is justified by the fact that He 
actually accomplishes some of His purposes through the evil 
desires of wicked men, using their very opposition to carry
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out His will. Thus sin is really turned into good, and that 
which appears evil, when taken by itself, is good when 
viewed in relation to the whole. Augustine even says that 
it is good that evil exists.
As a corollary of this idea of God's universal plan, 
Augustine held to a doctrine of absolute predestination. The 
elect are elected not only to future blessings, but also to 
be the recipients of faith as the result of divine grace. 
Hence faith itself is just as much God's gift as the bless- 
ings which follow upon the exercise of it. The number of 
the elect is unchangeably fixed, and is the same as the num- 
ber of fallen angels, in order that the loss incurred by 
their defection may be made up. On the other hand, all the 
non-elect are left in sin,- left to perish. Thus Augustine 
taught a double predestination, i.e., a predestination of 
some to salvation and others to damnation. The damned, how- 
ever, are not predestined to sin,- and this is important,- 
but only to the punishment which sin deserves.
This discrimination betweenphe elect and the damned 
does not cast a shadow on God's Justice, said Augustine, for 
the reason that all are guilty and deserve damnation. If 
any are spared, they have cause to rejoice, but none have 
cause to complain.
2. The Human Will
Augustine's controversy with Pelagius brought forth 
his doctrine of human freedom in its mature form. Quite 
naturally, with his conception of God's sovereignty, he
39
srould not entirely agree with Pelagius that man possesses 
the power of contrary choice. He did, as a matter of fact, 
attribute this power to Adam "before the fall, and he did not 
deny it entirely to Adam's posterity. Man, he held, has the 
power of alternate choice in civil or worldly concerns, and 
he even went so far, in his De Civitate Dei, as to concede 
that man might by the exercise of free will live righteously 
and grow in virtue. But to choose God and to live for Him 
over against oneself, the supreme thing, man is utterly in- 
capable of doing without divine help. And if he does not 
live for God, all his deeds, even the high and noble ones in 
the sight of men, are in reality evil. Thus despite his 
concessions, Augustine leaves man's will enslaved to the low- 
er elements in his nature, so far as the most significant 
matter in his life is concerned. Here, he possesses no free- 
dom in any sense of the term.
To Augustine freedomponsists in one's choices being 
determined by the higher elements in one's nature. Negative- 
ly put, it is freedom from subjection to the lower propensi- 
ties. To use his own words: "For it was expedient that man 
should be at first so made as to be able to will both good 
and evil, not without reward if he willed good nor without 
punishment if he willed evil. But in the future life it 
will not be in his power to will evil. However, he will not 
therefore be deprived of free will. On the contrary his 
will will be all the freer when it cannot become the slave
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of sin." Freedom is thus not the power of contrary choice, 
but a particular form of necessity, to Augustine indeed a 
blessed necessity. In his fallen state, of course, man 
possesses, so far as his religious life is concerned, 
neither freedom in this form nor in any other,
3. Original Sin
Man in his unregenerate state is the creature of the 
lower propensities in his nature. Without God's indwelling, 
determining grace, he is impotent to exhibit any real good* 
ness. This is a cardinal feature of Augustine*s theology. 
The "mass of perdition 11 which is man in his present state 
stands in tragic contrast with the "original righteousness" 
of Adam and Eve before the fall. They were then in a state 
of perfect holiness and unbroken communion with God. And it 
should be noted that as a part of the blessedness of this 
state they enjoyed the power of contrary choice in the 
realm of their religious life,
We have seen why, according to Augustine, God permits 
this sinfulness in man, but it remains to be asked what he 
held to be the cause of sin. To account for its appearance, 
and also for natural evil, in a world created out of nothing 
by a God who is both good and powerful, he made use of the 
Neo Platonic conception that evil is mere negation, the loss 
or diminution of being. The cause of evil is the tendency 
in all created beings to lapse again into the nothingness
Augustine, Enchiridion, quoted by A.C.McGiffert, A History 
of Christian Thought, Vol. II, p. 97.
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from whence they came, plus the absence of the divine power, 
which alone can sustain them in being. This tendency toeinJc 
into nothing reveals itself in man's choice of the less in- 
stead of the greater, of self instead of God, which is the 
essence of all sin. Thus the absence of divine grace is the 
occasion, but God is not the cause of sin.
With this theory of evil, Augustine did not need the 
fall of Adam to account for the universal sinfulness of the 
human race. Men are bound to sin, if left to themselves, 
apart from any act of Adam's. In spite of this, however, 
under the influence of the Catholic tradition, he accepted 
the doctrine that the fall accounts for the sins of Adam's 
descendants. As to Adam's own sin, he was true to his gen- 
eral theory of evil. This sin was not due to Adam's fleshly 
nature, which was good, but to his tendency to lapse into 
nothing, to turn from god, the greater good, to self, the 
lesser good, an act which was pride in its worst form. While 
this is in keeping with Augustine's general doctrine of the 
cause of evil, the connecting of Adam's sin with his poster- 
ity's was really inconsistent with it. Nevertheless he laid 
great emphasis upon the connection. According to him, human 
nature as a whole was somehow deposited in the first man. He 
expressed this idea of the race's solidarity sometimes in 
terms of Origen's conception of seminal existence in the first 
parent, and sometimes in terms of the realistic notion of
the participation of Adam's posterity, not only in his
/
nature, but also in his personality. Human nature as it 
came from God was pure, and included the capacity for alter-
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nattr choice. Through the exercise of this latter capacity
K
Adam fell into sin, and human nature, existing in its 
totality in him, was completely corrupted in this first act 
of transgression, and as such is transmitted to Adam's des- 
cendants. This transmission takes place through concupis- 
cence, by which Augustine means primarily the sexual appe- 
tite, which is itself the fruit of Adam's first sin, as 
well as the means whereby sinful nature is communicated from 
father to son.
Hot only were we corrupted in Adam, but we are guilty 
for the evil nature we inherit, and even for the first sin 
by which it was produced. This sin was truly the common 
act of mankind in their moral oneness. All, therefore, are 
responsible for its consequences, and thus share in both 
the corruption and the guilt of the first sin. The idea of 
our participation in Adam's sin is fundamental with Augus- 
tine, and forms the bulwark of his defense against Pelagian 
attacks upon the apparent injustice of our suffering and 
being condemned for what we could not prevent. The fact 
that Augustine was a convinced Greationist did not prevent 
his espousing this view of our relation to Adam, although 
it was only with a great struggle that he could reconcile 
the two positions.
4. Grace
Prom his state of depravity man can be rescued only 
by the grace of God. The experience of God's unmerited 
grace was the core of Augustine's religious consciousness,
43
and the prime motive back of his determinism. To him this 
grace consists both in external inducements and in the 
presence of divine power in man's own heart. By this in- 
ward power from God, sometimes thought of as the Indwelling 
Spirit and sometimes in impersonal terms, man*s will is not 
only enabled to rise above his lower nature and believe, but 
is indeed effectually determined so to do. God bestows His 
grace freely and quite without regard to human merit. "He
goes before the unwilling that He may will; He follows the
g willing that he may not will in vain." God*s grace is
irresistible,- He can do with the wills of men what He wills, 
and when He wills.
The basis of this conception is the notion of God as 
absolute or almighty will, a notion altogether different 
from the idea of God as the sole source of good. Augustine 
did not, however, like his disciple Zwingli, draw the con- 
clusion that finite creatures have no wills of their own. 
God is absolute will in the sense of an all-controlling, 
rather than an all-embracing will.
5. Final Perseverance
while the number of the elect is fixed, it is not 
identical with the number of believers. Perseverance, like 
faith, is the gift of God, but it is a distinct gift. It 
is bestowed only on those believers upon whom God, in His 
inscrutable wisdom, elects to bestow it. On this point
2 Augustine, op. cit., p. 93.
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Augustine is at variance with his disciples among the Re- 
formers, whose interest in the assurance of salvation led 
themto identify all true believers with the elect.
II. John Calvin
Augustine died in the year 430. The strength and per- 
manence of his influence is strikingly illustrated in the 
works of his great disciple, John Calvin, who was born in 
1509. In him we find a form of theological determinism both 
more systematic and, in some points, more thoroughgoing than 
Augustine's. While there was nothing really new in Calvin's 
teaching, he did give a new emphasi a to the doctrine of 
divine sovereignty, as expressed in the decree of predestin- 
ation.
1. The Decrees of God
Calvin places in the forefront of his system a 
sovereign God and His universal control through Hisfiecrees. 
Back of this emphasis lay a religious experience correspond- 
ing essentially to that of Luther. Distress of conscience 
and a sense of helplessness had been followed by an inner 
peace and assurance, through trust in the wholly undeserved 
grace of the Gospel. Reflection upon his experience im- 
pressed Calvin not only with the freedom, the unmerited 
character of grace, but also with what seemed to him the 
correlative fact of God's absolute sovereignty in the 
bestowal of grace. Grace would not be grace, he felt, unless 
God were absolutely sovereign, that is, above all condition-
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ing factors infaealing with His creatures. This primary 
emphasis on the doctrine of sovereignty, and the use made of 
it, is one of the fundamental differences "between Calvinism 
and the Lutheran system, in which unconditional election 
increasingly slipped into the background.
The sovereignty of God finds its expression in the de- 
cree of predestination. This decree Calvin makes the very 
core of his system. In distinction from Luther, he includes 
in it the decree of reprobation. God, he held, has deter* 
mined the destiny of every individual, electing some to 
eternal life and some to damnation. "Predestination we call 
the eternal decree of God, by which he has determined in him- 
self, what h« would have to become of every individual of 
mankind, For they are not all created with a similar destiny; 
but eternal life is foreordained for some, and eternal dam- 
nation for others. Every man, therefore, being created for 
one or the other of these ends, we say, he is predestinated 
either to life or to death." 3
The basis of this distinction between the elect and 
the damned, according to the Institutes, lies solely in 
God's will. If it were due to anything else, said Calvin, 
God would not be sovereign. There can be no cause, even in 
God Himself, of the actions of His will. "For if it has 
any cause, then there must be something antecedent, on which 
it depends; which it is impious to suppose. For the will of 
God is the highest rule of justice; so that what he wills
3John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Vol.Ill 
Bk. Ill, p. 145.
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must be considered just, for this very reason, because he 
wills it. When it is inquired, therefore, why the Lord did 
so, the answer must be, Because he would." Calvin*s method 
with cavilers who raise questions as to the justice of God's 
arbitrary discrimination between men is to remind them that 
to inquire into the reasons of the divine will is the height 
of presumption. "Foolish mortals enter into many contentions 
with God, as though they could arraign him to plead to their 
accusations. In the first place they inquire, by what right 
the Lord is angry with his creatures who had not provoked him 
by any previous offence; for that to devote to destruction 
whom he pleases, is more like the caprice of a tyrant than 
the lawful sentence of a judge; that men have reason, there- 
fore, to expostulate with God, if they are predestinated to 
eternal death without any demerit of their own, merely by his 
sovereign will. If such thoughts ever enter the minds of 
pious men, they will be sufficiently enabled to break their 
violence by this one consideration, how exceedingly pre- 
sumptuous it is only to inquire into the causes of the Divine
will; which is in fact, and is justly entitled to be, the
5 cause of every thing that exists. 11
In The Agreement with the Genevese Pastors Calvin takes 
a different position, asserting that there is a good and 
sufficient reason for every decree of the Almighty, however 
mysterious it might seem to us. This is to base God's will 
upon the right rather than the right upon the divine will.
4 John Calvin, op.cit., p. 165. 5 ibid, p. 165.
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Which of these clearly inconsistent position* he really 
held is uncertain, although it must be said that that of the 
Institutes is more in harmony with his general/theological 
system, and was written in a more dispassionate mood, free 
from the pressure of debate.
Calvin's doctrine of the divine decrees raises the 
question of God's relation to sin. That God could have kept 
sin out of the world he regards as certain. "Wherefore let 
us not hesitate to say with Augustine, 'God could convert to 
good the will of the wicked, because he is omnipotent. It ia
evident that he could. Why, then, does he not? Because he
u 6
would not. Why he would not, remains with himself. 1 Is
sin then directly produced by God, or is it only permitted? 
The absolute sovereignty of God, as Calvin conceives it, 
seems to imply that God is the efficient cause of sin. Sim- 
ilarly, the doctrine of reprobation as stated in the Insti- 
tutes seems to be clearly of y such a'nature as : , to in- 
volve a direct decree of sin. And in the Institutes Calvin 
himself avows this conclusion. "Kor should it be thought 
absurd to affirm, that God not only foresaw the fall of the 
first man, and the ruin of his posterity in him, but also ar- 
ranged all by the determination of his own will. 11 '7 Here 
again The Agreement with the Genevese Pastors is milder, for 
it declares that the decree regarding sin is a permissive 
one. The doctrine of the Institutes, however, is more logi- 
cally akin to Calvin's system as a whole and probably repre-
6John Calvin, op.cit., p. 192. 7 ibid, p. 170.
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senta his deepest conviction.
whatever be his true position as to God's part in its 
production, it is certain that Calvin felt the existence of 
sin could be justified. Despite God's commandments against 
it, its presence in the world is certainly in accord with 
His inscrutable, decretive will. This being Calvin's convic- 
tion, he reproduced the doctrine of Augustine in regard to 
the problem of evil: sin is evil, but because it exists in a 
world controlled by God, it must be good that it exists.
2. The Human Will
In asking whether Calvin attributed freedom to man we 
must first ascertain what he meant by freedom. He rejects 
as absurd the view of a number of the Fathers whom he quotes 
as identifying it with freedom from coercion, from physical 
or external necessity. If this is freedom, he concludes, 
"...man will be said to possess free will in this sense, 
not that he has an equally free election of good and evil, 
but because he does evil voluntarily, and not by constraint. 
That, indeed, is very true; but what end could it answer to 
decorate a thing so diminutive with a title so superb? 
Egregious liberty indeed, if man be not compelled to serve 
sin, but yet is such a willing slave, that his will is held 
in bondage by the fetters of sin. I really abominate con- 
tentions about words,which disturb the Church without pro- 
ducing any good effect; but I think that we ought religious- 
ly to avoid words which signify any absurdity, particularly 
when they lead to a pernicious error. How few are there,
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pray, who, when they hear free will attributed to man, do 
not immediately conceive,that he has the sovereignty over 
his own mind and will, and is able by his innate power to in- 
cline himself to whatever he pleases?" 8 This involves a 
thoroughgoing rejection of the position that freedom is 
synonomous with independence of external constraint, even 
though the will may be determined by good or evil motives. 
It thus involves a divergence from Augustine's idea that it 
consists in the control of the will by the higher nature. 
God Himself, says Calvin, whose will is in perfect accord 
with His holy nature, is not free, but rather under a per- 
fect necessity. "For there is such a close connection be- 
tween the goodness of God and his Deity, that his being God 
is not more necessary than his being good," 9 (Here, and 
again a moment later, Calvin is obviously inconsistent with 
his position referred to abofe that God's is an arbitrary, 
perfectly free will.)
To Calvin then freedom means the power of contrary 
choice in regard to good and evil. This power he emphati- 
cally denies to belong to man, whose will is enslaved to 
evil. Not even in civil matters does man possess the power 
of alternative choice. It should be apparent to all "that 
man is not possessed of free will for good works, unless he 
be assisted by grace,and that special grace which is bes- 
towed on the elect alone in regeneration." 1^ This fact,
8 
John Calvin, op. cit., Vol. I, Bk. II, p. 239.
?ibid, p. 265. 
10 ibid, p. 238.
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however, does not destroy man's responsibility. "Therefore, 
if a necessity of doing well impairs not the liberty of the 
Divine will in doing well; if the devil, who cannot but do 
evil, nevertheless sins voluntarily; who then will assert 
that man sins less voluntarily, because he is under a 
necessity of sinning?" Sinning thus "voluntarily", i.e., 
of his own will, although not of a free will, man can be 
held fully accountable for his sins.
3. Original Sin
As has already been indicated, Calvin taught that man 
in his present state is utterly corrupt and depraved, unable 
by his own power to turn to God in faith and lead a holy 
life. The origin of this sinful and helpless condition is 
the first sin of Adam. In his unf alien state Adam's life 
was one of perfect holiness and purity, and these spiritual 
gifts belonged to him as a part of his human nature. (The 
fall brought him to a sub-natural plane, hence left him
depraved,) In his unf all en estate Adam was also
endowed with free will. Calvin describes his primitive 
condition as follows: "...he possessed reason, understand- 
ing, prudence, anbyftudgment , not only for the government of 
his life on earth, but to enable him to ascend even to God 
and eternal felicity. To these was added choice, to direct 
the appetites, and regulate all the organic motions; so that 
the will should be entirely conformed to the government of 
reason. In thisjintegrity man was endued with free will, by
11 John Calvin, op. cit,, Vol. I, Bk. II, pp 265-266.
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which, if he had chosen, he might have obtained eternal 
life." 12 He fell by his own unfettered election of evil. 
"Adam, therefore, could have stood if he would, since he 
fell merely by his own will; but because his will was flex- 
ible to either side, and he was not endued with constancy to
13 persevere, therefore he so easily fell. 11
Calvin takes over the Augustinian ideayof the unity of 
the race and its consequent liability for the first sin. Our 
nature was vitiated in Adam so that we are born corrupt and 
devoid of free will involving the opportunity to choose the 
good. Calvin stresses the fact, however, that our guilt is 
not for Adam * s sin, but for our own. Except for the fact 
that our nature is corrupt at birth we would not be involved 
in the liability to everlasting damnation which is the 
penalty of the first sin. "These two things therefore should 
be distinctly observed: first, that our nature being so 
totally vitiated and depraved, we are, on account of this 
very corruption, considered as convicted and justly condemned 
in the sight of God, to whom nothing is acceptable but 
righteousness, innocence, and purity. And this liableness 
to punishment arises not from the delinquency of another; 
for when it is said that the sin of Adam renders us obnox- 
ious to the Divine judgment, it is not to be understood as 
if we, though innocent, were undeservedly loaded with the 
guilt of his sin...," 14 "The other thing to be remarked is,
12
John Calvin, op.cit., Vol. I, Bk. I, p.
"iDid, p. 181. ^_ 




that this depravity never ceases in us, but is perpetually 
producing new fruits... 1* 15 Calvin thus clearly holds that 
the first thing imputed to us is our own sinful nature, and 
that this is the ground ofour liability to eternal punish- 
ment* Hence he would seem to be a mediate imputationist.
4. Grace
From his depraved and helpless condition man can be 
rescued only by the intervention of divine grace, that is to 
say, by a special operation of the indwelling Spirit, which 
is given to believers. This grace is not only unmerited and 
sovereignly bestowed by God, but it is, as Augustine held, 
irresistible,- certain to move the will of the elect 
individual to faith.
5. Final Perseverance
Once grace has produced genuine faith in us, once we 
are effectually called, there will be no falling away. All 
true believers are certain to be given the grace to perse- 
vere. To be sure, some who appear to be true believers do 
fall away, but this is because they never were genuine in 
their faith. Of them Calvin says: "I dispute not their 
having similar signs of calling with the elect; but I am 
far from admitting them to possess that certain assurance of 
election which I enjoin believers to seek from the word of 
the gospel." 16 In this regard then Calvin differs from
^Calvin, op. cit., pp 229-230. 
16ibid, Vol. II, Bk. Ill, p. 186.
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Augustine, who held that a true believer might "fall from 
grace."
6. The Basis of Calvin's Determinism 
Calvin was not zealous for the doctrine of predestina- 
tion for speculative reasons, nor for that matter were the 
other Reformers* The motive behind his emphasis upon the 
doctrine was two-fold. (a) It was necessary, he felt, to 
uphold the truth of salvation by grace alone given uncon- 
ditionally to the elect soul, (b) It was also necessary for 
the comfort of believers requiring an assurance of salvation. 
This desire for assurance influenced him in his doctrine of 
the certain perseverance of believers. In addition to these 
practical religious motives, which led him to his extreme 
emphasis upon God's unlimited power, Calvin's temperament 
made the idea of divine sovereignty, as contrasted with the 
nothingness of man, congenial to his mind. There was some- 
thing in his religious devotion which instinctively expressed 
itself in the magnification of divine omnipotence.
III. The Arminian Revolt and the Synod of Dort 
Objections to Calvinism had appeared during the life of 
Calvin himself. After his death the doctrine of predestina- 
tion was set forth in its extreme supralapsarian form by 
Beza and others of his followers. The opposition which this 
provoked grew in intensity until it came to a head in a re- 
volt led by James Arminius, a professor at Leyden. Arminian- 
ism, as the doctrine he taught came to be called, is a
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protest against Calvinism on ethical grounds. It was clear- 
ly set forth by Arminius* disciples in 1610, the year after 
his death, in their Remonstrance, addressed to the States of 
Holland and West Friesland.
The Remonstrance contains a number of doctrines in 
opposition to Calvinistic determinism. Conditional election, 
or election dependent upon divine foreknowledge of faith, is 
affirmed. The inability of man to exercise saving faith, or 
do anything good without the regenerating power of the Holy 
Spirit is also asserted, but at the same time grace is said 
to be not irresistible. Finally, the perseverance of all be- 
lievers is declared doubtful. Later the Arminians went even 
further on this last point, declaring definitely that be- 
lievers may finally fall from grace.
Although there were leaders of exceptional talents in 
their ranks, the Arminians were greatly outnumbered by their 
opponents. The Remonstrance was met by a counter-remonstrance 
from the Calvinists, and a struggle ensued which resulted in 
the calling of the Synod of Dort in 1618 and the adoption of 
its famous Canons. It was attended by delegates from England 
and other Reformed Churches in addition to those from the 
Low Countries. The Arminians were not allowed to sit as 
members, but were invited to meet the Synod and present their 
cause. All their efforts, however, proved to be vain, and 
the Synod condemned their Remonstrance, sanctioned the 
Belglc and Heidelberg Confessions, which are both strongly 
Calvinistic, and promulgated five heads of doctrine of its 
own.
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These five heads set forth an unadulterated, though 
moderate, form of Calvinism. The doctrine of predestination, 
although in sublapsarian form, is placed in the forefront of 
the system. In a sense predestination, in the Canons of 
Port, is an even more fundamental principle than it was with 
Calvin. He laid primary emphasis upon it in order to as- 
cribe to God all the glory for man's salvation and as a sup- 
port to give the Christian greater assurance. The Synod of 
Dort, on the other hand, made it the fundamental principle 
in its own right, all God's soteriological activity being 
merely a carrying out of the decree of predestination. The 
elect are chosen from the fallen race, which has been con- 
demned for its sin in Adam. They attain to assurance, but 
in various degrees. The decree of reprobation is asserted, 
but in the modified form of the praeterition of the non- 
elect. The corruption of human nature is said to be trans- 
mitted from Adam. No one can turn to God without regenerat- 
ing grace. This is granted, however, only to the elect, in 
whom it takes the form of an efficient act of God, the ef- 
fect of which is comparable to the raising of the dead to 
life. The mode of this action is inscrutable, but it is not 
to be identified with coercion, nor is it destructive of the 
human will, Finally, the perseverance of all the regener- 
ated is explicitly asserted.
IV. The Covenant Theory
TOiile Arminianism was a frontal attack on Calvinism 
there were also other movements designed to temper some of
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its severities. The Trench School of Saumur and Pajonism 
both contained moderating features, but their influence in 
the Reformed Churches was not strong. Far more influential 
was the Federal or Covenant Theology, which won wide accept* 
ance.
The Federal Theology, while not originated by him, was 
given precise and comprehensive formulation, and made current, 
by Cocceius, a theologian of Holland, Professor at Franeker 
and later at Leyden, where he died in 1669. According to it 
God has entered into two covenants with men. They are not 
like mutual contracts among men,- they are instituted by 
God, and men simply act the part of recipients. In the first 
covenant, the Covenant of Works, God promises to Adam ever- 
lasting blessings for himself and his descendants as the re- 
ward of a brief term of obedience, the penalty of failure 
being the depravity and eternal punishment of himself and 
his posterity. The Covenant of Grace is God's promise of 
salvation and forgiveness through Christ.
whatever else may be said of the Federal Theology, it 
was in reality an ethical reform within Calvinism, designed 
to introduce legal relations instead of bare sovereignty 
alone into God's dealings with men. It eventually produced 
important changes in the doctrine of original sin. At first 
it was simply added to the Augustinian teaching that the 
first sin was generic as well as personal. It thus offered 
an explanation why the first sin of Adam is imputed to us 
but not his later offenses, nor the sins o^our immediate 
ancestors. On the other hand, the participation of all men
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in the first sin, and their consequent literal guilt for it 
were not denied. As time went on, however, the legal began 
to supplement the realistic conception of our relationship 
to Adam, and the more modern view rests on the Covenant alone,
According to this view Adam is conceived as having 
been the divinely constituted representative of mankind in 
virtue of his special kinship to them, as the first parent. 
His descendants have no guilt for his sin in the sense of 
"blame-worthiness. Their guilt is simply a legal liability to 
the penalty of that offense, a liability arising through 
their federal relationship to Adam. They are legally, not 
morally, responsible for Adam's act. How: the immediate pen- 
alty of his sin is our native depravity, while to this ia 
attached eternal death as the penalty of this depravity. 
Adam's guilt is thus/immediately imputed to us, our own cor- 
ruption being the consequence rather than the condition of 
the imputation. Here we find a very significant divergence 
from Augustine and Calvin, both of whom taught that our cor- 
ruption is due to the fact that we ourselves participated in 
the first sin, and that this actual participation, rather 
than a mere federal relationship, was the ground of our sub- 
sequent corruptionVith its attendant liability to everlast- 
ing punishment.
Beginning therefore as an ethical reform, the Federal 
Theory, divorced from the Augustinian conception, eventuated 
in a doctrine of original sin more arbitrary and unethical 
than the theory it supplanted. It substituted legal guilt
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for real guilt. The explanation of its currency was the 
difficulty of reconciling the Augustinian theory with the 
doctrine of Creationism, which was the generally received 
opinion in the Protestant Church. Augustine himself placed 
ethics above logical consistency; the later Calvinists, more 
accustomed to compromising their ethical sentiments to fit 
the Calvinistic system, strove for what appeared to be 
logical consistency at any cost.
V. The Westminster Confession
For the English speaking world Calvinism was given its 
definitive statement in the Westminster Confession. This 
creed contains nothing new or different from the Canons of 
Port, except that it incorporates the Federal Theology. The 
doctrine of God's decrees is brought into the forefront, but, 
as in the Canons of Port» predestination is stated in its 
infra-lapsarian form. Election is unconditional. The non- 
elect are simply passed by (praeterire) and ordained wto 
dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of His
17glorious justice." Af In attributing the reprobation of the 
non-elect to God's justice, the Confession differs from 
Calvin's position in the Institutes, where, as we have seen, 
election and reprobation are referred simply to God's arbi- 
trary will. God is said to foreoriain all things, "yet so 
as thereby neither is God the author of sin; nor is violence 
offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or
17Westminster Confession, Ch. Ill, Sec. VII.
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contingency of second causes taken away, but rather estab- 
lished." 18
This liberty of will, however, does not mean the power 
of contrary choice. Man's will, it is true, is subject to
no natural necessity,- "it is neither forced, nor by any
19 absolute necessity of nature determined to good or evil. 11
On the other hand, man is in a state of complete moral inabil- 
ity, having "wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual
20 good accompanying salvation." freedom means freedom to
will the good. Here the Confession, rejecting Calvin's idea, 
goes back to the Augustinian notion of freedom.
Ifen possesses a sinful and corrupt nature transmitted 
to him from Adam. Our first parents were "endued with 
knowledge, righteousness and true holiness" and were "left 
to the liberty of their own will." 21 Their first sin^was 
permitted by God. The transmission of their resultant evil 
nature, with its desert of everlasting punishment, is ac- 
counted for by the theory of Adam's federal headship of the. 
race. Underlying this, however, is the Augustinian concep- 
tion,- Adam and Eve are said to be "the root of all mankind." 22 
In view of this combination of the federal and the Augustin- 
ian conceptions it is still a debated question whether the 
Confession teaches mediate or immediate imputation.
Divine grace is perfectly free, being conditioned upon
^Westminster Confession, Ch. Ill, Sec. I. 
, Ch. IflC, Sec. I. 
, Ch. IX, Sec. III. 
, Ch. IV, Sec. II. 
, Ch. VI, Sec. III.
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nothing at all foreseen in man. While the term,irresistible., 
is not used of God's grace, the idea is clearly conveyed. 
God is said effectually to call the elect by His word and 
Spirit, "renewing their wills, and by his almighty power 
determining them to that which is good; and effectually 
drawing them to Jesus Christ." ̂  The recipients of the 
divine grace may fall into grievous sins, nevertheless they 
"can neither totally nor finally fall away from the state 
of grace; but shall certainly persevere therein to the end, 
and be eternally saved."
n>z
^Westminster Confession, Ch. X, Sec. I. 
24 ibid, Ch. XVII, Sec. I.
CHAPTER III 
THE SOURCES Off EDWARDS 1 DETERMINISM
We are now to make a survey of the more immediate 
sources on which Edwards drew in tne development of his 
deterministic system. Unfortunately, except for some 
illuminating statements In his diary and private papers, 
we have no account of his mental history from the time 
when, as a youth at college between the ages of thirteen 
and seventeen, he wrote his Hotes on the. Mind» till in his 
twenty-eighth year he delivered a public lecture in Boston 
entitled God Glorified in Man*8 Dependence, which revealed 
him as a full-fledged Calvinist. Nevertheless it is not 
difficult, with the aid of his diary, and from a study of 
his works, to ascertain when he became a Calvinist and to 
fix the chief sources of his deterministic thought. It 
should be remembered that Edwards was not an unoriginal 
thinker, particularly in his defense of Calvinism, and 
that frequently the source of his thought was his own fer- 
tile intellect. In some respects, however, he leaned 
heavily on others, and it is therefore important to inquire 
into the external sources from which he drew.
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I. New England Calvinism
Beyond all doubt the real fountain head of Edwards' 
determinism was the Calvinistic theology of New England in 
his day. This was the Calvinism of the Westminster Con- 
fession, which was accepted on practically all sides in that 
highly religious community as a definitive statement of 
Christian truth. Edwards grew up in Calvinistic surround- 
ings, and when he came to the point of thinking for himself, 
it never occurred to him that the prevailing theology might 
"be in error. His Puritan ancestry, the character of his 
training, and the circumstances of the time, all conspired 
together to make it almost inevitable that he should 
champion Calvinism. There is no suggestion that he ever 
questioned its essential truth, but on the contrary every 
indication that he regarded it as final, and looked upon any 
difficulty he experienced in accepting it as a misfortune. 
In his works he does not think of himself as an innovator, 
but as a defender of the "standard Calvinism", to use War- 
field's phrase.
In his Memoirs Hopkins prints some extracts from Ed- 
wards' private papers, written about 1743, which bear upon 
his religious experience. There is one paragraph in these 
which sheds so much light on the origin of his Calvinism 
that we quote it in full. "From my childhood up, my mind 
has been full of objections against the doctrine of God's 
sovereignty, in choosing whom he would to eternal life, and 
rejecting whom he pleased; leaving them eternally to perish, 
and be everlastingly tormented in hell. It used to appear
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like a horrible doctrine to me. But I remember the time 
very well, when I seemed to be convinced, and fully satis- 
fied, as to this sovereignty of God, and his justice in 
thus eternally disposing of men, according to his sovereign 
pleasure. But never could give an account, how, or by what 
means, 1 was thus convinced, not in the least imagining at 
the time, nor a long time after, that there was any extra- 
ordinary influence of God's Spirit in it; but only that now 
I saw further, and my reason apprehended the justice and 
reasonableness of it. However, my mind rested in it; and 
it put an end to all those cavils and objections. And there 
has been a wonderful alteration in my mind, with respect to 
the doctrine of God's sovereignty, from that day to this; so 
that I scarce ever have found so much as the rising of an 
objection against it, in the most absolute sense, in God 
shewing mercy to whom he will shew mercy, and hardening whom 
he will. God's absolute sovereignty and justice, with 
respect to salvation and damnation, is what my mind seems to 
rest assured of, as much as of anything that I see with my 
eyes; at least it is so at times. But I have often, since 
that first conviction, had quite another kind of sense of 
God's sovereignty than I had then. I have often since had 
not only a conviction, but a delightful conviction. The 
doctrine has very often appeared exceeding pleasant, bright, 
and sweet. Absolute sovereignty is what I love to ascribe 
to God. But my first conviction was not so."
Jonathan Edwards, quoted by 
 Samuel Hopkins, Memoirs of Edwards, in Edwards' Works, ed.
by Edward Williams 3b Edward Parsons, Vol. I, pp 29-30.
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This "conversion 1* to the doctrine of sovereignty 
occurred in 1721, soon after Edwards left college, when he 
was eighteen years of age, and was so complete that he seems 
never again to have questioned it. Prom his own account of 
it, just quoted, it is clear that he was adopting as his own 
the Calvinism in which he was reared. The fact that he had 
felt objections to it showed that he was thinking, and per- 
haps also that he was acquainted with the Arminianism which 
was a growing tendency in his day. Yet the passage shows 
clearly that his objections were not genuine doubts as to 
the truth of Calvinism, but only qualms of heart and mind at 
the unpalatable elements it involved. His problem was never 
to decide upon its truth, but only to discipline a recalci- 
trant reason into acceptance of it. "The Puritan assump- 
tions were so ingrained in his nature that the agony of mind 
which they caused never led him to question their truth, 
though it animateopim to discover a means of reconciling 
them to reason; and the reconciliation is the whole burden
o
of his ablest works. 11
Calvinism, as expressed in the Westminster Confession 
and mediated by his Hew England heredity, was thus the funda- 
mental source of the deterministic elements in Edwards* 
theology. He of course read more deeply into Calvinistic 
thought as he developed. He reveals a familiarity with Cal- 
vin himself, he had studied Turretine carefully, and he knew 
such writers as van Mastrict, and Jean Frederic Stapfer. He
2
Leslie Stephen, Hours in a Library, Vol. I, p. 284.
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also read all the works of the British Calvinists he could 
lay his hands on in Colonial New England, though he felt that 
they were in many cases receding from the soundly Calvinistic 
faith.
Edwards was always independent in his thought, differ- 
ing sometimes, as we shall see, with Calvin and the Westmin- 
ster Confession. He admitted that he might be called a Cal- 
yinist as distinguished from an Arminian, but he frankly 
disavowed any dependence on Calvin and asserted that with 
some of his views he did not agree. In the Preface to his 
Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will he states his own re- 
lationship to Calvinism in the following manner. "Yet I 
should not take it at all amiss, to be called a Calvinist, 
for distinction's sake: though I utterly disclaim a depen- 
dence on Calvin, or believing the doctrines which I hold, be- 
cause he believed and taught them; and cannot justly be
3 charged with believing in every thing just as he taught. 11 *
Here we have at once an assertion of independence and an ad- 
mission that he was, on the whole, following infthe line of 
his Calvinistic heritage.
Although Edwards adjusted himself intellectually to 
Calvinism, he never became completely at home in it 
emotionally. This fact is witnessed to by certain signifi- 
cant deviations he made from the strictly Calvinistic system. 
The emotional estrangement must be attributed to the fact
Jonathan Edwards, An Enquiry into the Freedomlof the Will, 
Works, Vol. I, p. 124. (For full title of this work 
see Bibliography. It will subsequently be listed as 
the Enquiry.)
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that he approached Calvinism primarily as an intellectual 
structure he should accept. His theological determinism was 
not the result of a religious experience such as Calvin had 
had, an experience which implied for the latter the doctrine 
of predestination as a fundamental conviction. The failure 
on Edwards 1 part to enter into Calvinism completely "by way of 
a deep religious experience, and the consequent deviations 
from the system at vital points, made him the father of the 
Hew England Theology, in which there was a gradual movement 
away from Calvin. His departures from strict Calvinism are 
infone sense slight, "but from the perspective of subsequent 
history they are highly significant.
It might be added here that the Bible was not one of 
Edwards 1 sources. While he quotes copiously from Scripture 
inxlefense of his Calvinistic positions, he was not primari- 
ly a student of Scripture, and he did not derive his determin- 
ism from it. This is evident both from what we know of his 
mental development and from the way in which he used Scrip- 
ture. In his defenses of Calvinism we find him calling on 
the Bible merely as an added support for his positions. He 
appealed to it largely as a partisan who regarded it primar- 
ily as an arsenal of proof-texts, although in so doing he 
was in keeping with the practice of his time.
II. Philosophical Sources
Edwards was greatly influenced in his theology by 
philosophical considerations. In view of this, and of the 
fact that certain elements in that part of his system we are
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to study are largely philosophical in nature, it is of im- 
portance to investigate his philosophical heritage.
1. Edwards and Berkeley
During his college days he had come to the conclusion 
that the world is "an ideal one", a position to which he gave 
expression in his Notes on the Mind, written while a student 
at Yale. He sums up his position as follows: "That, which 
truly is the Substance of all Bodies, is the infinitely exact, 
and precise, and perfectly stable Idea, in God 1 s mind, 
together with his stable Will t that the same shall gradually 
be communicated to us, and to other minds, according to
A
certain fixed and exact established Methods and Laws, tt Dev- 
eloping before his "conversion" to Calvinism, this idealism 
furnished a stage from which he moved naturally and without 
any emotional jarring into the Calvinistic system. From a
philosophy which thought of God in terms of Absolute Mind,
one
to/which thought of Him, at least largely, in terms of Abso- 
lute Will, the transition was easy. Nor did Edwards sur- 
render his idealism in moving from his philosophical, to his 
predominantly theological stage. It appears to have re- 
mained, and to have exercised a significant influence in his 
theological thought. It apparently underlies his defense of 
the theory of our identity with Adam in the first sin, and 
can also be seen in his idea of God's grace as a divine and 
supernatural illumination immediately imparted to the soul.
4^Edwards,Notes on the Mind, in Works, Edited by S. E. Dwight, 
Vol. I, p. 674.
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"The problem of Edwards' idealism", says Professor
Woodbridge Riley, "is the most difficult in the history of
5 
American philosophy. Was it his own, or "borrowed, or both?"
So closely akin is it to that of Berkeley that many have 
thought he adopted it from the English thinker. This was 
the view of Professor Fraser, Berkeley's biographer, although 
in his last editions of Berkeley's writings he admitted less 
disposition to hold the conjecture than formerly. The 
weight of opinion today regards Edwards as independent of 
Berkeley. Professor George Park Fisher remarks that it was 
once his impression that Edwards had drawn on Berkeley, but 
concedes, in his edition of Edwards' unpublished Essay on 
the Trinity, that this inference is in the highest degree 
improbable. * This is the position also of Professor Egbert 
C. Smyth, who did much to increase our knowledge of Edwards' 
early intellectual development, and of Professor H. Norman 
Gardiner, who has made a special study of his youthful 
idealism. One of Edwards' latest biographers, Professor 
A. C. McGiffert, Jr., holds the view that he could not have 
been acquainted with Berkeley's writings at the time he for- 
mulated his own philosophy. Berkeley's Principles appeared 
in 1710, and his Hylas and Philonous in 1713, while Edwards' 
Notes on the Mind were written between 1716 and 1720. There 
is undoubtedly a strong probability that the works of the 
English writer did not cross the Atlantic so soon after pub-
5J. Woodbridge Riley, American Philosophy, the Early Schools, 
, p. 129.
°George P. Fisher, An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the 
Trinity, with Remarks on Edwards and his Theology, p. 18.
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lication, although it is by no means impossible.
Apart, however, from this, there is practically con- 
vincing evidence that Edwards developed his philosophy in- 
dependently of Berkeley. There is, to begin with, absolute- 
ly no external evidence that he knew Berkeley's works. His 
frequent references to Locke and to other writers he knew 
establish the presumption that he would have mentioned Ber- 
keley, had he known him, especially had he been drawing the 
fundamental principle of his philosophy from him. A second 
reason for believing him independent of Berkeley is the fact 
that he writes as if his ideas were news the Notes on the 
Mind pointedly suggest that the author felt he was breaking 
new trails. Again, it is entirely possible that the 
brilliant young Edwards should have arrived at his idealism 
independently. We know he had read Locke, Cudworth, and 
Newton, (whom next to Locke he most admired), and the stimu- 
lus imparted by contact with these minds might well have set 
him on a path of his own, just as Berkeley himself had moved 
forward from Locke. Finally, as Professor Woodbridge Riley 
points out, there are some significant divergences between 
Edwards and Berkeley in their idealism, which indicate the 
independence of the former. In view of these considerations, 
there seems to be no ground for regarding Berkelianism as a 
part of Edwards 1 philosophical background except the strik- 
ing similarities in their philosophy, a reason which is 
entirely insufficient.
In the speculation on the origin of Edwards' idealism, 
four other philosophers have been suggested as possible
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sources,- Descartes, Malebranche, Norris, and Arthur Collier. 
But while there are affinities between Edwards and these 
writers, the assumption of actual connection is highly 
gratuitous.
2. Edwards and Other British Philosophers 
If Edwards did not derive his idealism from Berkeley, 
Locke is left as the sole philosopher whose influence is 
clearly traceable in his deterministic writings. He did not 
read French and German, and was, therefore, limited to phil- 
osophical worJcs in English and Latin. There is no evidence 
that he read in Latin anything but the writings of the 
Fathers and of some later Protestant theologians, such as 
Calvin. Of the British philosophers we know that he read 
Cudworth, but there is no way of tracing to him any specific 
elements in Edwards 1 thought, and the probability is that he 
was more a stimulus than a source of ideas. There are some 
striking resemblances between statements and arguments in 
the Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will and passages in 
Hobbes and Collins, but Edwards remarks that he had never 
read Hobbes, and the same is probably true in regard to 
Collins.
Similarities have been pointed out between Edwards and 
David Hume in their notions of causation, and of the necessi- 
ty of volitions. We know that Edwards had read Hume,- in 
1755, the year after the publication of the Enquiry infra the 
Freedom of the Will, he writes to Erskine, one of his Scottish 
correspondents, of having read one of Hume's works. "I had
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before read that book of Essays (i.e., by Lord Earnes), hav- 
ing borrowed Mr. Bellamy's, and also that book of Mr. David 
Hume's, which you speak of. I am glad of an opportunity to 
read such corrupt books, especially when written by men of
considerable genius; that I may have an idea of the notions
7that prevail in our nation." As we shall see, Edwards was
accused of holding a theory of the will identical with that 
of Kames, an accusation he indignantly repelled. It is, of 
course, inevitable that similarities should exist between 
deterministic thinkers, and Edwards was very close to some 
of the views of men like Hobbes, Collins> Hume and Kames, 
but there was certainly no conscious drawing upon any phir~ 
losopher but Locke, and it is impossible to fix on any defin- 
ite elements in his thought which betray even an unconscious 
indebtedness to others, beyond that which one owes any author 
who has been carefully read. In addition to the philosophers
mentioned, Edwards was acquainted with such men as Shaftes-
\ 1 ;^ 
bury, Pascal, Chevalier Ramsey, Henry Grove, George Turn- / V
bull, Samuel Clarke, and Bishop Butler.
It is perhaps appropriate here to mention his indebt- 
edness to the great scientist, Sir Isaac Newton. If he might 
be said to have had any masters at all, they were Newton and 
Locke. He studied Newton's works diligently, and from them 
enlarged and clarified his conception of universal causation 
and the reign of natural law. While his intellectual con-
7Quoted by S. E. Dwight, in his Memoir of President Edwards, 
in Dwight«s edition of Edwards 1 Works, Vol. I, p. 550.
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nection with Newton is not as explicit as that with Locke, 
the conception of causation and law in the universe, in 
which Newton confirmed him, underlies his whole deterministic 
system and is adhered to with the utmost consistency.
3. Edwards and Locke
Edwards 1 philosophical background, particularly that 
which is reflected in his deterministic writings, is almost 
entirely Locke's Essay on Human Understanding. This stimu- 
lating work was read "by him during his second year in col- 
lege, that is, when he was about fourteen. He not only read 
it with minute care, but declared that it gave him far higher 
pleasure "than the most greedy miser finds, when gathering 
up handfulls of silver and gold from some newly-discovered
Q
treasure." This frank acknowledgment of his debt to Locke 
does not indicate on Edwards' part any lack of independence 
in the reading. He truly owed more to Locke than to any 
other philosopher, but Leslie Stephen is substantially cor- 
rect in saying that he derived from Locke more the impulse 
to intellectual activity than a body of doctrine. He'dif- 
fered from the older philosopher on fundamental points, such, 
for instance, as Locke f s sensationalism.
The place in which Edwards' debt is greatest and most 
apparent is his theory of the will. At this point, while he 
is not guilty of blind reproduction of his master,he really 
finds in Locke the substance of his own theory. To note the
8Quoted by S. E. Dwight, in his Memoir of President Edwards, 
in Dwight's edition of Edwards' Works, Vol. I, p. 30.
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precise extent of his dependence, it will be necessary for us 
to investigate Locke*s theory of the will as it is set forth 
in his well known chapter on Power. Edwards has been sup- 
posed also to have derived from Locke*s chapter on Identity 
and Diversity the principle of his defense of the position 
that we are identical with Adam in respect of the first sin. 
Hence we shall also make some inquiry into the positions 
Locke takes in this chapter. Apart from these two points, 
there is no traceable influence of Locke in Edwards 1 deter- 
ministic writings.
It is apparent in the quotations he makes from Locke, 
and from certain positions ascribed to the latter,that Ed- 
wards read the seventh, i.e., the last, edition of Locke 1 8 
Essay, in which there are some significant alterations of 
positions taken in the chapter on Power as it appeared in 
the first edition. We shall, therefore, use the seventh 
edition as the basis of our study.
a. Locke's Chapter on Power
Locke begins his discussion by asserting that we have 
in ourselves two powers, a will and an understanding, or 
perceptive power. These powers, he says, may be called 
faculties, provided we realize that a faculty is not a dis- 
tinct agent in the self. Prom this latter position, however, 
he departs as soon as he begins to discuss the relation of 
will and desire.
Freedom, to Locke, means a man's capacity to do what 
he wills or prefers to do. "So far as a man has power to
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think, or not to think, to move or not to move, according to 
the preference or direction of his own mind, so far is a 
man free. 1* 9 Such being its nature, Locke emphasizes the 
fact that "liberty is not an idea belonging to volition or 
preferring; but to the person having the power of doing, or 
forbearing to do, according as the mind shall choose or 
direct." We can no more speak of our will as free than we 
can of sleep as being swift, or virtue, square. To do so 
would be to think of the will as a substance, or an agent, 
whereas it is only a power belonging to an agent. Locke f s 
view is well stated in an oft-quoted sentence, infwhich he 
says that "we may as properly say, that is the singing / 
faculty sings, and the dancing faculty dances, as that the 
will chooses." ^ In this position Locke is followed exact- 
ly by Edwards.
Now there can be no freedom, Locke points out, without 
thought and volition, or will, "whenever thought is wholly
wanting, or the power to act or forbear, according to the
12
direction of thought, there necessity takes place." On
the other hand the existence of these does not guarantee 
freedom, for they do not guarantee our capacity to perform, 
or refrain from, the action preferred or not preferred.
It is essential for the understanding of Locke 1 s theory 
and of Edwards 1 relation to him to note the distinction he
9 
John Locke, Essay on Human Understanding, Vol. I, Bk. II,




draws between preferring and willing. In a passage quoted 
by Edwards he explains that we do not necessarily always 
will what we prefer. The passage follows: "Por example, pre- 
ferring, which seems perhaps best to express the act of 
volition, does it not precisely. For though a man would
prefer flying to walking, yet who can say he ever wills
13 ya 
it?" In the same way he insists that/distinction is to be
drawn between will and desire, which frequently are confound- 
ed. "This well considered, plainly shows that the will is 
perfectly distinguished from desire; which in the very same 
action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which 
our will sets us upon." The latter part of this statement 
cannot be reconciled with Locke's position which we shall
shortly examine, that the wilmis determined by an uneasiness, 
for uneasiness is usually a desire. But the fact that he 
distinguishes willing and desiring is unquestionable. In 
this recognition of the difference between the emotional and 
the conative aspects of the self he thus diverges from the 
position expressed in the beginning of his chapter, that the 
"powers" of the mind are only two, understanding and willing. 
At this point Edwards declines to follow his master, insist- 
ing that willing is always preferring, and, though with 
somewhat less assurance, that it always coincides with desire. 
To return now to the question of freedom, Locke insists 
that it is not only improper to attribute freedom to the
John Locke, op. cit., p. 224. 
14 ibid, p. 231.
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will, which is a mere power, but also to say that in willing 
a man is free. It is apparent, he says, that when a man con- 
templates a certain action, he cannot forbear either willing 
it or not willing it. The question will then arise whether 
wa man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleases, 
motion or rest?" 15 But this question, he answers, is absurd. 
The reason for its absurdity he gives in the two following 
sentences, which contain the staple of Edwards' famous 
reductio ad absurdum of the Arminian conception of a self- 
determining power in the will. "Por to ask, whether a man be 
at liberty to will either motion or rest, speaking or 
silence, which he pleases; is to ask, whether a man can wi11 
what he wills, or be pleased with what he is pleased with. 
A question which, I think, needs no answer; and they who can 
make a question of it, must suppose one will to determine
the acts of another, and another to determine that; and so
ifi on in infinitum." x Our volitions then are determined, and
our freedom pertains solely to our capacity to perform the 
action willed. It is thus true that the freedom of the man 
is quite consistent with the necessity of his volitions.
In answer to the question, What determines the will? 
Locke replies that it is the mind, but he goes on to explain 
that something moves the mind to do this. The motive for 
continuing in the same state or action isjonly the present 
satisfaction in it, while the motive leading to change, or 
new action, is some uneasiness. We are, therefore,
15
Locke, op.cit., p. 229. lbibid, p. 229.
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determined by some uneasiness under which we find ourselves. 
"This uneasiness", he says, "we may call, as it is, desire;
which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent
17 good." Locke later states that it is sometimes an un-
easiness which cannot be identified with desire, though he 
holds that uneasiness is at least always accompanied by de- 
sire. He apparently overlooks the fact that, in distinguish- 
ing will and desire, he had asserted the possibility of our 
willing that which we do not desire. Edwards is led, 
probably by Locke, to hesitate in identifying desiring and 
willing, but he definitely disagrees with Locke in the lat- 
ter f s view that they may sometimes clash, and in this respect 
is more consistent than his master*
Locke remarks that when he first published his 
thoughts upon the question of the will he accepted the gen- 
eral opinion that the greater good determines the will, but 
that upon stricter inquiry, he had been "forced to conclude, 
that good, the greater good, though apprehended and ac- 
knowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until our 
desire, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneasy in the
want of it. WAO As there may be various "uneasinesses" in a
any 
man at/one time, Locke concludes that the will is deter-
mined by "the most pressing of those that are judged capable 
of being then removed." 19
Hejnext proceeds to show what "moves 11 desire, and as- 
serts that all desire is desire for happiness or pleasure.
1 rj
Locke, op.cit., p. 232. 18ibid, p. 233. ibid, p. 237.
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We call that which will produce happiness in us, good, and 
that which brings pain, evil. But this does not mean that 
all good moves every man's desire; only that good moves the 
individual's desire which is considered essential to his 
present happiness. This being true,it is not always the 
case that the "greater visible good" produces desire,- it 
may not be felt necessary to our present happiness. Individ- 
uals differ in their judgment as to what constitutes their 
greatest happiness, hence the different courses men pursue. 
It will be noticed that in this account of what "moves" de- 
sire, Locke reveals himself as an unquestioned hedonist. 
And it is in all probability on account of Locke that Ed- 
wards takes the same position, asserting that our will is 
determined by that which is the most agreeable.
While, as he has said, it is the greatest and most 
pressing uneasiness that determines the will, Locke admits 
that this is not universally true. Man has the power, he 
s&ys, to suspend the execution and satisfaction of any of 
his desires until he can deliberate upon their objects. This 
gives him the power to contemplate an absent good, until, by 
repeated contemplation, it is brought nearer the mind, and 
raises in him some desire by which it may work upon the 
will. This power of deliberation, Locko\adds, is all the e/ 
liberty any man has,- "in this seems to consist that which )
/"*- !
is (as I thinlc improperly) called free-will." 2(^ Thanks to 
this power, our will can be determined by "the last result
op. cit., p. 242.
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of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any 
action." 21 This is a far better freedom, says Locke, than 
"a perfect indifferency in the mind", which leaves it unin- 
fluenced by any judgment of the good or evil of an act. The
freest agents are d etermined, even God Hims.elf. "Sod al-
22mighty himself is under the necessity of oeing happy."
While his language in some cases might seem to imply 
that the power to suspend action is a power of contrary 
choice, this is certainly not in Locke 1 s mind. As Edwards 
pointed out, in dealing with a supposed evasion of his rea- 
soning, according to which the mind f s liberty of indffer- 
ence might be said to consist in its power to suspend the 
act of will pending consideration, the decision to suspend 
is itself a volition. Now Locke would certainly not grant 
that this volition arises spontaneously,- it comes about, as 
all others do, as the result of a preceding uneasiness.
Now this liberty, consisting in a power to suspend 
volition and deliberate upon the object of the desire giving 
rise to it, is, as Locke himself recognizes, different from 
the liberty which consists in the capacity to perform the 
action willed. In identifying it with the power of suspen- 
sion and deliberation, Locke has moved to a new idea of free- 
dom. It is in reality a sort of liberty iii willing. "But 
yet there is a case wherein a man is at liberty in respect 
°^ filling, and that is the choosing of afremote good as an 
end to be pursued." 23 Now in view of this capacity to
p
21 ALocke, op.cit., p. 243.
244. 23 ibid, pp 247-248.
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choose the remote good, as the result of suspension of 
action and deliberation, man can "be held responsible for his 
conduct. He does not have to choose the lesser goods, even 
though his will is always determined. "And here we may see 
how it comes to pass, that a man may justly incur punish- 
ment, though it be certain that in all the particular 
actions that he wills, he does, and necessarily does, will 
that which he then judges to be good. For though his will 
be always determined by that which is judged good by his 
understanding, yet it excuses him not; because by a too 
hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on himself 
wrong measures of good and evil." ^
There are various reasons why men choose the worse 
instead of the better. Sometimes it is because of desires 
arising from bodily pain, and sometimes because of wrong de- 
sires due to wrong and blameworthy judgments as to what con- 
stitutes the greater happiness, (particularly wrong judg- 
ments about the value of absent goods). Locke holds that 
men never err in their judgments about present good or evil, 
i.e., pleasure or pain, but that mistakes are apt to arise 
when we compare present pleasure or pain with future. The 
cause of our misjudgment in this respect is "the weak and
*J C
narrow constitution of our minds", which leads us to con- 
cern ourselves almost exclusively with present pleasure and 
pain. Even if we do consider future pleasures, they do not 
have the capacity, in competition with present pleasures,
24Locke, op.cit., p. 248. 25ibid, p. 253.
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to commend themselves to us in proportion to their value. 
Added to our errors about pleasures and pains in themselves 
are our misjudgments, through ignorance and inadvertency, re- 
garding the consequences in pleasure and pain of certain 
lines of action. We can, however,by consideration, effort 
and practice, alter our tastes as to what is pleasant and un- 
pleasant to us, and thus can come to desire virtue as op- 
posed to vice.
This completes Locke 1 s account of volition and its 
cause. Having shown that it is determined by the most 
pressing uneasiness, or desire, and that this in turn is due 
to what we apprehend to be our greatest pleasure, he goes no 
further. The question is still left unanswered as to how 
we arrive at our judgment of the greatest happiness. Locke*s 
discussion of the source of error in this judgment, particu- 
larly his demonstration of how we choose a lesser pleasure 
which is present t6 a greater one which is absent, does sug- 
gest that our judgments depend partly on our circumstances. 
He mentions/nothing, however, about any part played by our 
nature or character. Edwards goes beyond Locke at this 
point, at least in explicitness, explaining very carefully 
that volitions arise in the last analysis from OUT character, 
or "the state of the mind", in relation to our situation.
As we shall see, Edwards' theory of volition is on the 
whole substantially that of Locke. He gives us nothing of 
import that is new. There are just enough differences be- 
tween him and the English philosopher to make us sure that 
he was thinking independently, even if not with great
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originality. If, however, Edwards' theory of volition is 
not original, his elucidation and defense of it far surpass 
anything that Locke attempted. In the fulness/of his treat- 
ment, the minuteness with which he examined every point, and 
the acuteness with which he defended his position and fer- 
reted out the fallacies of his adversaries, his real origin- 
ality is revealed.
b. Locke's Theory of Identity and Diversity
In his attempt to establish man's responsibility for 
Adam's first sin, Edwards asserts the literal identity of 
Adam and his posterity in that sinful act. The argument in 
the defense of this position is drawn, it has been held, 
from the chapter in Locke's Essay on Identity and Diversity. 
In order to compare Edwards' argument with Locke's theory, 
we shall therefore examine here the leading ideas set forth 
by Locke in the chapter in question.
He begins by pointing out that the notions of identity 
and diversity arise from the comparison of anything existing 
at one time and place with itself existing at another time. 
The identity of an object consists in two things, it would 
appear, namely, (l) its existence in a particular time and 
place, which excludes the possibility of its being anything 
other than itself, and (2) the identification of the object 
existing at one moment with its existing in a previous point 
of time. To quote Locke's own statement: "When we see any- 
thing to be in any place in any instant of time, we are sure 
(be it what it will) that it is that very thing,and not
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another, which at that same time exists in another place, 
how like and undistinguishable soever it may be in all other 
respects: and in this consists identity,when the ideas it is 
attributed to, vary not at all from what they were that 
moment wherein we consider their former existence, and to
26which we compare the present." Elsewhere he expresses 
this more succinctly by the statement that continuous exist- 
ence constitutes identity. From this Locke draws a corollary: 
"From whence it follows, that one thing cannot have two be- 
ginnings of existence, nor two things one beginning; it 
being impossible for two things of the same kind to be or
exist in the same instant, in the same place, or one and the
27same thing in different places." At this point Edwards is
completely at variance with Locke, since he was a Creation- 
ist, and denied the necessity of continuous existence for 
the identification of things existing at different points of 
time.
While, as we have said, identity for Locke involves a 
comparison of an object with itself at two different times 
and, therefore some duration in the existence of the object, 
it is true that his language sometimes implies identity to 
consist solely in the existence of an object at one time and 
place so as thereby to exclude the existence of another like 
object in the same place and time. For instance, after his 
introductory remarks on the nature of identity in general, he 
concludes in this way: "From what has been said, it is easy
26Locke, op. cit., Ch. xxvii, p. 306. ^ibid, p. 306.
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to discover what is so much inquired after, the principium 
individuationis; and that, it is plain, is existence itself,
which determines a being of any sort to a particular time
28 and place incommunicable to two beings of the same kind."
Now if identity consists solely in the principium individua- 
tionis as here stated, no continuous existence is necessary. 
However, in regard to the identity of an object existing in 
successive moments of time, it is obvious that the comparison 
between the object at one moment and another must be made>- 
and Locke makes it clear that the identity cannot be estab- 
lished if there were two separate beginnings, that is, unless 
the object has had continuous existence from one time to the 
other. This is the position that bears on Edwards' dis- 
cussion, since he is interested only in the identity of ob- 
jects existing at different times, as is Locke himself, and 
we need not, therefore, concern ourselves with the inconsistency 
in Lockers statement of his position.
Having shown wherein identity consists in general, 
Locke next takes up the identity of various objects, vege- 
tables, animals, man and persons. In the case of the first 
three, the identity consists, he says, not in the identity 
of the substances of which they are composed, but in each 
case, in a certain continuous organization of the particles 
which successively compose the organism and a common life in 
which they participate. This organization and common life 
are permanent and self-identical, while the particles change.
28John Locke, op. cit., p. 307.
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Locke distinguishes the man from the person, meaning "by the 
former simply the animal or physical man.
Most of the discussion of identity is concerned with 
the problem of personal identity. This, Locke concludes, 
consists in the continued existence of the same conscious- 
ness. "For, since consciousness always accompanies think- 
ing, and it is that which makes everyone to be what he calls 
self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other
thinking things; in this alone consists personal identity,
j 
i.e., the sameness/of a rational being: and as far as this
consciousness can be extended backwards to any past action 
or thought, so far reaches the identity of that person; it 
is the same self now that it was then; and it is by the 
same self with this present one that now reflects on it,
pQthat that action was done."*" Now personal identity, Locke 
continues, has nothing to do with the continued existence of 
the "same substance'1 , or same "thinking thing. H "For it 
being the same consciousness that makes a man to be himself, 
to himself, personal identity depends on that only, whether 
it be annexed solely to one individual substance, or can be 
continued in a succession of several substances." 30 if -£h& 
same consciousness is transferred from one soul, or spirit, 
or "thinking substance" to another, these two will be the 
same person. On the other hand, the same spirit or immater- 
ial substance, if not always accompanied by the same con- 
sciousness ,would be different persons. It is on personal
29Locke, op. cit., pp 312-313. 30 ibid, p. 313.
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identity in this sense of sameness of consciousness that 
responsibility is founded. We are not accountable for any- 
thing our consciousness does not claim as our own.
III. Arminianism in New England and Abroad 
No account of Edwards' intellectual and theological 
background would be complete without a statement of the Ar- 
xninian views against which he wrote, and which really 
occasioned his deterministic works. They constitute the 
negative sources of his determinism. There was in his day 
a growing tendency toward Arminianisra, even in quarters 
which were by traditionjstrongly Calvinistic. As early as 
the period in which New England was colonized, there had ex- 
isted not only disagreement with minor features of Calvin- 
ism, but also open dissent from its characteristic principle 
of unconditional election, even in Calvinistic communities. 
In Edwards' time Samuel Webster, Charles Chauncy and Peter 
Clark had taken up the pen in defense of certain doctrines 
which were subversive of Calvinism. This tendency was 
highly alarming to Edwards, and he determined to check it by 
his treatises, notably those on the will and original sin, 
in which he undertook to give a final answer to every argu- 
ment advanced by the Arminians. The spearhead of the Armin- 
ian attack, as far as it was known to him at firsthand, was 
a group of English writers, including Mr. Thomas Chubb, Dr. 
Philip Doddridge, Dr. George Turnbull, Dr. Samuel Clarke, 
Dr. Isaac Watts, Dr. John Taylor of Norwich, and Dr. Daniel 
Whitby. They were of varying theological opinions,- indeed
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Watts and Doddridge were supposedly Calvinists,- but they 
were all one in their Arminian tendencies. All of these 
men are referred to in Edwards' writings, and it is there- 
fore desirable to have some idea/of their general position 
on the points of dispute between the Calvinists and the 
Arminians. This position is well stated in a treatise on 
the give Points of Calvinism written by Dr. Whitby, a work 
which is the most frequently quoted and attacked by Edwards 
in his polemics against the Arminians. In a letter to the 
Rev. John Erskine, of Scotland, in 1752, in connection with 
his projected treatise on the Free Will controversy, Edwards 
says: "In this essay, I propose to take particular notice of 
the writings/of Dr. Whitby, and Mr. Chubb, and the writings 
of some others, who, though not properly Pelagians, nor Ar- 
minians, yet, in their notions of the freedom of the will, 
have, in the main, gone into the same scheme." 3^
Dr. Whitby 1 s book, which ran through four editions, 
takes up the distinctly Calvinistic doctrines one by one, ex- 
posing their fallacies and establishing the contrary Armin- 
ian position. The full title of the work is A Discourse 
Concerning Election and Reprobation, The Extent of Christ * s 
Redemption, The Grace of God, The Liberty of the Will, and
The Perseverance or Defectibility of the Saints. He begins
"" the doctrine of the 
with a discourse in which he undertakes to show that/decrees
of absolute election and reprobation -is-1 inconsistent with 
the teaching of the Bible and of the Fathers. God, he
31Quoted by S. E. Dwight, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 498.
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argues, is not taught by Scripture to decree the reprobation 
of any individuals,- He reprobates only the "corruption of 
men's faith or manners." Of the election taught in Scripture 
Whitby says that (1) it is not of particular persons, but of 
whole churches and nations, (2) it is an election to the en- 
joyment of the means of grace rather than to certain salva- 
tion, and (3) it is a conditional election to be made sure of 
by good works.
The second discourse is directed against the Galvinis- 
tic doctrine of a limited atonement. With Scripture cita- 
tions supplemented by an appeal to reason, he argues that 
Christ's atonement is universal in its intent as well as in 
its sufficiency.
In the next section Whitby argues against the doctrine 
of an "irresistible and unfrustrable" operation of divine 
grace in conversion. "Grace in the Scripture", he says, 
"when it is styled, the grace of God, imports His favor and 
His kind affection to us." 32 This is shown first in His 
gift to us of the gospel as a rule of life. But in addition 
to this Whitby recognizes that God vouchsafes to men "some 
inward operations or assistances to incline tnem to what is
33good, and work conversion in them." This inward assist- 
ance consists, first "in representing the divine truths, 
which holy scriptures do contain and press upon us, more
32Daniel Whitby, A Discourse Concerning Election and Reproba- 
tion, The Extent of Christ's Redemption, The Grace of God, 
The Liberty of Will, and The Perseverance or Defectibil- 
ity of the Saints, 4th edition, p. 187. 
p. 189.
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clearly to our understandings, that we may have a fuller 
evidence, stronger conviction, and assurance of them...and 
this is styled THE ILLUMINATION OF THE MIND." 34 in con- 
nection with this Whitby says a few pages above that "what 
makes the will chuse, is something approved "by the under- 
standing, and consequently appearing to the soul as good; 
and whatsoever it refuseth, is something represented by the
•ZK
understanding, and so appearing to the will as evil." Ed- 
wards seizes upon the passage in which this statement occurs,
and quotes it at length in his Enquiry into the Freedompf - - rj~"~~   "   j  
the Will as conceding his view that the will follows the 
"latest dictate of the understanding". It can hardly be 
denied that Whitby laid himself open to attack at this point 
by the language he used, but he later makes it clear that he 
conceives the will as free to respond or not to the illumina- 
tion ofour understandings by the Spirit.
The inward operation of the Spirit consists, in the 
second place,says Whitby, in the bringing to our remembrance 
of divine motives to encourage us in the performance oij/our 
duty. He adds that "the highest motives and inducements 
possible offered to us in the name of the great God of heaven, 
when firmly believed and present to the mind, must be suf- 
ficient to produce their ends." 36 Here again the language 
lends itself to a deterministic interpretation, although this 
is farthest from the author's intention. He goes on to 
clarify his position by stating that the Holy Spirit produces
3 Whitby, op.cit., p. 20$. 35ibid, p. 193. 36ibid, p. 200.
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ideas in our minds by a "physical" operation, in which we 
are wholly passive. To this extent the activity of the 
Spirit is irresistible, and for this very reason we are not 
responsible for the ideas thus produced. Our responsibility 
is limited to the response we freely make to them. Never- 
theless, God deserves the praise for all our good acts, be- 
cause all the inducements come from Him, as well as the 
power of consenting to them.
whitby next enters into the question of the freedom 
of the will. He begins with the proposition that man is in 
a state of trial and probation in the world. From this it 
follows that man must have the power of contrary choice as 
between the good and the evil, between accepting the gospel 
and rejecting it. "This liberty", he says, however, "is 
indeed no perfection of human nature; for it supposes us 
imperfect,as being subject to fall by temptation, and when 
we are advanced to 'the spirits of just men made perfect*, 
or to a fixed state of happiness, will, with our other im- 
perfections f be done away*; but yet it is a freedom abso- 
lutely requisite, as we conceive, to render us capable of 
trial or probation, and to render our actions worthy of 
praise or dispraise, and our persons of rewards or punish- 
ments; nor is this liberty essential to man as man, but only 
necessary to a man placed in a state of trial, and under the
•zry
power of temptation." It will follow from this that the 
determination of the human will cannot be argued from the
37Whitby, op. cit., p. 262.
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fact that the will of God, and Christ, and of good angels is 
determined to the good, and that of evil angels to the evil. 
These "beings are not in a state of probation, and therefore 
freedom in the sense of contrary choice is not necessary to 
them. whitby is quite ready to recognize a freedom which 
means only freedom from co-action, not from all necessity. 
The wills of God and Christ and the angels are determined, 
according to him, yet these "beings are free.
Having asserted man's power of contrary choice, he 
proceeds to argue the necessity of such liberty on the ground 
that it is essential to moral responsibility. No man can be 
praised or blamed for his actions if he is determined to the 
good by divine grace, or to the evil by a corrupt nature he 
didnot produce and cannot control. Unless man has the power 
of alternative choice, God cannot rightfully issue commands 
to him or hold him accountable for his attitude toward the 
gospel. In addition to this proof of alternative choice on 
moral grounds, Whitby attempts also to establish it by ap- 
peals to Scripture. The Bible does not teach, he declares, 
that man by the fall lost the liberty of his will; on the 
contrary, it insists upon this liberty, a liberty which is 
freedom from all necessity. He concludes by citing the opin- 
ions of the Fathers,and reasoning from "the received notion 
of the word", liberty, and the common sense of mankind, in a 
cumulative argument to show the necessity of recognizing the 
power of contrary choice. Those who deny man such liberty, 
he asserts, are really in agreement with Mr. Hobbes and the 
fatalists.
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Edwards 1 reply to this last statement is that he had 
neyer read Mr. Hobbes, and that it was no refutation of his 
doctrine to point out that it agreed in some respects with 
those whose general position he opposed. He is also quick 
to call attention to the rather glaring oversight of Whitby, 
and his fellow Arminians, in failing to show how necessity 
can be consistent with moral accountability in God, Christ, 
and the angels, but not consistent with it in man. "It were 
to be wished", he writes, "that Dr. Whitby, and other
divines of the same sort, had explained themselves, when
have 
they/asserted that that which is necessary, is not deserving
of praise; at the same time that they have owned God's per- 
fection to be necessary, and so in effect representing God
•ZQ
as not deserving praise."
Whitby does not go deeply into the psychology of voli- 
tion, and in his psychology he does not begin to compare 
with Edwards. The free will of man, he says, is "a faculty 
or power." At another place he quotes with high approval 
a Mr. Thorndike, who speaks of freedom as "indifference". 
Man may be influenced by ideas and motives presented through 
his understanding, but the will possesses the sovereign 
power to resist this influence in making its choices. It 
can thus resist the persuasions brought to bear on it by the 
divine grace. Habits may exert great pressure on the will, 
but they cannot determine its actions. Whitby does not con-
Jonathan Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 256. 
Whitby, op. cit., p. 266.
93
cede that any acts of man's will are determined. His con- 
ception of volition, then, is that it is the act of the 
will, a "faculty or power", which in its acts is isolated 
from the rest of the self, from its character and intellect, 
its/motives and habits. In particular, the acts/of the will 
are independent of the influence of motives. There were 
some divergencies from this view among the Arminian writers 
whom Edwards read,- Dr. Samuel Clarke identified the act of 
will with the "last dictate of the understanding 11 , and Mr. 
Chubb undertook to assert at once the determining power of 
motives and the freedom of the will, an inconsistency which 
Edwards mercilessly exposed,- but Whitby's was the general 
view among Arminian thinkers. In giving expressioi^to this 
view some of them spoke of man's freedom as consisting in a 
self-determining power in the will, an expression which, as 
we shall see, Edwards attacks again and again. Others used 
an even more vulnerable phrase, describing man's freedomks 
consisting in a will in equilibrium before all external and 
internal motives/or influences. Whitby, although he says 
once that the will "determines itself 11 , on the whole avoids 
both these forms of expression, limiting himself to an ap- 
proval of the term 'indifference' as characterizing the 
will. All these various expressions, however, are efforts 
to set forth the same fundamental notion, that of a will not
determined in any respect, spontaneously originating its own
open 
choices between/possibilities. The liberty for which the
Arminian contended was thus not a liberty of the self, but 
strictly a liberty of the will.
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After establishing his/position on the freedom of the 
will, wliitby discusses the Calvinistic doctrine of the per- 
severance of the saints. He is willing to recognize, he 
states,that those who are preserved from falling from grace 
are so preserved by the power of God through faith; but he 
knows o|foo promise of God that all true believers will be 
so preserved. What God has promised is that those who do not 
wickedly depart from Him will be preserved from being forced 
from Him by their adversaries, not that their own faith will 
certainly prove steadfast. In short, all will persevere who 
use the means to it, but/not all true believers are certain 
to use the means. This position is argued at length from 
Scripture, and like "Whitby's other views, is supported by 
appeals to the Fathers. It is, of course, the only position 
that can be taken consistently with his other Arminian 
theories.
Having presented his own view, Whitby refers to the ob- 
jection against it that it undermines the comfort of Christ- 
ians and takes away an aid to holiness. As to the comfort 
to be derived from the belief in perseverance,he observes 
that, according to the Scripture,true peace and comfort arise 
only from an upright conscience and that we lose it only when 
we forsake the way of righteousness. Further, he says, the 
fact that a doctrine is comforting does not guarantee its 
truth. Again, the possibility of falling into evil should 
not be a source of discomfort to one who knows that "he can- 
not fall into it unless he will, and chuseth so to do, and 
unless he acts contrary to all the rules of reason and dis-
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cretion, and the strongest motives and sufficient means 
vouchsafed to avoid it. M 40 As a matter of fact, he argues, 
there is equally as much comfort in the Arminian, as in the 
Calvinistic view on this doctrine, for two reasons: (l) even 
if a man believes in certain perseverance, he can never be 
certain of his sincerity, and, therefore, of his own per- 
severance, and (2) no theological beliefs can remove the 
fears arising from an enlightened Christian conscience. .It 
will thus not make any difference which view is held, as 
far as the comfort to be derived from it is concerned. And 
as to the effect on our holiness, to feel certain of salva- 
tion is far more likely to promote indulgence and moral lax- 
ity than to feel ourselves on probation.
Whitby concludes his Discourse with an effort to 
answer certain other objections to his system. The most im- 
portant criticism dealt with, and the only one relevant to 
our purposes,is that most of the arguments against absolute 
decrees hold also against divine prescience. He answers 
that God's foreknowledge has no influence upon our actions, 
whereas His decrees infallibly produce the action. Since 
God's foreknowledge extends to all possible actions, as well 
as those which actually are to come to pass, He foresees an 
act as one to be freely committed. He is thus cleared of any 
direct responsibility for the act. How God can foreknow 
free actions, Whitby admits he does not know,but he reminds
40Whitby, op. cit., p. 393.
96
us that such foreknowledge is a plain teaching of Scripture 
and is thus not to be rejected merely because we are ig- 
norant of how it takes place.
In this resume' of Whitby's teaching we have a picture 
of the system of thought Edwards opposed in his deterministic 
writings. To him it was utterly subversive of fundamental 
Christian truths, particularly of that essential doctrine, 
the sovereignty of God. The spread of Arminianism caused 
him the greatest distress,and became, in reality, the oc- 
casion of the works which are the primary study of this 
thesis.
PART II 
DETERMINISM IN THE SYSTEM OF JONATHAN EDWARDS
CHAPTER IV 
THE HEART OF EDWARDS 1 THEOLOGY
"The doctrines of God's absolute sovereignty, and free 
grace, in shewing mercy to whom he would shew mercy; and 
man's absolute dependence on the operations of God's Holy 
Spirit, have very often appeared to me as sweet and glorious 
doctrines. These doctrines have been much my delight. God's 
sovereignty has ever appeared to me, great part of his glory, 
It has often been my delight to approach God, and adore him 
as a sovereign God, and ask sovereign mercy of him. 11 ^ Ed- 
wards' thought began and ended in the sovereignty of God. 
It was the heart, the focal point of his entire theological 
system. There was never a time when he did not think of God 
as absolute, either as Absolute Mind or as Absolute Will. 
George Park Fisher writes as follows: "The fundamental prin- 
ciple in the philosophical and religious system of Edwards is 
the doctrine of the Absolute. The existence and necessary 
existence of a Being, eternal, infinite and omnipotent , a 
being self-conscious, yet not dependent for self-conscious- 
ness on aught exterior to Himself, was propounded with em- 
phasis in the youthful essay, the title of which is 'Being'.
*  Jonathan Edwards, 
Rioted by Samuel Hopkins, op. cit., p. 37.
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This principle was ever after the groundwork of his teach- 
ing. In his mind God was the supreme and absorbing object 
of contemplation and study. His supremacy, the independence 
of His being and perfections, was the groundwork of his
creed. The 'sovereignty 1 of God he insisted on and empha-
2 / sized. 11 The same ideajis emphasized by a recent writer:
"To one cardinal principle Edwards was faithful - the 
conception of the majesty and sufficiency of God; and this 
polar idea provides the clue to both his/philosophical and 
theological systems." * To quote once more: "what Being was 
to Parmenides and Plato, what the one Substance was to 
Spinoza, what the Absolute was to Hegel, God was to Edwards." 
To Edwards God's sovereignty meant Eis predetermination 
of all things. It never occurred to him that one might deny 
universal determinism without denying divine sovereignty. 
He conceived of God's relation to the acts of man's will as 
in harmony with His relation to the events of the natural 
world. No volition takes place except as the result of 
God's decree, whether he was led, as a result of this view, 
to teach that God was essentially arbitrary will, is a moot- 
ed point which will be discussed later. There is no ground 
for doubt, however, that in accepting the doctrine of sov- 
ereignty, he was accepting the principle of universal de- 
terminism. This is the most obvious fact in his theolog-
2 George Park Fisher, An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the
Trinity, With Remarks on Edwards and his Theology, p. 31. 
3Vernon Louis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought, 
4 Vol. I, The Colonial Mind, p. 152. 
George A. Gordon, in Jonathan Edwards, a Retrospect, p. 59.
100 
ical works.
To say that his thought began with this notion of God's 
sovereignty is to state the literal truth. We have seen 
that he always believed Calvinism to be the truth, and Cal- 
vinism to him was essentially the sovereignty of God. He 
never went back of this conception. It was the major 
premise of his thought. "The foundations of this cardinal 
principle in his theology", says A.V.G.Allen, "seem to be
sunk in an abysmal darkness, which he makes no attempt to
5 sound." In his own account of his reconciliation to the
^doctrine of sovereignty, Edwards states that he never could 
tell how, or by what means, he was convinced of its truth. 
It was simply his underlying assumption, the rational foun- 
dation of which he never knew nor sought to learn. He does 
indeed present valid and acute arguments in defense of this 
great doctrine, arguments which have justly elicited the ad- 
miration of generations, but they carry in them an unmis- 
takable flavor of special pleading. Onahas the feJfeling in 
studying them that they are not the reasons which led Ed- 
wards himself to accept the doctrine, however much they may 
have strengthened his conviction after he had once made it 
his own.
The genesis of Edwards 1 faith in the doctrine of uni- 
versal determinism contrasts interestingly with that of 
Augustine and Calvin. In the case of these older thinkers 
the dogma grew out of a religious experience and was ground-
5Alexander V.G.Alien, Life and Writings of Jonathan Edwards, 
p. 60.
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ed in certain fundamental values. Their starting point was 
the experience of unmeritedjgrace (and with Calvin, also the 
desire for assurance), and the doctrine of sovereignty, in- 
volving universal predestination, was postulated as the im- 
plication of this experience. It was thus with them second- 
ary to the belief in free grace and the desire for assurance. 
With the authors of the Canons of Port and of the Westminster 
Confession, however, sovereignty, as expressed in the divine 
decrees, was taken practically for its own sake. Edwards 
followed in their footsteps. Taking the sovereignty of God, 
the divine decrees, as his point of departure, he developed 
this fundamental conception in all its ramifications through- 
out his entire theological system.
All his deterministic writings carry out this funda- 
mental idea of the sovereignty of God. The various deter- 
ministic doctrines are, indeed, only the manifestations of 
this "basic principle. His zeal for establishing it, as we 
have seen, was stimulated by the spread of Arminianism, 
which cut at its roots with the assertion of man's power of 
contrary choice. Should Arminianism carry the day, and 
God's sovereignty be repudiated, he felt that all bf value 
in religion would be lost. "The danger,the evil he depre- 
cated, was this, that men would think God had left the 
world to take care of itself, or that without God's aid they 
could accoKDlish their salvation." Thus the motive inkll
Alexander V.G.Alien, in Jonathan Edwards; A Retrospect, 
(Norman Gardiner, Ed.), p. 28.
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his deterministic works was apologetic, and none of them can 
be regarded as a dispassionate inrestigation of the subject 
with which it deals. This fact is recognized even by his 
most admiring biographers, such for instance as Henry Rogers, 
who remarks that the Enquiry was written for the purpose of 
refuting Arminianism, and must be viewed, along with all the 
works of Edwards, "in relation to the peculiarities of that
(the Arminian) system, and as far as Edwards' intention
7goes, to them alone." "The essay on the Freedom of the
Will", says John De Witt, "is essentially a polemic, and 
only incidentally a constructive treatise. As a polemic,
Q
therefore, it must be judged. 11 ° This Enquiry and the 
Treatise on Original Sin, the two greatest of Edwards' deter- 
ministic works, were written during the passion engendered 
by his banishmenlJfrom Northampton, a banishmenl/which Edwards 
traced, in its final analysis, to the influence of Arminian- 
ism, as he implied in his Farewell Sermon, In these works 
his deep seated intellectual conviction was thus abetted by 
a strong personal feeling.
The idea of God as sovereign bears a close affinity 
to Edwards' earlier philosophical idealism. In both his 
theology and his philosophy the absoluteness of God is 
primary, the difference being that in his theology Goo^is 
thought of as Absolute Will, whereas in his philosophy He
Henry Rogers, Essay on the Genius and Writings of Jonathan 
Edwards, in The Works of Jonathan Edwards, ed. by Edward 
Hickman, Vol. I, p. xxi.
8John DeWitt, Jonathan Edwards: A Study, in Princeton Theo- 
logical Review, II, January 1904, p. 105.
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is thought of as Absolute Mind. To shift from his philoso- 
phy to his theology by the feature of absoluteness common to 
both of them was thus very easy, and there is nothing in Ed- 
wards' writings to indicate that he felt he was making a 
transition from one to another type of thought when he moved 
from philosophy into theology. Indeed, there are indications 
that he retained his early philosophical views all through 
his theological career.
Some debate has centered around the question whether 
Edwards 1 idea of the absoluteness of God involved pantheism. 
Among certain recent writers, in particular, the tendency has
Qbeen to interpret him as basically pantheistic, or as in- 
consistently holding a pantheistic philosophy in conjunction 
with Calvinistic theism.
The attribution of pantheism to Edwards is certainly 
not groundless. He was innately a mystic, as is evident 
throughout his Diary and on many a page of hi smother writings. 
His statements about his mystic experiences, it has been said, 
reveal a "naive and unreflecting pantheism." In both his 
earliest and latest writings he uses language which identi- 
fies God and the world. In the youthful Notes on the Mind 
he says: "Hence we learn how properly it may be said, that 
God ^s, and that there is none else." He remarks further 
that God "is the Infinite, Universal and All-comprehending,
9 Cf. Frederic^ Ives Carpenter, The Radicalism of Jonathan Ed- 
wards, in New England Quarterly, October 1931.
11 Cf. A.C.McGiffert, Jr., Jonathan Edwards, pp 180-183. 
Jonathan Edwards, Notes on the Mind, in Works, Edited by 
S. E. Dwight, Vol. I, p. 688.
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Existence....He is in himself, if I may say so, an Infinite 
Quantity of Existence." 32 A little later he writes as fol- 
lows: "Seeing God has so plainly revealed himself to us; and 
other minds are made in his image, and are emanations from 
him; we may judge what is the Excellence of other minds, by 
what is his, which we have shown is Love." 1^ It is probably 
going too far to say with H. Norman Gardiner*4 that the 
whole trend of Edwards 1 thought in his early writings is 
toward a comprehensive idealism which makes God all in all, 
for there are many non-pantheistic elements in the Notes on 
the Mind. But that the pantheistic conception is prominent 
cannot be denied.
In Edwards' posthumous work, Go d * a Chief End in 
Creation, the idea of God as the sum total of existence and 
the world as an emanation from Him again appears. God is 
sometimes spoken of as an expansive substance: "Therefore, 
to speak strictly according to truth, we may suppose, that a 
disppeition in God, as an original property of his nature, to 
an emanation of his own infinite fulness, was what excited 
him to create the world; and so, that the emanation itself 
was aimed at by him as a last end of the creation." 15 
Later we find this remarkable passage: "But now, with respect
l pEdwards, Notes on the Mind, ut supra, p. 698.
I3 ibid, p. 699.
14Cf. H. Norman Gardiner, The Early"Idealism of Edwards, in
Jonathan Edwards: A Retrospect.
Jonathan Edwards, God's'Chief End in Creation, Works, 
Vol. I, p. 460. (See Bibliography for full title.)
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to the divine Being, there is no such thing as confined 
selfishness in him, or a love to himself opposite to general 
benevolence. It is impossible, because he comprehends all 
entity, and all excellence, in his own essence. The eternal 
and infinite Being, is in effect, Being in general; and com- 
prehends universal existence. God, in his benevolence to 
his creatures, cannot have his heart enlarged, in such a 
manner as to take in beings who are originally out of him- 
self, distinct and independent. This cannot be in an infin-
1 6ite being, who exists alone from eternity." Erich 
Voegelin sees this posthumously published work as the cul- 
mination of the pantheistic tendency exhibited in Edwards 1 
early philosophical writings. "In den Jugendwerken halten 
sich die mystischen Erlebnisse und die auf ihnen ruhende 
Philosophic innerhalb der typischen Bewegung vom Prades- 
tinationsglauben zur personlichen Versicherung der Auswahl; 
in den letzten Werken scheint ddeser Zusammenhang durch- 
brocken zu sein: die pantheistische Mystik ist selbstandig 
geworden, sie ist nicht mehr ein Moment im Seelenbeben des 
! Purinaners, sondern hat die calvinistische Dogmatik im 
Herzen aufgegeben (wenn auch nicht dem Wort nach) und 
findet die Mitte des religiosen Lebens in der Verbindung 
mit Gott. Nicht mehr Christus vermittelt die Gewissheit 
der gottlichen Auswahl, sondern der eine ungeteilte Gott 
selbst stromt aus in die Welt und umfasst uns als eihen
16
Edwards, God's Chief End in Creation, Works, Vol. I, 
p. 479.
106 
Teil seiner selbst." 17
The pantheistic elements in God's Chief End in Creation 
and the Notes on the Mind speak for themselves. Edwards' 
belief in universal necessity also lends itself easily to 
the pantheistic type of thought. In spite of these things, 
however, it is a misinterpretation to adjudge him a pantheist. 
In the Notes o_n the Mind there are quite as many passages 
which distinguish God and the world, God and the creature, 
as there are which identify them. The dissertation on God's 
Chief End in Creation, it is true, asserts that God ains 
at His own glory, the expression of His own attributes, and 
in the elaboration of this idea pantheistic language is 
natural. But it is incorrect to say that the essay's funda- 
mental theme involves an identification of God and the 
world. Here, as in the Notes on the Mind, Edwards speaks on 
every page of God's creating the world in/time, an idea op- 
posed to that of eternal emanation, and he is continually 
distinguishing God and the creature. He makes it clear that 
God's end in creation must be something distinct from His 
own existence. "Thus God's existence and infinite perfection, 
though infinitely valuable in themselves, cannot be supposed
to be the end of any divine operation; for we cannot conceive
IBof them as, irpny respect, consequent on any works of God." 
Joseph Haroutunian is right in saying that Edwards "never
17Erich Voegelin, Ueber die Form des Amerikanischen Geistes,
p. HI. 
Jonathan Edwards, God's Chief End in Creation, Works,
Vol. I, p. 452.
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19 fails to distinguish between God and the world." Except
for the cases noted above, there is no suggestion of pan- 
theism in his works. On the other hand, the personality of 
God, and the reality of sin and oyindividual responsibility 
are fundamental themes of his preaching and writing.
In view of the fact that Edwards approached his deter- 
ministic system through the fundamental notion of God as 
sovereign, the Predestiner of all things, rather than through 
one omts more specialized forms of expression, such for 
instance as the doctrine of efficacious grace, the logical 
an^natural point at which to begin the study of his deter- 
minism is with the doctrine of the decrees, which contains 
his teaching on sovereignty in its most generalized form. 
After studying the decrees, we shall move on to his teaching 
in regard to volition, in order to see the implications of 
his conception of God's sovereignty for human freedom. With 
this as a background we shall take up his doctrine of orig- 
inal sin, where he deals with the possibility and results of 
sin's entry into the world. We shall then be prepared for a 
study of hi s|t each ing on grace, and, following that, for an 
examination of his doctrine of perseverance.
* 9Joseph Hnroutunian, Jonathan Edwards, A Study in Godliness, 
in Journal of Religion, Vol. XI, July 1931, p. 413.
CHAPTER V 
THE DIVINE DECREES
We find references to the doctrine of the decrees 
scattered through Edwards* works, particularly in the 
Enquiry. But there is one rather "brief essay with the 
title, Concerning the Divine Decrees in General, and 
Election in Particular* the date of which is not exactly 
known, from which we glean most of/our knowledge of his 
teaching on this important subject. The essay, as we 
have called it, is in reality only a series of discon- 
nected remarks which he had presumably contemplated organ*
2 i^ing into a treatise. Its paragraphs, however, were
left in complete disorder, and it is only with difficulty 
that a systematic statement can be extracted from them. 
It/gives no evidence of Edwards' power of ingenious and 
sustained argument which is so markedly exhibited in his 
treatises on the will and on original sin. Nevertheless, 
in spite of these difficulties, it furnishes sufficient 
material to enable us to exhibit his teaching on the de- 
crees incomplete form.
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I. The Decrees in General
Edwards devoted a good deal of discussion to the de- 
crees in general. To "begin with, he explains that God's 
decreeing anything is the same as God's willing that thing. 
"Now, it is self-evident, that if He knows all things be- 
fore hand, He either doth approve of them or He doth not 
approve of them; that is, He either is willing that they 
should be, or He is not willing that they should be. But 
to will that they should be is to decree them..." 1 (God's 
"being willing" that a thing should happen and His willing 
it to take place are, for Edwards, the same.) He takes the 
position also that God's decreeing or willing a thing is in 
reality the same as His act in the execution of the decree, 
with the distinction that the decree is the act with respect 
to tfuture: time. The decree and its execution, thus, differ 
only relatively.
Every single event which ever has taken place, or will, 
is decreed by God, according to Edwards. Other Calvinistic 
theologians have regarded Adam as possessed of a real power 
of contrary choice. Not so Edwards. Adam's will, he taught, 
was determined by his holy nature and thus, in the last 
analysis, by God's will, in precisely the same manner in 
which our wills are determined by our nature. As we shall 
see, he regards us as possessing all the freedom conceivable, 
and yet all our acts are necessary. This assertion that all
Jonathan Edwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, 
Vol. VIII, p. 351.
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our acts are necessary reveals a further difference between 
Edwards and many other deterministic theologians, for they 
often taught, as did Augustine, that man has the power of 
contrary choice except in regard to the acceptance of 
Christ. To Edwards everything in nature and man is under 
the sway of necessity, i.e., all is decreed by the will of 
God.
The decrees in Edwards 1 view are absolute. That is to 
say, they are not conditioned upon foresight of anything in 
the creature. "It is commonly said, God decrees nothing 
upon a foresight of any thing in the creature; as this, they
say, argues imperfection in God; and so it does, taken in
p 
the sense that they commonly intend it... 11 The Arminian
notion of conditional decrees is of course unacceptable to 
Edwards because it involves the belief that the creature's 
acts in reality are not decreed. That the decrees are abso- 
lute is revealed also in the fact that there is no temporal 
sequence in them. Priority in time would imply a subordina- 
tion of one-decree to another, which is incompatible with 
the idea of absoluteness.
In connection with the absoluteness of God's decrees, 
a question of cardinal importance arises. Did, or did not, 
Edwards teach that God exercises a naked sovereignty, an 
arbitrary will, above, and independent of, His character? 
There idno doubt but that, in some of his^earlier works, he 
did. As A.V.G.Allen remarks: "One ruling principle of his
2Edwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Vol. VIII, 
p. 356.
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career as a practical theologian was the Augustinian idea/of
3 
God as absolute and arbitrary will." This position was
taken in the sermon, God's Sovereignty in the Salvation of 
Men, In regard to man's salvation he there remarks that "it 
is God's mere will and sovereign pleasure which supremely 
orders this affair. It is the divine wil^without restraint, 
or constraint, or obligation." 4 God has a perfect right "to 
dispose of all his creatures according to his mere pleasure.. 1' 5 
He can bestow salvation on the vilest sinner, if He chooses, 
and withhold it from the best of men. nothing outside Him- 
self, and no principles within Him can lay any trammel upon 
this perfect liberty. M If it would in itself be prejudicial 
to any of hi^attributes to bestow or refuse salvation, then
God would not in that matter act as absolutely sovereign, be-
/  
cause it then ceases to be a merely arbitrary thing. 11 ° No
statement could make clearer the independence of the divine 
will from the divine character. This same stress on God as 
will is apparent in Edwards' sermon, God Glorifiedftn Man's 
Dependence. There are also some scattering statements in 
the remarks,Concerning the Divine Decrees ,to the effect 
that God's sovereign acts must be accepted, even though they 
cannot be reconciled with His character, thus/implying that 
His "mere good pleasure" is the final arbiter of His conduct. 
This position, however, is set aside in Edwards' later
3Alexander V.G.Alien, Life and Writingsof Jonathan Edwards,
A P« 20 « 
Jonathan Edwards, God's Sovereignty in the Salvation of Men,
Works, Vol. X, p. 202. A 
°ibid, p. 203. °ibid, p. 204.
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theological development, and the contradictory notion of 
God's will as directed by His wisdom and holiness takes its 
place. The bulk of the teaching in his remarks. Concerning 
the Divine Decrees .bears this out. Each decree, he says, 
fits into an harmonious scheme of the decrees. "What we mean", 
he writes, "we completely express thus - That God decrees 
all things harmoniously, and in excellent order, one thing 
harmonizes with another, and there is such a relation be-
n
tween all the decrees, as makes the most excellent order." 
Each decree is made with its relationship to the others in 
view. "But nobody, I believe, will deny but that God de- 
crees many things that he would not have decreed, if he had 
not foreknown and foredetermined such and such other
Q
things." 0 In the achievement of this harmony some decrees, 
or parts of decrees, are "prior" to the others,- prior not 
in a temporal sense but inllogical order. The harmony and 
the logical order obtaining among them implies that they are 
made in accordance with God's wisdom and character,there 
being a reason or justification for each. "God has regard 
to conditions in his decrees, as he has regard to a wise 
order and connection of things. Such is his wisdom in his 
decrees, and all his acts and operations, that, if it were 
not for wise connection that is regarded,many'things would 
not be decreed." 9 Andjjust before this remark we have the 
explicit statement that God elects wisely and with regard to
7Bdwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Vol.VIII,
^ibid, p. 356. /P. 356.
9 ibid, p. 380.
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the common good. This insistence upon the harmony and wis- 
dom of the decrees is clearly inconsistent with the position 
that they are fiats of an arbitrary will.
whenever Edwards defends the doctrine of the decrees 
against criticism, he does so by showing that the ends to 
which the decrees are directed are ethically unimpeachable. 
Those decrees which he feels seem to reflect discredit on 
God's character,and thusfto imply a naked sovereignty, are 
never said to be ends in'themselves, but always only means 
to more ultimate, morally justifiable ends. For instance, 
God's vindictive justice is a means, not an end. His per- 
mission of sin is a means rather than an end in itself, and 
can be justified only because it presumably redounds to the 
greatest good.
The question might be raised as to whether the funda- 
mental or ultimate decrees are not held by Edwards to be 
arbitrary. There are two such decrees which he speaks of 
as relating to "mere or ultimate" ends, namely, the decree 
of God to glorify His love and communicate His goodness, 
and the decree to glorify His holiness and greatness. These 
decrees, relating to "mere and ultimate" ends, are not con- 
ditioned on any prior decree, but are themselves prior not 
only to the decree of the fall of man, but even to his 
creation. Being ends infth ems elves, they cannot be justi- 
fied in the same way as those which are a means to the work- 
ing out o^fanother decree. It will be noticed, however, that 
in"both these cases (with the exception of the design of 
glorifying His/greatness) the decree is a decree to give
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expression to God's moral attributes. It is, therefore, an 
act of will which is in accordance with His character. As 
to the decree to glorify His greatness, while it is not 
directed to the expression of a moral attribute, and while 
it is a "mere and ultimate 11 decree, it is nevertheless, 
according to Edwards, in harmony with the other decrees 
which are aimed at moral ends, and must therefore be morally 
justifiable.
In the two great works toward the close of his career, 
the Enquiry into the Freedom of the Will and the Treatise on 
Original Sin, the position that God's will is in harmony 
with His wisdom and character is strongly emphasized. Both 
works show Edwards trying tavindicate God's actions in the 
permission of sin, election, etc., at the bar of ethics. 
Both contain specific assertions that God is not essentially 
an arbitrary will, but rather a moral governor. In the 
Enquiry,for instance, we have the following statement: 
"God's actions, and particularly those which he exerts as a 
moral governor, have moral qualifications, and are morally 
good in the highest degree. They are most perfectly holy 
and righteous; and we must conceive of Him as influenced in 
the highest degree, by that which, above all others, is 
properly a moral inducement; viz the moral good which He 
sees in such and such things. 1*10 In the Treatise on Original 
Sin Edwards speaks of God's identification of us and Adam 
in the first sin as arbitrary, and then follows with this
10 Jonathan Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 155.
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statement: "When I call this an arbitrary constitution. 1 
mean, that it is a constitution which depends on nothing
but the divine will; which divine will depends on nothing
11but the divine wisdom. M Most significant of all, how- 
ever, as we shall later see, is the fact that the determin- 
ation of God's will by His holy nature and His wisdom is a 
prominent teaching of the Enquiry. God's will, Edwards 
there asserts, is no more free than ours, but must always 
follow the divine inclination.
It thus appears that there are two conflicting view- 
points in Edwards 1 thought on the matter of the divine will, 
but that the conception of it as moral, rather than arbi- 
trary, is more extensively taught and is the position of 
his later and maturer works. We need have no hesitancy in 
identifying this as his real view. He is one with the 
Calvin of The Agreement with the Genevese Pastors, his 
accord with the Calvin of the Institutes being only a pass- 
ing phase o^his intellectual career. He was, as Winfield 
Burggraaff^ points out, swayed from the stricter and 
purer Calvinism by his longing to make Christianity reason- 
able, and by the desire to meet the attacks made on Calvin- 
ism by the Arminians in the name of morality.
The doctrine that God's decrees are not mere arbitrary 
fiats, but acts dictated by wisdom and holiness, and thus
11Jonathan Edwards, The Great Christian Doctrine of Original 
19 Sin Defended, Works, Vol. II, p. 356. 
^Winfield Burggraaff, The Rise and Development of Liberal 
Theology in America, p. 121.
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directed to worthy ends, suggests that God has a supreme pur- 
pose in His decrees. It is appropriate that we ask at this 
point what that purpose, according to Edwards, is* In his 
essay on God's Chief EndJln Creation he approaches the ques- 
tion both through reason and Scripture, reaching the conclu- 
sion that God's one ultimate purpose is His own glory. "Thus 
we see that the great end of God's warks, which is so var- 
iously expressed in Scripture, is indeed but One; and this
one end is most properly and comprehensively called The
1 ̂  Glory Of God."* This is in keeping with the position in
his Dissertation on the Nature of True Virtue, where he says
that God should be the object of His own greatest love,
f 
inasmuch as He possesses the greatest share of existence and
of moral excellence. "Prom hence also it is evident, that
the divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind, must
14 
consist primarily in love to himself.* The glory of God
is "the emanation and true external expression of God's in- 
ternal glory and fulness." 15 It includes "the exercise of 
God's perfections to produce a proper effect....the mani- 
festation of his internal glory to created understandings... 
the communication of the infinite fulness of God to the 
creature...the creature's high esteem of God, love to Him, 
and the complacence and joy in Him; and the proper exer- 
cises and expressions of these."
13v^Edwards, God's Chief End in Creation, Works,Vol.I, p.528.
Edwards, A Dissertation Concerning the Nature of Tarue 
,R Virtue, Works, Vol. II, p. 23.
^Edwards, God's Chief End in Creation, Works,Vol.I, p.526. 
16 ibid, pp 526-527.
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While holding that God's chief and ultimate end is His 
own glory, Edwards is at great pains to explain that this in- 
volves the creature's good and happiness. It is a mistake, 
he declares, to view God's glory and the good of the crea- 
ture as "properly and entirely distinct." Were we capable 
of more perfect views of God and divine things, we should 
see that these things, instead of appearing entirely dis- 
tinct, are implied in one another. "God, in seeking his 
glory, seeks the good of /his creatures; because the emanation 
of his glory (which he seeks and delights in, as he delights
in himself and his own external glory) implies the communica-
17 
ted excellency and happiness of his creatures." Edwards,
however, is thinking only of those creatures who are elect. 
Nowhere in the discussion of the chief end for which God 
created the world does he speak of those whose lot is not to 
enjoy God's communicated blessings, but rather to remain 
eternal objects of His wrath. In fact, in elucidating the 
meaning of God's seeking His own glory, he doespot speak of 
the glorifying ojfais/justice as involved. The whole stress 
is in God's love, benevolence, knowledge, etc.,- those 
attributes whose expression would enhance the virtue and hap- 
piness of man. When he comes to discuss the specific de- 
crees, which are the most concrete expressions of the activ- 
ity by which God seeks His glory, the difficulty introduced 
by the decree of reprobation arises. When thisldecree is 
considered, it becomes apparent that God's seeking His glory
1 Edwards, God's Chief End in Creation, Works,Vol. I, p.477.
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involves the good and happiness of some of His creatures 
"but lay no means of all of them.
II. The Divine Decrees and Human Sin 
That the doctrine of the decrees ascribes to God the 
decreeing of sin Edwards is quite ready to grant. True, it 
is "by a permissive decree that sin takes place, "but this does 
not obviate the fact that it is decreed. "If God wills to 
permit a thing that it may come to pass, then he wills that
T8it should come to pass." Edwards does not stop with the 
simple recognition that sin is inevitably part of a doc- 
trine of unconditional decrees. He even brings forward a 
number of more specific arguments in proof of the divine 
authorship of sin. God must will sin and the refusal of 
Christ, he says, because, foreseeing who would sin, He could 
have refused to give being to him. This is of course a 
favorite argument of the determinist and there is a certain 
amount of truth in it. If we grant God's foreknowledge of 
human actions, we cannot deny that He is ultimately respon- 
sible in some sense for sin in the world, seeing He is 
responsible for the world. But we touch the nerve of the 
matter only when we ask whether to grant this is to concede 
God's decreeing of sin. Edwards replies in the affirmative, 
thereby assuming the deterministic position that to permit 
sin isfto decree it. His Arminian opponents would reply in 
the negative and insist that God's responsibility consists
18
Edwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees,Works,Vol.VIII,p.360.
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only in His making sin possible,- that His permission of it 
is quite different from His decreeing it. The argument is 
thus not independent, but derives its force from the 
strength of the deterministic position as a whole, which is 
precisely the question at stake. This same general criti- 
cism may be made of two other arguments Edwards brings for- 
ward. In the first of these he reasons that God could have 
willed that all men should be perfect without infringing 
*H&e» their liberty, because He has actually done this in 
the case of the angels and saints in heaven, and of those He 
has decreed to accept Christ and be saved. Here he is 
obviously assuming the truth of determinism. The other ar- 
gument runs as follows: God has decreed His own acts and 
therefore His punishment of sin from all eternity; but if 
so, the sin to be punished must be certain, and therefore 
necessary. Here the deterministic presupposition is that 
certain foreknowledge of an act implies its determination. 
We can deal with the questions involvedVin these assumptions 
more properly later on.
The most significant thing in regard to God*s relation 
to the existence of sin is Edwards' teaching that His moral 
attributes, as well as His natural, require the decreeing of 
sin. Sin isfaecessary, he says, in order that "the shining 
forth of God's glory should be complete." 19 If God's holi- 
ness in the hatred of sin and His majesty and justice in
19Bdwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Voi. VIII, 
p. 358.
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the punishment of it are to be revealed, sin must come into 
existence. "Thus it is necessary, that God's awful majesty, 
his authority and dreadful greatness, justice and holiness,
should be manifested. But this could not be, unless punish- 
on 
ment has been decreed." Similarly God's love can be
manifested at its highest only in the pardoning of sin, and 
His goodness properly appreciated only in contrast to it. 
"There would be no manifestation of God's grace or true good- 
ness, if there was no sin to be pardoned, no misery to be 
saved from. How much happiness soever he bestowed, his
goodness would not be so much prize^and admired, and the
21 sense of it not so great." This completer revelation of
God's attributes will also redound to the greater happiness
of the creature, "because the creature's happiness'consists
pp in the knowledge of God, and a sense of his love. ll<5* Thus
the decreeing of sin is justified because it serves good 
ends. And only in such cases is it permitted, God restrain- 
ing it when a good is not in view.
Edwards expressly denies that the good is ever that of 
upholding freedom injbhe creature. "If he permits it for 
the sake of that good, then he does not permit it merely 
because he would infringe on the creature's liberty in 
restraining it, as is further evident, because he does 
restrain it when that good iataot in view." 3 In the final 
analysis it is'never creaturely good that God has primarily
20Edwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works,Vol.VIII,p.358, 
2Jibid, pp 358-359., . 
22 ibid) p. 359. 23 ibid, pp 359-360.
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in view in permitting sin, but always the "shining forth of 
his own glory." The good that comes to the creaturarcomes 
as a corollary to this. Edwards' position here is thus in 
effect that sin is only a "seeming". To hold that sin is 
decreed, but only for good ends, is in the final analysis to 
deny the evil of sin, to deny that sin is sin.
While Edwards makes it clear beyond all doubt that God 
decrees sin, he conceives of God's relation to the sin He de- 
crees as different from that to the good He decrees. The 
elect Christian has no merit for his good; but the non-elect 
sinner is responsible for his sin. The distinction between 
God's relation to decreed sin and decreed good is that the 
former only iaaecreed permissively. And to say that God 
decrees sin by permitting it is not to say that He produces 
or commits sin. "I do not argue, that God may commit evil,
that good may come of it; but that he may permit that it
24 come to pass, that good may come of it." If God produced
or committed sin, Edwards admits, His character could not be
cleared. "It is in itself absolutely evil, for any being to
2 5 
commit evil, that good may come of it." By virtue of the
permissive character of the decree of sin, then, God does 
not directly produce it, and He is/thus free from blame.
There is a difference, Edwards conceives, between God's 
committing sin and permitting it, even when the latter means 
causingdt to be by an inevitable pre-determination. To the
*Edwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Vol.VIII, 
p. 386. /P. 386.
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indeterminist this distinction is entirely specious: for 
God to decree sin is for Him to will it, as Edwards himself 
insists, and to will it is to commit it. So he reasons, and 
thus denies that the determinist has any right to use the 
term, permit>to characterize God's relation to sin. Edwards 
himself vacillates somewhat on this question. When he is 
trying to prove the doctrine of the decrees, he insists that 
God's causation of sinful acts in the creature is the same 
as His causation of good acts. But when he is defending the 
character of God against the implications of this view, he 
has recourse to the distinction between the permissive and 
the non-permissive decrees. This distinction is made use of 
in his account of the fall, and we shall see when we come to 
study the latter just what is meant by God's "permitting" sin.
III. Predestination, Election, and Reprobation 
Edwards uses the term, predestination, to designate 
God's total will with regard to man. As a matter of fact he 
employs the word very little (only four times in his remarks, 
Concerning the Decrees) and gives no definition of the exact 
meaning he attaches to it. We can see, however, in the fol- 
lowing quotation, that he uses it to indicate the all-inclu- 
sive decree relating to human beings. "Hence we may learn, 
how much in the decree of predestination is^to be considered 
as prior to the creation and fall of man, and how much as 
posterior; viz. that God's decree to glorify his love and 
communicate his goodness, and to glorify his greatness and
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holiness, is to be considered as prior to creation and the
26 fall of man." Predestination thus includes God's decree
to glorify His love and communicate His goodness and the 
decree to glorify His holiness and greatness; and we have 
seen that these are the fundamental decrees. All the others 
are subordinate decrees or parts of these. Hence, the de- 
cree of predestination covers all God's dealings with men, 
and, it is to be noted, includes the decree of reprobation.
The first of the two major parts of the/d ecree of 
predestination, namely, the decree of God to glorify His 
love and communicate His goodness, is accomplished by the 
decree of election. In this God decrees to bestow happiness 
on certain fallen creatures, and thereby to glorify His 
mercy and grace. On one occasion Edwards uses language 
which suggests that he conceives of the decree of election 
as subsequent to the/d ecree of glorifying God's mercy and 
grace. His general usage, however, indicates that he treats 
these as in reality one decree or as coordinate decrees. 
"The first things in order in this decree are, that God will
communicate his happiness,and glorify his grace; (for these
\ 27 two seem to be coordinate.)" '
This decree, it is clearly stated, is not an end in 
itself. The bestowal of happiness and the glorification of 
God's mercy and grace is the means by which God's love is 
glorified and His goodness communicated. Here we have an
26^Edwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Vol. VIII, 
27 ibid, p. 381. /P« 383.
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illustration of how one decree, which is the end, may be 
"prior" in God's mind, to that decree which is the means of 
attaining it. The place of election in the order of the 
decrees is emphasized by Edwards. While, as we have seen, 
God's decree to glorify His love and communicate His good- 
ness is prior even to the creation of man, the decree of 
election presupposes not only the being but also the sin of 
man. "And the decree of election, as it implies a decree 
of glorifying God's mercy and grace, considers men as being 
cursed and fallen; because the very notion of such a decree
2 ft supposes sin and misery." ° On the other hand, the decree
of election doesnot presuppose faith and good works. "God, 
in the decree of election, is justly to be considered as 
decreeing the creature's eternal happiness, antecedently to
PQany foresight of good works. nf>v For there is nothing, he 
goes on to explain, in the notion of God's communicating 
His'own happiness nor in the notion of grace which necessarily 
implies faith or good works.
Elsewhere, however, he has this to say: "...both God's 
act, and also his decree of bestowing salvation on such a 
fallen creature, is, in some respects, grounded on God's act 
and decree of giving faith....Indeed, the salvation of an 
elect soul is, in this^respect, grounded on the decree of 
giving faith, as God's decree of bestowing happiness on the 
elect in this particular way." 30 This seems to mean that
28
Edwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Vol.VIII,
ibid, p. 380. /P. 383. 
p. 385.
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while salvation is not necessarily grounded on faith, as 
punishment isjon sin, it is nevertheless based on it in some 
sense, since God has chosen to make it the condition of sal- 
vation. If this leaves Edwards 1 teaching on this particular 
point somewhat obscure, it is only a part of the general 
difficulty which attaches to his teaching as to the order of 
the^decrees. We shall discuss this difficulty later on.
It will be noticed that in his doctrine of the place 
of election in the order of the decrees, Edwards is attempt- 
ing to show that God's act in election is justified because 
it reveals His mercy and grace and thus glorifies His love 
and goodness. He is careful not to represent election as 
an end in itself* In answer to the criticism that it shows 
partiality in God, he replies that it is dictated by God's 
wisdom and by His regard for worthy ends. "Besides,unjus- 
tifiable partiality is^iot imputable to a sovereign dis- 
tribution of his favours, though ever so unequally, unless 
it be done unwisely, and so as to infringe the common good. l|
Let us now turn to the second of the two fundamental 
decrees included in that of predestination, namely, the de- 
cree of God to glorify His holiness and greatness. Just as 
election is/the means of securing the glorification of God f s 
love and the communication of His goodness, so by the decree 
of reprobation God glorifies His holiness and greatness. In
31Edwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Vol.VIII, 
p. 380.
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reprobation He manifests His vindictive justice in the pun- 
ishment of non-elect sinners with eternal misery. The idea 
of the wicked's proving of some value in the scheme of 
things by serving as the means for the expression of certain 
divine attributes held a strange fascination for Edwards. 
One of his sermons was entitled, Wicked Men Useful in Their 
Destruction Only, and in it he made the point that the per- 
dition of ungodly men glorifies "both God's vindictive justice 
and His majesty. 32 In another sermon he added that God's 
grace is also indirectly glorified, since by the punishment 
of sinners, "the saints will be made the more sensible how 
great their salvation is." 33
Reprobation like election is not an end in itself, but 
a means to an end. Its religion to the end it subserves is 
clearly stated by Edwards. "Indeed, God's glorifying his 
justice, or rather his glorifying his holiness and greatness, 
has the place of a mere and ultimate end. But his glorify- 
ing his justice in punishing sin, (or in the exercising vin- 
dictive justice, which is the same), is not to be considered 
as a mere end,but a certain way or means of obtaining an 
end." 34 This means that in the order of the decrees God's 
glorifying of His holiness and greatness isfprior to the de- 
cree of reprobation. As we have seen, God's glorifying of 
His holiness and greatness is prior even to the creation of
32 Edwards, Wicked Men Useful in Their Destruction Only,
Works, Vol. VI, pp 542-543. 
33Bdwards, The Eternity of Hell Torments, Works, Vol. VII,
P. 480. 
54]Bdwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Vol. VIII,
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man, "but the decree 46 reprobate, like the decree to elect, 
is to be thought of as posterior "both to the creation and to 
the fall. "His having sin, is the foundation of both the 
fitness and possibility of justice being glorified in the 
punishment of his sins; and therefore,the consideration of 
the being of sin in the subject, must in some respedt be 
prior in the mind of the disposer, to the determination to 
glorify his justice in the punishment of sin." 35 Edwards is 
here trying to make it clear that reprobation takes place in 
view of the creature's sinfulness. He wishes to avoid the 
charge that in his teaching God decrees sin because he has 
previously decreed the/r eprobation of certain individuals. 
Here again he is attempting to show that the decrees can 
each be morally justified.
This/brings us naturally to the consideration of a 
difficulty in Edwards 1 idea of the order of the decrees. 
We have already noted that there is some ambiguity in his 
teaching as to the order of the decree of election and the 
decree to bestow faith on the elect. Another and more im- 
portant difficulty arises with regard to whether the decree 
to permit sin is to be regarded as prior to the decrees of 
election and reprobation. Upon this hangs the question 
whether Edwards is a sublapsarian. And it has important 
bearings also on his effort to reconcile the decrees with 
the character of God.
35Bdwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Vol. VIII, 
p. 381.
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In connection with the decree of election and repro- 
bation, we have noted Edwards' statements that they are 
posterior to the decree to permit sin. But in discussing 
the permission of si n he justified it as necessary to the 
revelation of God's holiness, justice, etc., and of His love, 
grace, etc., that is, as a condition of securing the ends 
aimed at inflection and reprobation. These decrees are 
then apparently prior to the decree permitting sin, since 
they are the ends for the attainment of which the permission 
of sin is a means. Here we have a genuine case of confusion 
in Edwards' thinking, and there is no way of saying what his 
real teaching is as to the order of these < decrees.
But the trouble is deeper than the question of the 
order of these particular decrees. Edwards is not really 
clear as to what constitutes priority. A decree may be 
prior to another, he says, when (1) it is the end of 
another, or (2) it is the ground of the other's fitness for 
obtaining its end.36 But one decree may, according to these 
criteria, be both prior and posterior to another. For in- 
stance, as Edwards himself says, the sinfulness of the 
reprobate is the ground upon which the punishment of sin is 
adapted to its end of glorifying God's vindictive justice. 
That is to say, sin is prior to reprobation according to 
the second criterion above. But according to the first, it 
is posterior, for God is said to have permitted sin that 
His holiness and justice might be revealed in punishing it.
36
Edwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Vol. VIII,
p. 381.
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The revealing of these attributes through the decree of 
reprobation is thus in part the end for which sin exists, 
and therefore the decree of reprobation is prior to the de- 
cree permitting sin.
It is probably impossible to show which of the two 
views Edwards really held, Utoat is. consistent is his at- 
tempt everywhere to vindicate ethically each decree, and it 
is this effort that has led to the difficulty* He is unable 
on the one hand to allow that God's permitting of sin is an 
end in itself, and yet, unless sin is the condition for the 
exercise of mercy and grace, and of vindictive justice, 
which, respectively, glorify God's love and goodness, and 
His holiness and greatness, it has no raison d'etre except 
existence in its own right. On the other hand, if Edwards 
grants that sin i^ the condition of election and reproba- 
tion, etc., he is saying simply that God's attributes are 
such that their proper manifestation necessitates the 
existence of sin,- an admission at which he naturally 
hesitates. Neither horn of the dilemma is inviting, and yet 
he has no other alternative.
In view of the ambiguity in Edwards' thought as to 
whether the decree permitting sin is prior to the decree of 
reprobation, it is impossible to say whether or not he was 
a supralapsarian. Professor Fisher felt very decidedly that 
he was. "We have seen that Edwards believed in predestina- 
tion in the extreae or supralapsarian form. He encloses/in 
the iron network of philosophica}6iecessity all intelligent
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beings. 110 ' it is apparently only on the ground that Edwards 
regarded Adam, like the rest of us, as being completely de- 
termined in his acts, thatfcrofessor Fisher takes his position. 
Frank Hugh Foster, writing more recently than Fisher, speaks 
more guardedly of M the substantial supralapsarianism" in 
which Edwards had left the New England theology. 38 Other 
students of Edwards have, perhaps discreetly, avoided the 
problem. It deserves to be said, however, in reply to 
Fisher andFoster, that there is at least as much ground for 
regarding Edwards as a sublapsarian ass for taking the oppo- 
site view. We cannot overlook the occasions upon which he 
specifically insists on the fact that God reprobates the 
non-elect in view of their sin. And this position, it should 
be observed, is in keeping with his efforts to show that God's 
decrees are morally justifiable. The fact that he regards 
Adam's first sin as necessary seems hardly a sufficient rea- 
son for concluding that he is a supralapsarian. Even those 
Calvinistic thinkers who regard Adam as free in the first 
sin, 'nevertheless consider sin an object of a divine decree. 
The question is thus not whether God decreed the first sin, 
but whether it was decreed prior to the reprobation of the 
non-elect. In view, then, of what can be said on both sides 
of the question, we can only leave the matter of Edwards' 
supralapsarianism an unsolved problem.
37George Park Fisher, Discussions in History and Theology,
p. 247. 
38Frank Hugh Foster, A Genetic History of the New England
Theology, p. 225.
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The doctrine that God decrees some individuals both to 
sin and to reprobation, while at the same time commanding 
them to be righteous and to repent, involves the Calvinistic 
distinction between the secret and the revealed will of God. 
This distinction is necessary to account for the apparent in- 
consistency in holding that, while all things are determined 
by God's will, some things come to pass apparently against 
His will. In his essay on the decrees Edwards expounds and 
defends this doctrine of the two wills in God. The term,will, 
he points out, is in this doctrine taken in two senses. We
must distinguish between the willand the law of God, or His>«__^ *""**"
"will of decree 11 and His "will of command". (In the Enquiry 
he uses the terms disposing and preceptive to characterize 
respectively the two wills.) When we recognize this differ- 
ence, "it is not difficult at all to suppose, that the one 
may be otherwise than the other." God's will in both cases is 
"in his inclination", that is, due to His nature. But His 
revealed Will, or "will of command", is His willing a thing 
"absolutely and simply considered", i.e., because it is in 
itself agreeable to His nature; while His secret will, the 
effective "will of decree", is His willing a thing "with 
respect to the universality of things", that is, because, 
while it may be in itself undesirable, it is nevertheless de-
•ZQ
sirable when considered in relationship to other things. 0 '' 
The Enquiry makes it clear that a thing "absolutely and aim- 
ply considered" is a different object from that thing
39Bdwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Vol. VIII, 
pp 357-358.
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"with respect to the universality of things." To suppose a 
clash of God's wills with regard to the same object would 
be to ascribe an inconsistency to God. But when we recall 
that the objects are different, consistency itself demands 
that the wills be different. "There is no inconsistence in 
supposing, that God may hate a thing as it is in itself, and 
considered simply as evil, and yet that it may be his Will 
it should come to pass, considering all consequences."
IV. Arguments Proving the Decrees
Included in his discussion of God's decrees are a few 
briefly stated arguments in proof of their reality. Perhaps 
the one to which Edwards attaches the greatest weight is 
based on the foreknowledge of God. That God foreknows all 
things he of course takes as axiomatic, and from this rea- 
sons that God must decree all things, since the foresight of 
a contingent event is a contradiction. God can foreknow 
only that which He has foreordained, and since His foresight 
is universal, His foreordination must be likewise. This ar- 
gument is elaborated as one of the main proofs of the deter- 
mination of the will in the Enquiry, and will be taken up in 
detail in our next chapter.
A second argument in proof of the fact that God has 
decreed all things rests on Edwards' conviction that a con- 
tingent event is an impossibility. Contingency, he says, is 
identical with chance,and for an event to come to pass by
40Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 386.
133
chance is for it to come to pass without any cause whatso- 
ever, which is an absurdity. Everything which takes place 
does so as the result of a preceding cause, and this, in 
the last analysis, means that all events can be traced to 
God as the ultimate cause. We can be certain that God de- 
crees all things/then, not only because the foresight of a 
contingent event is impossible, but also because such an 
event is in its/own nature impossible. The weak link in 
this reasoning is the identification of contingency with 
chance and thus with causelessne^s. As this argument must 
also be dealt with at length when we come to study Edwards 1 
doctrine of the will, we shall not do more here than point 
out the questionable feature in it.
A third proof is very briefly touched on by Edwards, 
namely, the argument that if God does not decree all things, 
some events may take place which are inconsistent with His 
plan, a fact which would imply a limitation of His power. 
God is omnipotent, and this means that all things come to 
pass in accordance with His will, and therefore, to Edwards, 
as the result of His decree. This is much the strongest of 
the arguments brought forward to prove the doctrine of 
universal decrees, although Edwards barely more than men- 
tions it. There is, however, also a questionable assumption
reasoning. Must we assert that, because God is all- 
powerful, He cannot delegate freedom in a limited sphere to 
His creatures? Is it not at least arguable that to deny God
1
the power of endowing His creatures with the capacity of con- 
trary choice is itself to place a limitation upon His power?
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Does omnipotence mean more than that God is in control of 
His world? Must it mean that He can control His world only 
as He decrees everything which takes place in it? These 
are questions which we shall treat in the constructive por- 
tion of the thesis, hut we mention them here to suggest that 
the doctrine of universal decrees does not follow as a self- 
evident corollary from the doctrine of God's omnipotence.
In addition to these arguments advanced by Edwards in 
proof of the decrees in general, he also advances one, very 
"briefly stated, specifically in proof of the decree of 
election. It is the old argument that God must elect, if 
merit is not to be ascribed to man. "If there be no election, 
then it is not God that makes men to differ, expressly con- 
trary to Scripture. Some of the ill consequences of the Ar- 
minian doctrine are, that it robs God of the greater part of 
the glory of his grace, and takes away a principal motive 
to love and praise him, and exalts man to God's room, and 
ascribes that glory to self, which belongs to God alone."41 
The motive behind this argument seems inviolable: we can 
surely not brook a theory which robs God of His glory, or 
which lends itself to a Pharisaical doctrine of human merit. 
But the question arises whether or not, in view of this, we 
are forced to accept the doctrine of unconditional election. 
Is it true that God is robbed of His glory, and man enabled 
to merit salvation, if contingency is granted to the latter? 
Is there any room for "boasting" if man is granted the power
4135dwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees, Works, Vol. VIII, 
p. 370.
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of humbly accepting God's grace? To answer this question 
fully would be again to anticipate the constructive portion 
of the thesis. Suffice it therefore to say here that the 
assertion that unconditional election is the only alterna- 
tive to a doctrine of human merit at least requires proof,- 
and Edwards does not furnish this. He does as a matter of 
fact supplement this argument/in proof of election by a nu,- 
ber of Scriptural quotations and proof-texts, but, as we 
have already observed, it is not worth our while to repro- 
duce them.
V. The Divine Decrees and The Character of God 
Calvinism has always been criticized on the ground 
that it impugns the character of God. The defense against 
this charge has taken one of two lines. It has sometimes 
been replied that God's sovereignty lifts Him above the 
reach of criticism based on our moral conceptions, that "His 
ways are past finding out 11 , that His conduct must simply be 
accepted because it is His. This is the line of'defense 
usually made by those who picture God as being in essence 
arbitrary will. Edwards, as we have seen, chooses the other 
line of defense, seeking to vindicate God's conduct at the 
bar of our ethical standards. He thinks of God as morally 
perfect and seeks to show that His decrees are in harmony 
with His perfect character.
His method in this is to show that these decrees, or 
parts of decrees, which seem to reflect discredit upon God 
are justifiable, if not indeed in themselves,because they
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serve good ends. We have noted that the decree permitting 
sin is/justified because it makes possible the completer 
revelation of God's attributes. Election and reprobation, 
involving an apparently unjust discrimination between indi- 
viduals and eternal misery for non-elect creatures, are de- 
fended on the ground that they too serve the high end of 
giving expression to God's mercy, grace and vindictive jus- 
tice. And the cruelty and deception of appealing to crea- 
tures to be virtuous and repent by a "will of command", 
while a "will of decree" makes it impossible, are excusable 
since some must be foreordained to reprobation for the 
glory of God's justice. Thus God's character is cleared, 
because in each decree, however undesirable in itself, He 
is aiming at worthy ends.
Now the ultimate end which justifies all these things 
is the "shining forth of God's glory". It is the revealing 
of His attributes and the securing of their recognition by 
mankind which is His purpose. More exactly, this is His 
primary purpose, for the communicating of His goodness is 
given as a part of His fundamental aim, and here the crea- 
ture's good is obviously in view. The decrees indeed do 
result in the happiness of the elect. But having said this, 
it must be emphasized that the creature's good and happiness 
is a highly subordinate aim. It is usually the mere mani- 
festation of God's attributes that Edwards speaks of. Fur- 
ther, when the creature's good is/taken account of, it is a 
rule not conceived of as an end in itself, but as a means to
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the glorifying of God's love.
If we lack other evidence of the fact that it is God's 
glory and not the creature's good and happiness which is 
aimed at, the actual effects of the decrees should be more 
than sufficient, For their net result is the production of 
far more evil and misery than good and happiness. As the 
consequence of the decrees all men are sinful, not because 
the possibility of sin is necessary as a means of character 
development, but simply because God can be glorified through 
sin. A large part of mankind is preordained to eternal suf- 
fering from which there is no possibility of escape. That 
some are elected to eternal life serves only to emphasize 
the arbitrariness of their selection and the helpless plight 
of the damned. All this is true, and yet according to Ed- 
wards, God could have created all men good and have saved 
all. Clearly the good and happiness of the creature is so 
subordinate in God's purpose as to be of negligible signifi- 
cance.
The question which forces itself upon us is whether 
such an end justified the means, ¥e can brook the surgeon's 
knife for the good that comes from its use. But we can 
never justify the willing of suffering and evil by a person 
merely for the purpose of revealing that which is noble in 
his character. And so far as our moral sense is concerned, 
this would be indefensible even in a person of infinite 
worth and perfections. God is indeed worthy of the highest 
praise for possessing infinite perfections, but after all, 
what inherent value is there in His displaying those per-
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factions? Since it cannot be replied according to Edwards' 
teaching that this revelation is valuable because of the 
good it causes the creature, the only answer is that it is 
good in itself. But such a self-centered aim is not praise- 
worthy in a man, even if the means of its accomplishment are 
harmless. And we cannot say that God's moral perfection 
justifies such display in Him, for this desire to display 
one's attributes is precisely not what we associate with 
moral perfection. The only reply that we can make is that 
God's being sovereign justifies it. That is to say, His 
omnipotence justifies what is to us morally wrong. Now 
when we give this answer, we are departing from the position 
Edwards is striving to maintain, namely, that the doctrine 
of the decrees can be ethically vindicated. Yet this, in 
the final analysis is all that can be said. If we hold to a 
doctrine of universal decrees, we must do so with the under- 
standing that we forego the attempt to moralize God's aims 
in regard to man.
Even, however, if we could justify God's fundamental 
aim,- the kind of aim that a thoroughgoing determinism 
necessitates our ascribing to Him,- it is beyond all 
possibility to justify God's using such means to accomplish 
His aim. The willing of sin, arbitrary discrimination, 
deception, and eternal punishment of beings who were created 
only to be damned, constitute too dear a price to pay merely 
that a sovereign's glory be revealed. As a matter of fact 
such means could not accomplish the end, for they reveal, 
not a God of infinite perfection, but a God who is unloving,
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unjust, cruel and deceitful. In short, they reveal a God 
who is supreme only in power, and thus again the futility 
of trying to reconcile a doctrine of unconditional decrees 
with a God of perfect character.
It is not only true that the acts attributed to God 
in Edwards 1 doctrine of the decrees cannot be justified on 
the "basis of the end they are supposed to accomplish; some 
of them could never be justified on the basis of any con- 
ceivable end. For some of them are not merely undesirable 
means to worthy ends but are in/themselves wrong, and in- 
capable of extenuation under any circumstances. We could 
justify the permission of sin if such permission were 
necessary for the development of character. But can we 
ever excuse the injustice of unconditional election, or 
regard as loving the heart that creates individuals con- 
demned to eternal/suffering before their birth? Can" we-  T. 
palliate the doctrine of the secret and revealed will? 
These are things which, so far asw e can see, could under 
no circumstances be done with the right motives. To do 
them would be to sin,and as Edwards insists, we can never 
justify sinning that good may come.
It is clear, then, that Edwards fails to reconcile his 
doctrine of universal and absolutefaecrees with his idea of 
God's will as determined in all its acts by His holy in- 
clination. Absolute decrees imply either an arbitrary will, 
which is independent of God's character, or an imperfect 
character. The latter alternative is of course out of the 
question for a Christian theologian. Hence the only re-
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course left to Edwards is that which Calvin took in the 
Institutes, namely, the acknowledgment that God is essential- 
ly supreme will, that His will cannot be thought of as con- 
trolled "by His character, nor His acts be called to judg- 
ment by our moral standards.
Thus in Edwards we see the conflict between the idea 
of God as good and as sovereign in its most acute form. When 
thinking of God's will in its relation to His nature, he 
takes the position that it is controlled by that nature,and 
thus directed to the sublimest ends. That is to say, he 
holds that God's will is moral. But when thinking of God's 
will in relation to the universe, he champions a doctrine of 
universal and absolute decrees, in all its detailed impli- 
cations, which is in direct contradiction to the notion that 
God's will is moral,as we see morality. Strive as he may, 
he cannot divorce the conception of unconditional deerees 
from the ide^of God's will as arbitrary, except by the ut- 
terly untenable method of impugning Hi ̂ character.
"When it comes to deciding which was nearer his heart, 
the idea'of universal predestination, with all that it in- 
volves, or the idea of God as a wise and good Governor, 
whose will is in subordination to His nature, the answer is, 
without doubt, the former. God as sovereign will takes pre- 
eminence over God as love.
In this connection Dr. George A. Gordon says we should 
take Edwards at his best, that is, we should accept his idea 
of God as absolute love as his fundamental position and 
simply recognize that his deterministic system is not the
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expression of his truest and deepest conviction. "It is only 
justice to Edwards to hold him to his "best thought of God; 
it is only justice to allow his thought of God to abolish 
his thought of man." 42 This is a generous, but an entirely 
false, interpretation of Edwards. The import of his thought 
as a whole is that God's sovereignty must be upheld at all 
costs. His youthful "conversion" to Calvinism was an accept- 
ance of divine sovereignty as expressed in predestination. 
All his deterministic works are unflinchingly consistent 
with this notion of God's absoluteness, his method being to 
establish a deterministic position, and then attempt to 
reconcile this as well as possible with the notion of God as 
love. But there never is any compromise from the side of 
his rigid determinism. Further, Edwards* last great 
treatises, representing, we may assume, his mature and final 
theology, are among his most polemical and strictly deter- 
ministic works. As Gordon himself insists, their motive is 
the :defense of God's absoluteness, and no one could argue 
that it is God's absoluteness as love rather than supreme 
power that is defended in the Enquiry and the Treatise <m 
Original Sin. We would indeed be untrue to Edwards if we 
did not take due notice of hisfcecognition of God as love, 
and his faithful portrayal and defense of it in many of 
his works. But we should be even more untrue to him, did we 
not recognize as his fundamental passion the establishment 
and defense of a deterministic system, which implies a God
*2George A. Gordon, in Jonathan Edwards: A Retrospect, p. 64.
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of naked sovereignty and absolute will.
It is hardly necessary to advert here to the dis- 
tinction between the secret and the revealed will of God. 
If the doctrine of absolute decrees, out of which this dis- 
tinction grows, is untenable in Christian theology, this is 
a sufficient refutation of the view that there are two wills 
in God. We simply observe that, apart altogether from the 
objections already raised against it, a theory which defends 
God's sovereignty at the cost of asserting a dualism in His 
will is paying a heavy price. It adds to our problems the 
vexing question, Why two wills, and why in opposition rather 
than in harmony? This is a question which is bound to force 
itself upon us, even if we allow the decreeing of sin by 
God's secret, or "disposing", will to be ethically justified.
Before leaving this examination of Edwards' doctrine 
of the decrees, it should be observed that we have not 
criticized Edwards' position that God's permitting sin is 
different from His committing sin. We shall examine this 
idea, however,when we take up his treatment of the doctrine 
of original sin.
CHAPTER VI 
THE FREEDOM OP THE WILL
The next feature of Edwards* Calvinistic system to 
come before us is his theory of volition. It was on the 
subject of the will that his chief effort was expended. He 
realized that it was the heart of the difficulty between 
the CalTinists and the Arminians, and felt that if he could 
establish the doctrine of the necessity of volitions, with- 
out destroying the reality of choice and of human responsi- 
bility, the battle against Arminianisra would be won. "It is 
easy to see", he says, Nhow the decision of most of the 
points in controversy, between Oalvinists and Arminians. de- 
pends on the determination of this grand article concerning 
the greedom of the Will requisite to moral agency: and that 
by clearing and establishing the Calvinistic doctrine in 
this point, the chief arguments are obviated, by which 
Arainian doctrines in general are supported, and the con- 
trary doctrines demonstratively confirmed. 11
The great source for our study of Edwards* doctrine of 
the will is his Careful and Strict Enquiry into the Modern
^ Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, pp 416-417.
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Prevailing Hotions of that Freedom of Will, which is Supposed 
to. be Essential to Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice, Reward and 
Punishment. Praise and Blame, This work is divided into 
four parts, the first,he entitles, "Explanation of Terms, 
etc.", and in it he states his theory of volition. The 
second part deals with the "Arminian Notion of Liberty", the 
third, with "Moral Agency, Virtue and Vice", and the fourth, 
with "The Chief Grounds of the Reasoning of Arminiana." 
These last three parts constitute his proof of the necessity 
of volitions* Some of his arguments, as the titles of the 
parts imply, are refutations of the Arminian theory* But any 
argument which destroys the Arminian view, in his mind, sup- 
ports the deterministic theory, and is thus a proof of his 
own position. It is really impossible to separate the refu- 
tation of the Arminian theory from the proofs of his own 
view,* each argument is double-edged,- attacking the 
Arminian idea of freedom and defending the doctrine of neces- 
sity. ¥e shall therefore treat the material in these last 
three parts under a single main head, as proofs of Edwards* 
theory.
I. Edwards 1 Theory of Volition
1. The Mature of Volition
Without preliminaries Edwards begins his Enquiry with 
the statement that the will is "That by which the mind
^
chooses any thing. The faculty of the Will, is that power, 
or principle of mind, by which it is capable of choosing: an
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act of the Will is the same as an act of choosing or choice.*2 
In the brief explanation he gives of the term choice he 
seems to imply that it is an act of selection between two or 
more alternatives, each of which is possible. To choose, he 
says, means to choose "one thing rather than the contrary*, 
and a little later he makes the statement that "for the soul 
to act voluntarily, is evermore to act ? electively." 3
We are told immediately after this, however, that 
choosing is the same thing as preferring. "So that if we 
carefully distinguish the proper objects of the several acts 
of the Will, it will not appear by this, and such like in* 
stances, that there is any difference between volition and 
preference.* * To act *electively* then does not necessarily 
mean to choose between open possibilities, but merely that 
in every volition the mind is more inclined to, or has a 
greater preference for, the thing it wills than that which is 
not willed. Of two courses of action, only one may be possi- 
ble, but the selection of it may none the less express the 
mind's preference. It is thus clear at the outset that Ed- 
wards uses the term, choice, with quite a different meaning 
from that it bears in the mouth of the indeterminist.
In taking the position that choosing and preferring 
are identical Edwards makes a significant divergence from 
the view advanced by iocke. The English philosopher, as we 
have seen, had held that the term, preferring, did not *pre-
2ldwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 127.
3 ibid, p. 128.
4ibid, p. 129.
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cisely" express the act of volition, since in some cases a 
person might will what he does not prefer. Edwards replies 
that it is entirely possible for us to choose something which 
is not what we remotely prefer, but that will and preference 
never clash with reference to the inanediate object of choice, 
which is always the inducement of some external action or 
other mental action. In criticism of Locke's illustration 
that, while a man might prefer flying to walking, he never 
wills it, Edwards has this to say: "But the instance he men-* 
tions, does not prove that there is any thing else in 
willing, but merely preferring; for it should be considered 
what is the immediate object of the Will, with respect to a 
man's walking, or any other external action; which is not 
being removed from one place to another; on the earth, or 
through the air; these are remoter objects of preference; 
but such or such an immediate exertion of himself. The 
thing next chosen, or preferred, when a man wills to walk, 
is not his being removed to such a place where he would be, 
but such an exertion and motion of his legs and feet, etc. 
in order to it. 1* 5 The same line of criticism is followed 
against Locke's assertion that "the Will is perfectly dis- 
tinguished from Desire." He seems, however, to hesitate at 
a complete identification of will and desire. "I do not 
suppose, that Will and Desire are words of precisely the 
same signification: Will seems to be a word of a more 
general signification, extending to things present and
^Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 128.
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absent. 1* 6 Possibly this is because there are many desires 
but only one strongest desire, that is, only one preference, 
and possibly Locke's influence is here felt. But Edwards 
is certain that will and desire never clash. "But yet I 
cannot think they are so entirely distinct, that they can 
ever be properly said to run counter." 7
This identification of will with preference, and, 
though more hesitatingly, with desire, is in keeping with 
Edwards* psychology of the faculties. Prior to the writing 
of the Enquiry he had followed Calvin rather than Locke in 
identifying the emotional and conative aspects of the self, 
the two aspects being variously designated as the affections, 
the inclination, the heart, and the will. His early Notes 
on the Mind included a title for the treatise he intended to 
grow out of them which read in part as follows: "Being a 
Particular Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Mind, with 
respect to both its Vacuities   the Understanding and the 
Will." 8 Here the identification of the will and the 
emotions is clear. The "understanding" included four im- 
portant operations of the mind,* sensation, imagination, 
memory, and judgment. The idea that the will and the 
emotions are not to be distinguished reappears eome twenty- 
two to twenty-five years later in his Thoughts Concerning 
the Present Revival of Religion in Kew England, where we 
find this statement: "I humbly conceive that the affections
Jldwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 129.
Jibid, p. 129.
8Edwards, Hotes on.the Hind, Works, Edited by S.E.Dwight,
Vol. I, p. 664.
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of the soul are not properly distinguished from the will, as 
though they were two faculties. All acts of the affections 
are in some sense acts of the will, and all the acts of the 
will are acts of the affections."9 Pour years later in his 
Treatise Concerning Religious Affections he still takes the 
same position: "God has endued the soul with two principal 
faculties: the one, that by which it is capable of percep- 
tion and speculation, or by which it discerns, and judges 
of things; which is called the und e r s t and i ng « The other, 
that by which the soul is some way inclined with respect to 
the things it views or considers..... This (latter) faculty 
is called by various names: it is sometimes called the 
inclination; and, as it respects the actions determined and 
governed by it, the will: and the mind, with regard to the 
exercises of this faculty, is often called the heart . * * 
On the following page we have this statement: "The will, and 
the affections of the soul, are not two faculties; the af- 
fections are not essentially distinct from the will, nor do 
they differ from the mere actings of the will and the inclin- 
ation, but only in the liveliness and sensibility of exer- 
eise." ^ The will is thus, according to this psychology, 
only a particular sort of emotion, differing from other 
emotions only in its "liveliness and sensibility of exer- 
cise", and in the fact that it is followed by the action
9Bdwards, Some Thoughts Concerning the Present Revival of
Religion in Hew England, Works, Vol. VI, p. 9. 
ldwards, A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, Works,
Vol. IV, p. 10. 
ibid, p. 11.
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which is the object of the volition. When Edwards begins 
the Enquiry by identifying volition with the emotions of de- 
sire and preference, he is therefore holding true to his 
previously established position. We find him also on one
other occasion in the Enquiry expressly speaking of the 
affections as "only certain modes of the exercise of the
will." 12 The distinction between the will and the emotions 
was never definitely attempted in the New England Theology 
until Samuel West published his Essays on Liberty and 
necessity in 1793, and the attempt was not successful until 
Asa Burton introduced the distinction inh.824.
Had Edwards held steadily to this identification of 
the will with the emotions, of choosing with preferring, his 
treatment of the subject of the will would have been far less 
ambiguous and more convincing. But unfortunately he seems, 
in the Enquiry and in other of his deterministic writings, 
more often to imply the distinction between the emotions and 
the will than to deny it. We have already seen that he 
started by identifying willing with choosing, or acting
4
electirely, which would seem almost to imply the power of 
contrary choice, and certainly to indicate a phenomenon far 
more active than an emotion. Further, he sometimes speaks, 
as we have seen, of the will f s not clashing with preference 
and desire, as though they might be distinct, although always 
in harmony, the will always following preference and desire. 
But far mor significant is the fact that, as we shall see,
12Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 289.
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it is a fundamental position of the Enquiry, and of his 
entire deterministic theology, that volition is affected by 
the heart, or the inclination, or the disposition, that is, 
by the emotional part of the self. Evil vVi>li*ions are said 
to spring from an evil heart, or inclination, and good 
volitions to be caused by a good heart, or disposition. The 
heart affects the mind's view of what is the greatest good, 
and thus plays a part in determining its choices. The clear 
implication of this position is that emotion and volition 
are differentiated,- otherwise the will determines itself, 
which Edwards holds absurd*
There was undoubtedly a serious ambiguity in Edwards 1 
mind regarding this whole matter. Had he followed Locke in 
hisjdistinetion between the conative and the emotional as- 
pects of the self, and used different terms to describe 
different phenomena, he would have spared himself, and even 
more his readers, endless confusion. As Fisher, Alien, and 
Foster all agree, however, he never really clarifies his 
position with reference tojthe matter. Alien points out the 
ambiguity of the term, choice: "But the close scrutiny to 
which it (i.e., The Enquiry) has been subjected has revealed 
a confusion in Edwards 1 mind as one source of the difficulty 
which the student encounters. The work starts out with a 
definition of the will as 'that by which the mind chooses 
anything',  a definition which might be allowed to stand, 
though far from being an adequate one. But even to this 
definition Edwards does not adhere. Hardly is he launched 
in his argument when he is found resting upon another ground,
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that the will is that by which the mind desires or inclines 
to anything; and this ambiguity of the word 'choice 1 runs 
throughout the treatise." 15 It of course follows, that the 
term, inclination, is equally ambiguous. As Foster says, 
HThe confusion resulted in the entire ambiguity of the word 
 inclination 1 , which is sometimes used to denote an emotion 
and often in the same sentence, and in the process of a 
vital argument, used immediately thereafter, as if no change 
of meaning had been made, to denote a volition." 14 Accord- 
ing to Fisher the principal inconsistency of Edwards in his 
dealing with the subject of the will is "the failure per- 
sistently to identify or persistently to distinguish volun- 
tary and involuntary inclinations. Inclination and choice'*, 
he continues, "are treated as indistinguishable, and yet 
the one is spoken of as the antecedent and cause of the 
other." 15
2. The Cause of Volitions
Having discussed the nature of volition, Edwards is 
now ready to answer the question, what determines the will, 
and to this he devotes the second section of Part I of his 
Enquiry. "By determining the Will, if the phrase be used 
with any meaning, must be intended", he says, "causing that 
the act of the Will or Choice should be thus and not other- 
wise."16 "It is sufficient to my present purpose to say", 
he answers, "It i^ that motive, which, as it stands in the
13A.V.G.Alien, The Life and Writings of Jonathan Edwards,pp 287-288. 
J-tF.H.Foster, A History of the New England Theology, p. 65,* 398 -
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view of the mind, is the strongest, that determines the
17 Will.. In this general position he is following Locke and
a long line of deterministic thinkers.
Although he holds that the will is determined by the 
strongest motive, Edwards does not represent the self as the 
scene of recurrent combats between various motives, as cer- 
tain of the determinists had done* For him one motive simply 
possesses the greatest strength and he apparently does not 
think of it as having to fight for the ascendancy. It might 
be pointed out here, however, that the physical analogy of 
the strongest force underlies his thought, an analogy which 
is faulty at many points, and to which, when applied to a 
deterministic theory, there is a fatal objection. In the 
physical world, when two forces act upon an object, although 
one may be stronger, both combine in producing the effect. 
But in the cage of two motives which are candidates for the 
determination of the will, it is only the stronger which 
produces an effect. How if the exclusion of the weaker 
motive is attributed to a selective power in the will or 
self, this particular difficulty is obviated. But on the 
deterministic view, no such selective power exists,- what 
takes place is referred wholly to the motive, which acts upon 
the will just as a physical force acts upon an inert body. 
Ihy the weaker motive does not produce its full effect along 
with the stronger, as does the weaker force in the physical 
world, the determinist cannot say. Edwards makes no attempt
17Jdward8, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 131.
153
to meet the difficulty, and apparently the problem never 
occurs to him.
What he means by the strongest motive will become 
clear in a moment. Let us ask first what he means by a 
motive. The motive is, he says, "the whole of that which 
moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether 
that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly." 18 
This is a highly unsatisfactory definition of motive. It 
states nothing whatsoever as to its nature, defining it sim- 
ply by reference to its function as the determinant of the 
will. It really adds nothing to the statement that the will
•f
is determined by the strongest motive. Edwards never ad- 
vances a better formal definition than this; we are left to 
infer indirectly from his discussion what he means by the 
term. It will be noted that in his rather broad definition 
there may be included external objects as well as mental 
states. However, he goes on to say that in order to have 
the power to determine volition, whatever is "objectively" 
a motive must be something which is "extant in the view or 
apprehension o£ the understanding, or perceiving faculty." 19 
Sothing can operate upon the self as a motive until in some 
way it comes before the mind.
Edwards has been severely criticized, and justly so, 
for this manifestly inadequate definition of motive. He 
sets himself to explain what determines the will, and an- 
 wers that it is the strongest motive. But he then explains
18Mwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 131. 19 ibid, p. 132.
154
motive by saying merely that it is that which "mores, ex- 
cutes, or invites the mind to volition", i.e., that which 
determines volition, a definition which leaves us in the 
dark as to what really constitutes the motive. As R. G. 
Hazard remarks: "This definition of motive then amounts 
simply to this: that whatever influences the mind in willing
is a motive; and what does not influence it is not a
20 motive." ™ it is true that when Edwards proceeds to tell us
what makes one motive stronger, he throws additional light 
on the matter, hut the vagueness in his conception of the 
nature of motive is never entirely dispelled.
A further objection to his definition is brought for- 
ward by Professor Henry Calderwood, who takes exception to 
it on the ground that it begs the question in dispute. "If", 
he says, "the law of mental activities be that motives ex- 
cite to volition, further philosophical investigation is 
useless. The matter is settled on the necessitarian side. 
The will is not free." 21 The definition is, of course, 
partisan, but then so are others which Edwards gives,- for 
that matter it may be impossible to give non-partisan 
definitions in this dispute,- but if we recognize that 
Edwards is here simply stating his theory, which he subse- 
quently intends to defend, the partisan character of the 
definition need not concern us. The major weakness in his 
definition of motive lies in its inadequacy, i.e., in its 
failure to tell us what a motive really is.
. G. Hazard, The Freedom of the Mind in Willing, p. 331. 
21Henry Calderwood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy, p. 177.
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While examining Edwards 1 definition of motive, it is 
fitting to notice a criticism brought forward by Dr. Albert 
Taylor Bledsoe, in his Examination of President Edwards * 
Inquiry into the Jreedom of the Will* He points out that 
Edwards sometimes speaks of the motive as determining the 
will to act, and sometimes as determining the will to act in 
* Particular way. This vacillation will be noted in the 
quotations above. The question is, Edwards states, "what 
causes the choice to be thus and not otherwise 11 , but when he 
defines motive, it is said to be "the whole of that which 
moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition", that is, 
motive is not only what causes the will to act in a particu- 
lar way, but also that which causes it to act at all. As we 
continue our study it will become apparent that it is in this 
latter sense that he understands the motive to determine the 
will,- it causes it to act, and also to act in a specific 
way. If Edwards should admit that the motive did not cause 
the will to act,but|only to act in a particular way, he 
would lay himself open to the charge of teaching motive to 
be only the occasion of volition, while leaving the will to 
be the actual cause of it, a charge which, as we shall see, 
was actually made, but on other grounds. This inconsistency 
in Edwards* statements pointed out by Bledsoe is only one 
instance of numerous cases throughout the Enquiry in which 
he uses language loosely.
Let us now ask what Edwards means by the strongest 
motive. A necessary characteristic of motive, he says, is 
that it have strength, that is, that it have "some sort and
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degree of tendency, or advantage, to more or excite the Will, 
previous to the effect, or to the act of the Will excited.*22 
The quality which makes up this tendency or advantage to move
*' w
the will is its being viewed as a good. "But so much I 
think may be determined in general, without room for contra- 
tersy, that whatever is perceived or apprehended by an in- 
telligent and voluntary agent, which has the nature and in- 
fluence of a motive to volition or choice, is considered or 
viewed as good." 23 It will follow that "the Will always is, 
as. the greatest apparent good is/1,24 it being understood 
that the good refers to the immediate object of the volition, 
not to a remote object.
Edwards goes on to explain that he here uses the term, 
good, as identical in meaning with the term, agreeable. "It 
must be observed in what sense I use the term 'good 1 ; name- 
ly, as of the same import with 'agreeable 1 .... The word 
'good 1 , in this sense, includes in its signification, the 
removal or avoiding of evil, or of that which is disagree- 
able and uneasy.... So that here is included what Mr. 
Locke supposes determines the Will. For when he speaks of 
 uneasiness* as determining the Will, he must be understood 
as supposing that the end or aim which governs in the voli- 
tion or act of preference, is the avoiding or removal of 
that uneasiness; and that is the same thing as choosing and 
seeking what is more easy and agreeable* 1125 This position
22»Lward8, Inquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 132.
Z3 ibid f p. 132. ~
24 ibid, p. 133. ^ibid, p. 133.
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is in entire conformity with the view that the will never
i
clashes with preference or desire. In following that which 
is the most agreeable the will is following that which ex- 
cites the strongest preference, or is the most desirable. 
As it appears later the "most agreeable" is not
necessarily synonomous with moral good, for it is entirely
* 
possible that what we know to be morally evil may be viewed
as the "most agreeable". Nor is the course which commends 
itself as "the most agreeable" necessarily synonomous with 
that which is the most reasonable, for although the will 
always "follows the last dictate of the understanding" in 
some sense, Edwards makes it clear that the dictate of 
reason may be overcome if it is not in conformity with that 
which appears "most agreeable". A man will never do right 
simply because it is right, nor act rationally simply be* 
cause it is rational, but only because it is "most ag£ee- 
able."
This theory of motivation is thus thoroughly hedon- 
istic. Man is represented as always seeking that which is 
the most pleasing to him. In the Treatise Concerning Re- 
ligious Affections Edwards makes the statement that "all 
the exercises of inclination and will, are concerned either 
in approving and liking, or disapproving and rejecting." 26 
However, while it is true that he is psychologically a 
hedonist, the same does not hold for his theory of ethics.
26 Edwards, A Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, Works,
Vol. IV, p. 12.
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True virtue, he says, in his Pissertation Goneerning the 
Hature of True Virtue, is lore to being in general, and he 
insists that it cannot be completely reduced to self-love. 
Man ought not always to act from the motive of self-love, 
he urges in this dissertation; but when he is thinking of 
how a man actually does act* he admits that he is always de- 
termined by that which is the most agreeable to him*
Edwards never gives any proof of the fact that the 
strength of a motive consists in its being regarded as the 
most agreeable* He simply assumes it in this section where 
he sets forth the position, and the arguments of the Enquiry 
are designed only to prove that the will is determined, not 
that it is either determined by, or is identical with, that 
motive which has the characteristic of the most agreeable* 
The only reason for saying an object chosen is the most agree- 
able is that it is chosen* Further, he does not attempt to 
prove that the will never clashes with preference or desire, 
but simply shows, in connection with the illustrations used 
by Locke, that a difference between what we will and what we 
remotely prefer or desire leaves it possible for will and 
preference or desire to coincide with regard to the imme- 
diate object of choice. There is no other positive proof 
that they do and must always coincide, and far less that they 
are identical*
The failure of the proof is not so significant a mat- 
ter as the fact that Edwards taught what he did. His posi- 
tion makes it impossible for him to be classed with the 
teleologieal determinists,- with those who hold man's
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freedom to consist in his capacity to rise above hedonistic 
considerations and be determined lay ends apprehended purely 
as moral or spiritual goods.
It will be noted that in the answer Edwards gives to 
the question of what mores the will there is up to this 
point much that is similar to Loeke. Both hold that the will 
is moved by the strongest motive. Both believe that the 
mind is always moved by that which appears to it the great* 
est good, or happiness. Both are thuslpsyehological hedon- 
ists. There does emerge, however, one significant differ* 
ence. while motive, for Edwards, up to this point in his 
discussion, is that which is perceived as agreeable, for 
Locke it is the "uneasiness 11 of desire arising from this. In 
his psychology of volition Locke is thus clearly thinking in 
terms of the distinction he has drawn between desire and 
will. The volitional process is analyzed in accordance with 
his three-fold division of the mind's "powers" or "facul- 
ties". There is, first, the judgment of the "understanding11 
as to the greatest good or happiness. There follows the
.  >.,
"greatest uneasiness", an emotional experience, which con-
 i 
stitutes the direct motive for the willing. The volition in
its turn is an expression of the will or conative aspect of 
the self. Edwards, on the other hand, when he analyzes the
,/ ;,.
volitional process into the motive, i.e., that which appears 
most agreeable, and the volition, which follows, is thinking 
in terms of his two-fold division of the mind's powers. 
That which appears most agreeable, that is, the motive, is, 
as his language usually implies, a judgment, "the last die*
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tate of the understanding", although it may involve also an 
emotional Element. This being so, the volition is, as he 
has told us, the desiring or preferring or choosing the ob- 
ject, and is thus simply a special sort of emotion. We have 
already seen, however, that he was not unfailingly true to 
the identification of will and emotion, frequently implying 
a distinction between them, and thus, without admitting it, 
affirming the truth of Locke's analysis.
Thus far Edwards' theory of motivation appears clear* 
cut enough. The will, or volition, is completely determined 
by the strongest motive, that is, by that which, in the view 
of the mind, is the most agreeable. But he now makes a 
statement in further elucidation of his meaning so signifi- 
cant that we quote it in full: "I have rather chosen to ex- 
press myself thus, 'that the Will always is as the greatest 
apparent good', or 'as what appears most agreeable', than 
to say 'that the Will is determined by the greatest apparent 
good', or 'by what seems most agreeable'; because an appear- 
ing most agreeable to the mind, and the mind's preferring, 
seem scarcely distinct. If strict propriety of speech be 
insisted on, it may more properly be said, that the volun- 
tary action* which is the immediate consequence of the mind's 
choice, is determined by that which appears most agreeable, 
than the choice itself; but that volition itself is always 
determined by that in or about the mind's view of the
ty n
object, which causes it to appear most agreeable." * ' That
27Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 134.
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in or about the mind's view of the object which causes it to 
appear most agreeable, he goes on to say, "is not only what 
appears in the object viewed, but also the manner of the 
view, and the state and circumstances of the mind that
pa
views."*0 "The manner of the view11 and the "state and cir- 
cumstances of the mind that views", he remarks later, are 
not really different, since the "state and circumstances of 
the mind" register themselves in their effect upon the "man- 
ner of the view". What he really intends to say, as his 
rather tedious and detailed exposition reveals, is that the 
mind, as affected by its inherited nature, its past exper- 
ience, and any particular current condition, is one of the 
causes of a thing's appearing most agreeable. The other 
cause is the object and its circumstances. To say that the 
object and the mind are the causes of the object's appearing 
most agreeable is really to say that the perception of the 
most agreeable results from the relationship of the object 
and the mind, with the latter's particular nature or 
character.
There is, of course, nothing unique in this account 
of the rise of motives. What is of signal importance, how- 
ever, is the statement that "volition itself is always 
determined by that in or about the mind's view of the 
object, which causes i£ to appear most agreeable." This 
is expressly to identify volition with the object's appear- 
ing most agreeable, which he has hitherto spoken of as the
28Bdwarda, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, pp 134-135.
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motive. It is to assert that the object's appearing most 
agreeable constitutes choice in itself, not that it causes 
choice.
The inconsistency of this position and that with which 
Edwards began was exhibited sixteen years after the Enquiry 
by James Dana, who issued anonymously a criticism of the 
Enquiry in 1770. After quoting the passage in which Edwards 
shifts his position, he remarks: "Here it is fully declared, 
that 'properly speaking', volition and the highest motive 
are not distinct things - that the former is only as the 
latter, and not determined bv_ it. Motive cannot be the 
ground and determiner of volition, and at the same time the 
act of volition itself... Instead of the strongest motive's
being the cause of volition, the real truth is, that
29 volition is the cause of external action."
This really means, Dana goes on to argue, that Edwards 
denies volitions to be determined by motives. "Thus volition 
being nothing diverse from the strongest motive, but the 
same thing with it - it being improper to say, that the will 
is determined by the strongest motive; there can be 'no such 
relation between' motive and volition 'as is signified by 
the terms cause and effect'." 50 That Edwards has laid him- 
self open to this criticism cannot be denied, in view of his 
express identification of what he had before spoken of as the 
motive (i.e., the object's appearing most agreeable) and the
29 James Dana, An Examination of the Late Rev. President Ed- 
wards *s Enquiry on Freedom of Will, p. 18. 
30 ibid, p. 19.
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volition. Dana, however, makes his case by accepting Ed- 
wards 1 new identification of volition and the object's ap- 
pearing most agreeable, while at the same time ignoring the 
different conception of motive which goes along with this. 
If we view Edwards' new position in its entirety, it is ap- 
parent that he does not deny the determining effect of 
motive on volition, but that he has moved to a new conception 
of motive as well as volition. The volition becomes the ob- 
ject's appearing most agreeable, while the motive becomes 
the mind and object in relation, that is, the cause of the 
object's appearing most agreeable. Thus what happens in any 
conative experience is this: the mind in relation to a cer- 
tain object (i.e., either a physical object or a certain 
action) causes, as the motive, the experience of the most 
agreeable, which is choice, and following this arises the 
voluntary action. That this is different from the theory 
with which Edwards began is obvious, but it is equally ob- 
vious that he still holds volition to be determined by the 
strongest motive.
This new position to which he has advanced, however, 
leaves in the dark the question of what it is about the 
strongest motive which makes it strongest. Since it is no 
longer the fact that it is that which appears most agreeable 
which constitutes it the strongest, the appearing most agfee- 
able being in reality the choice itself, it can only be said 
that the strongest motive is that which has the power to de- 
termine the will, to cause the experience of the most agree- 
able. Why one thing and not another appears most agreeable 
we are not told*
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We now have before us, in the same section of the 
Enquiry, two different theories of volition. Apparently up 
to the point at which he began to discuss the causes of an 
object's appearing most agreeable, Edwards had regarded 
volition as distinct from, and caused by, that which appears 
most agreeable, which was the motive of the volition. Now 
he is identifying the two. This inconsistency, appearing at 
the first of the Enquiry, raises a difficult question of in- 
terpretation. Which of these views represents Edwards* real 
position? There is no further direct discussion of the 
problem in the Enquiry and we are therefore forced to rely on 
inference to answer the question.
In his Review of Edwards* Inquiry into the freedom of 
Will, H. P. Tappan, who is one of his keenest commentators, 
takes the position that the author's real position is re- 
vealed in the quotation above, in which he identifies choice 
and the object's appearing most agreeable. "Edwards' mean- 
ing plainly is, that the terms are convertible: volition may 
be called the cause of voluntary action, or the sense of the 
most agreeable may be called the cause." 31 "It may be well 
here to remark, that in the system we are thus endeavouring 
to state and to illustrate, the word choice is properly used 
to express the action of will, when that action is viewed in 
relation to its immediate effects,- as when I say, I choose 
to walk. The sense of the most agreeable, is properly used
31H. P. Tappan, Review of Edwards' Inquiry into the Freedom
of the Will, p. 17.
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to express the same action, when the action is viewed inpe- 
lation to its own cause. Choice and volition are the words 
in common use, "because men at large only think of choice and 
volition in reference to effects. But when the cause of 
choice is sought after by a philosophic mind, and is supposed 
to lie in the nature and circumstances of mind and object, 
then the sense of the most agreeable becomes the most appro- 
priate form of expression. 11 32
The weight of the evidence, however, would seem to lie 
against this interpretation of Edwards' position. The truth 
seems to be simply that he included the passage which has 
caused the dispute in a moment of inadvertency.
One reason for rejecting the view that this passage 
expresses his real position is the fact that it denies to 
the "understanding" the part Edwards has attributed to it in 
the volitional process. If the object's appearing most agree-
 »/
able is the volition itself, then the appearing most agree- 
able is certainly not an act of the understanding. It is 
either a purely conative experience, or, if we hold Edwards 
to his expressed identification of the emotional and cona- 
tive aspects of the self, it is a particular sort of emotion. 
This is what Tappan makes of it. According to him Edwards 
means, when he speaks of the object's appearing most agree- 
able, that we have the "sense" of the most agreeable, that 
is, that the appearing most agreeable is an emotion. This 
being the case, there is no rational judgment in the entire
32Tappan, op. cit., pp 19-20.
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process, the "understanding" serving only, if it serves at 
all, as a means of relating the "sensitivity" to the object. 
The object is not perceived as the greatest good but only 
felt as such. Now Edwards has nowhere except in the passage 
under discussion given us ground for even inferring that the 
object's appearing most agreeable is a purely emotional, or 
a conative, experience. On the contrary he has indicated 
clearly that he regards it as having to do, primarily at 
least, with the "understanding". The very fact that he uses 
the term 'appearing' so often implies an act of the intellect 
rather than of the emotions. Further, his insistence that 
an object, to be a motive, must be "extant in the view or 
apprehension of the understanding or perceiving faculty" 
seems to suggest that he regards its appearing most agreeable 
as a judgment. This is even more definitely implied by his 
statement that the will follows "the last dictate of the 
understanding". Now if the appearing of an object as most 
agreeable is an operation of the understanding, we cannot re- 
gard the disputed passage, in which he identifies it with 
the act of volition, as exhibiting his real position.
A second ground^or holding that the passage in ques- 
tion does not express Edwards' real opinion is the fact that 
it is not in keeping with passages and language elsewhere in 
the Enquiry. We have already seen that it is inconsistent 
with his explicit: theory of what determines the will in the 
part of the section preceding it. And throughout the re- 
mainder of the Enquiry he speaks as though the volition 
follows the appearance of the most agreeable. In a few
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pages after the passage we have been discussing, he begins 
to use language to that effect: "The choice of the mind", 
he says, "never departs from that which....appears most 
agreeable and pleasing, all things considered." 33
It might be added that this passage is not given much 
attention by Edwards 1 commentators, except Tappan. Dana's 
reference to it is, as we have seen, dictated by a desire 
to twist Edwards 1 theory to his own purposes. Foster simply 
mentions it as a passage inconsistent with the general 
theory of the Enquiry. This fact that it has been so little 
noticed by students of Edwards is an additional reason for 
regarding it as an inadvertency.
Before leaving the discussion of Edwards 1 teaching as 
to what determines the will, two further observations may be 
appropriate. (a) It will banoted that there is no sugges- 
tion in Edwards of what has been called the education of the 
will. That is to say, there is no recognition of an effect 
of volition upon character, by which character might be 
progressively developed or weakened. The only causal rela- 
tionship proceeds in the opposite direction, nature or char- 
acter affecting the volition. Nor is this surprising, seeing 
that psychology in its modern sense was only in its infancy 
in Edwards 1 day. Nature or character was usually regarded 
as a fixed thing, and conduct «ould exert no modifying in- 
fluence upon it, particularly when conduct was thought of as 
wholly determined. All change in character had to be looked
33Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 137.
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for from some other source than the operations of the will. 
So static was our nature conceived to be, that the really 
significant change,- the change from the natural state to the 
state of faith,- was regarded as a purely supernatural, 
miraculous operation of the Holy Spirit upon us. The recog- 
nition of the plasticity of our nature and of the reciprocal 
influence of character and volition was not to come until 
later.
(b) In view of Edwards 1 early idealistic philosophy, 
the question naturally arises whether he taught that all 
motives and their strength are the immediate effect of the 
exercises of the di-yine will. He of course traced men's 
motives, like everything else, ultimately to the will of 
God. But according to his idealistic philosophy, the stable 
will of God is the immediate cause of perception by created 
beings, not only producing ideas in our minds, but causing 
the things perceived to be the objects of perception. It 
would seem to follow that motives are the direct result of 
God f s will. No definite answer, however, can be given to 
this question, owing primarily to the uncertainty as to how 
completely Edwards retained his idealism in later life. 
Nevertheless his distinction between common and efficacious 
grace, in his later theological development, suggests 
strongly that he had moved away from his pure idealism, and 
that he regarded most motives as arising mediately fronjbhe 
operation of an objective nature. As we shall see, he 
taught that God, in the operation of efficacious grace, acts 
immediately upon the soul, producing motives by an operation
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which involves "both a change of nature and the immediate im- 
partation of divine light (i.e., saving knowledge) to the 
mind. But in the case of common grace, God operates, he 
held, through the established laws of "nature", a statement 
which clearly implies that He does not act immediately upon 
the will,
3. The Necessity of Volitions
After giving his answer to the question, What deter- 
mines the will? Edwards proceeds to discuss the meaning of 
the term, necessity, in its application to the will. He 
doespot use the term, he says, in its popular sense, for 
there it applies to the connection between volition and its 
effects, and, like the terms, irresistible, impossible, 
unable, etc., it implies an opposition on the part of our 
wills which is overcome. It is rather in the philosophical 
sense that he wishes to use the term in this discussion.
Necessity in this sense, he says, applies not to the 
connection between volition and its effects, but to the re- 
lation between motive and volition. It thus does not imply 
that volitions are inevitable despite opposition, for there 
is no opposition of the will to motive. Necessity in the 
philosophical sense simply means certainty, a certainty, 
however, which is not merely a certainty of knowledge, but 
a certainty "that is in things themselves, which is the 
foundation of the certainty of knowledge." 34 The objection 
to the popular meaning of necessity in discussions of this
34
Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 141,
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kind holds likewise for a number of other cognate terms, 
such as impossible, irresistible, unable, etc. When used 
in connection with the will, says Edwards,these terms do 
not as a rule imply opposition on the part of the will which 
has to be overcome. The will always follows the motive in 
harmony and submission.
In his Life of Jonathan Edwards, Samuel Miller re- 
marks that Edwards was probably the first Calvinistic theo- 
logian who "freely employed the word necessity",35 but admits 
that all the chief ideas indicated by the term were recog- 
nized before. It is certain that Edwards was not the first 
to point out the objection to using the term in the sense 
which implies coercion of the will. The same feeling under- 
lies many of Augustine's statements, as when he speaks of
"the most blessed necessity" of not sinning under which God
<* g 
rest, and adds "si necessitas dicenda est." ° Thomas
Aquinas set forth the objection to all terms implying con- 
straint, and particularly to the term, necessity, as clear- 
ly as Edwards. Fisher quotes Aquinas as follows: "That 
which is moved by another is said to be constrained (cogi) 
if it is moved against its own inclination (contra inclin- 
ationem propriam); but if it be moved by another which gives 
to it its own inclination (quod sibs dat propriam inclinar 
tionem) it is said to be constrained... So God in moving 
the will does not constrain it, because he gives to it its
35 Samuel Miller, Life of Jonathan Edwards, in Jared Sparks*
Library of American Biography, Vol.VIII,p.226 
36Quoted by G.P. Fisher, History of Christian Doctrine, p.339
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own inclination. 1' 37 Fisher remarks that, in spite of these 
points of coincidence between him and earlier writers, Ed- 
wards did no borrowing from them in regard to his ideas 
about "moral hecessity". 38 This is perhaps true, although, 
just as in the case of Edwards 1 relation to Berkeley, we 
have no means of finally settling the question.
In elucidation of the term, philosophical necessity, 
Edwards says that it is "really nothing else than the full 
and fixed connection between the things signified by the 
subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms some- 
thing to be true." 3^ There are three ways in which two 
things may have this "full, fixed and certain connection." 
(a) "When they are so connected "in and of thems elves ",- 
i.e., when denying this implies a contradiction or absurd- 
ity. (b) When the existence of the thing affirmed has 
already come to pass, the connection of the subject and 
predicate of the proposition affirming this existence is 
necessary. (c) When two things are connected consequential- 
ly; i.e., when one thing may be "surely and firmly" con- 
nected with sometning else that is necessary in one of the 
former respects. It is only injthis last way, he goes on 
to say, that future things and those past things which nad 
beginnings, that is, events of any kind, can be necessary. 
And thus it is only necessity in this sense which is
37 G.P. Fisher, Discussions inpistory and Theology, p. 236.
38$.P. Fisher, An Unpublished Essay of Edwards on the Trinity,
p. 36. (See Bibliography for full title.) 
39Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 142.
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relevant to the question of the will.
At this point it will "be appropriate to discuss the 
question whether the connection "between motive and volition 
was for Edwards one in which the motive was only the oc- 
casional, not the efficient cause of the volition. Differing 
views on this point have been the source in the New England 
Theology of conflicting interpretations of his teaching. In 
order to meet the argument of Samuel West, that motives, 
according to Edwards, do not determine volitions, the 
Younger Edwards advanced the view that motives were held by
father to be only the occasion of the action of the 5 I 
will,- that the will follows, as Professor Park put it, not 
a M lawM , but a "usage". Edwards 1 language at some points, 
though very rarely, did lend itself to this interpretation. 
One passage in particular in a section of the Enquiry 
entitled, "Whether any Event whatsoever,and Volition in 
particular, can come to pass without a Cause of its e±is- 
tence", has been taken to imply that he taught motives to be 
only the occasional causes of volitions. We quote it at 
some length. M I would explain how I would be understood, 
when I use the word Cause in this discourse; since, for want 
of a better word, I shall have occasion to use it in a sense 
which is more extensive, than that in which it is sometimes 
used. The word is often used in so restrained a sense as to 
signify only that which has a positive efficiency or 
influence to produce a thing, or bring it to pass. But 
there are many things which have no such positive productive 
influence; which yet are causes in this respect, that they
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have truly the nature of a reason why some things are, 
rather than others; or why they are thus, rather than other- 
wise....! sometimes use the word Cause, in this enquiry, 
to signify any antecedent, either natural or moral, positive 
or negative, on which an Event, either a thing, or the man- 
ner and circumstance of a thing, so depends, that it is the 
ground and reason, either in whole, or in part, why it is, 
rather than not; or why it is as it is, rather than other- 
wise; or, in other words, any antecedent with which a conse- 
quent Event is so connected, that it truly belongs to the 
reason why the proposition which affirms that Event, is true; 
whether it has any positive influence, or not....! am the 
more careful thus to explain my meaning, that I may cut off 
occasion, from any that might seek occasion to cavil and 
object against some things which I may say concerning the 
dependence of all things which come to pass, on some Cause, 
andjtheir connection with their cause. 1
Now in this passage Edwards does draw a distinction 
between an efficient and an occasional cause. But it will 
be noted that he never says expressly that he thinks of a 
motive as a cause in the latter sense. Nor does he do this 
anywhere else in the Enquiry. On the other hand, as Bledsoe 
says, the idea of motive as the efficient, productive cause 
is "wrought into the very substance andjstructure of his 
whole argument." 41 Further, when Edwards defends his
40Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, pp 164-165. 
41 Albert Taylor Bledsoe, An Examination of President Edwards*
Enquiry, p. 31.
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position against opponents, he never suggests that in his 
view motive is only the occasion of the volition, but holds 
to the idea that it is the active and determining cause. 
He might easily, had it been his view, have disarmed his 
critics by pointing out that motive, for him, was only the 
occasion, while the agent was the productive cause of 
volition. In view of these things the more usual interpre- 
tation has been that motive, in Edwards, means always the 
efficient cause of choice,- and this is undoubtedly the 
correct view. The other interpretation was made and used 
for polemical purposes at a time when his disciples were 
attempting at once to remain loyal to him, and to modify 
his strict determinism. "But, when every allowance has been 
made", says Poster, "this cannot be said to be an objective 
interpretation of Edwards." 42 To foist upon the Enquiry, 
where it is insisted upon every page that motives "give 
rise to", "determine", "cause", "excite to", or "tend to 
produce" choice, the notion that the causation is only 
"occasional" is to wrest the meaning of plain language be- 
yond all reason. What purpose may have led Edwards to in- 
clude the quoted passage on the meaning of cause, unless 
it was a desire to seem to concede something to his oppo- 
nents, we cannot suggest.
In his doctrine of the necessity of volitions Ed- 
wards makes no exceptions. There is no individual whose 
will is not subject to this necessity, and there is never
the
42Prank Hugh Poster, A Genetic History of/New England
Theology, p. 70.
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an act of the will which is not necessitated. With this 
universal application of the notion of necessity he departs 
from the main stream of Calvinistic thought in two respects. 
In Augustine, Calvin, and in the doctrine of the Westminster 
Confession, a certain liberty of will ad utrumvis, or power 
of contrary choice, was ascribed to Adam. In Edwards 1 view, 
however, we are possessed of as much freedom as Adam ever 
had. Again, it was the common Calvinistic doctrine that 
while mankind, as a result of the fall, had lost their abil- 
ity to perform religious obedience, they were still free 
outside of this sphere in civil and secular matters. Ed- 
wards, on the other hand, teaching not an acquired, but a 
natural necessity, extends it to all acts of choice.
Not only does he apply his idea of necessity to 
every human volition, but he likewise includes under its 
aegis the acts of the divine will. Three entire sections 
of the Enquiry are given to the subject of the necessity of 
God's volitions. When he is arguing the consistency of 
necessity and moral agency, he places great weight upon the 
fact,- which he treats as though generally accepted,- that 
God's moral excellence is necessary, that His holy actions 
are determined by His holy nature. Absent is all trace of 
the conception of the arbitrariness of the divine will. 
Furthermore there are the most explicit statements to the 
effect that God's "mere good pleasure" indicates only an 
independence of anything outside Himself, not of His own 
wisdom and character. "The sovereignty of God", he writes,
176
"is His ability and authority to do whatever pleases Him... 
The following things "belong to the sovereignty of God; viz, 
(1) Supreme, Universal, and Infinite Power; whereby He is 
able to do as He pleases...without any subjection, in the 
least measure, to any other power.... (2) That He has 
supreme authority; absolute and most perfect right to do 
what He wills, without subjection to any superior authority. 
...(3) That His Will is supreme, underived, and independent 
orf anything without Himself; being in everything determined 
by His own counsel, having no other rule but His own wis- 
dom... (4) That His Wisdom, which determines His will, is 
supreme, perfect, underived, self-sufficient and independent. 
...If God's will is steadily and surely determined in 
everything by Supreme wisdom, then it is in everything
A 1
necessarily determined to that which is most wise. 11 Nothing 
could be clearer than this; and the fact, already pointed 
out, that in his later and maturer works Edwards is at pains 
to prove the moral nature of God's acts, only goes to stren^h- 
en the evidence that he had moved away from his earlier con- 
ception of an arbitrary, and therefore undetermined, will, 
to a belief in God's will as completely determined. Sover- 
eignty comes to mean, not the freedom of God's Will, but the 
independence and supremacy of God in relation to everything 
else.
In this position Edwards departs markedly from Cal- 
vin's teaching in the Institutes. To Calvin God's sovereign-
43Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, pp 359-360.
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ty meant what it did in Edwards 1 earlier writings, namely, 
His arbitrary will, unfettered by anything, even within God 
Himself. To Calvin God did not act in a certain way because 
it was right, but rather God's acting in a certain way made 
it right. For him, God, to be sovereign, must possess a 
free will, the kind of freedom presumably lost by the crea- 
ture in the fall. In Edwards 1 mind, however,- and this will 
become clearer as we study his conception of freedom,- the 
fact that God's will is perfectly determined by His wisdom 
is altogether consistent with the most complete freedom. 
God's freedom consists in His power to do what He wills, to 
perform the action which is the object of His volition, not 
in the capacity toprill independently of His nature. God 
possesses no "moral ability" to will evil, but He possesses 
untrammeled "natural ability", i.e., power to do what He 
wills. Thus the most perfect necessity of will is consis- 
tent with the most perfect freedom.
Having examined Edwards' general conception of 
necessary connection or causation in its application to the 
relation between motive and will, let us now note an im- 
portant distinction which he draws. Philosophical necessity, 
he says, may be either moral or natural. Moral necessity, 
as used in the Enquiry, he defines as "that Necessity of 
connection and consequence, which arises from^uch moral 
causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the 
connection which there is in many cases between these, and 
such certain volitions and actions." 44 By natural
44Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 146.
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necessity he means "such Necessity as men are under through 
the force of natural causes; as distinguished from what are 
called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the 
heart, and moral motives and inducements." 45 As the defini- 
tions indicate, it is "moral necessity", the necessity of 
volitions under the determining influence of motives, with 
which the Enquiry is concerned. With regard to this there 
are two things we are to note. In the first place, moral 
necessity may be as absolute as natural necessity, that is, 
the effect may be as perfectly connected with its cause as 
any natural, necessary effect is with its natural cause. In 
the second place, we are not to think of moral necessity as 
unnatural. It is as much "owing to the nature of things" as 
natural necessity. In fact there is no difference in the 
nature of the connection between the terms, the only differ- 
ence being in the terms themselves,- in one case they are 
natural, and in the other, moral, or as we should say, psy- 
chological. Thus acts of will are absolutely necessary, and 
they are connected with motives in the same way that natural 
events are connected with their causes.
In the light of the foregoing, Edwards' distinction 
between natural and moral inability can be made clear, a dis- 
tinction hailed by his followers as an unanswerable argument 
for Calvinism. Natural inability denotes a lack of the 
capacity to do a thing, even though we will to dp it, an in- 
ability which arises "because what is most commonly called
45Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 146,
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nature does not allow of it, or because of some impeding de- 
fect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the will." 46 We are 
naturally unable when the voluntary action does not follow 
our volitions. The term inability here applies to the re- 
lationship between choice and voluntary action. Moral in- 
ability, on the other hand, consists "either in the want of 
inclination; or the strength of a contrary inclination; or 
the wajit of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite 
the act of the will, or the strength of apparent motives to 
the contrary." 47 (Note that the will is here distinguished 
from the inclination.) This is an inability which might be 
called a negative moral necessity, a necessity making im- 
possible the performance of a certain act, not because the 
voluntary action fails to follow the willing of it, but be- 
cause we are unable to will it. The motive which might pro- 
duce the volition is either non-existent or too weak. Thus 
while natural inability consists, not in the absence of the 
volition, but in its inability to produce its object, moral 
inability consists merely in the absence of sufficient 
motive. For, ewen granted the volition, an extraneous cause 
may break the connection between it and the effect at which 
it is aimed, but nothing ever breaks the connection between 
an adequate motive and its volition. Moral inability, Ed- 
wards continues, may be "general and habitual", that is, due 
to some abiding defect of nature, or "particular and
^Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 149. 
47 ibid, p. 149.
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occasional", that is, due to the strength or weakness of 
motives arising on a particular occasion.
Although Edwards says nothing at this point of natural 
and moral ability, he does make use of these positive notions. 
As will be inferred from the foregoing, natural ability con- 
sists in the certainty of the connection between the voli- 
tion and its object. If, when willed, the voluntary action 
follows, the agent possesses natural ability. On the other 
hand, moral ability means the possession of the motive, in 
sufficient strength, to give rise to the volition in ques- 
tion.
It is evident that we may possess either form of 
ability without the other. If some natural impediment pre- 
vents my walking when I will to walk, this nevertheless does 
not impair my moral ability to exert the volition. On the 
other hand, while I may be unable to will to walk, it may be 
true that, if I willed, I could walk, there being no breach 
in the connection between the volition and its object.
The distinction between natural and moral ability and 
inability is of fundamental importance in Edwards' system, 
since he makes use of it in his attempt to reconcile freedom 
and necessity. It is an extremely ingenious distinction, 
andjone which, in his day, was acclaimed by Calvinists as 
solving the most difficult problem raised by their theologi- 
cal system. Edwards is not to be credited with being the 
first to use this distinction, however, as Dwight and some 
others thought. Joseph Truman, an English dissenting 
minister of the 17th century, had used the distinction at
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least sixty years before the Enquiry in a treatise entitled, 
On Moral and Natural Impotency. Indeed the French Calvinist, 
Amyrault, had hit upon the same idea at Samaur one hundred 
years earlier than the Enquiry, when he was grappling with 
the same problem. It is certain, though, that Edwards, who 
knew no French, had never read Amyrault, and probably that 
he did not know Truman's treatise. He may, therefore, have 
been original in his idea, although not the first to arrive 
at it.
4. The Freedom of Man
¥e now have before us Edwards 1 fully developed deter- 
ministic theory of the will. The will is determined by 
motives which arise from causes over which the individual 
has no control whatsoever. (This isjtrue whichever of his 
two theories we accept, that is, whether we regard him as 
identifying the appearing of the most agreeable with voli- 
tion or with the motive.) Motive and willing, or choice, 
are connected by a necessity as absolute and fixed as any 
that can be conceived. That man's volitions are simply 
links in an inexorable chain of cause and effect, Edwards is 
not only ready to concede, but has written the Enquiry to 
prove.
Nevertheless, he is equally anxious to show that man 
is free, and to this he devotes the next section of the 
Enquiry. He begins with his definition of freedom: "The 
plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty, 
in common speech, is The power, opportunity, or advantage,
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that any one has, to, do_ as_ he pleases." 48 The term "do as 
he pleases" is used as synonomous with "do as he chooses" or 
"as he wills". Freedom, he conceives, attaches to the rela- 
tion "between volition and its effects, that is, the volun- 
tary action. So long as the conduct one wills actually fol- 
lows the willing of it, one is free,- if when I will to walk, 
my legs obey, I am free to walk, freedom is thus the 
"natural ability" to perform the action willed, and will 
exist provided no external force prevents the volition from 
being followed by its object. It is thus for Edwards really 
a Physical liberty.
He makes much of the fact that his definition of free- 
dom is that of the average man, the meaning which has always 
attached to the term. This, however, is obviously open to 
debate. One interesting reply to the Enquiry was a post- 
script affixed to the fourth edition of Tflftiitby's Discourse 
on the Five Points of Calvinism, in which the author under- 
takes to show, by quotations from the Fathers and later 
writers, that Edwards 1 use of the term, freedom, did not 
arise until the time of Augustine.
It will be noted that the conception of freedom here 
advanced is the same as that which Locke held. Edwards, how- 
ever, holds more consistently to this notion, whereas Locke, 
as we have seen, moved on to lay increased emphasis on 
freedom as the power to suspend action pending deliberation,- 
an idea essentially different from that with which he began.
48
Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 152.
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Assuming that his definition of freedom is so "plain 
and obvious" that one cannot "but agree to it, Edwards pro- 
ceeds to point out two implications which follow from it. 
It will add to the clarity of our statement if we note the 
second of these first. Freedom, he says, has no relation 
whatsoever to the origin of the volition. It means simply 
the power to do as one chooses "without taking into the mean-
49ing of the word, anything of the cause of that choice."
50 far as the mere conception of freedom is concerned, the 
choice may be either caused by some "external motive" or 
"internal habitual bias" or "internal antecedent volition"; 
or it may take place without a cause, being entirely dis- 
connected with anything foregoing. This of course follows 
necessarily from the fact that freedom relates solely to 
the connection between volition and its effects.
The other of the two corollaries of his definition is 
that freedom, or its contrary, can belong only to the agent 
possessing the_ will, not to the will itself. Here again 
Edwards is reproducing Locke. No freedom, he says, can be 
ascribed to anything but that which has "such a faculty, 
power, or property, as is called will", since only the 
possession of a will gives the "power or opportunity of 
doing according to its will." 51 "And therefore to talk of 
Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very will 
itself, is not to speak good sense; ... For the will itself
49Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 153.
5°ibid, p. 152.
51 •?>*•?/* ^ i RO
™  
5l ibid, p. 152.
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is not an Agent that has a will; the power of choosing, 
itself, has not a power of choosing."^
It is a highly significant assertion that Edwards 
makes when he says that only that which possesses a will can 
act according to its will or do what it pleases. If we ask 
why this is so, it will appear that only two things could 
make the possession of a will necessary; (a) the fact that 
the will is the cause of the action willed, or (b) the fact 
that the will is the condition of the action, volition being 
an indispensable antecedent to action-in-accordance-with-will, 
But to regard the will as the cause of the action is to at- 
tribute to it the capacity to do as it wills, and that is to
it 
ascribe/freedom in the Edwardean sense, which Edwards does
not allow. If the will causes the action, this would also 
mean, according to his reasoning, the denial of his position 
that the possession of a will is essential to doing as one 
pleases, since the will cannot possess a will. It seems, 
therefore, that Edwards, in asserting that the possession 
of a will is essential to acting according to one's will, is 
regarding the will as only the condition of such action. As 
far as his definition of freedom itself is concerned, it 
would be quite legitimate to regard the will as the cause of 
the voluntary action, but this is ruled out by the corollary 
that freedom can belong only to the agent.
He thus rejects the idea of a cause and effect rela- 
tionship between volition and voluntary action in order to
52 Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 152.
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be able to predicate freedom of the agent. This, however, 
was a false step. For if the will does not have the capac- 
ity to perform the action willed, there is no sense in 
which this capacity can belong to the agent. By definition 
the agent is free only if he has the power to do as he 
pleases. Now if he does not possess this capacity by vir- 
tue of the fact that his will possess it, there is no way, 
so far as Edwards 1 account goes, in which he can possess it. 
He cannot be said to possess it owing to the fact that the 
motive is his, because the motive can do nothing but pro- 
duce a volition which is powerless to produce the action 
willed. Again, the capacity to "do as one pleases" is 
attributable neither to the agent's intellect nor to his 
emotional "faculty", unless emotion is identified with will, 
and this would be to predicate freedom of the will itself. 
Nor does Edwards show any way in which freedom could belong 
to the self as a whole, considered as more than the sum of 
its capacities. The truth is that, on his theory, the 
agent does not have the power to "do as he pleases". The 
capacity is really due to the necessary connection between 
volition and its object,- which may be a natural law or may 
even be thought of as God.
Up until the point at which he gives his definition of 
freedom Edwards had apparently taken the other view with re- 
gard to the relation between volition and voluntary action. 
He seems to have regarded the former as the cause of the 
latter. In discussing moral inability he speaks of "external 
actions which are dependent on the act of the will and which
186 
would "be easily performed, if the act of the will were
C «Z
present." And previous to this he had spoken of the vol- 
untary action as "being the immediate consequence of the 
mind's choice. This language all implies that he conceived 
of volition as being the cause of the action willed. Had he 
held to this idea, however, he would have been constrained 
to attribute the freedom to do as it pleases to the will 
itself, and this he was unwilling to do. The result is that 
he tacitly abandons the notion of the will as the efficient 
cause of the production of its object, when he attempts to 
deduce from his definition of freedomrhe fact that freedom 
is attributable only to the agent.
The question will naturally arise as to why Edwards 
was unwilling to attribute freedom in the sense in which he 
defined it to the will. The reason undoubtedly was that he 
felt this would have been conceding too much to the Armin- 
ians. He had an instinctive aversion to their notion of a 
liberty of indifference residing in the will, and although 
freedom in the sense he used it was vastly different from 
the Arminian conception and would not have isolated the 
free will from the rest of the self, as was the case with 
the Anainians, he could not bring himself to say that the 
will possesses any freedom. Any liberty of the will would 
have smacked of contingency.
Had Edwards held consistently to the notion of the 
will as producing the object willed, he could have avoided
53Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 151.
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to some extent this difficulty. He could have attributed 
freedom to the will without thereby denying it to the self, 
as was inevitable in the Arminian theory. For since, ac- 
cording to his theory, the volition is the effect of the 
motive, the real power would have resided in the motive, and 
the motive, Edwards insists, belongs to the self. Freedom 
could, therefore, have been attributed to the agent by vir- 
tue of its very connection with the agent's will.
While this would have been an acceptable solution of 
the problem to the determinist, it would still have been a 
very meagre sense in which the agent, could have been said to 
be free. For according to Edwards, the agent has no control 
over the rise of motives, nor their connection with volition,- 
he is only the arena in which the action takes place. This 
is a rather minor role for the self to play. In fact it 
leaves the self really no part at all in that process to 
which freedom is attributed. The exclusion of the self from 
the willing process, however, is an inevitable result of the 
analytical method employed by the determinist. There is 
nothing personal in the causal series formed by character, 
motive, and will. Even if these things are said to belong 
to the self, it is left merely as the spectator of the pro- 
cess. A self which is something more than an arena in which 
volition takes place, or an aggregate of parts or processes, 
a self which is a true personality, has no part in willing 
as far as Edwards 1 theory is concerned.
The whole question, therefore, whether the capacity to 
"do as one pleases" is to be located in the will or in the
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agent, loses its reality when examined in the light of Ed- 
wards 1 basic determinism. So long as this remains, the 
agent can hardly "be said to possess freedom, even in the 
Edwardean sense. Not only is the question unreal, "but it is 
unimportant, for the conception of freedom remains the same, 
whether it be attributed to the will or to the agent. It is 
only when freedom in the sense of choice between open possi- 
bilities is at stake, that the question whether it belongs 
to the will or to the agent becomes both real/and vital.
Edwards is probably right in saying that the ordinary 
man would accept his definition of freedom. But there is 
grave doubt whether the ordinary man would go with him in 
the position that doing what one pleases implies no ability 
to choose between real alternatives. D. D. Dfhedon insists 
that his type of necessitation is even more fatal than the 
external co-action he denies. " 'The fates lead the willing,
but drag the unwilling. 1 Pata ducunt volentem, nolentem
54 trahunt. But a deeper fate allows no nollBntem." In fact
even many deterministic thinkers disagree with Edwards. His 
position is in definite contradiction to that of Calvin in 
the Institutes. Calvin himself of course denied the power 
of the will to choose between good and evil, but as we may 
recall, he denounces rather scornfully those who, accept- 
ing this view, at the same time insist that man is free.
Edwards, however, was as strenuous in his insistence 
upon the freedom of man as he was upon the necessity of his
54 D. D. UYhedon, The Freedom of the Will, p. 41.
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volitions. His theory of the will was in essentials that of 
Hobbes, Collins, and Hume, but he objected to being classed 
with those who denied freedom to man. In 1751 Lord Kames 
(Henry Home), of Scotland, had published a volume entitled: 
Essays on the Principles of Ifoarality, and Natural Religion, 
which included an essay on liberty and necessity, in which 
he took the following position: "The resolution being taken, 
the choice being made, upon what is it founded? Certainly 
upon some motive, however silent or weak: for no mortal ever 
came to a determination, without the influence of some 
motive or other. If this be an undoubted fact, it follows 
of consequence, that the determination must result, from 
that motive, which has the greatest influence for the time; 
or from what appears the best and most eligible upon the
R R
whole," As the quotation reveals, Kames 1 theory was in 
essence that of Edwards and it was not strange that the 
former heralded the Enquiry as a confirmation of his posi- 
tion, 'that, . '...- .. , "if motives are not under our 
power, which is confessedly the fact, we can, at bottom, 
have no liberty." 56 But in an open letter to Dr. John 
Erskine, which subsequently was appended to the Enquiry, Ed- 
wards examined Kames 1 essay and reiterated his claim that 
nothing he had said of the necessity of volitions was to be 
construed as denying that a man is endowed with "the highest 
degree of liberty that ever was thought of, or that ever
5Lord Kames, Essays on the Principles of Morality, and 
- Natural Religion, p. 167. 
06ibid, p. 168.
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could possibly enter the heart of any man to conceive." ^7 
Edwards 1 attempted combination of freedom and neces- 
sity has led him to be claimed as an ally by champions of 
freedom as well as necessity. But if those who took his 
determinism seriously, such as Kames, found it difficult to 
reconcile with his ascription of freedom to man, those who 
took seriously his assertion of freedomtound it equally 
difficult to acquiesce in his determinism. As the New Eng- 
land Theology developed, there arose amony many of its lead- 
ers a tendency increasingly to deny the necessity of voli- 
tions. Yet these leaders claimed Edwards as their master, 
and found the authorization for their position in his insis- 
tence upon man's possession of natural ability and of gen- 
uine freedom. Winfield Burggraaff says: "Prom the dis- 
tinction of Edwards between natural and moral ability, it 
(i.e., the N.E.Theology) travelled on unti!J/with Finney man 
is declared to be completely free. Sin is a free act; con- 
version is a free act; regeneration is a free act. Pela- 
gianism was one of the legitimate offsprings of the Edward- 
ean theology."
5. The Conditions of Moral Agency
It seems well at this point to ask what Edwards 1 views 
were as to the conditions of moral agency, although to 
answer the question completely we must consult certain sec- 
tions in Part III of the Enquiry, where he attacks the
57
Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 430. 
'Winfield Burggraaff, The Rise and Development of Liberal 
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Arminian position on this point; In his treatment of this 
subject of responsibility he departs completely from Locke, 
who grounded it in our capacity to suspend action and re- 
flect on the object of our volition.
In the^ection we have just been examining he remarks 
briefly that a moral being is one to whose acts can be 
attributed moral quality, and that two things are necessary 
for a moral agent: (a) the capacity to perceive moral dis- 
tinctions, and (b) the capacity to be influenced by moral 
inducements or motives. In connection with this latter 
capacity he of course holds that nothing, including moral 
objects, can influence action except in so far as it is 
viewed as agreeable.
In Part III of the Enquiry Edwards mentions another 
condition that must obtain wherever we are held responsible 
for our actions. That condition is natural ability. "Natu- 
ral inability 11 , he says, "arising from the want of natural 
capacity, or external hindrance (which alone is properly 
called Inability) without doubt wholly excuses, or makes a
KQ
thing improperly the matter of Command." Where we are 
unable to produce the action willed, we are not responsible 
for it.
miile not explicitly stated, it is in keeping with 
Edwards 1 thought to say that he regarded the possession of 
the faculty of will as grounding our responsibility in the 
most significant sense, namely, our responsibility for
59Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, pp 288-289.
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volitions. We are responsible for our volitions, not, in- 
deed, because we can freely determine what they shall be, 
but because they are the acts of our will by which we choose, 
and take up our attitude toward the good and the bad. Be- 
cause it is the faculty of the self by which decisions are 
made, the will is the proper subject of coirmands, etc., and 
its volitions are acts for which the self must be held 
responsible. To let Edwards put it in his own words: "But 
now the soul has no other faculty whereby it can, in the 
most direct and proper sense, consent, yield to, or comply 
with any Command, but the faculty of the will; and it is by 
this faculty only, that the soul can directly disobey, or 
refuse compliance: for the very notions of consenting, 
yielding, accepting, complying, refusing, rejecting, etc., 
are, according to the meaning of the terms, nothing but 
certain acts of the will. Obedience, in the primary 
nature of it, is the submitting and yielding of the will of 
one, to the will of another. Disobedience is the not con- 
senting, not complying of the will of the commanded, to 
the manifested will of the commander....So that it is 
manifest, the will/itself may be required: and the being 
of a good will is the most proper, direct and immediate 
subject of Command."
These four things, then, constitute man a responsible 
moral agent: (a) the capacity to perceive moral distinc- 
tions, (b) the capacity to be influenced by moral induce-
60
Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 281
193
ments, (c) the possession of natural ability, i.e., of free- 
dom as Edwards conceives it, and (d) the "faculty" of will- 
ing. There can be no reason for disagreeing with Edwards on 
the score that these conditions are essential to responsible 
moral agency. A question must be raised, however, on the 
ground of what has been omitted,- there is no mention of any 
power of genuine contrary choice as prerequisite to respon- 
sibility.
Let us ask now what, in Edwards 1 view, is the extent of 
a man's responsibility, that is to say, what are those 
things/for which he can be held responsible. The answer to 
this question is substantially implied in what has been said 
as to the conditions of moral agency. To begin with, we are 
of course responsible for those actions or effects which are 
the results of our volition. This is implied in the state- 
ment quoted afcove in which Edwards explains that natural in- 
ability absolves us from responsibility for those actions 
which it renders impossible. In the second place, we are 
responsible for our volitions. "The will ftself, and not 
only those actions which are the effects of the will, is the 
proper object of Precepts or Command." 61
How there are no conditions under which a man is not 
responsible for his volitions. If the volition is unable to 
produce the voluntary action, he is nevertheless responsible 
for the volition. And, more important still, though the 
motive to the right choice be lacking or too weak, so that
61 Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, pp 280-281.
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the agent is "morally unable" to make the right choice, he is 
still responsible for the choice made. "And therefore those
things may properly be commanded, for which men have a moral
fi? Inability." 0 * Responsibility for volitions, in short, is
conditioned upon neither natural nor moral ability, and has 
no relationship to freedom, even in Edwards 1 sense of the 
term. In contrast to the Arminians, and to indeterminists 
generally, he conceives no power of contrary choice to be 
essential to a person's being morally responsible. To this 
position Edwards held with unflinching consistency through 
all his works. It is the most significant feature in his 
teaching in regard to moral agency. Indeed, and this is of 
importance, we are responsible for other things by virtue 
of their connection with the will. "Other acts that are not 
the acts of the will, as certain motions of the body and al- 
terations in the soul, are Obedience or Disobedience only 
indirectly, as they are connected with the state or actions 
of the will, according to an established law of nature." 63 
In the final analysis it is volition and only volition for 
which we are primarily responsible.
In conformity with this position we find Edwards, in 
dealing with the question of original sin, insisting that we 
are responsible for the radical sinfulness of our inherited 
nature, which exposes us to damnation even before the first 
actual sin is committed, because Adam's first sin, from 
which our depraved nature is derived, was in fact ouract
62Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 288. ^bid, p. 281.
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our sin. Mien our nature gives rise to what appears our 
first sinful act, the truth is that this is not our firs^b 
actual sin,- we sinned first when we sinned in Adam. And 
our depravity of nature is itself the result of our sin; our 
evil disposition is not non-voluntary, but is one of the 
"alterations in the soul" which is the fruit of our own 
volition. Edwards does not point out this origin of our 
evil dispositions in the Enquiry, and in fact argues, as we 
shall see later, that we are responsible for them solely 
because of their evil nature, regardless of their source. 
It was the general Calvinistic belief that we are responsi- 
ble for non-voluntary dispositions, and it is not surprising 
that Edwards failed to maintain consistently his variant 
position. "When we come to his doctrine of grace, we find 
him squarely in the Calvinistic fold, in asserting that God 
arbitrarily renews our heart, implanting in us virtuousaen- 
dencies, which make us eligible for salvation. Neverthetes, 
despite these lapses from the position, his assertion of the 
voluntary nature of sin isprobably true to his deepest con- 
victions. This point of view and'hi^clinging to the term, 
freedom, can be explained only as partial concessions to 
the feeling that responsibility implies the power of contrary 
choice. He does not make the full concession, for he insists 
that all volitions are determined, but his refusal to admit 
responsibili ty for non-voluntary dispositions is a step away 
from strict Calvinism in the direction of genuine freedom.
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II. The Proof of the Necessity of Volitions
The bulk of the Enquiry, three of the four parts, is 
devoted to a proof of Edwards 1 theory o^the will. More pre- 
cisely, it is aimed at the establishment of his central 
thesis that the will is determined by the motive. If this 
is granted, Edwards seemed to feel, the theory as a whole 
must be accepted.
It is significant that he offers no direct proof of 
his assertion that the will is determined by the strongest 
motive. He is concerned solely to prove that the will is 
determined, that a self-determining power in the will is 
absurd. The fact that it is a motive which determines the 
will, and not something else, is taken for granted. As far 
as his proof is concerned, it would be as true to say that 
the will is determined by physical movements in the brain as 
by a psychological motive. And incidentally, such an inter- 
pretation would apparently not be out of keeping with his 
formal definition of motive as "the whole of that which 
moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition." It is 
also taken for granted that it is the strongest motive which 
determines the will. Apparently it never occurs to Edwards 
that a weaker, but/more worthful motive might sometimes 
cause the volition, and he devotes no effort to debating 
this matter. This conclusion that it is/the strongest 
motive which determines the will, says H. P. Tappan, is 
based on the proposition that the will is determined, and is 
thus a petitio grincipii. We have already seen that Edwards 
likewisejassumed that the strength of a motive consists in
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its appearing agreeable, an assumption which is also unsup- 
ported by proof.
The arguments he advances in his proof of the necessity 
of volitions for a large part take the form of an attack on 
the Arminian theory of the will. The reason for this is 
two-fold. In the first place, Edwards is dedicated to the 
overthrow of the whole Arminian system of theology. In the
*
second place, the refutation of the Arminian notion of free- 
dom is for him an indirect and a very cogent method of estab- 
lishing his own position. It is a fundamental assumption of 
the Enquiry that there are but two alternatives,the Arminian 
and the Calvinistic. There being no third choice, it is all 
one for his purpose whether he is attacking the Arminians or 
defending his own conception.
Three major arguments are used, each of which is 
double-edged, developing his own view while attacking the 
Arminian. He begins with a proof based on the axiom that 
every cause must have a preceding effect. This is followed 
by an argument from the divine foreknowledge. He concludes 
with an argument that determinism is demanded as the basis 
of moral agency. These are not always given consecutively, 
nor are they clearly delimited, but the substance of his 
thought falls under these three heads.
1. The Argument from the Nature of Causation 
The first of the three leading proofs, as we have 
seen, is based on the nature of causation, more precisely, 
on the nature of causation as conceived by Edwards. Taking
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as his thesis the axiom of natural science that every event 
must have a preceding, distinct cause, he uses this as a 
weapon to overcome the Arminian notion of volitions as 
events which possess their own causative efficiency. The 
argument is a battle of the conception of derivative causal- 
ity against that of the spontaneity of finite spirits. Every 
real or possible "evasion" of the Arminians is hunted down, 
exposed as a denial of causation, and condemned in the light 
of the principle that every event is necessary,- the effect 
of its antecedent cause.
As Professor Fisher remarks, Edwards* adversaries, 
represented by men like Whitby and Chubb, "must have felt 
that he took advantage of the infirmities of language, and 
confuted what they said rather than what they meant, yet it 
is quite untrue that he was guilty of any conscious unfair- 
ness. He was not the man purposely to surround himself with 
f mist, the common gloss of theologians. 1 He had no faith in 
their conception of freedom, however it might be formulat- 
ed." 63 -t
We shall not follow him in ali the trivial minutae of
/*s.
his argument as with wearisome repetition, albeit with 
matchless subtlety, he reiterates the principle of the neces- 
sity of volitions, but shall endeavor to extract the signif- 
icant points in his attack upon the Arminian principle of 
the creative will. He begins with a criticism of this 
notion defined as the self-determining power of the will.
63 G. P. Fisher, Discussions in History and Theology, pp 237-8,
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This leads to a criticism of it as expressed by the term 
contingency. He then attacks the idea formulated as the 
"liberty of indifference", and finally gives a positive 
statement of the grounds for believing in the necessity of 
volitions. We shall discuss these four phases of the argu- 
ment in the order mentioned.
a. The Impossibility of a Self-determining Power in the Will
The idea of a self-determining power in the will is 
disposed of by Edwards in a striking piece of reasoning, 
which, because of its importance,- and as an excellent 
example of his method,- we quote at some length. "If the Will, 
which we find governs the members of the body, and determines 
their motions, does also govern itself, and determines its 
own actions, it doubtless determines them the same way, even 
by antecedent volitions....So that if the freedom of the 
Will consists in this, that it has itself and its own actions 
under its command and direction, and its own volitions are 
determined by itself, it will follow, that every free voli- 
tion arisesjfrom another antecedent volition, directing and 
commanding that: and if that directing volition be also free, 
in that also the Will is determined; that is to say, that 
directing volition is determined by another going before 
that; and so on, till we come to the first volition in the 
whole series: and if that first volition be free, and the 
Will self-determined in it, then that is determined by an- 
other volition preceding that. Which is a contradiction; 
because by the supposition, it can have none before it, to
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direct or determine it, being the first in the train. But 
if that first volition is not determined by any preceding 
act of the Will, then that act is not determined by the 
Willi and so is not free in the Arminian notion of freedom, 
which consists in the Will's self-determination. And if 
that first act of the Will which determines and fixes the 
subsequent acts, be not free, none of the following acts, 
which are determined by it can be free." This is the sub- 
stance of his argument against self-determination of the 
will, an argument which, says Prank Hugh Foster, he repeats 
at least a hundred times. It will be recognized as the ar- 
gument given in substance by Locke. The Arminian finds him- 
self in a dilemma: either he must admit a free choice before 
the first free choice (or if he wishes, an endless series of 
choices), or he must accept determinism. Edwards points out 
later that to choose the first horn of the dilemma is not 
only to admit a free choice before the first free choice, 
but also to admit that all the choices following the first 
one are determined,- determined by the preceding choices of 
the will.
The basis/upon which he proceeds in forcing the Ar- 
minians into this dilemma is his fundamental principle that 
every act of the will is the effect of a preceding cause.
Negatively stated, this means that there can be no such
both
thing as a single act by which the wily exerts a voli- 
tion and causes that volition. There is no such thing as a
64Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 158.
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single creative act of the will. This position being as- 
sumed, the self-determination of the will can mean only one 
thing: namely, that the will determines one volition by an 
antecedent volition. The Arminian position is thus demol- 
ished at one stroke*
To strengthen his argument Edwards proceeds now to 
examine four possible "evasions" of his reasoning. The 
first two, which he invents himself only to expose and shat- 
ter against his principle of necessity, are highly imaginery 
and are not worth our discussion. The third is more signif- 
icant. The Arminians, he says, may reply to him that the de- 
termination of the will does not imply two distinct acts, 
but that "the exertion of the act is the determination of the 
act; that for the soul to exert a particular volition, is 
for it to cause and determine that act of volition. 11 6 ^ This 
"evasion" is significant because, as a matter of fact, it 
is exactly what the Arminians did mean,- a single creative 
act of the will,- and it gives Edwards a chance to come face 
to face with the issue. The way in which he "rings the 
changes" as to the implications of the term, self-determina- 
tion, makes one wonder sometimes whether he is not uninten- 
tionally arguing more against the term than the idea it was 
intended to convey. But all doubt is dispelled as he con- 
fronts the "evasion" before us. His reply, however, is dis- 
appointing; he merely reiterates his fundamental position. 
"The question is, what influences, direct, or determines
65 Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 162.
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the mind or will to come to such a conclusion or choice as 
it does?...Now it must be answered, according to the Armin- 
ian notion of freedom, that the will influences, orders and 
determines itself thus to act. And if it does, I say, it 
must be by some antecedent act. To say, it is caused, in- 
fluenced and determined by something, and yet not determined 
by any thing antecedent, either in order of time or nature, 
is a contradiction." 66 Nothing could be clearer,- a creative 
act of will is an impossibility and there is an end of the 
matter. Volitions must be determined*
This concludes his criticism of the idea of the self- 
determination of the will. The fourth "evasion", to which 
we have referred, leads him into a discussion of the Armin- 
ian conception of the contingency of volitions, and brings 
us to the second phase of his argument based on the nature of 
causation.
Before entering upon an examination of this we might 
note the remarkable fact that Edwards fails completely to 
see that the fallacy of the infinite series, which he urges 
against the Arminians, applies in fact to determinism rather
than to indeterminism. For if a preceding cause is re- 
quired for everything, there must be a cause for that rela- 
tion between our nature and our circumstances which gives rise 
to the motive, and in turn a cause for this cause, and so on 
ii infinitum. If we carry on this process far enough we 
eventually succeed in overthrowing God Himself, for we run
Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 163.
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back finally to the divine will. But even here, according 
to Edwards' ripest thought, we cannot stop, for the explana- 
tion of God's volitions must be sought in His motives, which 
in turn spring from His nature. Hor can we, so long as we 
apply the principle of transeunt causation, deny an antece- 
dent cause of God's nature, nor a cause for this cause, and 
so on. We are carried straight back through God in an eter- 
nal regress. If to escape this, we postulate an arbitrary, 
and thus a non-determined will in God, as did Edwards in his 
sermon on God's Sovereignty in the Salvation of Men, we im- 
pugn the principle of transeunt causation, and allow to God 
the free will Edwards has denounced as preposterous in man. 
It is thus his own argument that runs into a dilemma: he 
must either admit that his position involves an infinite re- 
gress, or he must desert the ground upon which he has at- 
tacked the Arminian, by admitting in the case of God the 
possibility of an undetermined will.
b. The Impossibility of the Contingency of Volitions
The fourth "evasion" of his reasoning, says Edwards, 
takes the form of an assertion that the self-determination 
of the will means the arising of volitions without any cause 
at all. This is precisely what the Arminians mean, he as- 
serts, when they speak of volitions as contingent events. 
"Their opinion implies, that the particular determination of 
volition is without any cause; because they hold the free 
acts of the will to be contingent events; and contingency is
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essential to freedom in their notion of it."^ In explain- 
ing his own theory of the will Edwards defines a contingent 
event as one that has no fixed and certain connection with 
any previous ground or reason of its existence. And this is 
tantamount in his view to saying that it is without any 
cause whatsoever*
By way of answer to this "evasion 11 he enters upon an 
extended proof of the fact that no event comes to pass without 
a cause, and that volitions are no exception. Even if it 
could he proved, he continues, that volitions do come to 
pass without a cause, this would refute the Arminian doc- 
trine of the self-determination of the will. For according 
to this, the will causes its own volitions,- they are not 
uncaused. The assertion of both self-determination and con* 
tingency is thus a gross inconsistency.
How if contingency means coming to pass without cause, 
it is undoubtedly inconsistent with the self-determination of 
the will. Further, it can be shown, as Edwards has done, 
that chance has no place in an intelligible universe. But 
the Arminian; did not mean that a contingent will has no 
cause. He meant simply that its volitions were not ef- 
fects of a preceding cause. The will, he was trying to say, 
has the power of creativity, of initiating its own acts 
spontaneously. Hence Edwards* argument in proof of the fact 
that nothing comes to pass without a cause is manifestly be- 
side the point. The Arminian is quite ready to agree with
67Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 164,
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him in this general position: what he needs to prove is that 
the causation exerted in volitions is a derivative causation, 
that there is no such thing as a spontaneous cause in man.
The significant feature in Edwards' dealing with this 
"evasion", therefore, is not his proof of universal causal- 
ity and demonstration of the inconsistency of causelessness 
and self-determination, but his identification of contingen- 
cy with the absence of cause. He arrives at this identifi- 
cation, as we have seen, by direct inference from the fact 
that a contingent event has no connection with a.previous 
cause. But this inference is valid only if it is true that 
all events are the results of antecedent causes. It is, 
therefore, based on the same principle he has used in his 
criticism of the notion of self-determination. But this 
principle is always assumed, never proved. All events for 
Edwards are the necessary results of antecedent causes, and 
to deny this either by asserting self-determination or con- 
tingency of the will is to run into absurdity.
3. The Impossibility of a Liberty of Indifference in the Will
Edwards now takes up the third phase of his argument 
from the nature of causation, which consists in a refutation 
of the conception of a liberty of indifference in the will, 
a notion which Locke, before him, had rejected. This phrase, 
liberty of indifference, was only another way of expressing 
the Anninian conception of the creative will. It denoted 
a will in absolute independence of all motives or influence.
Edwards begins by pointing out that the Anninians 
must mean by their doctrine of the liberty of indifference,
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not only that the will is indifferent before the volition 
but actually during the volition. "Por the thing supposed, 
wherein this grand argument consists, is, that among several 
things the Will actually chooses one before another, at the 
same time that it is perfectly indifferent." 68 This is a 
just interpretation of their meaning, he insists, for free- 
dom is not lost during volition, and freedom consists, they 
hold, in the indifference of the will. Edwards quotes an 
unidentified Arminian author as follows: " 'Where the objects 
which are proposed, appear equally fit or good....the will 
does as it were make a good to itself by its own choice, 
i.e., creates its own pleasure or delight in this self-chosen 
good. 1 *1 69 This implies, as Edwards says, that the will is 
indifferent while choosing, preference coming as a result of 
choice. Now if this is true, he continues, the Arminian is 
utterly inconsistent with himself. To say that the will 
chooses while in a state of indifference "is the very same 
thing as to say, the mind has a preference, at the same time 
that it has no preference." 70 But obviously, "Choice and 
preference can no more be in a state of Indifference, than
motion can be in a state of rest, or than the preponderateon
of a balance 7 *
of the scale/can be in a state of equilibrium."
This criticism, that choice, being preference, is an 
act which, in its nature, is opposed to indifference, re- 
veals a fundamental defect in this Arminian method of ex-
^Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 179. 7,
69 ibid, p. 179. 70 ibid, p. 179. 71 ibid, p. 180..
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pression. We need not agree with Edwards in identifying 
preference and choice, but we can go with hitJto the extent 
of maintaining that no choice takes place without expressing 
some desire or purpose. It cannot, therefore, be ocalled a 
completely indifferent act, and the will cannot be said to 
remain absolutely indifferent throughout volition. For the 
will to choose is for it to move out of a state of indiffer- 
ence.
The phrase, liberty of indifference, however, is am- 
biguous, being susceptible of two interpretations. In one 
sense it refers to a will which, in its nature, is unbiased, 
expressive of no choice, susceptible to no tendency. In this 
sense, as we have just seen, the will could not possibly be 
indifferent during volition. In its other s ense, liberty of 
indifference indicates the will's independence of determina- 
tion or influence by antecedent factors. The conception, to 
use Edwards 1 own words, is of "such an Indifference as leaves 
the Will not determined already; but free from actual posses- 
sion, and vacant of predetermination, so far, that there may 
be room for the exercise of the self-determining power of 
the Will." 72 Now it is this notion, the notion of a creative, 
spontaneous will,- the same he has expressed by the terms, 
self-determination and contingency;- which the Arminian is 
really trying to express by the phrase, liberty of indiffer- 
ence. And this is a distinct conception from that of an act 
of volition indifferent in the sense of expressing no purpose
72 Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 186.
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nor desire*
In saying that choice is inconsistent with any in- 
difference, Edwards is therefore asserting not only that all 
choice involves purpose and expresses some desire on the part 
of the self, "but also that indifference in the sense of free- 
dom from determination by motive is inapplicable to the will. 
"If it be possible for the understanding to act in indiffer- 
ence, yet surely the Will never does; because the Will be- 
ginning to act is the very same thing as it beginning to 
choose or prefer. And if in the very first act of the Will, 
the mind prefers something, then the idea of that thing pre- 
ferred, does at that time preponderate, or prevail in the 
mind: or, which is the same thing, the idea of it has a pre- 
vailing influence of the Will." Willing is preference, 
and preference is the result of a prevailing motive.
If anyone should deny this, he says, and contend that 
the will can cause itself to change from a state of indiffer- 
ence and exert an act of preference, this will not help 
matters. For this causing of the act of preference, or 
choice, must itself be an act of choice, that is to say, an 
act of will. If not,- if the act springs from a state of 
indifference,- it is determined by something other than the 
will and is not therefore free. But, he concludes, to assert 
that this act of will takes place prior to the act of prefer- 
ence it causes, is to assert an act of choice while the will 
is indifferent, and this is to return to the same absurdity
73 
Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 180.
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we have already noted. It is to regard the will as indif- 
ferent in the very act of determining itself to an act ex- 
pressing a certain preference.
Now this argument against the conception of the will's 
indifference in the sense of freedom from determination by 
motive takes the form, it can "be seen, of a simply asser- 
tion of the contradictory position. Willing is preferring 
and is therefore determined. Edwards cannot conceive of one 
originative act in which the will spontaneously expresses a 
desire or preference. This involves in his mind two acts, 
one expressing the preference and the other causing the act 
expressing the preference. Thus the principle that an act 
of will can take place only as the result of a preceding 
cause is the basis of the criticism here, and is the same as 
that upon which the criticism of the self-determination, and 
the contingency of the will has turned in the two preceding 
phases of this argument. And as he did in these two cases, 
he here assumes the principle without proof. As far as his 
argument is concerned, it offers no reason why the will 
should not remain "indifferent", in the sense of being inde- 
pendent of determination, during its choice.
c. The Necessity of Volitions
The fourth phase of Edwards 1 argument, based on the 
nature of causation, consists in^ proof of his positive 
position. Having completed his attack on the Arminian theory 
of volition as expressed by the terms, self-determination, 
contingency, and liberty of indifference, he attempts by
210
direct argument to show that no volition takes place "with- 
out a Necessity of consequence, or an infallible connection
74.with any thing foregoing."
As the first step in this argument he reminds us of 
the proof he has given that no event, volitions included, 
takes place without a cause. From this fact he deduces the 
proposition that no event takes place without an antecedent 
cause. This conclusion follows because "those things which
have a cause, or a reason of their existence, must be con-
75 nected with their cause." Unless there is a necessary
connection between an event and its cause the event is not 
really dependent upon the cause. "And to say, the event is 
not dependent on its cause, is absurd; it is the same thing 
as to say, it is not its cause, nor the event the effect of 
it." 76 Further, "If there are some events which are not 
necessarily connected with their causes, then it will follow, 
that there are some things which come to pass without any 
cause." 77 This is obvious since there is no reason for an 
event's coming to pass, if, being disconnected with its 
cause, it might not have come to pass. "To suppose there 
are some events which have a cause and ground of their 
existence, that yet are not necessarily connected with their 
cause, is to suppose that they have a cause which is not 
their cause." TO For since, having no connection with their 
cause, these events may or may not follow them, their
^Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 194. ^ibid ' P« 194 - 
76ibid, p. 195. 77 ibid, p. 195, 78 ibid, p. 196.
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occurrence or non-occurrence must "be due to something which 
is not their cause,- which is a manifest contradiction. Prom 
these things it follows that every event occurs as the result 
of an antecedent cause.
We have quoted Edwards rather fully in the preceding 
paragraph in order that his type of reasoning on the basic 
proposition of his argument may be clearly revealed. Here 
for the first time he purports to offer a proof of the prin- 
ciple that all events follow preceding causes. Now with his 
position that all events are caused we have no disagreement. 
That all events are necessarily connected with their causes 
we can also agree, this being in reality only another way 
of saying that all events have causes. Given the event, 
there is no denying its connection with its cause.
But has Edwards succeeded hereby in separating cause 
and effect so as to make the former always distinct from, 
and prior to the latter? why does such a position necessar- 
ily follow from a recognition of the connection between 
cause and effect? It is at least conceivable that cause and 
effect should be the same, or, if one chooses to put it 
this way, that there should be a self-originative event. 
This would not be to say either that any event is uncaused 
or that any effect is disjoined from its cause. It would be 
only to say that there are some events in which cause and 
effect do not form a sequence. With this as a possibility 
then, it cannot be concluded without further proof that the 
fact of the connection between cause and effect implies 
universally a temporal sequence and real distinction between
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them* Edwards in reality here assumes this fundamental prin- 
ciple, offering no proof of the real point at issue. So 
strong is his conviction that the nature of causation im- 
plies invariably a cause antecedent to its effect that he 
forgets the debatable character of the proposition. To say 
every event has a cause is for him equivalence saying that 
it has a preceding cause.
Not only is the principle assumed here,but it has 
been assumed all through this argument. In the criticisms 
of the self-determination of the will, of contingency, and 
of the liberty of indifference, there has not even been an 
attempt at proof. We thus come to the end of the argument 
from the nature of causation, having looked in vain for a 
valid refutation of the central position of the Arminians. 
Not only is this so, but the proof of Edwards' own position 
is equally inconclusive. Indeed, the proposition assumed as 
the basis of his criticism of his opponents' position is 
nothing else than his own position, the principle which 
should have been the conclusion, not the major premise of 
his positive argument. Apart from his exposure of the im- 
possibility of a completely indifferent choice, he begs the 
whole question. "Edwards' argument", says A.V.G.Allen, 
"against the freedom of the human will, in the sense of a 
power to choose between good and evil, gains its force from 
the assumption of the thing to be proved. There is no move- 
ment in his thought beyond this assumption that every event
79must have some external cause."
79A.V.G.Allen, Life and Writings of Jonathan Edwards, p.289.
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The almost naive manner in which Edwards plants his 
feet upon this principle reveals how completely his thinking 
moved in the empirical realm. That man could be viewed as a 
part of nature, and the workings of his spirit be cognized 
under the laws of the natural world, it never entered his 
mind to doubt. He, therefore, never hesitated to apply the 
law of cause and effect as manifested in the empirical world 
to the problem of human conduct, and could not but feel it 
absurd for some to insist upon making man an exception to 
this law. Sincere in his conviction to the utmost, the 
possibility of an alternative position, which would place 
man above the empirical world, seems not to have occurred to 
him.
2. The Argument from God's Foreknowledge 
The second major proof of the necessity of volitions 
is based on the foreknowledge of God. It is an argument 
which, to Edwards, is absolutely final, and upon which, in 
the view of A.V.G.Allen, 80 he places his chief reliance.
The reasoning is divided into two steps, (a) the 
proof of God's universal foreknowledge, and (b) the infer- 
ence from this fact of the necessity of foreknown volitions.
a. The Foreknowledge of God.
Edwards remarks as he begins this section that it 
should be needless to argue the fact of the divine prescience 
of the acts of moral agents to any who profess to be
80A.V.G.Allen, 6p. cit., p. 290.
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Christians. To him it is an essential andself-evident 
characteristic of a theistic God. Nevertheless, for those 
who need it, he is ready with proof, and this he presents 
under five heads.
(1) The first proof is "based on God's prediction of 
men's volitions. If God does not foreknow, He cannot fore- 
tell. This is laid down as an axiom, along with the further 
statement that, if God does not certainly foreknow the future 
volitions of moral agents, He cannot foreknow those events 
which are dependent on them, however many and significant 
these may fce^ To show that God does predict the free acts 
of moral agents and also events dependent upon them Edwards 
fills pages with citations of such predictions from Scrip- 
ture. Even to one who is disposed to question certain 
Scriptural instances of prediction he takes for granted, 
the cumulative argument is impressive. There are enough 
bona fide instances in Scripture to make a strong case for 
God's foreknowledge.
(2) The second argument is that "if God does not 
foreknow the Volitions of moral Agents, then he did not fore- 
know the fall of man, nor of angels, and so could not fore- 
know the great things which are consequent on these events;
SL 
such as his sending his Son into the world..." But, as
a matter of fact, the Scripture proves that He did foreknow 
the fall, and innumerable other things which, to a greater 
or lesser extent, are consequent upcn it.
81 
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(3) If, says Edwards, in his third proof, God is ig- 
norant of the future volitions of men, "it will follow, that 
God must in many cases truly repent what he has done, so as 
properly to wish he had done otherwise, 1182 For many events 
would happen "quite otherwise than he was before aware of",83 
and contrary to His desire; and thus He would be exposed to 
disappointment in governing the world, to perplexity and 
vexation.
(4) Furthermore, he continues, God would be under the 
necessity of constantly changing His mind. Not being aware 
of what is going to take place, He would have continually 
to adapt Himself. "For his purposes, even as to the main 
parts of his scheme, such as belong to the state of his 
moral kingdom, must be always liable to be broken, through 
want of foresight; and he must be continually putting his 
system to rights, as it gets out of order, through the con- 
tingence of the actions of moral Agents: He must be a 
Being, who, instead of being absolutely immutable, must 
necessarily be the subject of infinitely the most numerous 
acts of repentance, and changes of intention, of any being
whatsoever."
(5) In the fifth proof Edwards points out a further 
consequence of the view that God's foreknowledge is limited, 
namely, the fact that a God who cannot foresee is liable to 
failure in His purpose in creation. "If this notion of God's






ignorance of future Volitions of moral Agents be thoroughly 
considered in its consequences, it will appear to follow 
fronjit, that God, after he had made the world, was liable 
to be wholly frustrated of his end in the creation of it; 
and so has been, in like manner, liable to be frustrated of 
his end in all the great works he had wrought." 85 God's 
end in creation is a moral one, involving the right use of 
their powers by moral agents. If God cannot foreknow 
everything that will take place, the possibility of man's 
continued misuse of these powers and final rejection of the 
good, in whatever form revealed, remains* God is reduced 
to the same situation as the creature, who, through limited 
knowledge no less than through limited ability, is always 
uncertain of the successful culmination of his efforts. The 
sending of Christ and all else that God has done in prose- 
cution of His designs would be in the nature of an experi- 
ment, the success of which would always be iijdoubt.
Of these proofs Edwards has given, the first two are
Biblical, and the last three, philosophical. To some minds
great 
the first two will not carry/weight. However, to one who
retains even an attenuated belief in the Scripture, they 
cannot be wholly dismissed as relics of pre-critical days. 
The God revealed in the Bible is not a God of finite 
knowledge,- He sees the end fronithe beginning.
The last three arguments reveal the implication of the 
view that limits God's foresight. Obviously, if we accept
85 
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the theistic position, this must ipso facto rule out a God of 
finite knowledge. But even leaving this consideration aside, 
a God who is liable to be sorry for what He has done, change 
His mind, andfabove all be frustrated in His purposes, can 
hardly be the object of Christian faith. The last two 
proofs Edwards gives are particularly cogent. A God of 
limited knowledge must be mutable and liable to failure, 
neither of which prospects can be acceptable to the Christian 
who is jealous of God's attributes and of His sovereignty in 
the world. The pluralist may be content with a certain 
amount of mutability in God, but such is certainly not con- 
sonant with the Biblical conception or the demands of per- 
sonal faith. The pluralist may likewise convince himself 
that a God who foresees only possibilities and not certain- 
ties can, by dint of wise maneuvering, contrive to bring 
His plans to fruition? but, as we shall have occasion to 
argue later, so long as the triumph of evil remains a dis-
 .
tinct possibility, it is futile to talk of the certain frui- 
tion of God's efforts. The liability of His being frustrated 
is the paramount objection to a limitation of His fore- 
knowledge. Such a liability, and therefore such a limita- 
tion, the Christian who stakes his all upon God simply can- 
not admit,
b. The Foreknowledge of God and the Necessity of Volitions 
Having shown that God foreknows all our volitions, Ed- 
wards proceeds to argue from this that they are necessary.
His first proof is based on the indissoluble connection 
between certain foreknowledge and the volitions foreknown.
218
"It is very evident", he says, "that, with regard to a thing 
whose existence is infallibly and indissolubly connected 
with something which already hatfc, or has had existence, 
the existence of that thing is necessary." 86 Foreknowledge, 
he points out, "being a thing which already has existence, 
must for that very reason "be regarded as existing necessar- 
ily. This, however, is of no importance to his argument, 
the validity of which does not depend upon the fact that 
foreknowledge exists necessarily, but upon the connection 
between existing foreknowledge and the volitions foreknown. 
Such connection, he reasons, is ample proof that the voli- 
tions must be necessary events. "It is no less evident", 
he says, "that if there be a full, certain, and infallible 
Foreknowledge of the future existence of the volitions of 
moral agents, then there is a certain, infallible and in- 
dissoluble connection between those events and that Fore- 
knowledge; and that therefore, by the preceding observa-
Q n
tions, those events are necessary events." 0
Now quite obviously there is a relation of some kind 
between foreknowledge and the event foreknown. But this is 
not to say that it is the kind of connection from which we 
can infer the necessity of the event. As Dr. Miitby argued, 
this inference is possible only if it is true that the rela- 
tion is a causal one, the foreknowledge being the cause of 
the event, what ground have we for asserting, fromjthe 
mere fact of its connection with foreknowledge, that a
86Bdwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 235. 87 ibid, p. 236.
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volition is determined by something antecedent, unless it is 
understood that the determinant is the foreknowledge itself? 
Itf fact Edwards has no right to lay it down as an axiom that 
an event indissolubly connected with a preceding necessary 
event is itself necessary, except upon the presupposition 
that the second event is necessary injvirtue of being the 
effect of the first. Without this presupposition this prin- 
ciple cannot serve as the basis of an argument, but must it- 
self stand in need of proof. It is entirely possible for a 
future event to be connected with something which already 
exists in such a way as to imply the future existence of the 
event, without implying anything as to its being a necessary 
event. Certainly this isjtrue in the case of the connection 
between foreknowledge and the event foreknown. "No 1m owl edge, 
however infallible, has any influence at all upon its ob- 
ject, nor does it make it either more or less certain, fixed, 
or necessary, than it would have been if it had not been
O n
known or foreknown." °
Edwards is of course not prepared to admit a causal 
influence in God's foreknowledge, although, after giving 
two more arguments for his thesis, to which we shall later 
advert, he goes so far as to point out in three corollaries 
that decreed events are no more necessary, nor inconsistent 
with human liberty, nor fatalistic than certainly foreknown 
events. He replies to Whitby's argument that foreknowledge,
87W. A. Copinger, A Treatise on Predestination, Election and
Grace, p. 122.
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being only knowledge, cannot Exercise causal influence on 
anything, "by insisting that his own argument does not im- 
ply such causal influence. Later on indeed he definitely 
states his agreement with Whitby as to the causal efficacy 
in foreknowledge. "I allow what Dr. Whitby says to be 
true, that mere Knowledge does not affect the thing known,
00
tp_ make it more certain or more future." But this, al- 
though he fails to realize it, is a fatal admission, bound, 
as we have seen, to cut the nerve of the whole argument as 
he has been presenting it. We cannot infer a volition to 
be necessary from its connection with a foreknowledge which 
is not its cause.
Edwards strives, however, to prove that we can. "In- 
fallible Foreknowledge", he urges, "may prove the Necessity 
of the event foreknown, and yet not be the thing which
O Q
causes the Necessity." If the foreknowledge is absolute, 
the event must be a necessary one, because if not the fore- 
knowledge of it would not be infallible. This holds true 
whether the necessity arises from the foreknowledge or 
vice versa: so long as we are given infallible knowledge of 
an event, that event is a necessary one, regardless of how 
the necessity arises. Certain foreknowledge, indeed, proves 
no more than certain "after-knowledge", but then certain 
"after-knowledge" implies the truth of the event certainly 
known. In fact it is only the certainty in the things them- 
selves which makes possible the certainty of the fore-
i QQ
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knowledge. "There must be a certainty in things themselves, 
before they are certainly known, or, which is the same 
thing, known to be certain. For certainty of Knowledge is 
nothing else but knowing or discerning the certainty there 
is in the things themselves, which are known. 1*®® This is 
the clearest statement of his answefr to Whitby. "What he is 
saying is that certain future existence of the event is an 
indispensable condition of certain foreknowledge of it. If, 
he adds, we regard the foreknown event as the cause of the 
foreknowledge, and not merely its condition, the argument is 
not weakened. In reality it is strengthened, "because it 
shows the existence of the event to be so settled and firm 
that it is as if it had already been." 91
But Edwards 1 denial of causal efficiency in God's 
foreknowledge has eviscerated this whole argument. The fal- 
lacy in it is apparent. He is confusing the idea of an event 
whose existence is certain with that of one whose/e xistence 
is necessitated by an antecedent event. We may readily grant 
that a certain and infallible foreknowledge implies beyond 
all shadow of a doubt the future existence of the foreknown 
event. But it does not follow that an event whose existence 
is certain is a necessary, determined event. To prove it 
such means proving it to be an effect of a cause antecedent 
to it. But there is no possible way to infer from the fact 
that the future existence of an event is a condition or 
cause of certain foreknowledge the further fact that it is
90Bdwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 243. ^ibid, p. 244.
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an event determined by something antecedent. We must dis- 
tinguish between certainty and necessity. Although we grant 
with Edwards that certain foreknowledge proves it is "im- 
possible the event should not be", we must bear in mind that 
this impossibility consists solely in the fact that its not 
being would involve a contradiction of the certain fore- 
knowledge* It is a logical and not an ontological impossi- 
bility. The existence of the foreknown event may be certain 
whether the event be contingent or determined.
Edwards 1 second proof of the fact that "foreknowledge 
infers necessity" is much more cogent than this one with 
which we have just been dealing. Briefly stated, the argu- 
ment is that a future event can be foreseen only by means of 
its connection with the past. He begins with the statement 
that "it is impossible for a thing to be certainly known to 
any intellect without evidence."^2 For a thing to be evi- 
dent, he explains, is for an understanding to "see evidence" 
of it. But, he continues, a future contingent event is 
without all evidence. It cannot be self-evident, for this 
means that it must either have present existence, or exist 
by the necessity of its nature, both of which characteris- 
tics are contradictory to the idea of a future contingent 
event. For can it have a second sort of evidence, which he 
calls "proof", that is, evidence consisting in its connec- 
tion with something preceding which is evident, for by defin- 
ition a contingent event is one which is unconnected with the
past.
92Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p.236.
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Hence since there is neither self-evidence nor "proof" of 
the future existence of a contingent event, "the thing in 
reality is not evident; and so cannot be seen to be evident, 
or, which is the same thing, cannot be known." 93
No one could possibly deny that for a thing to be 
certainly known it must be evident,- it must be apparent. 
It may be questioned, however, whether a thing's being evi- 
dent means that we must "see evidence" of it in Edwards' 
sense. If so, then quite obviously only a necessary event 
can be foreseen, for his argument is conclusive as to the 
fact that a future contingent event could not possesafsuch 
evidence. It could not be self-evident in either of the two 
senses in which, according to him, an event may be self- 
evident, nor could it be evident through connection with 
anything else. As a matter of fact, Edwards* argument 
really defines an evident event as a necessary event, for. 
the things which he holds give an event evidence, namely , 
present existence, necessity of nature, and connection with 
something else, are the very features he has previously 
cited as those which make an event IB cessary.
The question then arises whether an event may not be 
foreknown by God without being evident in any of these ways. 
To answer summarily, there seems to be no reason why it may 
not. The reason Edwards insists upon the necessity of God's 
seeing "proof", if He is to have certain foreknowledge, is 
that he conceives of God's foreknowledge as analogous to our
93Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 237.
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knowledge of truths for which we have no empirical evidence, 
and which have therefore to be proved by a process of de- 
ductive reasoning. In connection with another problem he 
says: "If none of the moral actions of intelligent beings 
are influenced by either previous Inclination or Motive, 
another strange thing will follow; and this is, that God not 
only cannot foreknow any of the future moral actions of his 
creatures, but he can make no conjecture, can give no
Q4probable guess concerning them." This being the case, it 
is quite natural that he should deny the possibility of God's 
having certain foreknowledge without seeing "proof" in the 
form of a necessary connection between the event in question 
and something preceding. But may not a future contingent 
event have for God an evidence analogous to that an empir- 
ical object we perceive has for us? If so, then no "proof" 
is necessary. The fact that I perceive an empirical object 
is sufficient evidence for me that it exists. Quite true, 
I may perceive it as interpreted in the light of my pre- 
vious experience, but that is not to say that in any sense I 
infer it from that experience. I perceive it as interpret- 
ed, and I require no further evidence of its existence be- 
yond the fact that I have a direct apprehension of it. tfow 
God may be conceived as knowing all things, past, present, 
and future, in a manner analogous to our apprehension of an 
empirical object. He may envision all things by a direct, 
intuitive gaze. All things would then be evident to Kirn,
94 
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that is, they would be apparent, and He would need no 
further evidence of them beyond the fact that He knows them. 
His foreknowledge of a future event would thus be sufficient 
evidence of its taking place, without His having to per- 
ceive a connection between the event and an antecedent cause 
that gives rise to it.
The doctrine of the specious present, that we our- 
selves apprehend time, not as a series of non-durational 
units, but as a span of duration, suggests what is perhaps an 
even closer analogy than that above. If, as seems true, this 
is the only theory which will adequately explain our time- 
experience, we are at any moment conscious of a duration- 
span including an "after" preceded by a "before" which is 
in a certain sense future to the "after". "The practically 
cognized present is no kndfe-edge, but a saddle-back with 
a certain breadth of its own on which we sit perched, and 
from which we look into two directions into time. The unit 
of composition of our perception of time is a duration,- 
with a bow and a stern, as it were - a rearward and a 
forward-looking end. It is only as parts of this du.ra.tion- 
block that the relation of succession of one end to the 
other is perceived. We do not first feel one end and then 
feel the other after it, and from the perception of the suc- 
cession infer an interval ofjtime between, but we seem to 
feel the interval of time as a whole with its two ends im- 
bedded in it. 1* 95 Thus our own diredt apprehension of the 
"before" included in any "duration-block" of our temporal
95William James, quoted by Pringle-Pattison, in The Idea of 
God in the Light of Recent Psychology, pp 352-353.
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consciousness, the evidence for which is in no way based on 
our discerning its connection with the "after", yields us 
an experience comparable, however slightly, to God's imme- 
diate knowledge of future events. "In the compresence which 
is thus an essential feature of our consciousness of time we 
therefore already realize, though doubtless on an infinitesi- 
mal scale, the nature of an eternal consciousness. 11 ^6
It is entirely compatible with the theistic position,- 
I should hold that it is necessary to it,- for us to conceive 
God as sustaining a relation to time such as would make it 
possible for Him to have a direct foreknowledge of future 
events. If we can follow Professor Pringle-Pattison, as it 
seems we must, in holding that the eternal consciousness 
comprehends in its purview the whole time span, then it 
should follow that God can contemplate past and future simul- 
taneously with the present. This is not to say that our 
time-experience is illusory or unmeaningful in the mind of 
God. On the contrary the temporal process, which is a real 
and necessary condition of the existence of finite minds, 
must be retained in the eternal experience of God. Yet, 
as Professor Pringle-Pattison goes on to say, it is somehow 
also transcended by the divine experience. The different 
stages of the time-process may be viewed by God, as he sug- 
gests, as elements in a completed purpose.
This is not the place to assay the difficult task of 
elaborating and defending any particular theory of the rela-
96A. S. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God, p. 354.
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tion of the temporal and the eternal. Suffice it to say 
that the position suggested does at least have the virtue 
of safeguarding the validity of our time-experience, while 
keeping God in relation t£ time without placing Him In time. 
And it does show that it is not impossible to conceive of 
God's having a knowledge of the future as immediate as that 
of the present.
But we need not stop with showing the possibility of 
the foreknowledge of contingent events. Let us examine the 
implications of the position taken by those who deny it. 
Why do they hold that God can have certain foreknowledge of 
a future event only by discerning its connection with some- 
thing else? The only conceivable reason is that they regard 
God as knowing future events by inferring them from|their 
antecedents. This is implied all through Edwards* writings 
and expressly stated by more recent writers who take his 
position on this matter. It cannot be too strongly em- 
phasized, however, that inference is essentially a temporal 
process. It is the process by which knowledge is arrived at 
which was not possessed before. It means that we know the 
premises at a time when we do not know the conclusion. It 
implies, when it is used as the method for penetrating the 
future, that we are ignorant of effects at a time when we 
know causes. It is to be attributed, therefore, only to 
beings placedjat a definite point in time, and whose knowl- 
edge is successive. Hence when determinists, and those in- 
determinists who agree with them in this respect,insist 
that God's foreknowledge must be based on a perceived con-
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nection between the foreseen event and something preceding, 
they are really ascribing to Him a temporal, successive 
knowledge, and thus placing Him in time. And yet they must 
insist on this inferential foreknowledge in God, however em- 
barrassing its implications, for it is the only real ground 
they have. It is the vital point, for instance, in this 
second argument of Edwards. Obviously, no future event, 
necessary or contingent, could possess what he calls "self- 
evidence", since no future event could have present exist- 
ence or exist by a necessity of its nature. Edwards is 
really saying, therefore, that to be evident a future event 
must exhibit "proof" in the form of its connection with 
something else. But this is to say that God must infer the 
future fromjthe past.
His third main argument fromjforeknowledge, to which 
we may now briefly advert, proceeds upon this same assump- 
tion. A contingent event, he says, is one which may or may 
not come to pass. This being true, if we suppose that God 
certainly foreknows its coming to pass, we are ascribing to 
God a knowledge which is inconsistent with itself. "For to 
say, that God certainly, and without all conjecture, knows 
that a thing will infallibly be, which at the same time He 
knows to be so contingent, that it may possibly not be, is 
to suppose His knowledge inconsistent with itself; or that 
one thing He knows, is utterly inconsistent with another 
thing He knows." 97
97 
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Now if we grant that a contingent event is one which 
may or may not come to pass, there is no answer to this argu- 
ment. And it may readily be admitted that for man, as a 
creature in time, this is one legitimate way of defining a 
contingent event. For he can foreknow only by inferring the 
future from the past, and a contingent event is one which 
camot be so inferred. But it is an entirely different mat- 
ter to say that a contingent event has this character for 
God. If, as we have argued is entirely possible, God may 
have immediate knowledge of a future event, that event may 
be certainly foreknown by Him regardless of whether it is 
connected with an antecedent cause, For God, therefore, the 
difference between a future contingent evenljfand a future 
necessary event is not that the former is one which may or 
may not be., but simply that it is one which does not arise 
entirely from the past. Hence this argument, resting as it 
does upon the definition of a future contingent event as 
one which may or may not come to pass, can stand only if we 
are prepared to assume that God, like us, is in time,and is 
therefore able to foreknow the future only by inferring it 
from the past. Edwards 1 thir4 argument, thus reduces to 
the second one, which likewise started from the position 
that God must see evidence in the form of "proof" to fore- 
know a future event.
Recent thinkers who hold that "foreknowledge infers 
necessity", both among determinists and indeterminists, 
still base their argument upon this postulate. Thus profes- 
sor Ward writes: "The only basis for anticipation is past
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experience... Unless then God has preordained all that is 
to be done, it is surely a contradiction to say even of hitt 
that he has such sjknowledge of the future as we have/of the 
past." 98 Ward, incidentally, quotes Edwards with strong ap- 
proval: "I do not think Jonathan Edwards overstated his 
case, when he said:- 'There is no geometrical theorem what- 
soever, more capable of strict demonstration than that God's 
certain Prescience of the volitions of moral agents is in- 
consistent with such a contingency of these events, as is 
without all Necessity. 111 " Martineau accepts it as self- 
evident that contingent events cannot be certainly fore- 
known. "If it is uncertain beforehand whether there will 
even be a Cyrus, a Josaiah, an Antiochus, a Judas (and this 
depends on innumerable volitions), or, if there be doubts 
how each will deal with his opportunities and his tempta- 
tions, prediction of his place and behavior in history will 
be impossible: and if the prediction has been made and veri- 
fied, it can only have been by the exclusion of contingency: 
a thing known for certain cannot be uncertain."* ° The 
postulate underlying this is that what God knows of the 
future He infers from the past.
Clearly, then, we can deny divine foreknowledge of 
future contingent events only if we are prepared to ascribe 
to God an inferential knowledge, characterized by the same 
temporal limitations as oura. But can the Christian theist
Ward, The Realm of Ends, p. 474.
"ibid, p. 312.
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afford to do this? A God who is in any sense transcendent 
cannot be "brought within the time process like His creatures, 
and reduced to the necessity of gaining knowledge of the 
future in the very way made necessary to them because of 
their finitude. One wonders that a thinker like Martineau 
is not alive to this difficulty in his position, but he ig- 
nores it completely, concerning himself solely with the 
effort to reconcile limited foreknowledge with a providen- 
tial government of the world. Even those who agree that he 
has succeeded in this can hardly fail to be aware that he 
has left untouched the far more difficult task of showing 
how Christian theism can content itself with a God whose 
relation to time is no different from that of His creatures. 
However modest and tentative our notions about the nature 
of time must be, one thing we can affirm, that a transcen- 
dent God is not limited by it as we are. And however differ- 
ent those notions may be,- whether for instance we follow 
Eant in making it the subjective form of intuition, or 
Bergson in conceiving it as a series of heterogeneous states 
permeating one another in succession but without distinction, 
or common sense in viewing it as a homogeneous spatialized 
medium in which events are spread out,- must we not at least 
agree that the Creator and His creatures view time from 
different standpoints? If so, then the fundamental argument 
of Edwards and his successors, who deny divine intuitive 
foreknowledge of future congingent events, will have to be 
abandoned.
Edwards 1 opponents insisted that a view like his
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implies a successiveness in God's knowledge. That Edwards 
did not realize this implication of his argument is evident 
Bjmfehe fact that he denies making God's knowledge successive, 
and goes on to say that its unsuccessiveness does not weaken 
the argument that "foreknowledge infers necessity." M So 
that it is manifest that there being no proper succession in 
God's mind, makes no alteration as to the necessity of the 
existence of the erents known. " 1C1 But he is manifestly 
wrong in denying that his theory makes God's knowledge suc- 
cessive, as we have already endeavored to show. He is also 
wrong in saying that foreknowledge implies necessity as 
much, if it is unsuccessive, as if it is successive. For if 
God sees all things at once, there is no reason for Him to 
infer one thing from another, and therefore no reason why He 
may not foresee an event that arises spontaneously as 
easily as He foresees one that is necessary.
It may he pointed out here that while unsuccessiveness 
in God's foreknowledge makes it impossible to infer necessity 
from such knowledge, we do not mean to say that it is incon- 
sistent with the foresight of necessary events. We quite 
agree with Edwards that God has an unsuccessive knowledge of 
all the relations between things, and that He sees the con- 
nection between cause and effect. But then we hold that He 
sees the effect ajs connected with its cause, and not because 
of its connection. God sees the conclusion as soon as the 
premises, so to speak, and while He understands the relations
Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 246.
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between them, He does not have to go through the process of 
deduction*
It has "been said that to hold to the conception of an 
immediate foreknowledge of the future is to give up a per- 
fectly intelligible explanation of God's foreknowledge and 
to take refuge in a mysterious doctrine which is impregnable 
only because it is mysterious. We trust that what has gone 
before is a sufficient reply to this criticism. Two further 
observations, however, may be made. In the first place, it 
is simply not true that the notion of immediate foreknowl- 
edge is thoroughly mysterious and unintelligible. We have 
already shown that in our empirical experience, especially 
in our consciousness of the  before* in the specious present, 
we have close analogies to it. The notion itself is clear- 
cut and understandable, even though the understanding of how 
such knowledge takes place may be beyond us. But, second, 
are we not to expect some mystery when dealing with the 
things of God? Is not the fact of divine omniscience with 
respect to "present events completely beyond our power to ex- 
plain on the analogy of our experience? Indeed, it is as 
mysterious, once we stop to think of it, as divine fore- 
knowledge of future events, and yet we accept it because we 
believe God infinite. And do we not accept mysteries on 
every hand? If we admit the mystery of creation, the mystery 
of the incarnation, the mystery of the Trinity, why should 
we renege when we run upon some mystery in the way God 
knows the future? We need not even go to God to discover 
a mystery in the knowing process. I apprehend a book lying
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on my desk, "but just how and why I have this awareness is 
beyond me. I know certain conditions it requires, and cer- 
tain things that take place when it occurs, but this is by 
no means completely to answer the how and the why of the 
process. Why then should I insist that the last shred of 
mystery be torn from God's ways of knowing? when we try to 
explain away the mystery of how He knows the future, we can 
do so only by describing His foreknowledge in terms of our 
finite experience, and that is to say, only by sacrificing 
His transcendence.
3. The Argument from the Moral Nature of Man 
The third major argument advanced by Edwards in support 
of his theory of the will is based on the implications of 
man's moral agency. He begins with an effort to prove the 
position that moral inability is not only compatible with 
moral responsibility, but actually demanded by it as its sole 
adequate basis. After this he moves into an attack on the 
Arminian theory, endeavoring to show its inadequacy as a 
basis of moral agency.
a. The Consistency of Moral Inability and Responsibility
In his effort to show that a man who is morally unable 
is none the less responsible for his conduct, Edwards has 
recourse to a number of theological arguments. The first is 
based on the necessity of God's volitions. God, he says, is 
praiseworthy for His holiness, although all His volitions 
are necessitated by His nature. If it is true then that God is
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morally responsible, there ie no reason why it should not be 
true of the man whose acts are determined. To deny the fact 
that a determined act is a matter of moral responsibility is 
to deny God credit for His holiness.
A second argument is based on the necessity of Christ's 
sinlessness. That His sinlessness was necessary, Edwards in- 
sists, is proved by the promises made by God to Him, by the 
promises to the church cond it joined upon His conduct, and by 
the promises of Christ Himself to His followers which were 
predicated on His conduct. Now these promises, which were 
certain to be fulfilled, would not have been certain had not 
Christ's sinlessness been certain, that is to say, necessary. 
Yet notwithstanding the necessity of His volitions, Christ 
was subject to commands, etc., deserving of reward, and thus 
fully responsible. It follows that any man whose acts are 
determined may also be responsible.
Again, God, according to the Scripture, has given up 
certain men to sin. In explanation of this Edwards remarks 
that "hereby is certainly meant God so ordering or dispos- 
ing things, in some respect or other, either by doing or for- 
bearing to do, as that the consequences should be men con- 
tinuing in their sins." 102 In spite of this fact that God 
Himself renders these sins necessary, they are nevertheless 
charged up to those who commit them.
These three theological arguments, while they may have 
carried some weight with Edwards' contemporaries, are not
102Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 272.
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convincing today. To reason from the nature of God to the 
nature of man is an extremely precarious procedure. We may 
well grant that God deserves credit for volitions which are 
determined by His nature, but then God must in some sense be 
ultimately responsible for His nature. He at least did not 
come by His in the way in which we inherit our natures, which, 
according to Edwards, determine all our acts. As for the 
argument from the sinlessness of Christ, the fact that the 
promises made to Him and by Him were certain to be fulfilled 
does not prove His conduct to have been necessitated. To 
foreknow with certainty does not mean that the foreknown is 
necessary. That it can be said of Christ »non posse pecare 1 , 
is a highly questionable position to use as a basis for 
argument. Even if this be granted, His uniqueness as an in- 
dividual should make us wary of too easily arguing from Him 
to ourselves. And finally, the argument that God holds men 
responsible for sins He has predetermined is a case of beg- 
ging the question. That we are blameworthy for necessary 
sins is/precisely the point at issue.
In Part IV of the Enquiry Edwards makes an attempt to 
show that necessity is compatible with moral responsibility 
by an appeal to "common sense", or as we would say today, to 
experience. His argument is thus not completely metaphysi- 
cal and theological, as some of his commentators have said. 
Recognizing the popular prejudice against the position that 
we are responsible for determined volitions, he endeavors to 
account for it by the fact that "natural" and "moral" neces- 
sity are commonly confused in the popular mind. Common
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sense tells us that we are not responsible in the case of 
natural necessity. M If men do things which in themselves 
are very good, fit to be brought to pass, and attended with 
very fcappy effects, properly against their wills; or do them 
from a necessity that is without their wills, or with which 
their wills have no concern or connection; then it is a 
plain dictate of common sense, that such doings are none of 
their virtue, nor have they any moral good in them." 103 But 
moral necessity involving no hindrance to, nor constraint of 
will is a different matter. Once the confusion between natu- 
ral and moral necessity has been cleared up it will, as a 
matter of fact, be found that the attribution of moral res- 
ponsibility to a morally necessitated act "is not at all in- 
consistent with the natural apprehensions of mankind, and 
that sense of things which is found everywhere in the common 
people; who are furthest from having their thoughts perverted 
from their natural channel, by metaphysical and philosophi- 
cal subtilties."104
To back up this statement Edwards undertakes to show 
wherein the popular notion of desert consists, illustrating 
by the common idea of blameworthiness. To let him speak for 
himself: M The idea which the common people, through all ages 
and nations, have of faultiness, I suppose to be plainly 
this; a person being or d.oing wrong, with his own will and 
pleasure; containing these two things: 1. His doing wrong, 
when he does as he pleases. 2. His pleasure being wrong.
Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 333. -^ibid, p. 339.
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Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing 
their Notion; a person having his heart wrong, and doing 
wrong from his heart,"105 This implies for the common man, 
he explains, that the act is the agent f s own act, which, 
however, is only to say that the agent does it "of choice 11 . 
There is not involved in this any speculation as to the 
cause of volitions. The act must be performed in M the exer- 
cise of liberty",106 but this means simply that the agent
must be able to M do as he pleases without considering how
107 his pleasure comes to be as it is."
Par from implying liberty in the Arminian sense as a 
basis for responsibility, the influence of "the heart", cf 
inclinations, argues Edwards, is demanded by common sense. 
"Men do not think a good act to be the less praiseworthy, 
for the agent being much determined in it by a good inclina- 
tion or a good motive, but the more. And if the good inclin- 
ation, or motive, has but little influence in determining 
the agent, they do not think his act so much the more vir- 
tuous, but the less. And so concerning evil acts, which are
1 no
determined by evil motives or inclinations." AW Action, to 
be good or evil, must express the character of the agent. 
This is the dictate of common sense, except in those "that
have darkened their own minds with confused metaphysical
109 speculation."
105Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 339.
106 ibid, p. 340.
102ibid, p. 427.
^ *^  »  » » y _ff 9 -^ ^ *r 9
Q7
108 ibid, pp 342-343.
109ibid, p. 340.
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b. The Incompatibility of Freedom in the Arminian Sense and
Moral Responsibility.
Having endeavored to show that we may be held responsi- 
ble for necessary volitions, Edwards now launches into an 
attack on the Arminian conception as a basis of moral res- 
ponsibility. He directs the attack first at their notion 
that a liberty of indifference is essential to acts for 
which we can be held responsible.
An indifferent choice, he reminds us, has been shown 
to be an impossibility. But even assuming that it might be 
possible, no act performed in a state of indifference could 
be moral on the Arminian view, because it would not be self- 
determined. An indifferent act must be free of all deter- 
mination, whereas, when the will determined itself, each 
act is determined by a preceding act. On the other hand, if 
the act is self-determined, it cannot be indifferent, and 
therefore cannot have moral quality. Hence the implication 
of the Arminian position, on the basis of its own principles, 
is that there can be no ethical quality attaching to man. 
This brief ar gum en-^Edwards does not stress, and we need not 
stop to consider, inasmuch as the principle on which it rests 
has already been examined.
Again, he says, assuming that indifference is possible, 
it will follow that the entire self must be indifferent dur- 
ing the act, if it is to be deemed either virtuous or vic- 
ious. The heart must be perfectly free from tendencies or 
inclinations of any kind. "And so it will follow, that in 
order to the virtue of an act, the heart must be indifferent 
in the time of the performance of that act, and the more
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indifferent and cold the heart is with relation to the act 
performed, so much the "better; because the act is performed 
with so much the greater Liberty." 110 Likewise the mind 
must be indifferent in its judgments as regards the charac- 
ter of the act. "And not only so, but for the will to be in 
a state of perfect equilibrium with respect to such crimes, 
is for the mind to be in such a state, as to be full as 
likely to choose them as to refuse them, to do them as to 
omit them." 11:L An indifferent will, then, implies an in- 
different self.
This criticism is invalid. The Arminian held that the 
will acts independently of the least influence of heart and 
intellect. This, as we have seen, was his fundamental mean- 
ing in speaking of it as indifferent. And since it is utter- 
ly independent, its indifference would not affect the state 
of the heart and mind. Edwards has good ground for holding 
that such indifference is impossible, but to say that it 
must, if existent, involve the entire self is simply to mis- 
interpret the Arminian's theory.
Having noted these preliminary thrusts at his oppo- 
nents, let us move now into the really significant criticism 
he brings against them. The Arminian doctrine, he points out, 
is inconsistent with the existence of habits, inclinations, 
eto., possessing moral quality. This follows in the first 
instance from the fact that tendencies or inclinations in them 
selves can possess no moral quality. Nothing, according to
110Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 299. i:uibid, p. 301.
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them, can possess moral quality in which freedom is not in- 
volved, but freedom, being indifference, cannot reside in 
any dispositions of the heart "which are contrary to In- 
difference, and imply in their nature the very destruction 
and exclusion of it." 112 Further, habitual bias is inimical 
to moral agency in the will. Habitual bias is incompatible 
with the notion of a self-determining power in the will, and 
since the latter is necessary to moral agency, habitual bias 
is opposed to moral agency. "In estimating the degree of 
Virtue or Vice, no more must be considered than what arises 
from self-determining power, without any influence of that 
Bias, because Liberty is exercised in no more: so that all 
that is the exercise of habitual Inclination, is thrown 
away, as not belonging to the morality of the action." 113 If 
the inclination is strong enough to necessitate the acts of 
will, all self-determination or contingency is excluded and 
moral agency cannot exist at all. And, further, "If very
strong Habits destroy Liberty, the lesser ones proportion-
114 
ably hinder it, according to their degree of strength."
It will follow from the Arminian position "that then is the 
act most virtuous or vicious, when performed without any In- 
clination or habitual Bias at all; because it is then per- 
formed with most Liberty." 115 Being in their own nature de- 
void of moral quality, and in their effect upon the will 
destructive of it, there is no place in the Arminian scheme
^Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 301.
,,,ibid, p. 303.
114 ibid, p. 302. ^bid, p. 302.
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for good or evil tendencies of the heart. The mere state- 
ment of this position, however, is sufficient to show its 
absurdity. Common sense tells us beyond all doubt that 
there is. such a thing as a good heart or a bad heart.
The same considerations which make moral quality in- 
consistent, on the Arminian theory, with inclinations of 
the heart, etc., rule out the possibility of the operation of 
motives. For ajmotive to determine volition would be for it 
to make the volition perfectly non-moral, and for it to in- 
fluence volition would be for it to exclude moral agency to 
the degree of its influence. H If a thousand degrees of 
Motive abolish all liberty, then five hundred take it half 
away."!-^ But without a motive, he continues, an act is 
without end or intention, it is a blind and purposeless 
action, and can therefore not be called a moral act. The 
real result of Arminianism is to exclude moral agency alto- 
gether. "For it is absurd in itself, and contrary to com- 
mon sense, to suppose a virtuous act of mind without any 
good intention or aim; and, by their principles, it is ab- 
surd to suppose a virtuous act with a good intention or aim;
117 
for to act for an end, is to act from a Motive."
In the foregoing criticisms Edwards is condemning the 
Arminians on two grounds, (l) for denying any moral quality 
in the dispositions, inclinations, etc, in our nature, and 
(2) for denying any influence of the heart or motives to be
116Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 308. 
117 ibid, p. 311.
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compatible with responsible moral choice. As to the first 
criticism, he is really misrepresenting their position. 
They did not deny the existence of evil and good disposi- 
tions, etc; on the contrary they as a rule recognized that 
the fall of Adam had impaired man's nature. The Remonstrance, 
of 1610, even went so far as to say that man could not do 
anything good, or exercise saving faith, without the regen- 
erating influence of the Holy Spirit. "What they did deny 
was man's responsibility for these non-voluntary tendencies 
in his make-up. We are not responsible outside the sphere 
of our freedom, they insisted, but this still leaves it 
possible for moral attributes to be predicated of our in- 
clinations, habits, etc.
If Edwards misses the mark in failing to see this, he 
finds the most vulnerable spot in the whole Arminian theory 
when he condemns it for rejecting the influence of our 
nature and of all motives upon our volitions. The idea of a 
self-determining, indifferent will is utterly inconsistent 
with any sort of influence. It is a will acting in vacuo. 
The Arminian in reality abstracts the will from the rest of 
the self, leaving it only a bare capacity for action, inde- 
pendent of the agent's nature or mind. As a result its 
acts, being insulated against the influence of the heart, 
express nothing of the agent's character,- in fact, cannot 
be said to belong to the agent. Being isolated also from 
the influence of motive, Edwards rightly says it is purpose- 
less, expressing no rational intention of the self, aiming 
at no end. The volition is thus left a characterless, non-
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rational exercise of abstract power. But no act is a moral 
act which does not express the agent's character, and is not 
led "by the guiding light of an intelligent purpose. Ed- 
wards has therefore done a genuine service in exposing so 
cogently the defects of the Arminian theory as a basis of 
responsible moral agency.
But apart altogether from its inadequacy from the 
ethical point of view, this theory is a nest of psychologi- 
cal fallacies,- a weakness which Edwards did not emphasize 
nor completely grasp. The bare, abstract will in which the 
libertarian locates the power of choice is arrived at in 
reality by the analytical method of the determinist, and be- 
longs to the now obsolete psychology which splits the self 
up into various faculties. It is the attribution of power 
to a nonentity. "The will itself has no real objective 
existence, except in its embodiment in an act, and only in 
the moment of the act. 1* 118 Locke was correct when he said 
that it is as proper to say that "it is the singing faculty 
sings, and the dancing faculty dances, as that the will 
chooses." We need not agree with him and some other oppo- 
nents of libertarianism that it is really a doctrine of 
chance, but as an approximation of true volition the acts of 
the abstract will are little better than chance. The liber- 
tarian has ignored the self's place in volition as complete- 
ly as the determinist, who links together character, motive,
118W. A. Copinger, A Treatise on Predestination, Election,
and Grace, p. 276.
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and willing in an impersonal, causal series. Instead of 
rational, free choice, made by the self as a whole, what we 
have is a mere accidental occurrence in which nothing per- 
sonal is involved. It is not the will that is free, but, 
if there be freedom at all, the person willing, Edwards 
was within his^rights when he insisted on this point, al- 
though he himself really left the person to one side.
If we overlook his inconsistencies, and whatever de- 
ficiencies we may feel to belong to his conception of free- 
dom, we must give Edwards full credit for taking the stand in 
his day, and for his earnest defense of it, that freedom be- 
longs, not to the abstract will, but to the agent. The fact 
that he did not himself completely succeed in locating free- 
dom in the agent should not overshadow the fact that he made 
the effort. As we follow him in his arguments against the 
Arminian theory we can see that, with all their fallacies, 
they constitute a highly significant attack on the concep- 
tion of an isolated will. The following tribute overstates 
the value of Edwards 1 contribution, but in its spirit we can 
concur. "We owe to the Calvinist preacher, Jonathan Edwards, 
the clear demonstration of the impossibility in theory and 
the absurdity in practice of locating freedom in an abstract 
faculty, the will, distinguishable from the other faculties 
of the soul. Since his treatise, whatever conception we may
form of human freedom, we recognize that there is no place
119 in natural or moral science for caprice. 1*
119Herbert W. Carr, The Free Will Problem, pp 22-23.
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In Part IV Edwards launches another criticism against 
the Arminian position in opposition to their claim that moral 
responsibility attaches only to those acts which are freely 
committed by the will. They assume, says Edwards, H that the 
virtuousness of the dispositions, or acts of the will, con- 
sists not in the nature of these dispositions,, or acts of 
will, but wholly in the Origin or Cause of them." 120 It will 
follow, he then goes on to show, that there really cannot be 
any moral good or evil attaching to an individual. For if 
moral quality does not reside in the nature of things which 
are good or evil but only in their cause, then it will fol- 
low that the moral quality of the cause can lie only in its 
cause, and so on, ad infinitum. Nothing can stop the re- 
gress but an admission that the final cause is good or bad
an admission 
in itself, and not because of its cause,/which is ruled out
by the initial assumption. Moral quality is therefore ban- 
ished from the world, there being nothing of which it can be 
predicated. Edwards puts the conclusion in characteristic 
fashion, "And so it follows, that faultiness can lie onJL£ in 
that Cause, which is a Cause only, and no effect of any 
thing. Nor yet can it lie in this; for then it must lie in 
the Nature of the thing itself." 121 Having exposed the ab- 
surdity of the Arminian position, he affirms his own posi- 
tion that the moral quality of a thing must lie in the 
nature of the thing itself. "It is agreeable to the natural
120Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, pp 314-315. 
121 ibid, p. 318.
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notions of mankind, that moral evil, with its desert of dis- 
like and abhorence, and all its other ill deservings, con- 
sists in a certain deformity in the Nature of certain dis-
1 9P
positions of the heart, and acts of the will."
Now Edwards achieves this apparent logical victory,
first by misrepresenting the Arminian position, and then by
have 
applying again the reductio ad absurdum argument we/already
examined. To begin with he assumes that the Arminian, like 
him, makes moral responsibility coterminous with moral 
quality. We have seen, however, that in their view, we are 
responsible only for the acts of the free will, although we 
also possess inherited tendencies which have a moral char- 
acter. Edwards, on the other hand, held that we are res- 
ponsible for our inherited depravity of nature as much as 
for our volitions. (It is true, of course, that he regarded 
our depravity as in the final analysis the result of our 
voluntary participation in Adam's first sin.) Now in this 
argument against the Arminian view he ignores their dis- 
tinction between our evil dispositions for which we are not 
blameworthy, and our volitions for which we are responsible. 
Assuming his own view that moral quality and responsibility 
are coterminous, he concludes, as he did in the argument 
preceding this one, that the Arminian, in limiting our 
responsibility to the acts of the will as a spontaneous 
cause, is likewise limiting all moral attributes to our voli- 
tions. On the basis of this assumption he undertakes to
122Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 319.
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show, not only that the Arminian denies the existence of all 
responsibility but also of all good and evil in man.
Again, he misrepresents the Arminian position when he
*
attributes to them the denial that dispositions and acts of 
the will are in their nature good or evil. This view he 
foists upon them by an illegitimate inference from their 
limitation of our responsibility to acts of the will. They 
claimed that responsibility could attach only to that which 
is a true cause, hence only to the volitions of a free will. 
From this Edwards reasoned that if responsibility,- and 
therefore moral quality,- is attributable only to that which 
is a cause, it cannot consist in the nature of dispositions 
or acts of will which are caused. These acts and disposi- 
tions are effects of preceding causes, and must, therefore, 
on the Arminian view, be non-moral. On the basis of this 
interpretation it is easy to fix on the Arminian again, 
from a slightly different angle, the fallacy of the infinite 
series. It is obvious, however, tnat he achieves the 
reductio ad absurdum here, just as he did in tne case of the 
self-determination of the will, by simply refusing to grant 
the possibility of spontaneous volitions, and thus by forcing 
upon the Arminian the very conception of causation he re- 
jected. By denying spontaneous causation Edwards distinguish- 
es between that which causes, and the act of the will caused, 
and thus between the cause, and the nature of the act. But 
for the Arminian the act of the free will is. that will exer- 
cising its causative efficiency, and thus it is In Its. 
nature a moral act. Its virtue or vice consists in this
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fact; and its being a blameworthy or meritorious act, an 
act for which we are responsible, consists in the fact that 
it is the act of a free cause. As for our dispositions, they 
are likewise good or evil ir^ their nature, and it is only a 
perversion of the Arminian«s teaching to represent him as 
denying this. Even though Edwards could prove that the Ar- 
minian does banish responsibility by limiting it to a 
cause, this would not affect the question of the goodness or 
badness of our dispositions one way or another. Had he been 
willing or able to grasp the conception of creative causa- 
tion, he would have seen that the Arminian was with him in 
regarding dispositions and volitions as iri their nature good 
or bad.
c. Observations on Edwards' Reconciliation 
of Necessity and Accountability
Having recognized Edwards 1 success in showing the Ar- 
minian theory of freedom to be untenable on ethical grounds, 
the question arises whether 
/he is right in assuming, as he consistently does, that there
is no third alternative between it and determinism. If he 
is right, he is in a position to argue that, Arminianism be- 
ing eliminated, we are committed to his own theory. His as- 
sumption, however, can certainly not be left unchallenged. 
To concede that the free will of the Arminian theory is un- 
tenable is not necessarily to deny all spontaneity, nor the 
possibility of attributing the power of contrary choice to 
the self as a whole. And likewise to recognize that a voli- 
tion must express our character and possess a motive is not 
tantamount to admitting that it must be determined. There 
is the possibility at least of a third alternative in the
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form of a theory of volition which includes the spontaneity 
insisted upon by the Arminian and also the influence of 
character and guidance of purpose demanded by the determin- 
ist. Our decision therefore lies, not between determinism 
and Arminianism, but between determinism and a theory which 
attributes freedom in the form of alternative choice to the 
agent.
In view of this possibility of a third theory Edwards* 
attempt to show necessity not only compatible with, but es- 
sential to moral agency, the discussion of which we have re- 
served to this point, takes on especial significance. For, 
r» we have seen that his efforts to prove the necessity of 
volitions from the nature of causation and the foreknowledge 
of God were not successful. The argument that moral agency 
implies the determination of our volitions is thus his only 
remaining proof. But apart altogether from the importance 
with which this invests it, we really come to grips, as we 
examine it, with the basic problem of freedom.
Let us now consider the reasons Edwards advances in 
proof of his position. We have seen that, in addition to 
the arguments based on the necessity of volitions in God, 
Christ, and those given up of God to sin,- arguments which 
are certainly not convincing,- he advances one based on 
"common sense". The real/cause of the feeling that determin- 
ism is opposed to responsibility lies, he holds, in a con- 
fusion of natural and moral inability in the popular mind. 
However, as soon as the distinction between them is clear, 
he insists, no man will deny that, while natural inability
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excuses, moral inability does not. But this is really no 
argument in proof of the compatibility of necessity and 
moral accountability,- it is only an explanation of the op- 
position to it on the part of certain people. It amounts 
simply to the statement that, when people understand the 
deterministic theory, they agree with it. This is a great 
deal to assume. Instead of agreeing with Edwards 1 position 
as obviously true, many people would probably find them- 
selves wondering why, if natural inability "without doubt 1* 
excuses, the same should not be true of moral inability. 
For after all it is not the distinction between these which 
is significant, but the fact that they are both forms of 
inability, "Whatever be the difference between the factors 
which cause it, and the acts which are rendered impossible 
by it, the inability itself is the same in both cases, why 
Edwards so sweepingly asserts that we are not responsible for 
an outward act we cannot perform, yet fully responsible for 
an act of will we cannot exert, is never made clear. It 
would seem then that something more than clearing up the 
confusion between natural and moral inability is necessary, 
if the objection to determinism is to be removed.
Edwards does attempt this by his analysis of the com- 
mon man's idea of "faultiness". This, he says, as we have 
seen, "is a person's being or doing wrong, with his own 
will and pleasure...a person having his heart wrong and doing 
wrong from his heart." Now both these statements would 
probably be accepted at face value by the common man, just 
as he would accept Edwards' statement that freedom means
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"doing as one pleases". But the language in each case im- 
plies a selective activity, or the initiation of activity. 
For a man to do wrong "with his own will and pleasure", or 
"from his heart", or to "do as he pleases" is, it would 
seem, for one to originate action, or make a choice between 
genuine alternatives, mien we are told, however, that no 
such spontaneity or selectivity is involved, that these ex- 
pressions are in fact consistent with the full and complete 
determination of our motives by factors beyond our control, 
a protest arises in the heart. We have the feeling that we 
have been tricked by language. "Common sense" would hardly 
accept "doing as one pleases", etc., as descriptive of gen- 
uine freedom, when we are told that, even though we "do as 
we please", our whole day is pre-determined for us, and 
that the real cause of our moral victories is a relationship 
between our nature and circumstances over which we have no 
control.
We are led to accept the statements quoted above, which 
on their face indicate contrary choice, only to be told that 
they have no reference to the origin of volition, i.e., to 
whether it is determined or free, but that as a matter of 
fact any volition which expresses character, as all morally 
significant ones do, is determined. What his "proof" of 
the compatibility of responsibility and necessity in reality 
reduces to is only the assertion that the common man's notion 
of faultiness is simply the doing of a wrong act expressive 
of an evil character, there being no question as to the 
freedom of volition which leads to the act. In other words,
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natural ability is the only requisite for moral responsibil- 
ity for the ordinary man. This being the case, there is 
nothing in the ordinary idea of blameworthiness which con- 
flicts with the doctrine of necessity. Now the least that 
can be said is that this is no proof of the compatibility of 
necessity and moral responsibility,- it is merely the 
assertion of it. To the person who insists that responsibil- 
ity implies freedom in willing Edwards can reply only with 
the contradictory claim.
It should be said, in fairness to Edwards, that the 
question with which he was dealing is of such a nature that 
its solution does not lend itself to either deductive or 
inductive "proof". We must recognize the ultimate character 
of the problem. We cannot deduce our answer from any other 
truths, nor can we discover it by empirical investigation. 
The attitude we take is the fruit neither of logic nor of 
science,- it is one of those few a priori assumptions which 
lie at the base of our whole thought structure. It is the 
answer we get when we take our problemsjto the oracle of our 
moral consciousness, an oracle which speaks in the impera- 
tive. The truth of its dictates we can but feel to be 
axiomatic. The most we can do in substantiating their truth 
is to show their implications more satisfactory than those 
of opposed positions, which, in fact, is what we find being 
done in all discussions of freedom. But however much this 
substantiation may strengthen them, it does not account for 
our fundamental convictions.
Now when we bring to the oracle of the moral conscious-
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ness the problem "before us, the answer seems clear beyond 
the possibility of a doubt: moral responsibility implies 
genuine alternatives; where there is no real choice, we can- 
not be held accountable. To hold a man blameworthy for doing 
an act he is unable to avoid, or for failing to will that 
which he cannot will, is to fly in the face of conscience. 
The very conception of moral responsibility implies the ex- 
istence of a power of contrary choice. Kant was right when 
he insisted that freedom is the essential presupposition of 
the moral life.
When the relation between man and God is taken into 
account, the importance of human freedom, in the form of con- 
trary choice, becomes even more apparent. In psychology and 
in the social sciences its significance is least appreciated, 
for the scientist excludes all ethical and religious consid- 
erations from his study of man. In fact, proceeding as he 
does with the causal postulate, as formulated by empirical 
science, his tendency is definitely deterministic. The more 
he can explain all human activity in terms of the principle 
of transeunt causation the more successful he is. From the 
scientific viewpoint there is gain, rather than loss, in 
abolishing freedom.
When, however, we move up to the level of ethics, free- 
dom becomes the sine qua non of the moral life. It is, as 
we hatie seen, the basis of human responsibility. And further, 
a belief by man in his freedom is a prerequisite of moral 
effort. This point has been well put by William McDougall, 
ajacientist who appreciates the ethical viewpoint. "If, as
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the determinist asserts, each of my actions is completely 
determined by antecedent conditions and processes that are 
partly within my own nature, partly in my environment, why 
should I make any moral effort? .... This is the legitimate 
inference from determinism. This is its moral difficulty, 
which has seldom been squarely faced by its advocates, and 
never overcome by them." 125 To the reply that determinism 
among Calvinists at least has not borne fruit in the form 
of moral laxity, it can be answered that the Calvinist in 
the daily struggle of his mwral life forgets the full im- 
plications of his belief in predestination. "It must be ob- 
served, however, that it is not from their favorite dogma 
that extreme Calvinists have drawn their ethics. Their moral
"L 24-sense has been invigorated from other sources." Never- 
theless, there are many moralists who, through misunder- 
standing the meaning of freedom, or through obsession with 
the desire to give character and motive a place in conduct, 
espouse the deterministic cause.
It is, as we said, only when we view man in his rela- 
tion to God that the full implications of determinism emerge. 
For, on the deterministic view, God becomes the author of 
sin and of an arbitrary election, and by the sensitive 
Christian consciousness this cannot but be summarily rejected. 
Determinism is utterly repugnant to theism. Its damaging 
implications for God's character cannot be avoided even by
McDougall, Social Psychology, p. 202. 
124George Park Fisher, Discussions in History and Theology,
p. 248.
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the genius of an Edwards.
The doctrine of necessity is the natural ally of pan- 
theism, naturalism, and agnosticism. It is far more often 
associated with the doctrine of moral irresponsibility and 
a non-theistic philosophy than with Christian theism. Sig- 
nificantly enough, several of Edwards 1 commentators, begin- 
ning with Dana, sixteen years after the Enquiry was pub- 
lished, have pointed out the similarity of his theory and 
the theories of men like Hobbes, Spinoza, Hume, Mill, Kames, 
etc. But these men realized the incompatibility of deter- 
minism and faith in the Christian God in a way that Edwards 
and other theological determinists, deterred by prejudice, 
have never done. "It is remarkable", says A.M.Fairbairn, 
"that while in his ultimate thinking he (i.e., Edwards) had 
so completely emancipated himself from empiricism, in this 
field of thought (i.e., his theory of the will) he identi- 
fied himself with the school to which he was most radically 
opposed. For just as Collins had so developed Locke as to 
deny liberty and affirm necessity, and as Hume had resolved 
causation into mere antecedents and sequence, and as Henry 
Home had app]_ied the same principles to the naturalistic 
explanation of morality and religion, so Edwards, in his 
Treatise cm Jhe. Will, turned his back upon his own philoso- 
phy and advocated one alien not only to Christianity, but 
even to theism."
125A. M. Fairbairn, The Prophets of the Christian Faith,
p. 163.
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The question may arise as to how, if the dictate of 
the moral consciousness is against necessity, we can account 
for the prevalence of determinism. The answer is that other 
considerations load to it. Many have been driven to deter- 
minism by the feeling that the denial of it is the admission 
of chance into the universe. They feel the reality of con- 
trary choice, but when they undertake to explain it, they can- 
not make it intelligible. Others, who are impressed with the 
part played by character and circumstances in our choices, 
feel this is impossible if genuine freedom exists, and have 
accepted determinism for this reason. Still others, seeing 
the defects in the Arminian theory of the free will, turn to 
determinism, concluding that there is no other alternative. 
Among those who are influenced by theological considerations 
there is the group represented by Edwards and other Calvin- 
ists, which feels that the sovereignty of God implies it. 
Such are the factors which exert an influence in the direct- 
ion of determinism, but it will be noted that they are con- 
siderations which arise from sources other than the moral 
consciousness. They are allowed to overcome its protest 
against necessity because of the weight attached to them. De- 
terminism really arises/through the exigencies of a certain 
theological or philosophical system, or from other theories 
which seem to demand it. It is not found in the unsophis- 
ticated mind. The plain man, who considers the nature of 
freedom by itself, without having to be concerned with its 
bearing on other views, attributes to himself the power of 
alternative choice.
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The insistence of Edwards and other Calvinists upon re-- 
taining the term, freedom, is an undesigned testimony to tne 
fact of genuine choice. Edwards clung to the term although, 
in his system, it was only the name for a particular form 
of necessity, and even then had no relation, in his thought, 
to moral responsibility for volitions. The term is in 
reality an encumbrance upon the thought of the Enquiry and 
serves only to becloud the issues. His clinging to it was 
simply a concession to the reality for which it stood. It 
was an admission of the force of conscience's demand,- an 
effort to seem to be granting what his theory in fact denied. 
Else why should he retain the term? It was only a case of 
historical justice, when, in the subsequent development of 
the New England Theology, some of his followers, who taught 
a freedom that was real, claimed him as an authority for 
their position.
A further concession by Edwards to the fact that free- 
dom is essential to responsibility is to be seen in his un- 
willingness to hold a man responsible for non-voluntary 
dispositions, as Calvinists generally did at his time. To 
deny a man's responsibility for non-voluntary tendencies is 
of course not to say that he is responsible only for free 
volitions. But it is a step in that direction. It is a 
recognition that there is something about willing which 
makes responsibility predicable of it alone. And it is a 
suggestion that that something is what Edwards explicitly 
denied, namely, the freedom of volitions.
Our conclusion, then, is that he fails to prove that
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volitions are, and must be determined, despite his brilliant 
efforts to do so. And perhaps the least cogent of his ar- 
guments is this last one, in which he bases his claim on 
the demands of our moral nature. For the unmistakable tes- 
timony of the moral consciousness is to the reality of gen- 
uine freedom.
Before we pass on let us glance at the most signifi- 
cant changes which have taken place in deterministic theories 
ef volition since the time of Edwards, with a view to as- 
certaining whether determinism can be modified in such a 
way as to be satisfactory. The "softest" form in which it 
can be found is that which is usually called self-determinism 
by its proponents. These thinkers are careful to point out, 
first of all, that volitions are not determined by external, 
natural causes. They are rather determined by an inner 
principle. Further, and this is of cardinal importance in 
their thinking, our most serious volitions, those for which 
we feel ourselves responsible, are conditioned by self- 
consciousness. The motive determining choice does not come 
to the front simply as the strongest of a number of conflict- 
ing desires. It is constituted rather by the agent's self- 
consciously identifying himself with one desire. In this 
identification reason may play a part, and the motive may 
involve a judgment as to the value or Tightness of the voli- 
tion to result from it. Hence the volition may not necessar- 
ily be determined by the strongest preference, as Edwards 
held, a position which is consistent only with hedonism.
We may, it is held by some, come to the point at which
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we predominantly identify ourselves with objectively appre- 
hended goods, so that these goods, or ideals, become the 
real motives of our actions. Self-determinism may thus 
take a teleological form. Instead of being driven fromfee- 
hind by desires, it is held, we are pulled from before by 
these rationally apprehended values. And we become free in 
proportion as our conduct is determined by them. Neverthe- 
less it is our character, as already developed, that deter- 
mines in the first place whether we identify ourselves with 
these ideals. Teleological determinism is thus simply 
ordinary determinism once removed. In the following quota- 
tion from Professor A. E. Taylor we have a good description 
of/this theory: "Hence we can at once see that freedom does 
not mean 'absence of rational connection' or 'absence of 
determination', but does mean, as so many recent philoso- 
phers have told us, for us finite beings, self-determination. 
I am most free when acting for the realization of a coher- 
ent rational purpose, not because my conduct is 'undeter- 
mined'; in other words, because there is 'no telling* what 
I shall do next, but because it is, at such times, most 
fully determined teleologically by the character of my inner 
purposes or interests,- in other words, by the constitution
of my self." l26
In emphasizing the fact of self-consciousness in our 
choices the self-determinist feels that he has restored the 
self to its rightful place in volition. There is of course
126A. E. Taylor, The Elements of Metaphysics, p. 367.
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no denial of the fact that the agent's character causes him 
to identify himself with one desire and not another. It is 
recognized, however, that this character is not a fixed and 
unalterable factor, but rather is modified by the agent's 
conduct, so that he can intelligently influence his future,
by hi^present choices.
/
This theory avoids many of the criticisms which can be 
levelled at the more rigidly necessitarian view. It does 
away with the mechanistic picture of man. It does not re~ 
gard motives after the analogy of physical forces competing 
for supremacy, an analogy bristling with fallacies. It is 
a genuine effort to recognize constructively as well as 
verbally the existence and activity of the rational self in 
the willing process. But in what is, from the standpoint of 
ethics and religion, the most significant feature, it is 
open to the same objection we have urged against Edwards* 
theory. Self-determinism, even in its teleological form, 
leaves no room for genuine choice. As Professor Pringle- 
Pattison says, "we may agree with Bergson that it is prac- 
tically indifferent whether we adopt the naturalistic or the 
teleological alternative, that is to say, whether we regard
the course of events as pre-determined by the collocations
127 of brute matter or by some divine Idea." It cannot be
denied that in finalism the agent's volitions are necessi- 
tated just as effectually as they are in any other form of
127A. S. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God in the Light of 
Recent Philosophy, p. 369.
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determinism, however mechanistic. It may be true that char- 
acter and circumstance, according to this theory, do not 
cause, but only condition volition, but this does not mean 
that the agent initiates his own acts. They are initiated 
by the final cause which is taken as his end. It may also 
be said, as indeed it has been said, for instance by Paulsen, 
that this is a different sort of causality from that of a 
physical cause, but whether this is true or not, the neces- 
sity is there. Edwards himself pointed out, in dealing with 
natural and moral necessity, that the necessity in both 
cases is the same, the difference being only in the terms 
connected. Real choice is thus, even in teleological deter- 
minism, effectively ruled out of court.
And if we deny choice, we in reality deny the self 
its part in volition. Self-determinism, however "soft" it 
may become in its teleological form, like other forms of 
determinism, really leaves the self, the rational I, out of 
account, substituting in its place simply a causal series. 
Even though it has been actuated by a desire to restore the 
self to its rightful place in the willing process, it has not 
been radical enough in its cure. So long as choice can be 
analyzed into a series of impersonal events, there is no 
self in the act.
Edwards 1 followers have thus not succeeded where he 
failed. They have indeed made great improvements on him, 
but they have not been able to reconcile the principle of 
necessity with genuine choice. And hence determinism and 
accountability still refuse to be bedfellows.
CHAPTER VII 
ORIGINAL SIN
Having made a study of Edwards' doctrine of the 
divine decrees, and of his theory of volition, it seems 
logical to take up next his teaching in regard to the origin 
and propagation of sin. What is man's condition with regard 
to sin? How did sin originate? And in particular, what is 
God's part in the origin and spread of it? - these are the 
questions which lie "before us and which Edwards attempts to 
answer in his treatise, The Great Christian Doctrine of 
Original Sin Defended..
The treatise was written, he tells us in the preface, 
as a reply to attacks which had been made against the doc- 
trine. In particular it is a reply to the English divine, 
Dr. John Taylor of Norwich, whose book, The Scripture-Doctrine 
2£ Original Sin Proposed to a Free and Candid Examination, 
created, at its publication in 1738, a great stir in relig- 
ious circles. Taylor also dealt with the doctrine of orig- 
inal sin in his Key to the Apostolic Writings, with a Para- 
phrase and Notes on the Epistle to the Romans« He argued 
that as a result of Adam's sin men are subject to sorrow, 
labor, and physical death, but that they are not thereby 
made guilty of sin nor totally corrupted, and that they have
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no "necessary inclination" to sin. In the dispute following 
the publication of his gree^ and Candid Examination some New 
England divines became active, notably Samuel Webster, and 
Charles Chauncy, who defended Taylor's views, and Peter 
Clark, and Joseph Bellamy, a staunc& follower of Edwards, who 
opposed Taylor. Edwards devotes a great deal of attention 
to Taylor in his treatise, but he was aroused not only over 
the opposition to the doctrine of original sin on the part 
of men like Taylor, but also over the way in which Watts, 
Doddridge, and other English Calvinists had attenuated the 
doctrine in deference to the Arminian attacks.
He begins with a definition of the phrase, original 
sin, in which he explains that, as commonly used by theolog- 
ians, it means "the innate sinful depravity of the heart." 
As popularly understood, he says, it means also the imputa- 
t_ion of Adam's first sin, "or in other words the liableness
or exposedness of Adam's posterity, in the divine judgment,
2to partake of the punishment of that sin." It is in the
sense of "corruption of nature", he tells us, that he in- 
tends to consider the doctrine at first, allowing the doc- 
trine of our liability to punishment for Adam's sin, i.e., 
the doctrine of original guilt, to develop later as the con- 
nection between the two doctrines emerges.
1 Jonathan Edwards, The Great Christian Doctrine of Original
Sin Defended, Works, yol. II, p. 87. (This 




I. The Proof of Man's Depravity
Edwards begins his development of the doctrine of 
original sin with a proof that man possesses a depraved 
nature. There are two lines of reasoning by which he ar- 
rives at this conclusion. The first, and by far the most 
important, is that man's corruption can be inferred from the 
universality of sin, sin deserving the eternal wrath and 
curse of God. The other line of proof is drawn from Scrip- 
tural facts and statements. To the first of these we now 
turn.
1. The Proof of Depravity from the Universality of Sin
Part I of the treatise is devoted to this proof. He 
sums it up in a brief statement before he begins to elabo- 
rate it. "I now assert, that mankind are all naturally in 
such a state, as is attended, without fail, with this conse- 
quence or issue; that they universally run themselves into 
that which is, in effect, their own utter eternal perdition, 
as being finally accursed of God, and the subjects of His 
remediless wrath through sin. Prom which I infer, that the 
natural state of the mind of man, is attended with a
/
propensity of nature, which is prevalenyand effectual to 
such an issue; and that therefore their nature is corrupt 
and depraved with a moral depravity, that amounts to and im- 
plies their utter undoing." 3 He remarks that he wishes to 
consider first "the truth of the proposition", and then to 
show the "consequences" he infers from it. The truth of the
3Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 93,
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proposition that all men expose themselves to "their own 
utter eternal perdition" can be demonstrated "by showing, 
first, that all men sin, and second, that sin "deserves and
exposes to utter and eternal destruction, under God's wrath
4and curse." Both of these facts he then proves by quota- 
tions from Scripture, after which he undertakes to show that 
they are also involved in admissions made by Dr. Taylor,
Having shown that all men bring themselves into a con- 
dition deserving eternal punishment, Edwards proceeds to de- 
duce the "consequences" of this, that is, the fact of human 
depravity. This likewise involves the proof of two propo- 
sitions, namely: "That the mind of man has a natural tendency 
or propensity to that event, which has been shewn universally 
and infallibly to take place; and that this is a corrupt or 
depraved propensity," 5 The reasoning by which Edwards 
proves man to be possessed of a propensity for sin is as 
follows: we observe si n to take place, therefore there must 
be a sufficient cause for it; since, however, sin is not an 
isolated event, but a common, universal phenomenon, a steady 
effect, we must infer from this fact a steady cause, that is 
to say, a tendency to sin in man. "The natural dictate of 
reason shews, that where there is an effect, there is a 
cause, and a cause sufficient for the effect; because, if it 
were not sufficient, it would not be effectual; and that 
therefore, where there is a stated prevalence of the effect, 
there is a stated prevalence in the cause. A steady effect
4Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 93. ibid, p.99,
267
argues a steady cause." 6 The fact that men do some good, 
Edwards argues, does not affect the reasoning, the question 
here being not how much sin there is a tendency to, but 
whether there is a sinful tendency. The prevalence of sin 
is sufficient to prove this, without raising the question at 
this point of its proportion to the good in man. This ten* 
dency, he goes on to say, must not be thought to consist in 
the external circumstances of man, but is inherent, a pro- 
pensity with which man is born into the world, as is obvious 
from the fact that sin takes place in all circumstances. 
(This should not be taken, of course, as a denial of his 
position in the Enquiry that our circumstances, in relation 
to our character, play a part in determining our volitions.)
"While it is not explicitly stated here, it is clear 
from Edwards 1 language that this propensity is regarded as 
a determining cause of sin. It is spoken of as sufficient 
and effectual, which cannot mean anything other than that sin 
follows from it as a necessary consequence. This is such a 
fundamental position of his deterministic system that it 
hardly needs to be pointed out.
Having now proved man possessed of a natural propensity 
to sin, Edwards moves on to the second proposition he wishes 
to deduce from the universality of sin and its desert of 
punishment, namely, that this is a corrupt and depraved pro- 
pensity. He first argues that the propensity which leads to 
sin is depraved because sin deserves and incurs God's wrath
6 
Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 100.
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and punishment. "Surely that tendency, which, in effect, is 
an infallible tendency to eternal destruction, is an infin- 
itely dreadful and pernicious tendency." 7 This is true no 
matter how many good deeds a man does. The alternatives are 
"persevering, sinless righteousness" and "the guilt of sin", 
and it takes only one sin to exclude a man from the ranks of 
the righteous. "Let never so many thousands, or millions 
of acts of honesty, good nature, etc. be supposed; yet, by 
the supposition, there is an unfailing propensity to such 
moral evil, as in its dreadful consequences infinitely out- 
weighs all effect or consequences of any supposed good."® 
This effort to prove man's depravity by showing the 
consequences of the sin to which his natural tendency leads, 
throws light upon a rather complicated argument Edwards has 
been following. Instead of reasoning directly from the 
universality of sin to a depraved propensity for it, he has 
given an argument of four steps, showing, first, that sin 
is universal, second, that it deserves eternal destruction, 
third, that its universality implies a natural tendency to 
sin, and finally, that this tendency is depraved by virtue 
of the ill desert of the sin to which it leads. As yet 
there has been no effort to prove man depraved simply be- 
cause of his tendency to sin, bu^only because of the conse- 
quences following the sin. However, without giving notice 
of the change in the line of argument, and possibly without 
being conscious of it, Edwards now takes up the simpler type
f> Q
7Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 107. ibid, p.107
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of proof based on the nature of sin.
If it should be suggested, he says, that since the 
number of men's good deeds sometimes exceeds the number of 
evil, they should therefore not be judged depraved, we have 
only to remember "the infinite heinousness of sin against 
God, from the nature of things." 9 The demerit of sin is so 
great that the merit of all virtuous acts is as nothing to 
it. He justifies this statement with the argument that our 
obligation to God is infinite, thus making any sin infinite- 
ly unmeritorious, while at the same time making any good 
deed less meritorious, owing to the fact that the merit of 
meeting an obligation is decreased in proportion as the 
obligation is great. "That on such accounts as these", he 
concludes, "there.is an infinite demerit in all sin against 
God, which must therefore immensely outweigh all the merit 
which can be supposed to be in our virtue, I think, is cap- 
able of full demonstration." 10 The depravity of man's ten- 
dency to sin appears then, not only because of the fact 
that sin exposes him to "utter ruin", but also because sin 
is in itself infinitely heinous. This argument in proof of 
the infinitely heinous character of sin is as old as Anseln. 
That Edwards felt it strongly is witnessed to by the fact 
that he emphasized the infinite heinousness of sin in his 
discourses on Justification b£ gaith Alone, and The Justice 
SL£ God in the Damnation of Sinners, and also in his sermon,
9Bdwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 108. 
10 ibid, p. 108.
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God Glorified in Man's Dependence.
His first proof, as he points out, is now complete, 
tut he subjoins a number of sections, giving at some length 
a cumulative argument exhibiting the sinfulness of man and 
thus enhancing what has been asserted as to his depravity. 
It can be proved, he holds, that the degree of evil in man 
is greater than the good, "not only as to weight and value", 
but also as to "matter and measure." Edwards had taught 
that there is no impulse to virtue in the natural man in 
his sermon, Natural Men in a Deeadful Condition. The great 
degree of evil in man appears, he says, when we consider our 
sins of'omission* We are commanded to love God with all our 
hearts, yet many of us withhold more love from Him than we
yield, andeven the best of us must admit that we fail to
/
love Him as we ought and could. In his Nature of True Virtue 
he dwells at length upon the fact that man in his natural 
state is capable onlyiof self-love. Thus considering both 
our sins of omission and commission, we must recognize that 
the amount of our sin is far in excess of our righteousness. 
Further, the corruption of human nature is such that all 
men sin as soon as they are capable of it, sin continually 
and sin progressively, growing worse as time passes. Even 
in the saint there are the remains of sin. Except where 
the grace of God has intervened, man's folly and stupidity 
have led him to engage in idolatry and to disregard his own 
eternal interests. Again, most men in all ages have been
Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 116.
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wicked, and this is true in spite of all that God has done 
to promote virtue and true religion. "The heart is a mere
sink of sin, a fountain of corruption, whence issue all
12 manner of filthy streams." So complete is man's depravity
that he is utterly incapable of helping himself. "The 
hearts of men are dreadfully hard and incorrigible. There 
is nothing but the mighty power of God will move them. They 
will cleave to sin, and go on in sin, let what will be done 
with them." 13
This completes Edwards' proof of depravity from the 
universality of sin. Before proceeding to a critical exami- 
nation of it let us note the fact that man's "total depravi- 
ty" does not prevent his ever performing a good act. The 
sinful acts, Edwards does seem to feel, preponderate in 
numbers, but he never denies the existence of all good acts. 
In fact the language of his arguments in proof of the 
prevalence and heinousness of sin implies his consciousness 
of some good. Take, for instance, this statement: "Thus, 
whatever acts of virtue and obedience a man performs, yet 
if he trespass in one point, is guilty of any the least sin, 
he...is exposed to be wholly cast out of favor with God.." 14 
Again, he comments on Ecclesiastes 7.20: "There is not a 
just man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not", with 
this remark: "Which is as much as to say, there is no man on
12Edwards, Natural Men in a Dreadful Condition, Works, Vol.X,
IT P» H^*
,,ibid, p. 116.
14Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 109. (Italics mine)
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earth, that is so just, as to have attained to such a de- 
gree of righteousness, as not to commit any sin." In 
other words, while there are some very just men, that is, 
men who perform good acts., none are perfect. What Edwards 
means by depravity, then, is that man's nature is suf- 
ficiently corrupt to deserve eternal punishment, to pre- 
vent his meriting salvation by anything that he does, and 
his turning to Christ without the interposition of divine 
grace,- but not in such a condition as to render him in- 
capable of any good deeds.
Now the arguments which Edwards has advanced unques- 
tionably prove a propensity to sin. The sin of the world 
cannot be accounted for on any other hypothesis than the 
existence of a tendency in man toward sinful acts. This is 
as true for those who believe in free choice as for the 
determinist. For, as we shall argue, all acts are con- 
ditioned at least by man's nature, that is to say, by the 
tendencies/in his makeup which determine the possible acts 
before/him. Edwards 1 argument is an impressive demonstra- 
tion of the prevalence and strength of those tendencies in 
us which lead to sin.
Having recognized this amount of truth in his funda- 
mental argument, however,it must be pointed out that his 
effort to show the corruption of the tendency to sin,- 
which in reality is a parallel argument to the one proving 
the existence of the tendency,- will carry little weight
15Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 115.
273
with the modern mind. The assertion that the least sin ex- 
poses the sinner to eternal punishment pre-supposes such a
^
questionable escatology that it cannot be made the basis ofA.
a strong argument. That sin separates us from God is true, 
butmore than this we cannot safely assert. The effort t>o 
show the depravity of the tendency to sin by proving the 
infinite heinousness of each sin is more to the point, but 
is^iot convincing. In fact, as D. D. Whedon points out, the 
argument really admits the principle that necessity excuses, 
for if guilt is greater when resistance is against a greater 
motive to good, then it is less when against a lesser motive, 
and by parity of reasoning, non-existent when there is no 
motive to good. However, the failure of these rather arti- 
ficial arguments to make the propensity to sin seem more 
corrupt by exhibiting sin in an enhanced form, does not weak- 
en his fundamental position, since the mere proof of a ten- 
dency to sin is sufficient.
The significant point at which we must take exception 
from Edwards is his assumption that the tendency to evil is 
the sole and efficient cause of that evil. There is nothing 
in the nature of the case to prevent the advocate of con- 
trary choice from taking his start also with the universal 
sinfulness of mankind and arriving at the conclusion that 
this sinfulness, while implying a sinful propensity in mai , 
implies it only as the condition, and not as the cause of the 
sin. Edwards does not attempt to show this line of explana- 
tion impossible, even when he is at his favorite sport of 
answering "evasions". Here then is the weakness of his argu-
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ment, that it leaves open an alternative explanation. We 
need not deny that the deterministic position seems an ex- 
tremely plausible explanation of the impressive fact that 
all men sin. The non-determinist, however, claims that his 
theory is fully capable of accounting for the sinfulness of 
mankind. He can readily admit a tendency to evil in man 
giving rise to temptation, and when we recognize that man is 
free to respond to this temptation, we can see in these two 
facts ample ground to account for sin. Sin, he claims, is 
the result of free choices on the part of the person who 
choosesjto respond to the solicitations of the evil, rather 
than of the good tendencies in his nature.
Not only can the proponent of free choice claim that 
his view is fully capable of accounting for sin, but that, 
when the good acts men do are considered along with their 
sins, it is a more adequate explanation than the determinis- 
tic. It ielnot merely the fact of universal evil that has 
to be explained, but rather the existence of both evil and 
good. Now if men's sins imply a tendency to sin, by the 
same token their good acts, however few, must imply a ten- 
dency toward the good. It is not to Edwards 1 purpose, to 
point this out, since he is concerned here ofaly with estab- 
lishing the fact of the propensity to sin, but it is germane 
to his thought. Given then these two conflicting tendencies 
in man, the question arises as to which shall determine the 
act in a given situation. Edwards replies that it is the 
one which, in relation to the situation, is able to produce 
the experience of the most agreeable. And this is, in most
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instances, an intelligible explanation. But there are some 
times when we exert variant volitions in situations which 
are, with regard to the volitions, the same. At one time 
we fail, at another time, in a similar situation, we conquer 
temptation; and we have the feeling that the reason for the 
difference is within us, not in our environment,- that in 
either case we might have done otherwise than we did. Now 
the determinist cannot adequately account for this: according 
to him the same individual in the same circumstances^nust 
make thejbame response. Of course it is always left open 
to him to say that there are no identical situations, and 
that there is no time when the individual has exactly the 
same character he had at a previous time. Nor can it "be 
denied that there is force in this reply. But it seems 
hardly capable of accounting for the widely varying conduct 
on the part of an individual in similar situations, and even 
less for his conviction that his right or wrong act is the 
result of free choice. In such cases/the theory that man 
is able freely to choose "between the competing tendencies 
in his nature seems far more adequate.
2. Scriptural Proofs of Man's Depravity 
Included in Part I of Edwards' treatise, along with 
the argument from the universality of sin, is another proof 
of man's depravity drawn from the universal mortality of the 
human race. This is really a Scriptural argument, for it is 
based on the fact that, according to Scripture, physical 
death comes upon mankind as a punishment of sin, not as
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natural to man. This being true, death, which is the supreme 
temporal calamity, testifies more strongly than anything else 
to that disposition which produces sin. Especially is this 
true when we contemplate the death of infants who have not 
committed conscious sin. That death should come upon them, 
reveals how utterly corrupt and ill deserving is that nature 
we "bring into the world with us.
This argument cannot be taken with great seriousness 
for two reasons. In the first place, it will be very diffi- 
cult to establish as a definite teaching of Scripture the 
fact that physical death is due solely to sin. And in the 
second place, even should we grant this, we have not proved 
anything more than the universality of sin. The argument 
thus leaves us where Edwards' other argument left us, with- 
out establishing the fact that total depravity, in the Cal- 
vinistic sense of a determining propensity, can be inferred 
from universal sin.
Part III of the treatise is devoted to a proof of 
human depravity based on our redemption by Christ. The fact,
says Edwards, that all Christ came to redeem are sinners
of 
deserving/punishment, is proof sufficient that men are in a
depraved and guilty condition. "The representations of the 
redemption by Christ, every where in scripture, lead us to 
suppose, that all whom he came to redeem are sinners; that 
his salvation, as to the term from which (or the evil to be 
redeemed from) in all, is sin, and the deserved punishment 
of sin." 16 Edwards goes on to say that unless we accept
16Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. H, s>. 310.
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the view that man is hopelessly depraved, Christ's redemp- 
tion is of no avail. For Christ came to redeem us from sin, 
to give us power over sin. But if man has any power of con- 
trary choice, he has power over sin,- he is free to do the 
right if he chooses, and therefore Christ's redemption is 
useless.
This argument is no more successful than the others in 
proving what Edwards desires to prove, namely, total deprav- 
ity. Even if man has all the freedom the Pelagian would con- 
cede him, Christ's redemption would still be needed to re- 
deem him from the guilt of sins he freely commits* And fur- 
ther, to grant man some power to choose the good is^iot to 
imply that he has no need of the help that comes from the 
cross, even though its influence may not be irresistible. 
In fact, it might be argued that it is only when a person has 
some freedom to respond to it that the sufferings and death 
of Christ can exert a moral influence in his life. To say 
that the necessity and benefit of Christ's redemption are 
contingent upon man's being hopelessly depraved is to over- 
shoot the mark by a wide margin.
Edwards develops another argument to prove his point, 
based on the Scriptural teaching as to the application of 
redemption. In order to be redeemed, he says, the Scripture 
teaches us that we must be born again. This idea of the new 
birth is expressed in various ways. It is sometimes spoken 
of as repentance and confession, sometimes as circumcision 
of the heart, sometimes as a spiritual resurrection, i.e., 
dying unto sin and living unto righteousness,sou etimes as
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making the heart or spirit new, sometimes as putting off the 
old man and putting on the new, and sometimes as being creat- 
ed anew or made new creatures. The conclusion Edwards draws 
from these statements as to what is necessary for a man, if 
he is to come into the kingdom, is that all men are utterly 
depraved. "From what is/plainly implied in these things, and 
from what the scripture most clearly teaches of the nature of 
them, it is certain, that every man is born into the world in
1 *7
a state of moral pollution." Af
None of the Scriptural expressions used here make an ex- 
plicit statement of what Edwards wants to interpret them as 
meaning. They are all figurative representations of the sin- 
fulness and corruption of man. But they do not indicate cer- 
tainly that he brings into the world with him a nature so ut- 
terly corrupt as to render it impossible for him ever to choose 
the right or accept the gospel. They indicate simply that all 
men have sinned, and thus need the new birth, but they leave 
it open for the non-determinist to hold, if he chooses, that 
they sinned freely.
II. Original Righteousness and the Fall
1. Edwards 1 Presentation of these Doctrines 
In Part II of his treatise Edwards presents the doc- 
trine of original righteousness. This doctrine is important 
to the theory of original sin, since it is a means of recon- 
ciling God's holy nature with the idea of inherited depravity.
17 Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 325.
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The substance of the view is "that our first parents were
created in a state of moral rectitude and holiness." 18 After
Edwards 
expounding this doctrine '/o undertakes to erect the bridge
between man as righteous and as depraved by the theories of 
Adam's federal headship and the fall. Except for his insis- 
tence that Adam's will was completely determined, there is 
nothing original in Edwards' presentation and defense of the 
doctrine of man's pristine righteousness. For this reason 
and because Edwards himself treats it in very brief compass, 
we shall not give an extended statement of it.
The first three chapters of Genesis, he says, teach 
that man was created righteous by God. And since Adam's 
eating the forbidden fruit was his first sin, he must have 
been righteous up to the time of4ts commission. "This 
history leads us to suppose, that Adam's sin, with relation 
to the forbidden fruit, was the first sin he committed. 
Which could not have been, had he not always, till then, 
been perfectly righteous, righteous from the first moment 
of his existence; and consequently, created or brought into 
existence righteous." 19 That he was fereated righteous, fol- 
lows from the fact that he was created a moral agent. In a 
moral agent there is no medium between righteousness and 
sin. To say that he was innocent, would thus be to say 
that he was righteous. Innocency is distinct from righteous-
18Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 198. 
l^ibid, p. 198.
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ness only when it is the innocency of a non-moral agent. As 
a moral agent, created righteous, Adam was "obliged as soon
as he existed to act aright", and this being the case he was
20 
"inclined to act aright." The real meaning of his being
created righteous is that he was created with an inclination 
to the right, or a "holy disposition of heart." But for 
this he would never have acted righteously during the period 
before his first sin.
Adam's righteousness previous to the eating of the 
forbidden fruit is proved not only by the fact that Genesis 
represents this as the first sin, but also by the Genesis 
account of the "great favors and smiles of heaven" enjoyed 
by our first parents in Eden. These things were the rewards 
of righteousness, and the curse after the fall was the pun- 
ishment of sin. If there had been no righteousness, God 
would obviously have withheld His great favors.
A further argument for original righteousness is 
found by Edwards in Ecclesiastes 7.29: "Lo, this only have I 
found, that God made man upright; but they have sought out 
many inventions." He dwells on this text at unusual length, 
insisting that it undoubtedly refers to the righteousness of 
our first parents.
Edwards defends his position against his Arminian 
enemy, Dr. Taylor, who held that the right disposition came 
as a result of right action, by pointing out that no right 
act can take place without a right disposition or principle
20Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 198.
281
as its source,- a defense which is undoubtedly justified on 
either deterministic or non-deterministic grounds. Edwards 
rightly says: "The very supposition of a disposition to 
right action being first obtained by repeated right action, 
is grossly inconsistent with itself: For it supposes a 
course of right action, before there is a disposition to per- 
form any right action." 21 The Arminian position that moral 
acts took place before any sort of moral tendencies were 
developed is wholly untenable.
In Part IV of his treatise Edwards answers objections 
to the doctrine of original sin; and in reply to the criti- 
cism that it makes God the author of sin, gives a further 
explanation of the conception of original righteousness, 
and undertakes to account for the fall. With regard to the 
conception of original righteousness he takes the position 
that man 1 s inclination to the right sprang from, or con- 
sisted in supernatural principles of holiness implanted in 
him, which held in check his inferior natural impulses. 
In this respect he departs from Calvin's view that Adam's 
primitive gifts were natural. To let him express his idea 
in his own words: "when God made man at first, he implanted 
in him two kinds of principles. There was an inferior kind, 
which may be called NATURAL, being the principles of mere 
human nature; such as self-love, with those natural appe- 
tites and passions, which belong to the nature o£ man, in 
which his love to his own liberty, honour, and pleasure were
21Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 199.
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exercised....Besides these, there were superior principles, 
that were spiritual, holy, and divine, summarily compre- 
hended in divine love; wherein consisted the spiritual image 
of God, and man's righteousness and true holiness; which 
are called in scripture the divine nature. These principles
no
may, in some sense, be called SUPERNATURAL." In a note on 
his use of the term, supernatural, he explains that he does 
not mean a principle miraculously introduced, but a nature 
distinct from, and above what belongs to man's nature "mere- 
ly as man",- that which makes man not only a man but a "vir- 
tuous, holy, and spiritual" man. The supernatural principles 
are thus not essential to human nature, but to the spiritual 
well being of man. They are, he continues, "such as imme- 
diately depend on man's union and communion with God, or 
divine communications and influences of God's Spirit." 2^ In 
fact he frequently speaks of the blessings of Adam's unfall- 
en state as consisting in the presence of the Holy Spirit 
within him. When Adam fell, "the Holy Spirit, that divine 
inhabitant, forsook the house." 24 In the state of original 
righteousness the superior principles dominated the natural 
principles completely, causing man inwardly and outwardly 
to be righteous.
It should be noted, however, that man was not without 
natural impulses to sin, even in the state of original 
righteousness; the impulses are there all along but they
22Edwards,Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, pp 332-336. 
23 ibid, pp 335-336. 
24 ibid, p. 336.
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are only checked. Just as depraved man is capable of good 
acts and presumably, therefore, possessed of some tendency 
to the good, so man in the state of original righteousness 
cannot be said to have been totally righteous in the sense 
that all parts of his nature were holy. There were, Edwards 
teaches, from the beginning impulses natural to man which 
tended to sin, and which could not, therefore, have been 
designated as a "holy disposition 11 . However, when he is 
answering "evasions", he denies strenuously that Adam's 
first sin implied a previous propensity to sin, arguing that 
a tendency is proved, not by one, but by repeated acts. In 
his essay, Concerning the Perseverance of Saints, he says 
that the Spirit dwelt in Adam "constantly, and without in- 
terruption, in such a degree as to hold him above any lust 
or sinful habit or principle." *® He does go so far at one 
point as to recognize that an evil disposition or inclina- 
tion "was included" in Adam's first sin, but, he says, it 
"was not properly distinct from his first act of sin." 26 
Thus this is no recognition that a previous sinful propen- 
sity was necessary to account for temptation and the conse- 
quent sin. That Edwards could take the position he did on 
this matter can be credited only to the fact that he did 
not fully realize the meaning of what he had said as to the 
existence of an "inferior nature" in Adam. This, however, 
is only one of the inconsistencies into which he falls in
25Edwards, Concerning the Perseverance of Saints, Works,
0 . Vol. VIII, P. 437.
^Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 343.
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dealing with the problem of sin.
We have seen in our study of Edwards 1 theory of free- 
dom that Adam "possessed almhe freedom it is in the mind of 
man to conceive." In this respect his doctrine of original 
righteousness was unique. Augustine, Calvin, and the West* 
minster Confession attributed to Adam in the state of origi- 
nal righteousness a genuine power of contrary choice. In 
denying this Edwards shows himself more consistent, for 
moral perfection implies determinism. To be perfect there 
must be no evil tendencies which present an evil alternative 
to man. At least these tendencies, if they exist at all, 
must be in such subjection to the higher tendencies that they 
can condition no genuine alternative. In allowing Adam the 
freedom to sin Calvin and others were thereby in reality 
contradicting their attribution of perfect righteousness to 
him.
We are now ready to examine Edwards 1 account of the 
fall. Strange to say, there is no word of explanation as to 
why the falltook place in the work on original sin. For 
this we have to go to his essay, Concerning the Perseverance 
of Saints, where he compares Adam and the converted man 
under the New Covenant. There he assigns the fall to "man's 
own weakness and instability." 27 Adam, he tells us, was left 
to his own strength to persevere in righteousness. "The 
great thing wherein the first covenant was deficient, was,
27Edwards, Concerning the Perseverance of Saints, Works, 
Vol. yill, P. 436.
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that the fulfilment of the righteousness of the covenant, 
and man's perseverance, was entrusted with man himself, with 
nothing better to secure it than his own strength." 28 Al- 
though he possessed divine grace,- the supernatural 
principles,- it was left to him to make use of that grace. 
"Eternal life was not merely suspended on that grace that 
was given him and dwelt in him, but on his improvement of
p Q
that grace which he already had. 11 * Grace dwelt in Adam as 
a "constant principle", but he was promised no "extraordinary, 
occasional assistance" of grace, as is necessary for fallen 
man if he is to persevere. Being left to himself and with- 
out this "extraordinary assistance", Adam fell into sin. 
Once the fall had taken place, man's corruption followed. 
"When man sinned and broke God's covenant, and fell under his 
curse, these superior principles left his heart: For indeed 
God then left him; that communion with God on which these
principles depended, entirely ceased; the Holy Spirit, that
30 
divine inhabitant, forsook the house." That God should
withdraw after man became a rebel was only fitting and 
proper, indeed inevitable for a holy God. But once this took 
place, man's total corruption followed naturally. The in- 
ferior natural principles of his nature, being freed from 
restraint, took complete possession of him and sought their 
own sinful objects.
Thus we see the manner in which the decree of sin is
28Edwards, Concerning the Perseverance of Saints, Works,
Vol. VIII, P. 436. 
29ibid, p. 437.
Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 336.O\J
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effectuated. Man's corruption came about without God's 
doing anything positive to cause man to sin. "Thus it is 
easy to give an account, how total corruption of heart 
should follow on man's eating the forbidden fruit, though 
that was but one act of sin, without God putting any evil 
into his heart, or implantin% any bad principle, or infusing 
any corrupt taint, and so becoming the author of depravity." 2 
Since God does nothing positive in causing sin, He cannot be 
accused olfproducing or committing sin. This is of prime 
importance to Edwards. He refers us here to the sections at 
the end of the Enquiry in which he emphasizes at length 
this distinction between God's actually producing sin and 
His permitting it by withdrawing His restraining influence. 
We are reminded again, however,that God's permitting 
a thing does not imply that He does not decree it. It is 
much better, he argues, for the divine wisdom to determine 
the existence of sin than for it to be "disposed by blind 
and undesigning causes." 3 We have already discussed Ed- 
wards' attempt to justify the permission of sin in connec- 
tion with our study of the decrees, and also his attempt to 
explain how it is possible for sin to get into the world 
against the will of a sovereign God, by means of the theory 
of the secret and revealed will of God. There is, therefore, 
no necessity here for going again into these matters. The 
question which emerges is the distinction between the
^Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 337. 
32Edwards, Enquiry, Works, Vol. I, p. 384.
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permission and the production of sin.
Before criticizing Edwards' account of the fall and 
how it took place, however, let us note that the corruption 
of Adam does not flow solely from the first sin as its ef- 
ficient cause. The first sin, according to Edwards* teach- 
ing, is in reality only the occasion of the corruption which 
followed. The corruption really came from the withdrawal 
of God's Spirit and the consequent liberation of man's 
natural impulses to sin. It cannot, therefore, be said that 
Edwards regards one sin as having entirely dislocated man's 
moral nature. This, as P. R. Tennant points out, would be 
impossible, and is a cardinal objection to any theory which 
ascribes the consequent corruption of man wholly to his 
first sin. Edwards' theory avoids also another criticism 
which is often made against the doctrine of the fall as 
responsible for the inherited corruption of the race. It is 
argued that the transmission of the results of the fall is 
inexplicable, since no defect of nature in Adam acquired 
through one act could be transmitted to posterity. On Ed- 
wards' view, however, the transmission of this corruption 
is simply the transmission of natural impulses, a trans- 
mission due, as he says, to M a course of nature", not of an 
acquired defect. Again, he does not have to go the length 
of Calvin and others who said that the first sin caused the 
loss of the power of contrary choice, seeing he had denied 
it to Adam even before the fall.
Edwards believed in a pre-mundane fall of the angels. 
In some remarks on this subject he explains their fall in
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the same way he explains Adam's,- the lower principles in 
their natures overcame the higher. The occasion of the fall 
was God's decree to unite human nature to His Son, a decree 
which aroused opposition among the angels, in view of the 
fact that they would have to minister to a creature of in- 
ferior nature. They therefore decided to resist God and be- 
come independent of His government. "And having an appetite 
to their own honor, it overcame holy dispositions, which, 
when once overcome, immediately left them to the full and 
unrestrained rage of the principles that overcame."*55 How 
the holy angels came to possess these lower principles, and 
how they fell from a state of perfect righteousness, Edwards 
does not explain any more than he does the same difficulties 
in the case of Adam. It is significant that no connection 
between the fall of the angels and the fall of Adam is as- 
serted. The two events are perfectly unrelated,- Adam was 
neither weaker nor stronger as a result of the fall in heaven.
2. Observations on Edwards 1 Doctrine of Original
Righteousness and the Pall
The conception of a state of original righteousness in 
which primitive man was born has almost disappeared from 
modern theology. There are insuperable difficulties in con- 
nection with it. We shall now briefly point out the major 
objections to which Edwards 1 presentation of it is liable.
To begin with, modern scholarship recognizes that there
33Jonathan Edwards, Fall of the Angels, Works, Vol. X, p. 11.
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is inadequate Biblical support for the doctrine. Ho mention 
is made, in the first three chapters of Genesis, of a state 
of complete moral perfection. Edwards 1 inference,from the 
fact that there was a first sin, that Mam was a paragon of 
holiness before this sin, is out of the question. Adam is 
represented as having "been created a moral being, and inno- 
cent, but there is not the slightest justification for Ed- 
wards' position that, since there is no medium in a moral 
being between sin and righteousness, the innocence of Adam 
was tantamount to moral perfection. All our knowledge of 
moral development contradicts this assumption. Again, Ed- 
wards 1 argument, that the favors enjoyed by Adam and Eve 
before the fall implied their perfect righteousness, is 
based on the untenable assumption that a man's earthly estate 
always corresponds to his desert. Thus even if we regard 
the Gsnesis account as substantially literal history, we 
cannot justify a doctrine of original righteousness. But 
that the first chapters of Genesis are not to be taken as 
literal history is a position which is generally accepted. 
As for the assertion in Ecclesiastes 7.29 that God created 
man upright, this means, if we take it at face value, only 
that God created man without sin, not that He made him a 
creature of consummate moral perfection. We have already 
seen that Paul knew nothing of original righteousness, and we 
are quite safe in making the general assertion that it is not 
a Scriptural doctrine. There is a vast difference between 
the innocence of "the first Adam" in his unfallen state and 
the perfection of "the second Adam".
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A second objection to the doctrine of original right- 
eousness is that it conflicts with the most fundamental and 
well established findings of evolutionary science. We must 
adjust our notions of man's primitive state to fit the 
scientific conception of a gradual progress of the race, 
according to which the first man may be regarded as created 
innocent, but not as a moral and spiritual ideal.
The impossibility of the doctrine becomes most 
obvious when we think of it together with the fall. There is 
no possible way of accounting for the fact that a being in 
the state of original righteousness should fall into sin. 
Edwards makes it clear, as we have seen, that God did not 
withdraw from man until after man had sinned. This fact is 
of the utmost significance, for it means that man is repre- 
sented as sinning at the very time that he possessed the 
Holy Spirit, and that all his acts were determined by a 
dominant, holy disposition. That this would be impossible 
need not be argued. The commission of a sin means that this 
holy disposition did not determine the act. For some reason 
it ceased to be dominant, and yet, according to Edwards, the 
only possible explanation of this cessation is the disposi- 
tion itself. But since we cannot regard the disposition as 
being responsible for its own overthrow, we are at a complete 
loss on his principles to account for the first sin. If we 
regard it as due to external circumstances, we still could 
not avoid the difficulty. For the force of the external 
circumstances would depend on an internal propensity to evil 
to which appeal is made. And if this propensity is strong
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enough to determine man's acts in some circumstances, man 
can hardly be said to "be a righteous person dominated by 
a supernatural principle of righteousness. Adam would have 
been righteous only in certain circumstances. But this is 
absolutely denied by the doctrine of original righteousness.
Edwards* explanation that Adam, being left to his own 
strength, sinned because of his own weakness, beclouds 
rather than clarifies the situation. To say that Adam was 
left to his own strength to improve grace is to use words 
which have significant meaning only in the mouth of the in- 
determinist. It is to assert that Adam was free to choose 
whether his higher nature would govern his acts. But the 
picture Edwards has given us of Adam before the fall is of 
a man whose will in its every act was determined by this 
regnant higher nature, and therefore incapable of choosing 
whether this nature would determine it. The only thing he 
could mean by Adam's being left to his own strength, is 
that his acts were determined by him without outside inter- 
ference. This, however, is simply to say that his acts were 
motivated by his own holy disposition. But this is a con- 
tradiction of the major thesis that Adam was created with a 
dominant, perfectly holy nature. We are therefore left in 
the dark as to how the first sin took place.
That Edwards can deny that Adam's sin proved a propen- 
sity to evil in him only shows how little he grasped the im- 
plications of his assertion that a man dominated by a holy 
principle fell into sin. For whether we take the determinis-
292
tic or indeterministic position, we must recognize the im- 
possibility of sin's arising without a tendency to it. As 
J. R. Tennant says, "Whether the freedom ascribed to the 
will of unfallen Adam were that of perfect harmony with the 
will of God, or that of independence of all motives, or that 
of choice conditioned by motive and character, it is equally 
hard on the theory of an original balance or pre-established 
harmony of human nature to explain how sin could take its 
rise. It is the approach to evil, the indwelling propulsion 
to a wrong course which, on the theory that man was made at 
once an innocent and a moral being, precisely needs to be 
accounted for." ^4 Edwards can be condemned out of his own 
mouth. He argues that there could have been no righteous 
act without a righteous disposition. It will follow that 
there could be no evil act without an evil disposition. 
Further, according to his theory of the will, no act takes 
place without a motive; the first sin, therefore, must have 
had a motive arising from Adam's nature in relation to its 
circumstances, and this motive was certainly not a good 
motive. Edwards can account for Adam's sin, therefore, only 
by admitting a tendency in him strong enough in certain cir- 
cumstances to overcome the holy principle and lead to sin. 
Even if we regard the first man as free, as Calvin did, we 
can account for his sin only if we postulate a propensity to 
it which gives rise to temptation. In neither case, of 
course, would Adam have been quite the impeccable and fault-
34 i1. R. Tennant, The Origin and Propagation of Sin, p. 28.
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less creature pictured "by the doctrine of original righteous- 
ness, but this only goes to show that a doctrine of original 
righteousness in a high form is utterly impossible. Edwards 
would have had a more satisfactory position had he freely 
recognized the "inferior nature" as a tendency to sin, strong 
enough in certain circumstances to gain the control of Adam's 
action.
We come now to examine Edwards 1 demonstration of how 
God can decree sin without becoming the author of it. Leslie
Stephen remarks that with this problem "Edwards struggles
3*5 
long and with less than his usual vigor. 11 This is a true
statement, although Edwards' son cites his father's solution 
of the problem of God's part in the origin of sin as one of
 7 g
his outstanding "improvements" in theology. The weakest 
part of Edwards' deterministic system appears in hid dealing 
with sin. This may be because the problem of sin is perhaps 
the greatest of the difficulties to which his position 
forces him. But at any rate, his effort to show how God 
permits sin without producing it is as weak as his account 
of how the first sin originated in a perfect man. Of course 
this failure to give an adequate account of why the first sin 
occurred is itself a failure to show how God permitted sin's 
entrance into the world. But if we waive this objection, 
there is still the fact that the term 'permit' seems utterly
35Leslie Stephen, Hours in a Library, Vol. I, p. 319.
36Jonathan Edwards, (the Younger), Improvements in Theology, 
Made by President Edwards, and Those Who Have 
Followed His Course of Thought, in Works, Ed. by 
S. E. Dwight, Vol. I, pp 616-618.
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out of place in his account of God's relation to sin.
Even if we accept the fact that God's withdrawal from 
man is itself not a positive act producing sin, it is the 
occasion upon which other causes produce sin, and these are 
positive, direct acts of God. As w. A. Copinger says, re- 
ferring to the doctrine of a permissive decree, "It still 
leaves God as the author of sin, for he who enacts a law 
which it is impossible to perform without grace and with- 
holds that grace from him upon whom the law is imposed, is 
in reality the cause of sin, or rather the cause that the 
law is not observed: which non-observance cannot then be
•Z fj
accounted as sin. H °' God's creation of man with an in- 
ferior nature tending to sin, and his placing of him in cir- 
cumstances giving rise, along with this nature, to a tempta- 
tion which constitutes a motive causing sin by a complete 
necessity,- these are the acts which produce sin. And the 
fact that God's withdrawal of His Spirit is not itself the 
efficient cause of sin serves only to point out the fact 
that these other acts of His are. God, therefore, does not 
permit sin in any sense of that term, even though one 
necessary act'in the chain of causes leading to it is, with 
regard to the sin,- though not in itself,- a negative act. 
As a matter of fact, this act should never be thought of in 
isolation from the other factors leading to sin. It is not 
the whole of what God, according to Edwards, does to cause 
sin. His withdrawal must be regarded simply as one step in
37W. A. Copinger, Treatise on Predestination, Election and 
Grace, p. 160.
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a chain of causes which make sin inevitable. To speak of it 
by itself as having a positive or negative relationship to 
sin becomes irrelevant. The significant fact is that God 
determines sin, and the withdrawal of His Spirit is one means 
by which He does so. Edwards himself takes thisytoint of 
view when he wishes to remind us that God is the "disposer" 
of sin, shifting to the other position only when attempting 
to avoid the implications of this for God's character. That 
he must resort to such methods reveals the impossibility of 
reconciling the permittingknd the disposing of sin. A.V.G. 
Alien has well described Edwards' failure to deal adequately 
with the question: "At this point in his theology, upon 
which everything hinges, he takes refuge in darkness, not in 
light. What he needed, what he was sincerely striving after, 
was some formula which, while expressing the relationship of 
human sinfulness to the order and nature of things, should 
not not-impute to God complicity with or responsibility for
its origin. But this he could not do so long as he denied
38 the self-determining power of the human will." Thus the
distinction between the efficient and the permissive decrees 
of God turns out to be a distinction without a difference.
III. The Federal Headship of Adam
1. Edwards' Exposition and Proof of the Doctrine 
The next part of the doctrine of original sin is the 
federal headship of Adam. Edwards has attempted to show that
38A.V.G.Alien, Life and Works of Jonathan Edwards, p. 87.
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all men inherit a corrupt nature. He has undertaken also 
to prove that the first man "began in a state of moral and 
spiritual perfection. The task now is to show that man's 
depravity, and his consequent guilt, is due to the fall of 
Adam, owing to his connection with Adam as federal head of 
the race. We shall not present the exposition of Edwards* 
doctrine of Adam's headship, and of the imputation of his sin 
and guilt to posterity, separate from his proofs of his 
position. The presentation and defense of the doctrine will 
emerge together as we follow him in his Scriptural exegesis 
and philosophical discussion*
He "begins with an exposition of the first three chap- 
ters of Genesis, in which he purports, as in the case of 
original righteousness, to find a Scriptural basis for his 
doctrine. The threat to Adam and Eve, he says, in the event 
of their sinning, was a threat of death. This death was the 
opposite to the life Adam was enjoying in Eden, and as such 
involved not merely death of the "body, but sin, misery, and 
guiltiness in the sight of God. "Now that which is most 
opposite to that life and state in which Adam was created, 
is a state of total, confirmed wickedness, and perfect -hope- - 
less misery, under the divine displeasure and curse: not ex- 
cluding temporal death, or the destruction of the body, as 
an introduction to it." 39 It was the opposite also of 
that eternal life promised Adam as a reward for his obedience,
\
and thus was an endless death,- "an exposure to everlasting
39Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 206.
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wickedness and misery, in separation from God, and in endur- 
ing His wrath. M 4Q In support of this statement Edwards 
brings forward texts from "both Old and New Testaments.
The threat to Adam, found in Genesis 2.17, was as 
follows: "...but of the tree of the knowledge of good and 
evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou 
eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." Now this threat, 
while in the second person singular, and making no express 
mention of hisfposterity, nevertheless must have included 
them. God frequently spoke in the second person singular to 
the heads of the race, such as Abraham, when their posterity 
were also instjsnded. Other remarks addressed to Adam in the 
second person singular obviously, in the light of subsequent 
history, included his descendants. For instance, the words, 
"Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and sub- 
due it" 41 and the words "Behold, I have given you every 
herb yielding seed;.....and every tree, in which is the 
fruit of a tree yielding seed...." 42 certainly included 
both Adam and his descendants. Further, the sentence passed 
upon Adam in Genesis 3.19, "unto dust shalt thou return", 
without doubt referred to his posterity. These facts make 
it legitimate to infer that they were included also in the 
threat of death. Indeed, Edwards adds, since the sentence 
came in pursuance of the threat, and in punishmenyupon 
posterity as well as upon Adam, it is more than certain that
^Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 207. 
^Genesis 1. 28. 
42Benesis 1. 29.
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the former were included in the threat. A further evidence 
that posterity was included in the threat of eternal death 
is found in the fact that God's curse on the ground affect- 
ed Adam's children equally with himself, and yet the second 
person singular is again used in pronouncing the curse. The 
sentence would not have fallen upon Adam's posterity along 
with him unless they had "been included in the threat executed 
"by the sentence.
Again, there is evidence in the fact that Adam named 
his wife Eve, or Life, on that occasion, and because of God's 
promise that her seed should bruise the serpent's head. This 
promise is literally, for Edwards, the protevangelium. 
Through her descendant , the Redeemer, Eve is to become the 
mother of all the living, that is, of all who should be 
saved by Christ. But the very fact that Adam gave her this 
name with this understanding shows that he understood the 
salvation to be salvation from the ruin brought upon his pos- 
terity by the serpent, in tempting Eve and him to sin. The 
salvation wrought by Christ was to be a thwarting of the 
serpent's design. But this implies Adam's realization that 
his posterity was included in the death threatened in case
he should fall.
If we consider all the foregoing evidence, concludes 
Edwards, "I cannot but think, it must appear to every impar- 
tial person, that Moses's account does, with sufficient evi- 
dence, lead all mankind, to whom his account is communicated, 
to understand,that God, in his constitution with Adam, 
dealt with him as a publi c person,- as the head of the human
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species,- and had respect to his posterity, as included in 
him." 43
Edwards follows his section on the federal headship of 
Adam with a long list of proof-texts, showing from both Old 
and New Testaments that sin belongs to man as a property of 
the species, and that it belongs to him from birth. This not 
only strengthens his position as to man's depravity, but also 
shows the oneness of the race in sin, and thus supports his 
argument for the federal headship. The passage, Romans 5. 
12-21, is exegeted at great length as a further proof that 
Adam was the federal head of the race, and that both his 
depravity and his guilt are imputed to us.
Up to this point Edwards has contented himself with 
proving that Adam1 s posterity were included with him in the 
threat of et.ernal death attached to his first sin. In Part 
IV of his treatise, where he has a section elaborating his 
conception of our relation to Adam, he goes on to show that 
posterity's^nclusion in the threat was due to their literal 
oneness with Adam in the first sin and in the guilt arising 
therefrom. "God, in every step of his proceeding with Adam, 
in relation to the covenant or constitution established with 
him, looked on his posterity as being one with him." To 
be sure, God dealt more immediately with Adam, but it was 
as head of the whole body, as root of the tree. "And in his
proceedings with him, he dealt with all the branches, as if
45 they had been then existing in their root." And then he
 ^Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 228. 
,;ibid, p. 342. 
45ibid, p. 342.
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adds, "From which it will follow, that "both guilt, or exposed- 
ness to punishment, and also depravity of heart, came upon 
Adam's posterity just as they came upon him, as much as if he 
and they had all co-existed, like a tree with many branches."46 
That is to say, our guilt and native depravity are identical 
with Adam's guilt and depravity in his first sin. The
with which we are born is Adam's guilt in his first
sin. "The guilt a man has upon his soul at first existence, 
is one and simple, viz, the guilt of the original apostacy, 
the guilt of the sin by which the species first rebelled 
against God. This, and the guilt arising from the depraved 
disposition of the heart, are not to be looked upon as two
things, distinctlyilmputed and charged upon men in the sight
47 of God." Likewise the depravity with which we are born
is Adam's depravity in his first sin. "The first existing of 
a corrupt disposition, is not to be looked upon as sin dis- 
tinct from their participation of Adam's first sin." 48 Our 
depravity is not, therefore, to be thought of as due to the 
imputation of Adam's guilt to us, but to be due solely to 
our identity with Adam. "The first being of an evil dispo- 
sition in a child of Adam...is not to be looked upon as a 
consequence of the imputation of that first sin...Indeed the 
derivation of the evil disposition to Adam's posterity..is 
a consequence of the union that the wise Author of the world 
has established between Adam and his posterity; but not proper-
46Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 342.
ibid, p. 343. 
48 ibid, p. 343.
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ly a consequence of the imputation of his sin." 49 Morally 
and spiritually we are Adam,- the first sin is our sin, and 
the guilt arising from it, our guilt. We share not only in 
the moral culpability (culpa), but also in the liability to 
punishment (reatus).
This oneness with Adam in his first sin and guilt is 
the ground upon which God could include us in the threat of 
punishment appended to the commission of the sin. We are 
punishable not because Adam's sin and guilt are imputed to 
us but because we committed the sin and incurred the guilt. 
The punishment, as we have seen, consists in eternal deprav- 
ity, with its attendant guilt, exposing us to the eternal 
wrath of God. It is a continuing depravity and guilt, meted 
out as punishment alike to Adam and to his posterity, and is 
to be distinguished in both of them from the depravity and 
guilt of the first sin, of which it is the punishment and 
the consequence. The first depravity with its guilt differs 
from the depravity and the guilt which follows it as a pun- 
ishment in that it remains in us, as it did in Adam, as 
"an established principle". It comes upon us, Edwards says, 
as it did upon Adam, by a permissive decree of God. God 
simply withdraws His presence from us as He did from him, 
leaving the natural principles in us to gain the mastery.
On the vexed question of mediate and immediate impu- 
tation, Edwards, in so far as he can be called an imputa- 
tionist at all, takes the former view. Samuel Miller, indeed,
49
Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 344.
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spoke of him as immediate imputationist, but Professor 
Charles Hodge and George Nye Boardman were correct in taking 
the contradictory position. Since Adam's first sin was like- 
wise our sin, there was no possibility of imputing his guilt 
to us "before our "becoming depraved. We are guilty because 
we are depraved, not depraved because we were first guidty. 
Edwards tells us plainly that, just as Adam's own sin pre- 
ceded Ms guilt, so our depravity is antecedent to our guilt. 
"The first depravity of heart, and the imputation of that 
(Adam's) sin, are both the consequences of that established 
union (i.e., between Adam and us); but yet in such order, 
that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt 
consequent, as it was in the case of Adam himself." ^
In this theory of our identity with Adam Edwards is 
returning to the Augustinian idea of the real oneness of the 
race with Adam. He appears to have been more immediately in- 
debted to Jean Frederic Stapfer, of Zurich. In a note, he 
quotes extensively from Stapfer*s Theologia Polemica, which 
had been published about fourteen years before his own 
treatise. The following excerpt from the quotation reveals 
the fact that Stapfer had stated the view Edwards expounds 
almost in the latter's own words. "'Seeing therefore that 
Adam with all his posterity constitute but one moral person, 
and are united in the same covenant, and are transgressors 
of the same law, they are also to be looked upon as having, 
in a moral estimation, committed the same transgression of
50Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 344.
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, 51 the law, "both in number and injkind.*" The view that Adam
and the race are one, with respect to the first sin, not 
merely one "in nature", or one in a rather vague generic 
sense, "but "one moral person", as Edwards, following Stap- 
fer, holds, carries the Augustinian conception to its most 
extreme development.
The doctrine of imputation as consisting in our liter- 
al identity with Adam in his first sin and its consequence 
raises an interesting question. Is this idea ofimputation 
consistent with the meaning the term carried in the federal 
theology? Imputation, as the term is there used, signifies 
the application to one individual of the moral act and desert 
of another. It means that Adam's first sin and its guilt 
were attributed to his posterity, not because he was literal- 
ly one moral person with them, but because he was their 
representative. As a representative he was a distinct 
individual,- he acted for the race,- but his sinful act was 
not identical with the race's sinful act. However, in Ed- 
wards 1 view Adam's first sin and guilt are not to be treat- 
ed as_ if they were the race's,- they actually were the 
race's. "He asserted not only that all men sinned in Adam, 
but that every man is identical with Adam, and has therefore 
actually committed Adam's sin." 52 Imputation as a conse- 
quence of the oneness of Adam and the race thus means nothing 
more than the imputation of the race's sin to itself. As
51 Jean Frederic Stapfer, Theologia Polemica, quoted by Ed-
wards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 345. 
0<:A.V.G.Alien, Life and Writings of Jonathan Edwards, p. 308.
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Edwards puts it in one place: "And therefore the sin of the 
apostasy is not theirs, merely because God imputes it to 
them; "but it is truly and properly theirs, and on that 
ground God imputes it to them." 53 It would "be as true ac- 
cording to him to say that the race's sin is imputed to 
Adam as to say that Adam's sin is imputed to the race. As a 
matter of fact, Edwards, though he retains the term, in 
reality gives up the doctrine of imputation as it existed in 
the federal theology. He denies the fact that the sin and 
guilt of a federal representative,- an individual distinct 
from the race,- is attributed to the race. As Alexander V. 
G. Alien says, "The old federal conception grows weak, which 
regarded Adam as having a proprietorship in the race of his 
descendants. Instead of being the head of humanity he be- 
comes rather its generic type on that side of its existence 
which is of the earth earthy." Edwards has really abai- 
doned the federal theology in his attempt to explain and de- 
fend it. He reveals himself as fundamentally at odds with 
the legal fictions bound up in the theory. He is too true 
at this point to moral experience to feel justified in 
charging either the sin or the guilt of one individual upon 
another, no matter how nice a theory of federalship is dev- 
eloped. In beginning his discussion of the race's relation 
to Adam with a presentation of the federal theory he is in 
fact, though he does not realize it, using a conception
^Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 360.
54A.V.G.Alien, Life and Writings of Jonathan Edwards, p. 311
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which doesjnot go nearly far enough for him, and which he 
moves on in reality, though not in word, to repudiate as 
foreign to his thought and as morally untenable. Here again 
he is influenced by his desire to do strict justice to the 
demands of the moral consciousness.
The theory of our literal identity with Adam in his 
first sin is a further development of the position taken in 
the Enquiry; that we are responsible only for volitions/and 
their consequences. It reveals how, on this view, we can be 
held responsible, as Edwards insists we are, for our inherit- 
ed character. Our depraved nature is our responsibility be- 
cause it results from our own volition. We inherit it, but 
nevertheless our own sinful act was the cause of it. It re- 
veals also how one person can be held responsible for 
another 1 s sin,- the problem is solved and the ethical diffi- 
culty overcome by the simple expedient of identifying what 
appear two distinct acts. We are guilty for Adam's trans- 
gression because we committed it. Thus Edwards opened the 
way for that distinguishing doctrine of the New England 
Theology that all sin is voluntary.
In endeavoring to meet the obvious objection that his 
theory of the identity of Adam and his posterity in the first 
sin violates the fact of individuality, Edwards offers a 
highly ingenious argument. Most emphatically a creationist, 
he has no need of the traducian hypothesis of the evolution 
of souls to support his theory. Briefly stated, his argu- 
ment is that, since identity in created things rests on a 
divine constitution, God has a perfect right to identify
306
Adam and his posterity if He chooses. The objection to the 
oneness of Adam and his posterity, he says, derives all its 
plausibility from the failure to recognize that there is 
nothing in the nature of the things we identify, taken in 
themselves alone, to account for the identification. Some 
things which are entirely distinct, and quite-diverse, are 
yet so united by God that they are in a sense one. A tree, 
for instance, one hundred years old is the same plant from 
which it grew. The body of a man at forty is one with the 
infant body which first came into the world. Likewise per- 
sonal identity is a thing which is arbitrary, that is to say, 
due solely to God's sovereign will in the matter. To say 
that the identity of the same consciousness through time is 
due to the nature of the soul is simply another way of say- 
ing that it is due to God, since God gave the soul its 
nature. "From these things it will clearly follow, that
identity of consciousness depends wholly on a law of
55 nature; and so, on the sovereign will and agency of GOD. n
We can even carry this principle farther and show that 
the identity of all created substance is dependent upon the 
divine constitution. This follows from the fact of the con- 
tinued preservation in being of all created substance by God. 
We know this continued upholding activity of God to be a 
fact because the present existence of all created substance 
is a dependent existence. A dependent existence is an effect, 
and must therefore have a cause. The cause must be one of
55Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 351.
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two things: either the antecedent existence of the same sub- 
stance, or the power of God^ But it cannot be the antece- 
dent existence of the same substance for two reasons; first, 
because the antecedent created existence is "no active 
cause, but wholly a passive thing", and second, because 
no cause can produce effects in a time and place where it is 
not,- and no created thing is at one moment in the same time 
and place it was in the preceding moment. "Therefore", Ed- 
wards concludes, "the existence of created substances, in
each successive moment, must be the effect of the immediate
*57
agency, will, and power of GOD." Even if we allow, he
adds, that the course of nature can continue an existence 
once given,we must remember that nature is "nothing, apart 
from the agency of God", and therefore to say a thing is
»
preserved in existence by nature is to recognize it is up- 
held by Him. To say that God preserves in existence all 
created substance is equivalent to saying that He continuous- 
ly creates these things out of nothing at each moment of 
their existence, for "those things would drop into nothing, 
upon the ceasing of the present moment, without a new exer- 
tion of the divine power to cause them to exist in the fol- 
lowing moment." 59 His continuous bringing into being of 
created substance differs from the first creation only in 
the circumstance that no effects of God's power had preceded 
His first creation.
56Edwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 352.
27 ibid, p. 353.
58 ibid, p. 353. 59ibid, p. 353.
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If creation is continuous, then at each moment of time 
new effects come into existence. They are not the same as 
any past existence, though they may be like it. Now the 
fact that we identify any new effect with a past existence 
is due entirely to the "arbitrary constitution of the 
Creator." God Himself "treats them as one, "by communicating 
to them like properties, relations, and circumstances; and 
so, leads us to regard and treat them as one.." By saying 
that the constitution is arbitrary, Edwards explains, he 
means only that it is a constitution that depends on nothing 
but the divine will. In this sense,he says, the whole 
course of nature is an arbitrary constitution. "Thus it ap- 
pears, if we consider matters strictly, there is no such 
thing as any identity or oneness in created objects, exist- 
ing at different times,but what depends on God's sovereign 
constitution." 61 To deny this is to imply that identity is 
a character of certain things distinct from and prior to 
any divine constitution, and this has been disproved. God 
may, therefore, if He wishes, identify Adam and his poster- 
ity in/respect to sin. "And I am persuaded", he concludes, 
"that no solid reason can be given, why God...may not 
establish a constitution whereby the natural posterity of 
Adam. ... should be treated as one with him, for the derivation 
either of righteousness, and communion in rewards,or of the 
loss of righteousness, and consequent corruption and guilt." 62
fjEdwards, Original Sin, Works, Vol. II, p. 356.
°iibid, p. 357.
62 ibid, p. 358.
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That the identity of Adam and his posterity in the 
first sin is, while in one sense arbitrary, yet directed by 
divine wisdom, appears in two things. In the first place, 
there is a beautiful analogy between it and other laws or 
constitutions, according to which, through the whole system 
of vital nature in the world, everything is derived from the 
first of its kind and has exactly the qualities of the first 
member of the species. In the second place,the wisdom is 
shown in the good consequences of the union. For since the
manner of mankind's coming into existence naturally unites
the^i 
them, makin^sodally one, it is far better that they be in
the same moral state, and not that some be perfectly inno- 
cent and happy while others are wholly corrupt and condemned 
to perfect misery.
In this defense of his theory that we are identical 
with Adam in his first sin Edwards' philosophical idealism 
reasserts itself. This has been noted by several students
ff'Z
of his thought. H. Norman Gar diner remarks that his 
exposition of God's continuous creation is perhaps the near­ 
est approach to a restatement of his early idealism that we
64 have in his theological works. Professor Egbert C. Smyth ,
the greatest authority on Edwards 1 idealism, also sees here 
a reappearance of it. A.V.G.Alien says: "We have here again 
the principle of Berkeley carried beyond the sphere of sense
63H. Norman Gardiner, The Early Idealism of Edwards, in 
Jonathan Edwards; A Retrospect, p. 152.
64Egbert C. Smyth, "Idealism", in The American Journal of 
Theology, Vol. I, October 1897, p. 152.
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perceptions to which Berkeley confined it, and regarded as 
controlling the whole range of human consciousness of in- 
tellectual activity. God is not only the universal mind 
which constitutes the substance of the external world, but 
He is also the essence which lies behind the phenomena of 
consciousness or mind."^*
If Edwards in his idea of continuous creation was 
drawing on his idealistic philosophy, where, we may ask, did 
he get his idea of what constitutes identity? Professor 
Fisher remarks: "It is evident that Locke*s curious chapter
on Identity and Diversity put Edwards on the track on which
/?/? 
he advanced to these novel opinions." D Now it is Entirely
possible, in fact almost certain, that Edwards' reading of 
Locke set the former to thinking on the subject of identity.
it
But beyond this the indebtedness apparently ceases. A com- 
parison of them will show that there are fundamental differ- 
ences between Edwards 1 and Locke's treatments, differences 
which indicate that Edwards was doing some original thinking.
In the first place, Edwards differs from Locke in 
noting that philosophical reasoning about the nature of iden- 
tity has a bearing on the question of original sin. If 
Locke was aware of, or interested in this, which is highly 
improbable, he does not mention it.
In the second place,even if Locke had applied his 
teaching to the question of our oneness with Adam, he would
A.V.G.Allen, Life and Writings of Jonathan Edwards, 
.. pp 308-309. 
b6George Park Fisher, Discussions in History and Theology,
p. 241.
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have "been led to disagree entirely with Edwards. His idea 
that personal identity consists in the same consciousness. 
and that this is the basis of responsibility for actions 
committed, is an absolute contradiction of the view that we 
participated in, and are guilty for Adam's first sin. We 
do not have the same consciousness with Adam, and therefore 
we are not, according to Locke, responsible for his acts. 
Further, Locke 1 s view that we cannot identify what exists at 
different times unless it has continuous existence would 
contradict the assertion of our identity with Adam, except 
perhaps on the traducian hypothesis, which Edwards did not 
accept.
The mention of Locke's insistence upon continuous ex~ 
istence as essential to the identity of that which exists at 
separate times brings us to another feature in which Edwards 
is radically at variance with him. As we have seen, Edwards 
teaches a continuous creation, which means that all things 
are ceasing to be and beginning anew in every instant of 
time. We can identify things, he holds, which had separate 
beginnings; and therefore for Edwards, in contradistinction 
to Locke, the fact that Adam and we had different beginnings, 
that we are not a continuation of him, places no obstacle 
in the way of our being identical with him in the first sin.
A further important respect in which Edwards departs 
from Locke is the former's insistence that there is nothing 
in the nature of things existing in successive moments to 
lead us to identify them,- that our identifications are due 
to the "arbitrary constitution of the Creator". Locke would
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probably agree that there is nothing in the nature of the 
thing-- -which guarantees it to be the same today as it was 
yesterday except its continuing to be. But Edwards would 
reply that we have no proof of continuous existence,- in 
fact, he would insist that we have proof to the contrary,- 
and that in default of this proof we cannot be certain, on 
Locke 1 s principles, but that we might sometimes identify two 
things which are just alike yet distinct. Things are iden- 
tical,he emphasizes, only because God makes them so, and 
causes us to perceive the identity. Edwards thus diverges 
from Locke not only on the question of what we may identify, 
but also on that of why we identify what we do.
It is barely possible that one brief passage in Locke 
reveals some affinity to Edwards* view that the identity of 
objects is due to God's arbitrary constitution. Locke 
raises the question why our consciousness may not sometimes 
represent to us that certain past actions were ours, which 
we never performed, in other words, why we may not make mis* 
takes about the identity of certain actions. Why this is 
not possible, he says, "will be difficult to conclude from 
the nature of things«" 67 The only guarantee we can give, 
he says, is "the goodness of God", who will not permit us 
to make such a fatal error. This seems to conform closely 
to Edwards 1 position that we do not identify things because 
of their nature,but because of God's constitution. That
67 John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
Vol. I, Bk. II, P. 315. (Italics ours).
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this may have suggested to Edwards his view, however, is 
doubtful. It must be remembered that his theory is in har- 
mony with his youthful idealism, and it may be that this, 
rather thftn the few sentences in Locke, was the source of 
the idea.
It is clear then that the originality of Edwards' 
theory of identity, at least so far as Locke is concerned, 
can hardly be questioned. He has thought for himself, and on 
this subject, he has thought more deeply than Locke. And if 
Locke is not the source of his thought at this point, it 
must be referred to his own genius. There is no other source 
from which it could have come. For the theory, as he devel- 
ops it, and particularly its application to Adam, is unique.
2. Criticism of the Federal Theory as Edwards Presents It
Let us now turn to a critical examination of Edwards' 
presentation of the federal theory. We shall note first the 
Scriptural proofs he gives of Adam's headship of the race, 
and then his theory of our literal identity with him in the
first sin.
Edwards derives two proofs of the federal relationship 
from the first three chapters of Genesis. The first is to 
the effect that, since certain other remarks addressed to 
Adam in the second person singular obviously included his 
posterity, so might the threat ofeternal death. In proof of 
the assertion that other remarks did include his descendants 
he instances the fact that the things promised, or threatened, 
to Adam affected them just as they did him,- his posterity
314
replenished the earth, returned to dust, and were affected 
by the curse on the ground, etc. Hence, reasons Edwards, 
the promises and threats must have refereed also to Adam's 
descendants. And if so, the same must have been true of 
the threat of death, even though it was given in the second 
person singular. Now it is/true that, if we take Genesis 
literally, this argument lends a certain credibility to Ed- 
wards' view. But the fact that there is no ground for the 
interpretation, and that, indeed, the literal reading of it 
limits the threat to Adam, seriously weakens the argument. 
Further, the mere fact that the things mentioned did come 
upon Adam's descendants is no proof that they came in pur- 
suance of the promises and threats to Adam. It shows only 
that these promises and threats could have applied to his 
posterity, not that they actually were represented as so 
doing when they were made. And finally, even if they did, 
the inference that the threat of death also did is based only 
on an analogy.
Edwards' second proof from Genesis is based on the 
protevangelium, but this is a rank case of "spiritualizing" 
the Scripture. The prophecy made is simply that the seed of 
the woman shall briuse the serpent's head. TWiy not take it 
literally, if we are to regard Genesis as literal history? 
But this raises a fundamental question,- the question of the 
literalness of the first three chapters of Genesis as a 
historical record,- and thus further weakens Edwards' exegesis
In presenting his Scriptural proofs of the federal 
theory we mentioned the fact that, in addition to his argu-
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ments drawn from Genesis, Edwards cited many proof-texts, 
and gave an extended exegesis of the passage in Romans 5. 
12-21. We shall not however dwell any longer on his Bibli- 
cal arguments. We have already seen from our study of Paul 
that the doctrine, as Edwards develops it, cannot be found 
even in the famous passage, Romans 5. 12-21; and we noted 
then also that it could not be regarded as taught in the 
first three chapters of Genesis, nor, for that matter, in 
the rest of Scripture.
Let us now turn to Edwards 1 assertion and defense of 
our identity with Adam in the first sin. It should be noted 
that there are no ethical objections in his view, such as can 
be brought against the federal theory of the imputation of 
Adam's sin. As we have seen, in making posterity active in 
participating in Adam's sin, Edwards is not going the length 
of imputing to one man another's sin and guilt, but is really 
only imputing to each man his own sin and his own guilt. If 
I am identical/with Adam in the first sin, then it is my sin.
But the theory is patently untenable as violating in 
the strongest degree the fact of individuality. Whatever be 
the ground of our consciousness of personal identity, the 
testimony of that consciousness is unmistakable,- we are 
utterly distinct from Adam, and in no sense one moral person 
with him in any single act. Edwards' theory idfiighly in- 
genious, but it is doubtful, as someone has said, whether he 
convinced even himself. He was attempting a philosophical 
feat even more daring, if possible, than the ethical feat at- 
tempted by the federal theory in holding us responsible for
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another individual's sin. The impossibility of his position 
is further manifested when we consider the fact that to as- 
sert our personal identity with Adam in sin is to ignore 
time completely. Edwards would reply, of course, that as 
he has shown, a man may be identified with a child born forty 
years before. But even if we grant this, that is a very 
different thing from identifying one human act with the act 
of another individual, which took place milenniums before,
./v
an identification which involves the assertion that wills 
yet uncreated participated in Adam's act in Eden. True, 
Edwards points out in defense of his position that the 
physical sin is not the same, and that the identity consists 
in the consent of the heart to the sinful tendency in our 
nature. But this is inconsistent with his position that our 
sinful nature is the result of our participation with Adam 
in the first sin. Even, then, if he could intelligibly dis- 
tinguish betweenkhe physical and the inner act, he is com- 
pelled to agree that our wills acted with Adam's in a par- 
ticular volition at a definite time in the past. It is 
hardly necessary to press the matter further,- that we are 
morally and spiritually distinct from Adam all will agree, 
even the imputationist who thinks of Adam as our representa- 
tive.
Not only is it true that the fact of our individuality 
is an insuperable objection to Edwards' theory, but it should 
be noted that Edwards has not really offered proof of the 
point he should prove. THJhat he attempts to prove in his dis- 
cussion of the nature of identity is simply that God can
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identify what He will. But even though we agree with him in 
this, and forbear entering upon the abstruse philosophical 
probibems raised by hisjdiscussion of the theory of identity, 
it does not follow that, as a matter of fact, God has iden- 
tified Adam and his posterity in respect of Adam's first 
sin. The argument may be good so far as it goes, but it does 
not go far enough. It needs to be proved not only that such 
an identification is possible, but also that it has actually 
been made. Nor is it enough to show, if it could be shown, 
that the Bible teaches the federal headship of Adam. For 
that federal headship is susceptible of other interpretations 
than that given it by Edwards' theory of identity. It may 
mean simply, as the federal theology held, that Adam was the 
race's representative, and that his sin, though we did not 
actively consent to it, was imputed to us. Hence Edwards' 
Biblical proofs, even if they proved the federa^headship, 
are not supports of his identity theory. Ingenious, there- 
fore, as it is, we must dismiss his defense of the doctrine 
of identity as being far from&onvincing.
CHAPTER VIII 
THE GRACE OF GOD
We proceed next to a study of Edwards 1 teaching on the 
subject of divine grace. There are two chief sources of his 
thought, one, his Treatise on Grace, posthumously published, 
and the other, his miscellaneous remarks Concerning Effica- 
cious Grace, Like his remarks Concerning the Divine Decrees, 
this latter is a completely unorganized mass of material. 
The major ideas are endlessly repeated and a bewildering 
number of actual and possible Arminian evasions are run to 
the ground. The two sources, however, afford an opportunity 
to enter fully into Edwards' thought on the subject of grace.
He does/not discuss the relationship of efficacious 
grace to the decree of election. It is clear, however, that 
grace means to him what Moffatt calls "the under side of 
election". Saving grace is God's activity in election, as 
that activity is experienced by the elect. Decreeing is 
willing, he tells us, and therefore the decree of election is 
God's willing the salvation of certain individuals, including 
the means to their salvation, which, obviously, includes the 
operation of grace. Our problem, therefore, is to ascertain 
Edwards' conception as to how the operation of grace on man 
takes place and what its results are.
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He begins his Treatise on Grace by pointing out that 
the term may signify either (l) diverse kinds of influence 
of God«s Spirit on men, or (2) diverse fruits of that in- 
fluence. The diverse kinds^ of influence are two in number, 
"common" and "saving 11 , or "efficacious" grace,- here Edwards 
is following the traditional Calvinistic distinction. The 
diverse fruits are the fruits of common and of saving grace. 
For the purposes of this thesis, in which we are limiting 
ourselves to determinism in Edwards 1 thought, it is grace as 
an influence of God upon man in which we are primarily inter- 
ested.
It will clarify our thought, however, if/we pause here 
for a moment to note the chief difference between common and 
saving grace ih regard to their fruits. Edwards goes beyond 
Augustine and Calvin in ascribing common grace to the non- 
elect, but he includes among its fruits many things which by 
these older thinkers were attributed to nature. He did not 
deny that the fruits of common grace were "natural", indeed 
he insisted upon it, but he felt that even natural blessings 
had their source in divine grace. The fruits of common 
grace include almost everything that lifts man above the 
merely animal level, except the capacity to exercise saving 
faith. The existence of human government, the amenities and 
affections of family life, the duties and virtue which human 
society involves, the moralities of common life, even con- 
science itself,- these and most other human values are the 
result of common grace. Scripture promises, the sending of 
Christ, etc., are even included. This grace is essential to
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the ordering of the world, and is a condition for the effec- 
tiveness of saving grace. Its fruit is not merely the pro- 
duction of these goods just mentioned, but also the preven- 
tion of evil. It is, he says, in his dissertation, Men are 
Naturally God* s jtaemies, the only thing that restrains us 
from "anything that is bad." 1 Only through common grace is 
the world prevented from going rapidly to destruction.
The fruit of saving grace is the Holy Spirit*s dwelling 
in the soul of the eleet man, together with what follows 
from this. We find this conception all through Edwards* 
works, and it is dwelt upon at length in the Treatise on 
Grace. There he says: "So that true saving grace is no other 
than that very love of God - that is, God, in One of the Per- 
sons of the Trinity, uniting Himself to the soul of a crea- 
ture, as a vital principle, dwelling there and exerting Him- 
self by the faculties of the soul of man, in His own proper 
nature, after the manner of a principle of nature." 2 Again, 
n l suppose there is no other principle of grace in the soul
than the very Holy Ghost dwelling in the soul and acting
3 there as a vital principle."
As a result of this indwelling of God in the soul there 
is imparted to it a "divine and supernatural light". In his 
famous sermon on this subject he undertakes to establish the 
doctrine, "That there is such a thing as a spiritual and
Edwards, Men are Naturally God's Enemies, Works, Vol. V, p.307. 
2Edwards, Treatise on Grace, in Selections from the Unpub- 
lished Writings of Jonathan Edwards, (A.B.Grosart,
Editor), p. 53. 
3 ibid, p. 55.
321
divine light, immediately imparted to the soul by God, of a 
different nature from any that is obtained by natural means."4 
Edwards often speaks of saving grace as consisting in this 
illumination, though it is always made clear that the illu- 
mination flows frogfehe indwelling Spirit. This illumination 
amounts, so he tells us in his Treatise Concerning Religious 
Affections, to a special spiritual sense. In the regenerate 
man there is added a new sense,- added over and above the 
natural faculty, "a supernatural sense", giving us a "new 
inward perception or sensation", clarifying our grasp of 
truth, etc. "From these things it is evident", he says, 
"that those gracious influences of the saints, and the effects 
of God's Spirit which they experience, are entirely above 
nature, and altogether of a different kind from any thing 
that men find/in themselves by the exercise of natural prin- 
ciples. No improvement of those principles that are natural, 
no advancing or exalting of them to higher degrees, and no 
kind of composition will ever bringlmen to them; because they 
not only differ from what is natural, and from every thing 
that natural men experience, in degree and circumstances, but 
also in kind; and are of a nature vastly more excellent. And 
this is what I mean by supernatural, when I say, that gracious 
affections are from those influences that are supernatural. tt 5 
As the result of this possession by the Spirit, with its il-
A
Edwards, Divine and Supernatural Light, etc., Works,
Vol. VIII, p. 5. (For full title see Bibliography). 
5Edwards, Treatise Concerning Religious Affections, Works, 
Vol. IV, p. 108.
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lumination, man is led to exercise saving faith.
With this comparison of common and saving grace as to 
their fruits in men, let us move on to study Edwards 1 doc- 
trine of grace as an influence of God's Spirit on men. For 
we are concerned primarily with the reltaionship of God and 
man in the giving and receiving of grace. Now the distinc- 
tion he draws "between common and saving grace, as kinds/of 
divine influence, is that common grace is "natural", while 
saving, is "supernatural" or "spiritual". "Common grace 
differs from^pecial, in that it influences only "by assist- 
ing of nature; and not "by imparting grace, or bestowing any 
thing above nature...But in the renewing and sanctifying 
work of the Holy Ghost, those things are wrought in the soul 
that are above nature, and of which there is nothing of the 
like kind in the soul by nature." 6 Common grace is God's 
action upon men through the established laws and processes 
of nature. It is gracious in its/origin, but natural in its 
method of/influence. Saving grace, on the other hand, is 
"supernatural", not only in the nature of its fruit in man's 
soul, but also in its method of influence, being an action 
of God upon man mediated by no natural laws or forces what- 
ever. It is a purely spiritual process, and so far as the 
natural world is concerned it is miraculous. Both common 
and efficacious grace are determining in the influence, and 
thus in the feature which is most significant for us they do 
not differ. Edwards 1 works on grace deal, however, chiefly
6Edwards, Divine and Supernatural Light, etc., Works, Vol. 
VIII, pp 5-6.
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with efficacious grace, which of course is of primary im- 
portance in his theological system. For this reason, and 
because our^tudy of his theory of freedom has included 
everything in his doctrine of common grace which bears on 
determinism in his system, we shall devote our attention now 
to his teaching on the subject of efficacious grace.
Edwards distinguishes two questions relating to effi- 
cacious grace, which, he says, are "controverted between us 
and the Arminians." The two questions are as follows: Ml. 
Whether the grace of God, in giving us saving virtue, be 
determining and decisive. 2. Whether saving virtue be de- 
cisively given by a supernatural and sovereign operation of 
the Spirit of God: or, whether it be only by such a divine 
influence or assistance, as is imparted in the course of 
common providence, either according to established laws of 
nature, or established laws of God's universal providence to- 
wards mankind." 7 That is to say, does saving grace really 
differ from conanon? The question whether grace is a super- 
natural act is of no great significance to our study of 
determinism in Edwards, for in either case he regards grace 
as determiring in its influence upon the finite will. To 
say that it is supernatural,, is, for him, only another way of 
saying that it is determining, but it may be determining, he 
insists, without being supernatural. "I mention this (i.e., 
the question of whether saving grace is supernatural) as an
7Edwards, Concerning Efficacious Grace, Works, Vol. VIII, 
p. 390,
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entirely different question from the other, viz. Whether the 
grace of God, by which we obtain saving virtue, is determin- 
ing or decisive. For that it may be, if it be given wholly 
in a course of nature, or by such an operation as is limited 
and regulated perfectly according to established invariable 
laws. For none will dispute that many things are brought to 
pass by God in this manner, that are decisively ordered by 
him, and are brought to pass by his determining providence."^ 
We address ourselves, therefore, to the question of what Ed- 
wards has to say of the efficacious or determining power of 
divine grace, leaving aside the proofsfhe gives of its super- 
natural character.
To begin with, he insists that God either does all or 
nothing in bringingabout saving faith (or as he usually 
says, saving virtue) in a man. "The nature of virtue being 
a positive thing, can proceed from nothing but/God's imme- 
diate influence, and must take its rise from creation or in- 
fusion by God. For it must be either from that, or from our 
own choice and production, either at once, or gradually, by 
diligent culture." 9 Any theory of cooperation between man 
and God/reduces, once the camouflage is stripped away, either 
to a purely man-centered or God-centered affair. Arminians 
speak, he says, of man's making use of the common grace he 
already has in the exercising of saving virtue, and imply 
that both God and man have a part in the production of that
8Edwards, Concerning Efficacious Grace, Works, Vol. VIII,
q P- 391. 
y ibid, p. 408.
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virtue. But the crux of the matter is reached when we ask 
whether the fact that some men "improve" it, while others 
do not, is determined by God or man. In the final analysis 
the answer has to be one or the other, and this being so, 
saving virtue is due either wholly to God or wholly to man. 
For it is precisely this determining act that constitutes 
saving virtue.
This being the case, man, on the Arminian scheme, is 
wholly responsible for the exercise of saving virtue. For 
it is of the essence of Arminianism that man has the free 
will to decide whether he will make use of the divine as- 
sistance he has. However much the Arminian may stress the 
fact of God's aid, it is man who, in his sovereign freedom, 
determines whether that aid will be utilized in the exercise 
of saving faith. In the conclusion of a long paragraph in 
which he discusses this question, Edwards says: "From the 
latter part of the above discourse, it appears that, accord- 
ing to Arminian principles, men's virtue is altogether of 
themselves, and God has no hand at all in it." 1
According to Edwards, on the other hand, God does all. 
"In efficacious grace we are not merely passive, nor yet 
does God do some, and we do the rest. But God does all, and 
we do all. God produces all, and we act all. For that is 
what he produces, viz. our own acts. God is the only proper 
author and fountain; we only are the proper actors." This
10Edwards, Concerning Efficacious Grace, Works,Vol.VIII,p.420, 
uibid, p. 415.
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statement, typical of what one finds all through Edwards' 
works on efficacious grace and the sermon, God Glorified in 
M**1 * 8 Dependence, makes it clear beyond doubt that God«s 
grace is determining and decisive in a man's acquiring sal- 
ing faith. Hence to God belongs the full responsibility and 
glory. Such a position, of course, follows inevitably from 
what Edwards believes as to man's fallen condition,- a condi- 
tion which makes it impossible for him to do anything himself 
toward his own salvation.
The imparting of saving faith by God to man takes 
place, not through the ordinary laws of nature, but by a 
special, arbitrary, divine intervention, the act being in 
reality a miracle and thus supernatural. To become the ob- 
ject of God's gracious activity, no conditions in man, no 
preparatory acts, are necessary or of use. "And is there 
any man that will assert, that God has absolutely or per- 
emptorily promised his saving grace to any man that ever 
stirs hand or foot, or thinks one thought in order to his 
salvation?" 12 The production of saving faith is an opera- 
tion in which God influences man's heart immediately, chang- 
ing his disposition by the exercise of divine power, so that 
man instantaneously puts forth saving virtue. "Hereby 
Christ shews his great power. He does but speak the powerful 
word, and it is done. - He does but call, and the heart of
the sinner immediately cometh, as was represented by his
1 *x 
calling his disciples, and their immediately following him."
12Edwards, Concerning Efficacious Grace,Works,Vol.VIII, p.394. 
!3iMd, P. 426.
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This conception of God's immediate action upon man, Edwards 
asserts, is open to no objection to which a doctrine of the 
sovereign freedom of man is not open. "There is no objec- 
tion to God's producing any effects, or causing any events, 
by any immediate interposition, producing effects arbitrar- 
ily, or by the immediate efforts of his will, but what lies 
equally against his ordering it so, that any effects should 
be produced by the immediate interposition of men's will, to 
produce effects otherwise than the established laws of 
nature would have produced without men's arbitrary interposi- 
tion." 14
Now this is of course thoroughgoing determinism, but 
Edwards nevertheless insists that grace is not to be spoken 
of as being irresistible. "The dispute about grace being
resistible or irresistible", he asserts, "is perfect non-
1 5 sense." Such a usage implies that the will resists the
action oflGod's grace. The truth is that the will always 
follows the motive produced by the influence of divine 
grace in perfect harmony and subjection. Thus for the same 
reason that he would not speak of volitions as necessary in 
the popular sense of the term, i.e., as implying resistance 
on the part of the will, so he will not speak of grace as
irresistible.
There is some evidence to indicate that Edwards did 
not conceive of the impartation of saving faith entirely as 
a personal relationship. In those places where he speaks of
14Bdwards, Concerning Efficacious Grace, Works, Vol. VIII, 
15ibid, p! 406. /PP 407-408.
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the movement upon man by the Spirit, and of the Spirit's 
presence in man in the act of, and as the result of, the im- 
partation of saving grace, the language does suggest that he 
conceives the relationship in terms of personal influence. 
"But he (i.e., the Spirit) unites himself with the mind of a 
saint, takes him for his temple, actuates and influences him 
as a new supernatural principle of life and action. 1* 16 The 
Spirit, dwelling in man, imparts a divine light. "A true 
sense of the divine excellency of the things revealed in the 
word of God, and a conviction of the truth and reality of
1 7them thence arising." A ' The effect of grace is to produce 
faith more through new "light" than through an alteration of 
the disposition, that is, more through an appeal to the mind 
than a transformation of the nature. But more often the im- 
plication of his language is that he conceives of grace as 
a sort of impersonal, physical energy, "by which God secures 
effects upon men through an alteration of their natures in a 
manner almost naturalistic. The term most frequently used 
to describe the imparting of grace is "infusion". The fol- 
lowing quotation will illustrate the usage: "Those that deny 
infusion of grace by the Holy Spirit, must, of necessity, 
deny the Spirit to do anything at all. By the Spirit's in- 
fusing, let be meant what it will, those who say there is no 
infusion, contradict themselves." 18 How "infusion" is hardly 
the term to characterize the action of one personality upon
J-nEdwards, Divine and Supernatural Light, etc., Works, Vol.
ibid, p. 8. /VIII, p. 6. 
18Edwardsi Concerning Efficacious Grace,Works,Vol.VIII,p,406.
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another. It suggests rather the action of an impersonal 
force. On five occasions in his essay, Concerning Effica- 
cious Grace Edwards actually speaks of the impartation of 
efficacious grace as a physical operation. "The opponents 
of efficacious grace and physical operation, may be chal- 
lenged to shew that it is possible that any creature should 
become righteous without a physical operation, either a 
being created with the habit of righteousness, or its being 
immediately infused." 19 The following quotation suggests 
even more strongly that efficacious grace operates in such 
a way as to make personal influence impossible: "All assist- 
ance of the Spirit of God whatsoever, that is by any present 
influence or effect of the Spirit; any thing at all that a 
person converted from sin to God is subject of, through any 
immediate influence of the Spirit of God upon him, or any 
thing done by the Spirit, since the completing and confirm- 
ing the canon of the scriptures, must be done by a physical 
operation either on the soul or body. The Holy Spirit of 
God does something to promote virtue in men's hearts, and to 
make them good, beyond what the angels can do. But the 
angels can present motives; can excite ideas of the words of 
promises and threatenings, etc. and can persuade in this way 
by moral means; as is evident, because the devils in this 
way promote vice." 20 The influence of the angels and the 
devils, it would seem, is personal, while God's is "physical",
19Edwards, Concerning Efficacious Grace, Works, Vol. VIII, 
20ibid, p. 407. / P. 409 -
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and, the implication is, impersonal. That Edwards would ac- 
knowledge the validity of this implication is hardly possible, 
in view of his conception of grace in terms of the indwell- 
ing Spirit. But it is there nevertheless, and as long as the 
relationship between God and man is thought of in terms of 
necessity, it cannot be wholly removed. Thoroughgoing deter- 
minism is incompatible with a personal relationship.
Having established the fact/that God,- whether by a 
personal, or an impersonal operation,- does determine the 
existence of "saving virtue", Edwards stresses the point 
that, as a result, all the glory of man's salvation belongs 
to Him. It is by means of saving virtue that salvation is 
achieved, and to be the cause of it, in his view, is to be 
the cause of salvation. As an illustration of this he asks 
us to consider how it would be if a third party were between 
us and God as the determiner of whether orihot we should ex- 
ercise saving virtue. If, says Edwards, this person deter- 
mines that we shall have faith, and salvation results, we 
would not ascribe the glory to God, who was the giver. "On 
the contrary", to quote his own words, "would not this de- 
termining cause, whose arbitrary, self-determined, self- 
possessed, sovereign will, decides the matter, be properly 
looked upon as the main cause, vastly the most proper cause, 
the truest author and bestower of the benefit? would not he 
be, as it were, all in the cause? would not the glory pro- 
perly belong to him, on whose pleasure the determination of 
the matter properly depended?" a It follows that if a man
21Edwards, Concerning Efficacious Grace,Works,Vol.VIII,p.402.
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determines his own faith, he is really the cause of his own 
salvation and deserves the glory for it. This istarecisely 
what Arminianism results in. "The Arminian scheme natural- 
ly, and "by necessary consequence, leads men to take all the 
glory of all spiritual good (which is immensely the chief, 
most important and excellent thing in the whole creation) to 
ourselves; as much as if we, with regard to those effects, 
were the sup- erne, the self-existen* and independent, and ab- 
solutely sovereign disposers." 22 The only way for God to be 
the real author of our salvation is, therefore, for Him to 
determine our choice to exercise saving virtue.
Since he places the major emphasis upon God f s deter- 
mining our faith, Edwards necessarily thinks of God's grace 
almost wholly in terms of efficacious grace. The things 
usually spoken of as making up His common grace hold a very 
negligible place in his scheme. Even God's love in sending 
Christ, and His mercy and forgiveness in offering salvation 
on condition of faith in Christ are rarely spoken of as exam- 
ples of grace. In the essay, Concerning the Divine Decrees, 
he makes the statement that "there is a necessary connection 
between faith in Jesus Christ and eternal life. Those that 
believe in Christ must be saved, according to God's invJol- 
able constitution of things." 23 That eternal life is freely 
offered to faith is regarded as a matter of fact,- not as a 
matter of grace. Similarly the revelation of God and His
^Edwards, Concerning Efficacious Grace,Works,Vol.VIII,p.424. 
23Edwards, Concerning the Divine Decrees,Works,Vol.VIII,p.376
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appeals to mankind in the Scripture, since that is open to 
everyone, is of little importance as illustrating His grace. 
Moreover, the gift of the capacity to accept Christ, which 
the Arminians held to "belong to man, coupled with the p<r.osi- 
ises to those who accept, and the inducements/to acceptance, 
are regarded as of minor value and weight, for they consti- 
tute only the opportunity for salvation. It is he who 
determines its acceptance and not he who gives the opportun- 
ity, who deserves the credit for salvation. "He may be said 
to be the giver of money that offers it to us, without being 
the proper determiner of our acceptance. But it is in the
acceptance of offers, and the proper improvement of oppor-
24 
tunities, wherein consists virtue." Common grace is thus
practically no grace at all; it is only efficacious grace 
that is of realJsignificance.
The question naturally arises why Edwards centers the 
emphasis on the determining of the act of saving faith. Why 
is it that God f s favor in "common grace" is so minimized? 
Why does he feel that for man to be the cause of his faith 
is for himjto rob God of all the glory? Why can he not con- 
ceive of God's giving salvation to faith, and His making 
faith itself possible, as being of vastly greater importance 
in salvation than the mere act of accepting the gift? Per- 
haps the chief reason is that God's sovereignty, which he is 
primarily concerned with magnifying, is exhibited in the 
determining of the act of saving faith, rather than in His
24Edwards, Concerning Efficacious Grace, Works, Vol. VIII, 
p. 424.
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love and mercy in the sending of Christ, etc.
But there is another factor which without doubt plays 
a part in determining Edwards 1 emphasis in this matter. It 
is the fact that he regards saving faith as an act of merit, 
to which salvation must be given as a deserved, and even 
necessary reward. In his discourse, Concerning Faith, he 
does justice to the receptive nature of the act of faith, 
speaking of it as believing, accepting, trusting, receiving, 
etc. At one point he defines it as follows: "Upon the whole, 
the best and clearest, and most perfect definition of justi- 
fying faith, and most according to the scripture, that I can 
think of, is this,faith is the soul's entirely embracing 
the revelation of Jesus Christ as our Saviour." 25 Prom this 
it would seem that he regards faith simply as an act of 
humble acceptance of God's gift, not as an act which God is 
rewarding. But when he thinks on the question of where the 
responsibility for the existence of faith is to be located,
»
he appears to regard faith as a meritorious act. His cus- 
tomary term for it becomes, as we have seen in a number of 
the quotations above, "saving virtue". It is something which 
deserves a reward, and which thus makes man eligible for sal- 
vation. It may be a trusting appeal to God, an act of grate- 
ful acceptance,but it is also a "virtue", a spiritual at- 
tribute partaking more of the nature of "work" than of faith 
in the Pauline and evangelical sense. It is, he says, a 
thing in which men are apt to glory, as they might glory in
25Edwards, Concerning Faith, Works, Vol. VIII, p. 495.
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any other accomplishment. "Virtue is not only the most 
honourable attainment, but it is that which men, on the sup- 
position of their being possessed of it, are more apt to 
glory in, than in any thing else whatsoever. For what are 
men so apt to glory in as their own supposed excellency, as 
in their supposed virtue?" 26
This tendency to regard faith as a work was natural to 
one who followed the Calvinistic emphasis upon the holy life 
as distinct from the Lutheran emphasis upon the receptive 
nature of faith. But with such a conception of saving faith 
there is little wonder that he considered the causing of it 
as a major element in man's salvation. For such a faith, or 
better,such a "virtue", really obligates God to give salva- 
tion to its possessor. "Saving virtue", so conceived,be- 
comes in reality the cause of salvation. It was perfectly 
logical then for Edwards to reason that, if man, as the Ar- 
minians held, produces the "saving virtue", he is the author 
of his own salvation, God having no glory in the affair. 
Hence to prevent man's glorying in his own "virtue" and at- 
tributing salvation to his possession of it, God must be re- 
garded as the determiner of faith.
This completes the presentation of Edwards' ideas as 
to the nature and operation of divine grace. His chief Rroof 
of the reality of efficacious grace is man's inability to 
put forth saving faith of himself, and consequent utter de- 
pendence upon God in the exercise of it. This inability has
26Edwards, Concerning Faith, Works, Vol. VIII, p. 423.
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teen emphasized in the treatise on Original Sin, and need* 
no reiteration here. The fact that the doctrine of deter- 
mining grace follows naturally from that of the divine de- 
crees means, of course,that the arguments supporting the 
latter also support it.
Let us now make a critical examination of the doctrine 
of grace as Edwards has presented it. That it cannot suf- 
fice for us today as an adequate interpretation of God's 
saving influence upon man is apparent. We have already noted 
several weaknesses in his conception,- the tendency to/think 
of grace in impersonal terms, despite his insistence upon 
the indwelling Spirit, the portrayal of faith as of the nat- 
ure of a good work, and the minimizing of the saving efficacy 
of such gracious acts as the revelation of God in Scripture, 
the sending of Christ, and our endowment with conscience. In 
addition to these things there lie against Edwards 1 doctrine 
all those objections that can be "brought, in the name of
God's character and of/our moral nature, against a theory of
and 
unconditionaMiscriminatisre election, of which it is an
integraljpart. Moreover,the theory is open to all the ob- 
jections to determinism in the name of moral agency. Even 
if we concede that Edwards is thinking of the operation of 
grace upon us in personal terms, his deterministic account 
leaves only a very meagre role for the human personality to 
play,- a new illumination is|produced in us, which in turn 
produces a new motive, which gives rise to the new volition 
of faith. The act of faith, as Edwards himself says, is pro- 
duced in is; it is certainly not, in any full sense, produced
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us. And at bottom the theory constitutes a complete 
denial of genuine freedom. It is a theory of necessity, and 
as such excludes any power of contrary choice, and therefore 
any moral responsibility. The act of faith is not free, not 
aorally significant, not real. Instead of the personal 
response of an individual to God's drawing, faith is God's 
own act,which, when He has produced it, He rewards.
This last thought suggests another inconsistency in 
Edwards, which should be pointed out here. He has taken the 
position that man is responsible for his volitions, however 
they may be determined. On the basis of this, he layw upon 
him the full responsibility for his sins, and by parity of 
reasoning, he should regard him as responsible for the voli- 
tion exerted in the act of faith. Since we are responsible 
for volition and its consequences, regardless of how or 
whence the volition comes into being, we should therefore at 
least share with God the credit for our faith. God's part 
would be primary and most significant, but man would not be 
utterly devoid of any credit in the process. To grant man 
any credit would, of course, be repugnant to Edwards,but this 
is nevertheless the implication of his view that we are 
responsible for all volitions,
A further word as to the implications of determinism 
for the conception of salvation by grace should be added. 
Granting, for the moment, that "works" and faith may be moral- 
ly significant and responsible acts even though determined, 
it is nevertheless true that the doctrine of efficacious 
grace destroys largely the distinction between "the law" and
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grace. For it regards man in both cases as being unable to 
fulfil the conditions of salvation. If he is to be saved by 
faith, God must work in him that which is necessary. But 
the same was true under the conception that he was to be 
saved by "works of the law". Under the new covenant God 
does all, but so it was under the old; under the new coven- 
ant man is left no ground for boasting, but the same was 
true, seeing that God produced the works, under the old. 
The upshot of the situation is that the old covenant was as 
gracious as is the new. In both cases man can do nothing to 
deserve salvation or to receive it; and therefore in both 
cases it isfeiven unconditionally. Thus the real distinc- 
tion between faith and works is obliterated,- and this is 
true even though faith and works are in themselves different. 
For the significant fact is that, however the acts may dif- 
fer, God does all.
Indeed faith and "works" play no part in determining 
the individual's salvation,- thisjis determined by God's 
inscrutable decree, and it is all one whether He carry out 
His decree toward the elect person by producing in him 
"works" or faith as the basis of his salvation. Since God 
produces them, and they are both of grace, it is as appro- 
priate that one be produced asfthe other, and God can as 
easily produce one as the other. Why He should elect to 
produce faith in those He saves rather than works is beyond 
us, and must be referred simply to His sovereign and arbi- 
trary will.
The new covenant is thus completely sfaltified; it is
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heralded as something new, as God's making salvation a free 
gift, but as a matter of fact, according to the determinist, 
He has been doing this all along. Salvation has never been 
an achievement of man; it has never been suspended on human 
merit. Only when man is regarded as the author of his own 
"works" or faith does the real distinction between the cov- 
enants emerge. For only then can the difference between the 
nature of a work of merit and an act of humble and grateful 
acceptance be taken account of.
CHAPTER IX 
THE PERSEVERANCE OF THE SAINTS
The doctrine of the perseverance of the saints is 
closely related to that of efficacious grace. In fact, it 
is simply the theory that efficacious grace continues to 
operate in those in whom it has once begun to operate, lead- 
ing them on in Christian endeavors and in the life of faith. 
We 'shall now turn to Edwards* teaching on this subject, 
which is contained in an essay, entitled, Concerning the 
Perseverance of Saints.
That the continuous operation of grace is necessary to 
salvation is a presupposition of the doctrine. Edwards is 
very emphatic on this point. "Perseverance in faith is, in 
one sense, the condition of justification; that is, the 
promise of acceptance is made only to a persevering sort of 
faith; and the proper evidence of its being of that sort is 
actual perseverance." As he says in the quotation just 
given, perseverance is not only necessary to salvation, but 
it is in reality necessary to justification. He was not 
satisfied with the customary way in which Calvinistic think- 
ers explained perseverance to be a sine qua non of salva- 
tion,- he wanted the manner in which it is necessary to be
Awards, Concerning the Perseverance of Saints, Works, 
Vol. VIII, p. 435.
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made clearer. The truth of the matter is, he insisted, that 
we are justified only by that faith which has the quality of 
perseverance in it from the beginning. "Faith (on our part) 
is the great condition of salvation; it is that by, which we 
are justified and saved. But in this faith, the persever- 
ance that belongs to it is a fundamental ground of the con- 
gruity that faith gives to salvation. Perseverance indeed 
comes into consideration, even in the justification of a 
sinner, as one thing on which the fitness of acceptance to 
life depends. For, God has respect to perseverance as being 
virtually in the first act. And it is looked upon as if it
were a property of that faith by which the sinner is then
2 justified." This position is clearly and emphatically
stated also in his Discourse on. Justification by Faith Alone.
Now God, through the operation of divine grace, guar- 
antees the perseverance of the elect in faith in the same 
way that he does the initial act of faith in conversion. 
"God, when he had laid out himself to glorify his/mercy and 
grace in the redemption of poor fallen men, did not see meet, 
that those who are redeemed by Christ, should be redeemed so 
imperfectly, as still to have the work of perseverance left 
in their own hands." 3 The work is taken completely out of 
man's hands,- he commits his soul to Christ for safe-keeping, 
and is thereby assured that he will not fall. "It is/one 
act of faith tojcommt the soul to Christ's keeping in this 
sense, viz. to keep it from falling. The believing soul is 
convinced of its own weakness andjhelplessness, its inabil- 
ity to resist its enemies, its insufficiency to keep itself,
S^dwards, Concerning the Perseverance of Saints,Works,Vol.VIII, 
^ibid, p. 436. & /p. 442.
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and so commits itself to Christ, that he would be its keep- 
er."
Grace is necessary to insure the perseverance of man 
for the same reason that it is necessary to convert him, 
namely, because of fcis inability. Edwards' discussion of 
the inability of the converted man to persevere in his own 
strength isknteresting both in itself and for his references 
to the doctrine of original righteousness and the fall. Adam, 
he reminds us, was not able to persevere in righteouensss, 
although the Holy Spirit had been communicated to him in such 
a way that he had no lust or sinful principle, because he was 
left to his own strength to persevere, without the "extra- 
ordinary occasional assistance" of divine grace. And if 
Adam, who had no sinful propensity in his nature, was not im- 
mune to falling, redeemed man is, in his own strength, even 
less able to avoid it, "because man's strength is exceeding- 
ly less than it was then, and he is under far less advantages 
to persevere." 5 The operation of grace in leading to his 
conversion has not eradicated the evil propensity which has 
characterized man since the fall. If the elect did not have 
something beyond their own strength on which to depend, they 
would be certain to fall. "The perseverance on which life 
was suspeded, depended then (i.e., before the fall) indeed
on the strength of mere man: but now (on the supposition)
/? 
it would be suspended on the strength of fallen man."
4Edwards, Concerning the Perseverance of Saints, Works,
. Vol. VIII, p. 441. 6
5 ibid, p. 437. "ibid, p. 438.
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The perseverance of the redeemed is thus entirely de- 
pendent upon a special operation of the Spirit, who is given 
to him, as He was at conversion, in an arbitrary and sover- 
eign fashion. This special operation of the Spirit, this 
supernatural act of divine grace, follows the first act of 
faith, and comes in answer to it. "For it is by faith that 
we first perceive and know this righteousness (i.e., 'the 
righteousness of God'), and do at first receive and embrace 
it; and being once interested in it, we have the continuance
of faith in the future persevering exercises of it made sure
7 to us. 11 Efficacious grace produces saving faith which in
turn calls for further and continuous grace to guarantee per- 
severance. By virtue of this special grace vouchsafed to 
them the redeemed are insured against falling, as Adam, who 
was left to his own strength, never was. "The Spirit of God 
was given at first but was lost. God gives it a second time, 
never to be utterly lost. The Spirit is now given in 
another manner than it was then. Then indeed it was commun- 
icated, and dwelt in their hearts. But this communication 
was made without conveying at the same time any proper right 
or sure title to it. But when God communicates it the second 
time, as he does to a true convert, he withal gives it to him 
to be his own; he finally makes it over to him in a sure cov- 
enant." 8 It is obvious that Edwards is put to it to discover 
a real difference between converted man and unfallen Adam,
^Edwards, Concerning the Perseverance of Saints, Works, 
. Vol. VIII, p. 441 
5 ibid, p. 447.8
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and that he really does not succeed. In "both cases there is 
the possession of the Spirit, as the determining influence, 
and as far as his account is concerned, Adam wasiio more 
left to his own strength than converted man. Edwards' real 
difficulty is not in explaining how, under the influence of 
efficacious grace, man can never fall, but how Adam, in the 
state of perfect righteousness, ever did.
There are various grounds mentioned by Edwards upon 
which we can be sure that, once truly converted, a man will 
persevere in his faith, "It is evident that the saints 
shall persevere", he says, "because they are already justi-
Q
fied." This assertion is based upon his position that 
perseverance is necessary, not only to salvation, but also 
to justification. This position, however, begs the whole 
question at iss*; to say that justification involves per- 
severance is simply to say that genuine faith, which is the 
basis for justification, never fails to persevere. Scrip- 
ture, moreover, gives us no ground for this belief, for 
there the sinner is told simply that, if he has faith, he is 
justified in the eyes of God, and there is, to say the 
least, no suggestion that a real faith may not weaken and 
die. Another reason for the certain perseverance of the true 
convert is derived by Edwards from the nature o^Christ's 
mediation. Christ "undertakes and becomes a surety for man 
to God",10 fulfilling the law and satisfying God's justice.
9Edwards, Concerning the Perseverance of Saints, Works,
Vol. VIII, P. 439. 
10 ibid, p. 443.
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He has already persevered for those who place their trust in 
Him. The Christian whose spiritual life is a participation 
with Christ in the life He received as risen from the dead 
is assured of infallible perseverance. Here, however, it is 
taken for granted that the Christian's faith, by which he re- 
lates himself to Christ, and enjoys the "benefits of His 
mediatorship, will not falter. But this is again precisely
'V
the matter at statue,- it is not a question of what Christ has
f
done, but of v/hether we can persevere in our acceptance of 
His gift. A third ground for belief in perseverance, equal- 
ly unstable, is that God, having begun a gracious work in 
us, will certainly complete what He began. Having given us
ictorious faith, He will not suffer that faith to be de- 
feated. This argument obviously assumes the theory of ef- 
ficacious grace, denying man's part in his conversion, and 
reposes for/its final validity upon the doctrine of uncon- 
ditional election. It depends upon the whole system of 
thought Edwards has been defending, and must meet all the 
criticisms which can be levelled at it.
In addition to these arguments, Edwards follows his 
usual custom and quotes Scriptural texts in proof of the 
doctrine of perseverance. Here, however, even more than 
elsewhere, there are numerous texts which place him decid- 
edly upon the defensive. One of the chief difficulties is 
that raised by the frequency with which tiie Scripture con- 
tains cautions to the faithful against falling away. This 
difficulty he meets by the assertion that it is entirely 
proper to caution one against a fall, although it i^fcertain
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that he will not heed, and that these cautions do not at 
all imply the possibility of defection on the part of the 
t,ruly righteous. Those who fall after apparently having 
been converted are only seemingly converted, and their 
righteousness is only external. As a matter of fact, there 
is a difference between the truly righteous and the seeming- 
ly righteous even before the latter reveal it by falling 
away. That Edwards should be driven to such statements to 
prove his doctrine Scriptural is itself sufficient to show 
the impossibility of any such proof.
Apart from the failure of his supporting arguments, 
there are a number of objections to his theory in itself. 
While the position with which he begins his discussion,- 
namely, that, if a man is to be finally saved, he must per- 
severe in his faith,- is one to which no objection can be 
raised, it is going too far to say that .lustification depends 
on perseverance. The Scripture teaches us that when a man 
comes to God with genuine faith, he is received, but it does 
not identify genuine faith with persevering faith. Indeed, 
as we have seen, the Bible abounds in cautions to the faith- 
ful against falling away. As far as Scripture is concerned 
we have no ground for insisting that saving faith possesses 
a special quality from the beginning which makes it persever- 
ing, and which is a condition of Justification, It is, to 
say the least, not unscriptural to believe that an individual 
may give up a faith at one time genuine, and thus forfeit his 
relation of justification with God.
Edwards' argument in proof of the fact that only God's
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grace can guarantee perseverance is/of course valid. Ob- 
viously if man is in a state of total depravity and complete 
inability, there could be no other guarantee than divine, 
efficacious grace that he would put forth a saving faith. 
And if he is possessed of freedom to exercise faith or not, 
there can of course be no guarantee of his persistence in 
faith. But the vital question is not whether man needs God's 
gracious action to make certain his perseverance, but whether 
there is any certainty of his persevering. Edwards* proof 
of this certainty, briefly noted above, is^iot convincing. 
In fact there are no independent proofs of the doctrine of 
perseverance. It rests upon the whole deterministic scheme 
of which it is a part, and stands or falls with it. If God 
determines all things, if He elects certain individuals to 
lasting salvation, and if He rescues them from perdition by 
special and determining grace, it follows that they will 
persevere in faith. But if the objections we have raided 
against these theories are valid, the doctrine of persever- 
ance must go with them. Even apart from its dependence upoi 
the system as a whole it is, being nothing more than the 
theory of the continued action of efficacious grace, in it- 
self untenable as destructive of responsibility and of faith 
in any real and personal sense.
The doctrine of perseverance of the saints was given a 
religious appeal in the eyes of many because it was felt to 
be a ground for the assurance of salvation. It was felt 
that, once in the fol4, the Christian could rest confident 
of remaining in it. To suppose our salvation suspended on
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our own efforts would, says Edwards, "deprive the believer 
of the comfort, hope, and joy of salvation; which would be 
very contrary to God's design in the scheme of man's salva- 
tion, which is to make the ground o^bur peace and joy in 
all respects strong and sure." 11 But the belief in the cer- 
tain perseverance of the elect in reality cannot be the 
ground of assurance on the part of any individual Christian 
that his faith will not fail. For no amount of belief in 
election and perseverance can furnish the assurance that 
one's faith is genuine. We can never know beforehand 
whether our faith may not be of the spurious kind which will 
some day fail us. The only assurance we can have is that 
we shall persevere, if ours is genuine faith. But then the 
man who denies the doctrine of perseverance has as much as- 
surance. He too knows that he will be saved, if he perse- 
veres in his faith. Thus the religious value which was sup- 
posed to be particularly supported by this doctrine is in 
reality no more supported by it than by the theory that man's 
perseverance depends partly upon his own free response to 
divine grace.
nEdwards, Concerning the Perseverance of Saints, Works, 
Vol. VIII, p. 440.
CHAPTER X 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF EDWARDS 1 DETERMINISM
With the doctrine of perseverance, we complete the 
study of determinism in the system of Edwards. When we con- 
sider his deterministic system as a whole, we cannot fail to 
be impressed with the fact that he was, indeed, a systematic 
theologian. We have noted minor inconsistencies, and we 
have noted the more serious confusion in his theory of the 
will, "but it cannot "be said that he was ever untrue to the 
deterministic principle. He applied the conception of 
necessity in every possible ramification of his theology, 
articulating each deterministic doctrine with the system as 
a whole. Ho one haslever been more thoroughgoing than Ed- 
wards in the extension of necessity to every act of God and 
of man, including even the first sin of Adam. And no one 
has ever defended it with more acumen or resourcefulness.
Looking back upon his system, as we have studied it, 
however, the most significant feature appears to be, not 
the precision of his/exposition, nor the skill of his de- 
fense of the Calvinistic theology, but the fact that he 
undertook to vindicate it ethically. He was sufficiently im- 
pressed by the attacks on Calvinism current in his day to 
realize that it could not endure without demonstrating the
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consistency of its conception of divine sovereignty with 
the deepest moral convictions of man. Calvin responded to 
the ethical criticisms of the doctrine of sovereignty 
usually by denying man's right to question God's ways. God's 
acts are right because God wills them, he said, if indeed 
the question of their Tightness is to be raised at all. And 
man is to be held responsible for his sins, without its being 
necessary to show him free in any sense. If one asked how 
these thinrs could be, Calvin warned him against intruding 
with his reason into the "sanctuary of the divine wisdom." 
With Edwards, however, it was different; he could not tether 
his reason. He had to justify God's ways with man, and to 
this stupendous, and from the Calvinistic standpoint, im- 
possible, task, he bent his best efforts.
His attempted ethical vindication of Calvinism we see 
on almost every page of his works, and in the most varied 
connections. There were five significant positions, however, 
to which it led him. In the first place, it led him to the 
definite position that God's will is determined by His wis- 
dom and love, and to an effort to show that His decrees are 
consistent with the divine wisdom and love. In the second 
place, Edwards 1 desire to show his theory of volition consis- 
tent with the moral agency of man led him to a curious in- 
sistence that man, although caught in the web of necessity, 
is in reality free. In the third place, we found him limit- 
ing responsibility to volitions and their results,- a position 
which seemed to be a step in the direction of limiting 
responsibility to real freedom. Again, we saw that in the
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name of God's character, he tried to show that, though sin 
is decreed, and though Adam's first sin was completely de- 
termined, it is still true that God only permits sin, doing 
nothing positive to produce it. Finally, we had the doctrine 
oyour personal identity with Adam in his first sin,- a 
doctrine developed because Edwards recoiled at the imputa- 
tion of the moral state and desert of one individual to an- 
other. These five positions showed him making special ef- 
forts all along the line to strengthen the ethical founda- 
tions of Calvinism.
That Edwards failed in this attempt we have seen. 
Strive as he might, he could not present a thoroughgoing sys- 
tem of theological determinism which would not impugn the 
character of God and destroy the moral agency of man. No- 
where do we see better than in Edwards, who recognized the 
legitimacy of the ethical challenge to Calvinism, the impos- 
sibility of reconciling the latter with the demands of 
morality. For nowhere has a more able effort been made than 
we find in Edwards. His failure attests the fact that Cal- 
vinism is strongest when purest, that is to say, when it 
doestaot attempt to make its peace with ethics, but insists 
upon the conception of sovereignty as an ultimate truth, 
which needs no defense, and which reason has neither the 
ability nor the right to call into question.
The fact that Edwards failed to show theological de- 
terminism tenable on moral grounds is no more significant 
than the fact that he made the attempt. The history of the 
New England Theology would have been far different had he
351
done otherwise. As it was, he became the "Father of the New 
England Theology" in both of its two main divisions,- this 
must be admitted in spite of the indignant denial of it by 
some of Edwards 1 Calvinistic defenders. The old-line Cal- 
vinists could claim him as their master because of his fidel- 
ity to the doctrine of sovereignty in all its deterministic 
implications. But the left wing of New England thought, 
which continued the ethical attack on Calvinism and subse- 
quently bore fruit in Universalism and Unitarianism, could 
also claim his authority. It could point not only to his 
insistence upon the necessity of showing Calvinism to be 
moral, but also to the positions he took in order to accom- 
plish this, which v/e have already mentioned. Even Professor 
Hodge of Princeton, who strenuously insisted that Edwards 
was a defender of the "old Calvinism" against the "New 
Divinity", admitted that in his theory of identity and 
mediate imputation, he deviated from the straight and narrow
Calvinism, and that the influence of his theory re- 
sulted in an attenuation of Calvinism among his followers. 
It can thus truly be said that Edwards was as much the fore- 
father of New England Unitarianism as he was the defender of 
the "standard Calvinism".
As we seek to make a constructive statement upon the 
doctrines we have been studying, we are indebted to Edwards 
for showing convincingly that, if we yield allegiance to
1 Charles Hodge, in fhefeiblical Repertory and Princeton
Review, October 1858, p. 614ff.
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ethical considerations, we must dispense with theological 
determinism. For his failure to produce a moral justifi- 
cation of Calvinism was due, not to any incapacity on his 
part, but to the fact that he was attemtping the impossible*
PART III 
TOWARD AN ADEQUATE THEORY
CHAPTER XI 
THE FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS
We have completed our study of determinism in the 
theology of Edwards, and have found it in important respects 
an untenable theory. Our task is to undertake a solution of 
the problems raised. It will be helpful, as we begin the 
task, to clarify the situation by attempting to ascertain 
what are the criteria of an adequate theory of the relation- 
ship of the divine, to the human will. It is of course es- 
sential that any satisfactory theory should be self-consis- 
tent, that it should be framed in the light of recent 
scientific and philosophic thought, and that all relevant 
data should be taken into account. However, the chief cri- 
teria to guide us are the great truths which have been 
fought over in the long struggle between freedom and deter- 
minism in theological/thought, and which we find testified 
to in the Bible,- truths which carry with them great values 
for the religious consciousness. No theory can be satisfac- 
tory which doe^not do justice to them. Let/us ask, then, 
what these truths are.
I. The Sovereignty of God
The first we shall mention is the sovereignty of God. 
This is the truth which has been the watchword of determinism
355
in its theological form. We find it presented in unsystem- 
atic fashion and non-technical language in Scripture. It is 
one of the essential truths of Christianity, and includes 
supreme values for the religious consciousness. If we 
analyze more exactly the meaning of the conception, we find 
that there are three senses in which it is held, and valued, 
by the Christian.
(1) The divine sovereignty in the sense in which it 
comes homes closest to the Christian means God's independence 
in the exercise of His saving grace. The Christian feels 
that in His soteriological activity God is not constrained, 
nor obligated by anything in man. He is convinced that 
there is no way in which man can merit salvation, and that 
but for the fact that God in His grace enters human life, 
there would be no possibility of man's exercising saving 
faith. God, of His own accord, takes the initiative in sal- 
vation. As Paul expressed it: "For by grace have ye been 
savedfthrough faith; and that not of yourselves, it is the 
gift of God." 1 This New Testament conception of salvation 
by grace alone became the "material principle" of the Reform- 
ation, and must be upheld today as of the very essence of
Christianity.
(2) A second meaning which the conception of the 
divine sovereignty bears for the Christian is that God is in 
absolute control of His world. It is assumed that His crea- 
tion and preservation of the world is inspired by a purpose,
Ephesians 2.8.
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and the fact of His sovereignty is the guarantee that His 
purpose is being, and will be realized. There is no power 
external to God which can frustrate His pians. It is the 
conception of sovereignty in this sense which the doctrine of 
providence is designed to express. That this conviction is 
an essential of the Christian theistic faith need not be de- 
bated.
(3) We may take the idea of sovereignty, in the third 
place, as meaning that God is the being to whom omnipotence 
is to be attributed. This is the most abstract of the mean- 
ings we have distinguished, and draws most of/its positive 
content from the ic'ea/of God as the absolute Governor- of His 
vorld. Indeed these two ideas are correlative, each is es- 
sential to, and implies the other. They may, in fact, be 
thought of as only the two aspects of one idea. Yet they can 
be distinguished in thought, and for the purpose of clarity 
we shall treat them selarately.
II. The Character of God
The second of the great truths which must be upheld by 
any satisfactory theory of the relation between the divine, 
and the human will is|that the highest moral attributes at- 
tach to the character o^God. It was in the name of God's 
holy nature that Arminianism launched many of its attacks on 
the deterministic system. Yet the perfection of God's char- 
acter is not, of course, to be thought of as a partisan con- 
ception any more than His sovereignty. It isjfreely admitted 
by determinists, although some of their positiondhave seemed
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to contradict it. 77e do not need then to defend, but only 
to point out the necessity of upholding God's justice, love, 
and mercy as we undertake a constructive statement upon the 
problems before us.
III. The Moral Agency of Man
The third of the great truths is the reality of man's 
moral agency. Th ̂(importance of upholding this fact like- 
wise needsJnot to be proved,- it is axiomatic for the 
Christian that man must be portrayed by theology as a 
morally responsible creature. We have seen that both Ed- 
wards and the Arminians made desperate efforts to do this, 
which, while failing in both instances, nevertheless testi- 
fied to their estimate of its importance.
God's character and man's moral agency are usually 
defended together against the supposed implications of His 
sovereignty, but it must not on this account be supposed 
that an adequate defense of one will suffice for the other. 
While they are closely related, they are nevertheless dis- 
tinct, and must be individually established. The Arminians 
succeeded fairly well in upholding the character of God, 
but we have already seen that this success did not extend 
to their defense of moral agency. In fact it might be 
argued that the determinist has/done more to establish the 
moral agency of man than the libertarian. In view of these 
things it is clear that we must regard the fact of man's 
moral agency independently as one of the great truths to 
be upheld in our constructive statement.
        *    
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Our criteria for an adequate theory are now clear. TYe 
must attempt to develop a theory which is tenable in the 
light of modern science and philosophy, and which at the same 
time supports the three essential truths of Christian theism 
we have delineated. The fundamental problem is still the 
same that it has been for theology through the ages, namely, 
the problem of reconciling the fact of the divine sovereign- 
ty, with the facts of the perfection of the divine character 
and the reality of man's moral nature. The whole debate has 
been the result of the fact that one group has upheld God's 
sovereignty at the expense of His character and man's moral 
agency,- as we have seen to be the case with Edwards,- while 
the other group has sacrificed His sovereignty in the effort 
to defend His character and to portray man as morally 
responsible. Each group has always verbally affirmed, but 
too often constructively denied, the truths supported by the 
other. Nevertheless, since all three truths are affirmed 
as essential even by the contending parties, they must be 
regarded as ultimately reconcilable.
CHAPTER XII 
THE PURPOSES AND DECREES OF SOD
•In developing a constructive statement it appears best 
to approach the various doctrines to come before us in the 
fcrder in which we have treated them in our exposition of Ed- 
wards. We begin, therefore, with the decrees of God, at- 
tempting to formulate a theory in the light of the criteria 
which we have recognized.
I. The Nature of God's Purposes and Decrees 
It is an axiom of Christian theism that God is motivat- 
ed by certain external purposes in the creation and govern- 
ment of the world. It is also axiomatic that He is no "deus 
ex machina" but that He is active in His world with a view 
to the realization of these ends. To grant this much is to 
grant that certain things come to pass as a result of what, 
to use the traditional term, ^T e may call God's decrees. We 
can define a divine decree ag God's predetermination of cer- 
tain events with a view to effectuating His purposes. It is 
important that the decrees be distinguished from God's pur- 
poses. Every decree is inspired by a purpose, but it does 
not therefore follow that every end God has in view is the 
immediate object of a special decree. While none of His
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purposes could be realized apart from His predetermining 
activity, it is possible that the achievement of a certain 
purpose may be conditioned also upon events which are not 
decreed.
Prom the teaching of Jesus and the New Testament as a 
whole it seems clear that God's fundamental purpose in regard 
to mankind is the enjoyment of fellowship with creatures 
made "in His image", and fit for fellowship with Him. It 
does not appear to be in harmony with the spirit of the New 
Testament to say that His creation of man and all His soter- 
iological activity is due to His "mere gooc^leasure". Nor 
does it sound quite like Jesus to say that God is motivated 
in saving certain men purely by the self-regarding desire of 
glorifying His attributes of goodness and mercy,- if indeed 
such an idea is self-consistent,- nor to say that He damns 
certain other men merly that His vindictive justice may be 
given a display. The loving Father-God whom Jesus revealed 
is a God who creates, and preserves, and suffers for His chil- 
dren, that He might have fellowship with them. To take this 
view is'not to insinuate that God is insufficient in Himself 
without His creatures, nor to imply that He makes Himself 
only a^means to the creature's happiness. It in no wise im- 
pairs His sovereignty, for He is as free and independent in 
framing His purpose of fellowship with man as He could be in 
determining to glorify Himself.
Pursuant to this fundamental purpose God creates man a 
moral agent. Only a being with the ability to appreciate 
right and wrong and act from maral inducements can develop a
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character fit for fellowship with a holy God, or be capable 
of a genuine, morally significant love to God. But moral 
agency in the full sense involves more than the ability to 
distinguish ra>gh$ and wrong, and be appealed to by moral 
considerations,- it involves also, as we have seen, genuine 
freedom as the basis of moral responsibility. The necessity 
of freedom becomes all the more apparent when we approach the 
matter from the standpoint of God's desire for fellowship 
with man. Man must be capable of doing wrong in preference 
to right, of choosing sin in preference to Christ, of loving 
self before God, if he is to be capable of meaningful and 
worthful fellowship with His Maker.
It may be well to pause here and take note of an argu- 
ment, which has been brought forward, to the effect that a 
created will cannot be creative, that is, possess the power, 
of contrary choice. This is an entirely distinct attack on 
the conception of a spontaneous choice from any we have con- 
sidered up to this point. It doesfoot assert that spontaneity 
does not exist, but rather that it could not even come into 
being. It iafoot possible for God to endow a creature with the 
power of alternative choice,- this is the position. Now if 
we examine this reasoning it will reveal itself as a begging 
of the question, or nerhaps more accurately, as a mere contra- 
diction of the opposing position. What it asserts is simply 
that when God creates a will, He must create it as a deter- 
mined will.
The argument is based on the assumption that man, who 
is himself the result of the divine creative act, cannot
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therefore possess a creative capacity. When God acts in 
creation, a train of transeunt causation is "begun and this 
cannot be interrupted. That is to say, we are not able to 
explain how this is possible. And this is quite true,- to 
be able to set forth just how God could endow a creature 
with freedom is beyond us. But this hardly constitutes a 
cogent argument against freedom, for the creation of anything 
is a mystery to us. Our inability to analyze the process is 
no refutation of the fact of creation, even when it is the 
creation of a free being. We need not therefore hesitate to 
recognize God's power to endow man with freedom of choice.
It will follow from the fact of man's power of contrary 
choice that God does not decree all things that come to pass. 
Those acts of man falling within the sphere of his own moral 
responsibility are by that very fact referable, not to God's 
decree, but to man's own will alone. Thisjneans that God does 
not decree sin, nor the rejection o^Christ; and therefore, 
that He does not unconditionally decree the reprobation of 
any individual. Similarly, He does not decree men's good 
acts, nor the acceptance of Christ, nor, it follows, the un- 
conditional salvation of any individual. In view of this, 
we cannot say that the realization of God's fundamental pur- 
pose with regard to man is directly decreed by Him. All His 
decrees, except that involving the punishment of those who 
reject Him, are indirectly designed to bring about that pur- 
pose, but it is not/unconditionally decreed that any should 
have the perfect fellowship with Him, which is His chief 
end in the world. The achievement of God's fundamental
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purpose even partially is conditional.- it depends upon man's 
use of his freedom.
On the other hand, most events are decreed. It is 
part and parcel of theism that God has decreed the course of 
nature, although natural science at the present time is at a 
loss to explain, in accordance with its law of cause and ef- 
fect, just why small scale phenomena occur as they do. The 
only exceptions to God's predetermination of natural events 
are those events expressive of free volitions, but even 
these are largely conditioned by the antecedent physical 
process. Not only does God decree the course of nature, but 
He decrees a large percentage of human actions. Even the 
most insistent indeterminist will admit today that the major- 
ity of a man's acts are determined. Some of these may not be 
decreed, because they may result from characteristics which 
in turn have been produced by free volitions. But there 
remains & large number of/acts, such as those due to in- 
stinct, fixed habit, etc., which can be traced in the final 
analysis to the predetermining activity of God. In addition 
to this, God decrees the connection between all volitions 
and their consequences, both in the natural, and in the moral 
and spiritual worlds. This is not to say that He uncondition- 
ally decrees the consequences of free volitions themselves,- 
they are not decreed, because the volitions are not decreed. 
He is responsible for the results of free volitions only to 
this extent, that He has made it certain that the results 
will follow, provided the volitions take place. Now we may 
use the term -oredestination to designate God's decrees with
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respect to the actions, and the final destiny of man. In- 
cluded in His total predestinating activity are two all- 
important decrees, to the consideration of which we now turn.
The first of these is the decree of election. In view 
of the fact that God's fundamental purpose is to enjoy the 
fellowship of His creatures, we can legitimately infer that 
it is His desire that no one of them should fail of that 
fellowship. But since He is a perfectly holy being, He can 
have fellowship only with a being who is morally fit for it; 
and since fellowship is a reciprocal relationship, the crea- 
ture musyfurther show his desire for fellowship in a real 
love for God. These are the indispensable prerequisites of 
fellowship with God, and are fulfilled only when the indi- 
vidual becomes rightly related to Jesus Christ. If men were 
not possessed of the freedom necessary to moral responsibil- 
ity, God might guarantee the satisfaction of His desire to 
share His presence eternally with all His creatures simply by 
decreeing that all men should fulfil the conditions requi- 
site to fellowship with Him. But in view o^man's freedom, 
He issues a decree of election which takes the form of a 
predestination to everlasting life of those who freely ac- 
cept Christ. No individual is unconditionally elected to 
the divine fellowship, but at the same time no one isiincon- 
ditionally excluded from it. The decree applies not to in- 
dividuals, but to a class, to all who render themselves elig- 
ible for eternal life.
The second of the decrees is that of reprobation. The 
freedom to meet, with God f s help, the conditions of fellowship
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with Him implies the freedom to reject those conditions. 
Those who persistently refuse to fulfil them are, by God's 
decree, excluded from His fellowship. For lack of a better 
term, and for the sake of continuity with the traditional 
usage, we may speak of this decree as the/decree of reproba- 
tion. As we hare just seen, no individual is arbitrarily 
punished with separation from God, the truth being that those 
who come to it do so against God's desire and fundamental 
purpose. He appoints no individual to punishment; He merely 
decrees the connection between wilful rejection of Him and 
the legitimate consequences of that rejection. It cannot be 
too strongly emphasized that there is nothing in God to make 
the reprobation of any individual an inevitability. Quite 
true, the punishment of those who reject Him takes place in 
accordance with God's justice, but this is far different from 
saying that the damnation of a certain number of individuals 
is/unconditionally demanded by God's justice as a means to 
its "shining forth". Further, the position here taken does 
not make the divine justice an inscrutable thing: there is no 
arbitrary discrimination between persons, irrespective of 
their moral and spiritual condition, nor is any individual 
punished for sins he could not avoid. There is nothing in 
God's dealings with men, as these dealings have been repre- 
sented above, which could not be vindicated at the bar of
Christian ethics.
The position here taken with regard to the decree of 
reprobation involves the assumption that God's nature being 
what it is, He must punish those who r>ersistently reject Him.
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This is in keeping with Christian theology, and, as Profes- 
sor A. E. Taylor reminds us, is demanded by an ethical atti- 
tude toward sin. That the punishment consists essentially 
infseparation from God is also in accordance with Christian 
teaching. This is the most serious punishment that can be 
meted out to the sinner, yet it is the natural and legiti- 
mate outcome of his conduct. To the question whether any 
individuals are doomed to eternal punishment, we are of 
course not able to return a positive answer, but the settle- 
ment of this point is manifestly not germane to ourpresent 
purposes.
The theory we have advanced may be called a doctrine 
of limited decrees, in distinction from the deterministic 
position that all events, inclusive of all human volitions, 
are foreordained by God. On the other hand, it is not a 
doctrine of conditional decrees. The course of nature which 
God has decreed, and the large number of human actions He has 
predestined, are contingent upon nothing. Likewise the con- 
nections between all volitions and their consequences, in- 
cluding the relationships established in the decrees of 
election and reprobation, according to which faith and its 
opposite receive their due rewards,are of the most absolute 
nature. It might be said that, relative to the individual, 
the decrees of election and reprobation are conditional; but 
this is to speak loosely, for what is conditional is the ap- 
plicability of the decrees to him, not whether, given a cer- 
tain attitude on his part, the decreed consequences of that 
attitude will follow. In this connection it is important to
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bear in Kind the distinction between God's fundamental pur- 
pose and His decrees. As we have seen, the realization of 
that purpose ijs conditional, owing to its dependence upon 
man's use of his freedom, but the connections between faith
>»
and reward and persistent sin and punishment, established 
respectively in the decrees of election and reprobation, are 
absolute, and hold, whatever the conduct of the creature. The 
decree of election would hold, although all men should reject 
Christ, and similarly, that of reprobation would be unaffect- 
ed, even though all should accept Him.
In our employment of the traditional terms, predestina- 
tion, election, and reprobation, it is obvious that we are 
giving them a somewhat different content from that they carry 
in the deterministic system. These terms are not essential 
to the expression oyou-r position, and it might be argued 
that it were better to omit them because of the deterministic 
associations. But the terms, we may reply, bear clear and 
definite meanings as they are useci Moreover, two of them, 
predestination and election, have the advantage of being 
Scriptural, and, as we have seen, are not necessarily used 
there in a thoroughgoing deterministic sense. On the whole, 
then, there is no reason for foregoing the use of terms to 
which the determinist cannot rightfully claim the exclusive
title.
The position we have adopted will enable us to avoid 
those/objections which are fatal to a doctrine of absolute, 
universal decrees, First of all, it enables us to free God 
from the authorship of sin. Sin is the result of free acts
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of which God is not the efficient cause, and so far as His 
decrees are concerned, the good was as possible as the evil, 
and sin might not have come into existence at all. Thanks 
to this fact, we are not faced with the dilemma of regarding 
God as either wicked or impotent. The moral evil in the world 
comes, not by God's decree, but "by His permission.
The question may of course "be raised whether, although 
we are able to free God from the charge of direct complicity 
in sin, He is^iot to be held guilty for the permission of/it. 
For to say that God permits sin only is not to free Him from 
the ultimate responsibility for its existence,seeing that He 
created the world with the existence of sin as a distinct 
possibility. If, as we shall try to show, God foresaw the 
sin He was to permit, His responsibility, it might be argued, 
is even as great as it is on the deterministic view. The 
question, then, isWt without its difficulty, but it must 
be emphasized that it is a question which confronts all the- 
istic thinkers, and not merely those who attribute freedom 
to man. Now since God's ultimate responsibility for the ex- 
istence of sin cannot be denied, we can meet the difficulty 
only by showing that He is justified in its permission. This 
the determinist is utterly unable to do. Even i^ne were able 
to show that, according to his tenets, God does not actually 
produce, but only permits, sin, he cannot show a sufficient 
reason for this permission. For, according to determinism, 
God might as easily as not have created man morally respon- 
sible, while at the same time decreeing that he should do no 
evil. To explain why He did not follow this manifestly wise
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and good course the determinist is forced to choose between 
saying that He permitted sin out of His "mere good pleasure", 
which is to confess ignorance, and saying that He permitted 
it in order to glorify His justice, which is morally revolt- 
ing. On the other hand, from the point of view of the theory 
we are supporting, God's permission of sin is perfectly in- 
telligible and justifiable. God wanted man to have fellow- 
ship with Him, and to this end man must be morally responsi- 
ble; but moral responsibility implies freedom, and freedom 
implies the possibility of sin. Here is the reasoning in a 
nutshell,- the achievement of God's purpose necessitated His 
creating man with the power of choosing the evil. This rea- 
soning will hold even if God, in creating man, foresaw man's 
sin, and in fact is greatly strengthened if we grant this 
foresight, for we can be sure He would not have brought man 
into being, had He foreseen that His purpose with regard to 
hi:n would not be realized. The divine foreknowledge enables 
us to say that God permits sin, not merely in the hpjDe, but 
in the certainty of achieving His purpose.
A second advantage of the theory we have advanced lies 
in the fact that it does not represent God as arbitrarily 
electing certain individuals to salvation, while others are 
singled out for punishment. God wants all to be of the elect, 
and it is left to the individual to determine whether he will 
be or not. This freeing of God from the stigma of an arbi- 
trary election and from the authorship of sin means that the 
theory we have presented is in harmony with belief in the 
perfection of God's character,and thus that it is to this
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extent true to the criteria we have selected. It is also, 
as far as it goes, consistent with the reality of moral 
agency, for it attributes to man the power of contrary choice
II. Limited Decrees and the Sovereignty of God 
If, however, our doctrine of limited decrees, and of 
the conditional character of God's fundamental purpose, 
enables us to avoid some of the gravest objections to the 
deterministic point of view, it may yet be felt that we en- 
counter an equally serious difficulty in connection with the 
sovereignty of God. For to the/determinist, givirg up the 
thoroughgoing deterministic position is tantamount to deny- 
ing divine sovereignty. We must, therefore, askwhether the 
position we have been taking is compatible with this great 
religious truth, which weriave seen the necessity of pre- 
serving.
Let us/proceed by examining the implications o#bur 
position for the conception of sovereignty in each of the 
three senses we have seen it to bear. First, then, the ques- 
tion ariseswhether we have been true to the fact of God's 
freedom in the bestowal of salvation. This will be more 
fully discussed later, when .we are dealing with the doctrine 
of grace. It should be said here, however, that man's free- 
dom to exercise faith is not, according to our theory, free- 
dom to perform a meritorious act which obligates God. Faith 
is simply the acceptance of God's gift of salvation, end 
involves the acknowledgment of the individual's unworthi-
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ness to receive it, as far as his own desert is concerned, 
mien, upon the exercise of faith, God rewards the creature 
with His fellowship, He is simply doing what He has sover- 
eignly predetermined to do upon such an occasion.
In the second place, let us consider the bearing of 
our theory on the conception of God's sovereignty in the 
sense of His control of the world for the realization of His 
purpose. Can God be sovereign in this sense if His decrees 
are limited, and His fundamental purpose conditional, or does 
the successful control of the world imply determinism? Now 
it would seem to be plain that controlling or directing is 
not universally synonymous with determining, and that under 
certain circumstances God might secure His desired end in 
the world without being the efficient cause of all that takes 
place. Determinism is not unambiguously implied by the idea 
of a divine providence which secures God's purpose in the 
world.; and we shall contend that God's control is entirely 
consistent with the theory we have advocated, which ascribes 
man a measure of freedom, and thus makes God's purpose in 
one sense conditional. But it must be emphasized that this 
consistency can be established only if we grant God the fore- 
knowledge of contingent events. We have seen in our criti- 
cism of Edwards' argument from foreknowledge that there is 
no adequate ground for denying God's prescience of the fut- 
ure free acts of men, and that "the certain knowledge of the 
Almighty of what will be done freely, neither abirdges the 
liberty of the agent, nor changes the contingency of the
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event." We saw, further, that to deny Him such foreknowl- 
edge is in fact to place Him in time. We must now insist 
upon the ascription of this power to God as essential if, 
on our theory, we are to uphold His omnipotence.
Perhaps^we can "best show the necessity of this posi- 
tion, and the way in which foreknowledge guarantees the suc- 
cess of God's fundamental purpose, "by a criticism of the 
pluralistic theory, which ascribes freedom to man and at the 
same time denies God the foresight of man's free acts. Ac- 
cording to the pluralist, and to certain theistic thinkers, 
such as George Galloway and Martineau, God, being unable to 
foresee contingent events, is aware only of the various pos- 
sibilities which the future holds. This, however, is regard- 
ed by them as quite sufficient. The following quotation 
from Martineau gives a clear statement of the position: "Be- 
yond this (i.e., the domain of physical nature), in the world 
of intelligences, a margin of freedom being allowed, the 
lines of possibility are not rectilinear, but divergent, and
open a way into innumerable hypothetical fields, among which,
«
as yet indivisible, lies the actual. In the outlook upon this 
realm which embraces the future, what is needed, in order 
that the intending causality of God, and His moral government, 
may secure their ends and shape their means? Simply that no 
one of the open possibilities should remain in the dark and 
psss unreckoned; and that they should all, in their working 
out, be compatible with the ruling purposes of God, not de-
XW. A. Copinger, A Treatise on Predestination, Election, and
Grace, p. 122.
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feating the aim, Taut only varying the track. An infinite 
mind, with prevision thus extended beyond all that is to 
all that can be, is lifted above surprise or disappointment, 
and able to provide for all events and combinations." 2 
Ward, in his Realm o£ Ends, refers approvingly to this pas- 
sage as a sufficient reconciliation of pluralism with fore- 
knowledge, a reconciliation he admits to be necessary.
Now the feature which makes this a thoroughly unsatis- 
factory position is that one of the possibilities is the 
frustration of God's basic purpose for man by man's misuse 
of his freedom. If man is free to choose the evil, we can- 
not then speak of the future possibilities as being all 
"compatible with the ruling purposes of God", only variations 
of the track toward their fulfilment. Galloway holds that 
there is no danger of the failure of God's purpose, owing to 
the fact that "the consequences of human volition in the 
world of existences are constantly conditioned by the wider 
activity of God." 3 "This constant conditioning activity of 
God", he goes on to say, "renders the ultimate frustration 
of the Divine Purpose impossible." But as long as man is 
granted freedom of choice between the goo^and the evil, no 
amount of "conditioning activity" can obviate the fact that 
he may choose the evil. The frustration of God's purpose 
remains a possibility unless the "conditioning activity" is 
such that the real power of contrary choice between the good
2James Martineau, A Study of Religion, Vol. II, Bk.3, p.279. 
3 George Galloway, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 490. 
4 ibid, p. 490.
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and the evil is taken away.
This is made very evident by an illustration used by 
William James, designed to show how a God, without foreknowl- 
edge of free acts, may yet be sure of reaching His objective. 
"Suppose", says James, "two men before a chessboard  the one 
a novice, the other an expert player of the game. The ex- 
pert intends to beat. But he cannot foresee exactly what any 
one move of his adversary may be. He knows, however, all the 
possible moves of the latter; and he knows in advance how to 
meet each of them by a move of his own which leads in the 
direction of victory. And the victory infallibly arrives,
after no matter how devious a course, in the one predestined
v 5
form of check-mate to the notice's king." The flaw in this
analogy is that the game is won only when the novice's free- 
dom to make further moves is taken from him. According to 
the analogy God will ultimately accomplish His purpose, if 
men persist in choosing wrongly, by progressively depriving 
them of their freedom, until they finally discover themselves 
to be "check-mated", all freedom being gone. That is to say, 
as long as the divine foresight of free acts is denied, we 
must either deny the power of contrary choice to man or the 
certainty of the fulfilment of the divine purpose.
I1 .C.S.Schiller, who, like James, rejects complete pre- 
destination and likewise divine foresight of contingent events, 
is more ready to accept the consequences. "Indeterminism", 
he,says, "even when it has been tamed, i.e., limited, and ren-
James, The Will to Believe and Other Essays in 
Popular Philosophy, p. 181.
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dered calculable and determinate, still means chance, and 
chance means risk, and risk the possibility of failure." 6 We 
need not agree that all types of indeterminism mean chance, 
but we can see that to attribute to man real freedom, and to 
deny God the foresight of his acts, is to jeopardize the 
realization of His purpose in the world, and thus to render 
His providential control uncertain. It is to rob us of full 
confidence in God's control of the world; and the simple 
fact that God, knowing all the future possibilities, knows 
thereby the possibility of His failure, does not restore that 
confidence, what the religious heart wants is the faith that 
somehow good will prevail, not simply the assurance that, 
should the day be won by the forces of evil, God would be 
"lifted above surprise or disappointment." The trusting soul 
wants to believe that such an outcome will certainly not take 
place, and nothing less than faith in a sovereign who offers 
this assurance will meet his needs.
Now, granting real freedom to the creature, such assur- 
ance can be given only by a sovereign whose knowledge is un- 
limited. With God possessing certain knowledge of the future, 
we can be sure that the outcome will be in accordance with 
His purpose, for we can be sure, as we have said above, that 
a wise and good God would not have created a world in which 
His purpose was subject even to possible defeat. God's wis- 
dom and goodness, coupled with His prevision, are a suffi- 
cient guarantee of the fact that things will work out in such
6P. C. S. Schiller, Studies in Humanism, p. 418.
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a way as to accomplish His aim, even though this is con- 
ditioned upon man's exercise of faith. Ho "conditioning 
activity 11 of God is necessary to render inevitable the vic- 
tory of His purpose. Man is free to choose between real al- 
ternatives, free to choose evil if he wills, but nevertheless 
it is certain that God will emerge the conqueror. The ful- 
filment of His purpose is conditional in the sense that its 
accomplishment depends on the free choices of man, but it is 
not conditional in the sense that its achievement is uncer- 
tain. That it will be secured is as certain as determinism 
can make it, yet the certainty is not bought at the prohib- 
itive price determinism must pay for it.
A word of explanation should be added regarding our 
meaning in saying that God's purpose will be realized. We do 
not, of course, mean that all His purposes with regard to 
each individual will come to pass. We cannot accept the de- 
terministic theory of providence, according to which all 
things, both good and evil, come about through God's will. 
The existence of sin is a frustration of some of His purposes; 
nor is this a fact to be reluctantly admitted, but rather a 
precious truth to those who are jealous of God's character. 
What we/io mean is that God's fundamental purpose will be 
realized; God 'till have creatures for fellowship with Him- 
self. His purpose from the standpoint of the race as a whole 
will be achieved. To discuss the question of how many in- 
dividuals would have to be saved for this purpose to be ful- 
filled would manifestly be absurd. And it is of course be- 
yond us to suggest what proportion of men actually will at-
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tain the goal of perfect fellowship vrith God. It is entire- 
ly possible that there will ultimately he a universal salva- 
tion, but we cainot go further than to suggest the possibil- 
ity of this. What we can say is that a sufficient number of 
individuals will attain to fellowship with God to make the 
cost in moral and spiritual tragedy worthwhile. And if we 
can say this with certainty,then we can say that the world 
!£ providentially ordered, that God is indeed in control, 
and His sovereign purpose even now being brought to pass.
Let us now examine the bearing of our position on the 
ascription of omnipotence to God. We have seen that there 
is no conflict between our theory and the conception of sov- 
ereignty in the sense of God*s freedom in salvation, or as 
meaning that God's control of the world guarantees the reali- 
zation of His purpose. If the fact that God's decrees are 
limited, and His fundamental purpose conditional, is also in 
harmony with our regarding Him as omnipotent, it will follow 
that the theory we have advanced upholds the doctrine of sov- 
ereignty.
To proceed, then, we cannot deduce from the notion of 
an omnipotent God the conclusion that He must be the efficient 
cause of everything. There is no reason why omnipotence 
would no longer be omnipotence, if it voluntarily delegated 
to finite spirits the power of causation in a limited sphere. 
Omnipotence implies simply that there is nothing extrinsic 
to God which forces from Him this delegation of the power of 
contrary choice or trammels His will in any way. And it has
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been forcefully argued that it would be a more serious limi- 
tation upon His sovereignty to deny Him the power of creating 
free finite spirits than to ascribe it to Him. The fact 
that God has voluntarily/delegated freedom to man implies c-,lso 
that He has voluntarily made the accomplishment of His funda- 
mental purpose conditional, its conditional character,there- 
fore, implies no limitation in Him, and is in keeping with 
His attribute of omnipotence.
But here again we must insist upon God's foreknowledge 
of contingent events as essential, for to deny it, while at- 
tributing freedom to the creature, would be to limit the 
divine power. We have said that the delegation of freedom 
to man is not inconsistent with God's omnipotence, so long 
as it is voluntary. By a parallel line of reasoning it 
might seem that to give up His foreknowledge of those acts 
whose foredetermination He has relinquished would be com- 
patible with His omniscience, and certainly no limitation 
upon His power. This would indeed be true but for the fact 
that the limitation of His foreknowledge could not be volun- 
tary. Martineau speaks of it as a "self-limitation", but 
this language is misleading. God limits His power voluntari- 
ly when He endows the creature with freedom; but there is 
no reason for a voluntary limitation of His knowledge. If we 
grant freedom to the creature, and on this ground deny God 
the foreknowledge of his free acts, the only reason for this 
limitation is the position taken by Edwards, that God is 
under the necessity of knowing future events by inference. 
that is to say, that God is in time. Now if God's knowledge
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is limited for this reason, it is not a voluntary limitation, 
"but a necessary limitation imposed upon God by factors ex- 
trinsic to Himself. God, so the reasoning goes, in order to 
delegate freedom to the creature, is forced to surrender 
foreknowledge of the creature's free acts. This is expressly 
to deny His omnipotence, and thereby to forfeit the truth of 
His sovereignty. It is to substitute for the infinite and 
transcendent God of theism, for whom Earth is rightly contend- 
ing today, the finite God of pluralism. Thus if, on our 
theory, which acknowledges freedom to the creature, we are to 
maintain the sovereignty of God, we must be prepared to 
grant Him foreknowledge of contingent events.
It might be added that, even on the deterministic the- 
ory, the possibility of God's knowing the future directly, 
and not on the basis of His decrees, must be granted if He is 
to be thought of as an infinite and transcendent being. For 
even if God determines all events, He is yet, on the theory 
that He knows the future only by inference, in time, and 
therefore not the God of theism. In fact it would even seem 
to follow from a position like that of Edwards 1 , that God 
does not determine all things, and is therefore not omnipo- 
tent, since the necessity of His inferring the future must 
be due to external factors.
CHAPTER XIII 
THE FREEDOM OF MAN
We come now to the problem of the will, our task being 
to develop a theory which will accord with the conditions of 
genuine moral agency. We have already made considerable 
progress toward this goal in the discovery that determinism 
in any form is untenable, on the ground of its denial of al- 
ternative choice. On the other hand, Edwards has revealed 
to us, through his criticism of Arminianism, the impossibil- 
ity of a libertarian theory. Our cardinal problem will be 
to defend the attribution to man of a power of contrary 
choice with.tut falling into the libertarian position.
I. The Error in the Method of Determinism 
Perhaps the best approach to a true theory will be to 
ask ourselves where the determinist has missed the way. 
What is the error which has led him into his untenable posi- 
tion? To answer summarily, it is the fact that he begins 
his study with an initial supposition which precludes an im- 
partial investigation. He approaches the study of volition 
with the assumption that in all its manifestations it can be 
completely explained by the methods of empirical science. All 
volition, that is to say, is an empirical phenomenon, and as
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such is simply a case of the operation of the causal law as 
science states it,- the law that every event must have a 
preceding cause, and that a cause can produce only one ef- 
fect. Volition, it is assumed, can "be analyzed, and its 
component parts exhibited as links in a causal chain. The 
question whether there may be a subjective, or noumenal, 
factor in volition,- a factor which resists empirical 
analysis,- is not raised. Ward has clearly stated the nat- 
ure of the deterministic procedure. "In the first piace, 
determinism and sensationalism alike, in common with all 
naturalistic thinking, set out from the objective standpoint, 
as if it were absolute. The subjective factor in all exper- 
ience, which the naturalraciences can safely ignore, can, 
they assume, be ignored by the moral and historical sciences 
too." The determinist never gets back of this initial as- 
sumption. Instead of asking, first of all, ?/hat is here? he 
begins rith the certainty that,whatever it is, its nature 
is amenable to analysis.
It is evident that such a procedure amounts to a pre- 
judgment of the case. If all volition can be accounted for 
by the method of empirical science, then the determinist is 
committed to his deterministic conclusion by his initial as- 
sumption. He will see only those elements in the willing 
process which can be empirically cognized. The very existence 
of other non-phenomenal, subjective elements is denied with- 
out investigation, by this assumption. The study of volition
1James Ward, The Realm of Ends, p. 290.
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for him becomes simply the analysis of the process in terms 
of the law, 'like cause like effect'. His task is simply to 
exhibit the act as determined by the strongest motive, which 
in turn is caused by the agent's character in its relation 
to the environment.
This fallacy in the deterministic approach has been 
somewhat differently expressed by Bergson by means of the dis- 
tinction between the abstract, spatialized conception of time 
used by science, and real duration. To picture volition as a 
purely phenomenal event and seek completely to analyze it is 
to abstract it from the real duration in which it actually 
takes place, and represent it as taking r>iace in the homogen- 
eous medium, which is the scientific symbol of time. Volition 
represented in this fashion is a static thing, consisting of 
parts external to one another. This is indeed the way voli- 
tion appears in retrospect, but its living, dynamic nature is 
experienced only in the present. To represent the willing 
process in spatialized time, to view it in retrospect, is, in- 
evitably, to regard it as determined. To quote Bergson: "For 
we can analyze a thing, but not a process; we can "bre^k up 
extensity, but not duration. Or, if we persist in analyzing 
it, we unconsciously transform the process into a thing and 
duration into extensity. By the very fact of breaking up con- 
crete time we set out its moments in homogeneous space; in 
place of the doing we put the already done; and, as we have 
begun by, so to speak, stereotyping the activity of the self,
we see spontaneity settle down into inertia and freedom into
n 
necessity."
^Kenri Bergson, Time and Free Will,
pp 219-220.
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Thus the initial assumption of the determinist is such 
that he is excluded from facing the real question at issue 
between him and the proponent of genuine freedom. He is con- 
cerned solely with applying a method which inevitably in- 
volves determinism, without first having asked whether that 
method is applicable to the case in point. His conclusion is 
invulnerable if we do not question his assumption, and in- 
deed the plausibility of his position rests upon a tacit ac- 
ceptance of his fundamental presupposition. The more un- 
conscious that acceptance is, the more logical and inevi- 
table appears the deterministic scheme. Indeed the failure 
to become aware of it is the chief reason why so many think-
w
ers find themselves faced with the dilemma of choosing be- 
tween determinism and chance.
II. The Nature of Free Volitions
Our criticism of the determinist f s procedure should 
warn us against the assumption which defeats him in his 
search for the truth. In order further to free ourselves 
from presuppositions, let us forget temporarily, as far as 
possible, the ethical and theological demands which we have 
recognized to lie upon us in framing a theory of volition. 
If we leave out of account, for the time being, all thought 
of its moral and religious bearings, we may be able to ap- 
proach the development of a theory of volition from a stand- 
point which is relatively independent of the mejor consider- 
ations of this thesis.
In this objective spirit, let us interrogate our voli-
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tional experience in an effort to discover what we can of 
its nature. We are to ask simply what it is that takes 
place in the willing process. This will necessarily mean 
that we are to look at volition, as far as possible, in its 
actual process, and not as it appears after it is past, 
since only thus can we observe its real/nature.
The testimony of our consciousness of our conative ex- 
perience seems to make the answer to our question plain be- 
yond the possibility of error. Volition at least sometimes 
involves a selection between open possibilities. That is to 
say, we are sometimes conscious of choosing one alternative, 
when one or more other alternatives are equally within our 
power to choose. We feel that some of our volitions consist 
not merely in the willing of a certain thing, but in the 
choosing of it, in the full sense of the term. It is im- 
plicit in these volitions that, if we had wished, we might 
have acted otherwise than we did, and we therefore feel our- 
selves responsible for our actions, and praise or condemn 
ourselves for them.
This consciousness of alternative choice is our primary 
experience. When we scrutinize it further, it becomes appar- 
ent that there are two chief implications of the experience, 
namely, that the volition is free, and that it is purposive. 
Let us examine these implications in turn. First, then, 
when we say that a volition is free, we mean that the self 
originates it spontaneously, that the self's efficiency lies 
within itself and is not communicated ab extra, that in will- 
ing it is independent of any previous cause, whether efficient
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or final. Now this is involved in the fact of alternative 
choice. If the self is not a cause to which the description, 
'like cause like effect 1 , applies, but one which can produce
different effects, then the self is/obviously not determinedI - - -" -" '-~~  ~~~
to produce either one or the other. We cannot choose one 
alternative rather than the other unless we are free to do 
so, that is to say, independent of everything antecedent 
which might either prevent, or force, our choosing one alter- 
native. And for the self to be thus independent of preced- 
ing causes is for it to be a spontaneous, creative cause in 
its own right. Thus we affirm on other grounds the existence 
of that freedom we have seen to be implied by our conscious- 
ness of moral responsibility.
This is not to say that our free volitions are un- 
caused events. Ward is right in saying that the admission 
that a volition is in some sense caused "can only be disputed 
by one who is prepared to allow a positive reality to abso- 
lute chance, and to regard praise and blame as entirely
 T
meaningless and out of place." Spontaneous causation is 
not causelessnes^f. And when the applicability to our free 
volitions of the principle of causality, as science formu- 
lates it, is denied, it is not meant to deny the principle 
itself, namely, that every event has a cause. The self in 
itsjfree volitions is the spontaneous cause of its own activ- 
ity. We may go even further and say that a free cause, such 
as we have asserted the self to be, is the only true cause.
James Ward, The Realm of Ends, p. 273.
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For the only true cause is "that which determines an alter- 
native", and thus initiates its own activity. The so-called 
"second causes" of the natural world are not causes in the 
primary sense of the term.
In asserting that some of our volitions are free in 
the sense described, we do not wish to be understood as im- 
plying that this is true of all volitions. On the contrary, 
no advocate of freedom should be unwilling to admit that, as 
we have already recognized, the majority of our volitions are 
determined. Most o^our acts are performed as the result of 
instinct, habit, etc. Many more of them are determined by 
virtue of the fact that our character, in relation to the 
circumstances, excludes the rise of alternatives. Hi/hat we 
are concerned to insist upon is only the fact that some of 
our volitions, those which are morally the most serious., are
free.
Before we pass on to consider the purposive character 
of our free volitions, it is well to point out that causa- 
tion, such as we have held the self to possess, does not be- 
long to the phenomenal realm. All phenomenal causes are the 
effects of antecedent causes, and they are all subject to 
the rule, 'like cause like effect 1 . The realm of empirical 
science and natural causes knows nothing of spontaneity. The 
agent, however, in his really free acts, initiating his own 
choices, is a non-empirical being, lying deeper than the 
phenomenal realm. His free volitions are thus not suscepti-
4 James Martineau, A Study of Religion, p. 241.
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ble to the methods and explanations employed in regard to 
empirical events. His causation is of the kind that the de- 
terministic method overlooks, and to which it does not apply.
The second implication of the consciousness of choos- 
ing between genuine alternatives is that the choice is a 
purposive one. Choice, in its very nature, is an act in 
which selective, purposive activity is brought into play. We 
have a reason for choosing the alternative we do chooseV- we 
have a purpose or end in view. The purpose, or end, answers 
the question why the act takes place by giving a reason for 
it. It is that aspect of the volition which characterizes 
it as the act of a rational, intelligent being. Purposive- 
ness implies a mind. On the other hand, to say that the pur- 
pose of the act is the reason for its taking place is not to 
say that it is the cause of its taking place. If the ques- 
tion is asked what causes the act, the answer is that the 
agent does. The purposiveness of the act furnishes an in- 
tellectual vindication of it, but does not completely account 
for it, either as efficient or final cause.
There is no reason for objecting to the purpose's be- 
ing spoken of as the motive, provided this term be stripped 
of itsketerministic connotations. Even in the mildest 
forms of self-determination the motive is determinative of 
the volition, and this is unacceptable. If we bear in mind, 
however, that a motive is not an impulse, but a reason,- and 
a none-determining one,- there is no ground for discarding the 
term. It must of course be understood that this is not to 
adopt the position taken by Martineau and others to the effect
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that we choose our motives,- this would be to fall back into 
libertarianism. We neither are determined by, nor do we 
choose, our motive, but in our free volitions, we have a 
motive, that is, a purpose. This purpose or motive is a 
part of the volition itself, and not to be abstracted from 
it and made either its antecedent cause or the object of its 
choice.
If our free volitions are purposive, they are, for 
this reason, utterly different from the spontaneous acts of 
will postulated by the libertarians, against which Edwards 
so manfully strove. As we have seen, such acts are dissoci- 
ated from both the agent's character and his intellect, be- 
ing merely events without meaning and without aim. On this 
ground libertarianism is inadequate both psychologically, as 
an account of volition, and ethically, as providing a basis 
of moral agency. The view we have advanced conserves the 
spontaneity of libertarianism and also the purposiveness of 
determinism. It will follow from the fact that free volitions 
are not mere aimless happenings, but rational choices, that 
they cannot be predicated of a will in abstraction from the 
intellect, nor, as we shall see later, from the character. 
In fact they cannot be predicated of any one part of the 
self, nor even of all the parts taken together, but flow 
from the self as_ a whol,e. Volition is the self's willing, 
and freedom belongs to the self, not to any part of it.
This view is in harmony with the best modern psycho- 
logical thought, which sees the self, not as an aggregate, 
but as a unity, in which certain elements can be distinguished,
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but from which they cannot be separated. The self, on this 
view, cannot be reduced without remainder to the various 
elements distinguishable within it, but is more than the sum 
of its parts. Further, the parts within it have their nat- 
ure and mode of operation moulded by the whole. "We must 
recognize that the self which is the origin of the action, 
and in which we distinguish both the idea of goodness and 
the desire for an object inconsistent with the good, is the 
real cause of the action and exercises a real choice. It is 
the nature of the self to act and thus, in certain circum- 
stances, to choose or/select between possible alternatives. 
This is neither a freak of unmotived willing nor/an irrup- 
tion of a pure ego into the realm of time. It is simply the 
real choice of a real self,- a self which is not merely a 
diversity of tendencies and qualities, but a unity of that 
diversity."
This being the nature of the self, it manifestly lies 
at least partially below the level of the phenomenal realm 
in which complete analysis is possible. As we should expect, 
there is a noumenal self, which originates those volitions we 
have seen to belong to the noumenal realm. But to recognize 
this is to have notice served upon us that such volitions can- 
not be exhaustively analyzed and explained. We cannot explain 
spontaneous causation, because explaining it means accounting:^ 
it in terms of transeunt causation, and thus denying spontan- 
eity. Nor can we explain just how a volition can be both spon-
5.V. R. Sorley, Moral Values and The Idea of God, p. 436.
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taneous and purposive without denying the fact. For explana- 
tion means distinguishing the purpose, or motive, and the 
act of volition proper, and relating these causally. But if 
we relate them as the libertarian does and say that the voli- 
tion chooses the motive, we then deny the purposiveness of 
the volition. If, on the other hand, we relate them as the 
determinist does, and say the motive determines the volition, 
we deny spontaneity to the volition. We are thus forced to 
recognize that the conative process cannot be artificially 
split into a motive and an act of volition proper, but re- 
sists this sort of empirical analysis. We can say then that 
a free volition is a spontaneous act and that it possesses a 
motive, or purpose. This much we know, and it is sufficient.
Further than this we cannot go, nor do we feel the need of
free
going further. Recognizing the noumenal character of/voli- 
tions, we are free to acknowledge the fact that a spontaneous, 
purposive choice is a unique, concrete event, of. which we 
can know something, but whose nature we cannot exhaustively 
understand. We are conscious of being in the presence of 
something which transcends the full grasp of conceptual 
thought. Choice is choice, and here we must stop.
That this admission of our ignorance of the ultimate 
nature of free volitions is a valid and necessary position, 
and not just a confession of failure, should be granted by 
all who appreciate the distinction between the metaphysical, 
or noumenal, and the phenomenal realm, and the respective 
methods applicable within them. The impossibility of render- 
ing in conceptual thought the complete process involved in a
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free volition is widely recognized. In this connection let 
us note the opinions of a theologian, a philosopher, and a 
psychologist in turn. "This fallacy of applying an intel- 
lectual test to an act of the moral will", says w. A. Copin- 
ger, "is apparent throughout the Necessarian scheme. It is 
difficult, if not impossible, truly to express the higher 
forms of spiritual truth in words applicable to the action 
or mode of operation in natural things. Language itself is 
constituted on an intellectual or logical, not a spiritual 
basis, and if the mystery of the action of freewill could be 
set forth and made plain in terms capable of being compre- 
hended by the understanding, it could no longer be properly 
termed a mystery." 6 The same idea is expressed by Professor 
Herbert W. Carr, when he says that "the very terms in which 
alone we can give outward expression to what we know as inner 
intuition contradict the affirmation, even in affirming it." 7 
Again, let us note the striking testimony given from the 
point of view of the psychologist by Professor William 
McDougall: "Now a purposive action, when considered in isola- 
tion, is strictly speaking unintelligible; it has not the 
intelligibility of an isolated mechanical event, such as the 
impact of one billiard ball upon another. It is for this 
Very reason that it is so hard to persuade many psychologists 
that even human activities are truly purposive. They cannot 
see through and comprehend the isolated purposive act from
6W. A. Copinger, A Treatise on Predestination, Election, and
  Grace, p. 279.
'Herbert W. Carr, The Free Will Problem, p. 78.
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beginning to end. That difficulty I admit. I insist upon 
it. But I do not for that reason resort to the absurdity of 
denying the obvious facts. There is nothing more obstructive 
to the advance of knowledge than a certain unformulated dog- 
ma implicitly accepted by many men of science, namely, the 
dogma that what we cannot fully understand cannot happen. 
We cannot too strongly insist that the bounds of the possible 
do not coincide with and are not set by the limits of our 
present powers of comprehension." 8
In the light of the distinction between the noumenal 
and the phenomenal spheres, and the consequent inapplicabil- 
ity of the analytical method to the free volitions which lie 
in the former, we can see the answer to the major determinis- 
tic criticism of the position we are advocating. For the 
determinist, a purposive act must be a determined act. The 
reason is clear: a purposive act involves a motive, and 
whether this motive be an efficient or a final cause, it is 
determinative of the volition. To deny the determining char- 
acter of the purpose, or motive, is to deny purposiveness 
altogether, and to fall back into libertarian!sm. There can 
thus be no middle ground between the Arminian doctrine of 
free will and determinism.
Now this criticism proceeds under the conviction that 
our conative activity can be analyzed in such a|way as to 
enable us to explain the exact relationship between the pur-
8William McDougall, Religion and the Sciences of Life, in
The South Atlantic Quarterly, January 
1932, pp 24-25.
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pose, or motive, and the act of the will, or volition proper. 
To explain the relationship is to express it in terms of the 
law of cause and effect, as that law is formulated for the 
empirical world. Accordingly the volition is said to be de- 
termined by the motive, as its antecedent cause, with the 
result that the volition loses its spontaneity. But this 
entire procedure involves the assumption that conations be- 
long wholly to the phenomenal realm, that an act which takes 
place in "the flow of concrete duration 11 can be described in 
terms of spatialized time. To point this out, then, is a suf- 
ficient answer to the criticism,- it proceeds upon an 
assumption, and according to a method our investigation has 
already shown to be fals e.
The picture of choice given us by the determinist is 
itself a testimony to the fact that its real natureflows 
through the meshes of the empirical net. What we have,even 
in the "softest" determinism, is simply a causal chain, dif- 
fering in no respect from a causal series in the natural 
world, as Edwards himself recognized, except in the nature 
of the elements related. To exhibit this as an account of 
free volition is to caricature the reality. The inner nature 
of choice eludes the searchlight of empirical analysis just 
as life eludes discovery by the surgeon's knife. Like 
Buddha's chariot, choice for the determinist is merely an 
aggregate of pa-ts. And just as there is, in reality, for 
Buddha, no chariot, so for the determinist there is in real- 
ity no choice. But Buddha realized there was no chariot, 
while the determinist does not realize that, on the basis of
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his presupposition, there is no choice; and he therefore 
persists in applying the term to a causal series which den- 
ies the existence of open possibilities.
It is worth calling attention at this point to the 
significant fact that the initial error of the libertarian 
is identical with that of his deterministic opponent. His 
position is vitiated by the fact that he does not detect and 
repudiate the method of empirical analysis used by the de- 
terminist. If he is aware of the assumption on which the 
determinist proceeds, he does not make it know\ or at least, 
he does not reject it. On the contrary he accepts its val- 
idity and actually utilizes some of its results in building 
up his own theory of freedom. The determinist analyzes voli- 
tion and finds it to consist in the determination of a power 
of activity he calls the will by a foregoing motive, which 
in turn has sprung from the agent's character. The indeter- 
minist accepts this as being a complete analysis of what is 
involved. This is his initial and fundamental error. He 
faile to perceive that, in the deterministic account, the 
self is entirely omitted, and the possibility of a noumenal 
factor in volition ruled out,- that what is given us as a 
picture of the volitional process is merely its skeleton. 
But having gone the length of accepting the determinisms 
analysis, and thus having on his hands an unbroken causal 
series,the libertarian finds himself on the highroad tojde- 
terminism, and must cast about for some way of escape. This 
escape he makes by endowing the will with the whole power of 
choice, independent of character and motive. The result is
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his doctrine of the "liberty of indifference".
Now in doing this, the libertarian resorts to the only 
alternative left the proponent of freedom, who does not dis- 
avow the deterministic procedure at the very outset. He 
must introduce spontaneity somewhere. He cannot introduce 
it into the relation between character and circumstance, 
which gives rise to the motive. The only thing he can do is 
to break the chain of transeunt causation after the motive 
has arisen, and denying that this motive determines the act 
of the will, predicate spontaneity of the abstract faculty 
of will itself. We have already seen how unsatisfactory 
this theory is in itself, not to speak of the disadvantage 
at which this compromise attitude places the libertarian in 
his argument with determinism.
Before moving on to a discussion of the relation of 
character to free volitions, it may be well to advert to a 
position taken by Bergson, whom we have quoted approvingly 
above, which constitutes a criticism of the view we have up- 
held. While the determinist insists upon a complete eluci- 
dation of volition, Bergson insists with equal vigor upon 
the impossibility of saying anything about the nature of 
choice. The defenders of freedom, he argues, follow the 
same procedure as the determinist when they define a free 
act as a selection between equally possible alternatives. 
For this involves the representation of the self as oscil- 
lating between two diverging lines of action, a representa- 
tion which spatializes the conception of the willing process, 
and leads the proponent of freedom/to take up his position
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after the act - Now this, he insists, issues in absolute de- 
terminism. For since we can symbolize with our geometrical 
figure of the diverging lines only time which has passed, 
once the lines have been traced, one of them has been chosen, 
and the activity of the self is seen to have been tending 
all along in one direction. Bergson goes on to say that in 
truth such a symbolizing of volition is perfectly meaning- 
less, since, seeing we cannot speak of a line of action un- 
til after the action has been performed, there can be no 
question of possible lines of action before the choice has 
taken place.
Now this is a misrepresentation of what the proponent 
of freedom does. It may be, and is probably true that the 
alternatives implied in choice are pictured as Bergson says, 
and that the symbolism is clumsy. But the real choice is 
not symbolized. The nature of the process by which selection 
is made we have recognized to transcend our grasp. The de- 
tenninist, with his sequence of character, motive, and voli- 
tion, does endeavor to give a complete analysis, in spatial 
terms, of volition, but this is precisely what we have recog- 
nized to be impossible.
Bergson's error is his failure to distinguish between 
a definition of free choice and an exhaustive explanation of 
its nature. To give some idea of what a free choice is, and 
to give a complete account of its nature and how it takes 
place, are vastly different things. It is entirely possible 
for a process such as willing to defy exhaustive analysis, 
and yet reveal something of its nature, and be to that extent
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susceptible of definition. If freedom means anything, we 
must be able to give some expression to its meaning. And 
when we ask what it means, the essential thing about it is 
that it is the capacity for free and purposive selection be- 
tween alternatives. Unless this much can be said of freedom, 
it is indistinguishable from determinism.
Bergson's refusal to give this much definition has 
vitiated his own positive treatment of the subject, leading 
him to attenuate the meaning of freedom until it is worth- 
less. We are free, he says, "when our acts spring from our 
whole personality, when they express it, when they have that 
indefinable resemblance to it which one sometimes finds be-
Qtween the artist and his work." Freedom must be looked for, 
he continues, "in a certain characteristic of the decision 
which is taken, in the free act itself." Again, "Freedom 
is the relation of the concrete self to the act it performs." 11 
These statements about freedom,- and so far as they go, they 
are really definitions,- indicate what an attenuated, 
nondescript thing it is in Bergson's own thought. As they 
stand, no determinist could possibly object to any of these 
statements as/descriptive of volition. And the root of the 
difficulty is Bergson's refusal to define freedoms the 
choice between alternative lines of action. If there is a 
real distinction between freedom and determinism, that dis- 
tinction must at least be expressible, or the whole discuss- 
ion is stultified.
9Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, p. 172.
^ibid, p. 173.




III. The Relation of Free Volitions and Character
For the sake of clarity we have reserved to this point 
the discussion of a problem which has important bearings on 
any theory of the will, namely, the question of the relation 
between volitions and character. We are concerned primarily 
with the part played by our character, or nature, in our free 
volitions, and conversely, with their effect upon it.
First of all, however, it should be made clear what is 
the relation to the self of the set of tendencies we call 
our character. Is, or is not, our nature capable of being 
isolated from the self? The answer is that it is no more to 
be abstracted from the self which owns it than the will and 
the act of willing from the agent who wills. The attempt to 
do this has been one of the egregious errors of determinism. 
As Professor Ward has well put it: "The efficiency and initi- 
ative that the indeterminist seems to find in the man apart 
from his character the determinist professes to find in the 
character apart from the man." 12 The self includes its 
character, or nature,- it is not extrinsically related to 
it. "Character, apart from the self which owns it, is an 
abstraction." 13 It is of vital importance that this truth 
be kept in mind as we discuss the part played by character 
in volition. To ignore it is to expose ourselves to the fal- 
lacy of thinking of the character as influencing the self in 
willing ab extra, after the analogy of physical forces, or 
of leaving the self out altogether.
12James Ward, The Realm of Ends, pp 287-288.
George Galloway, The Philosophy of Religion, p. 536.
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One form of this error against which we are warning is 
an identification of the self with the character. Once the 
character has been abstracted from the self, volitionfce- 
comes a mere causal connection between character, motive, 
and will, with the result that the self is left out entirely. 
To avoid the crassly mechanistic nature of this depersonal- 
ized theory, and do at least a verbal honor to the self, it 
is identified, as by T. H. Green, with the character. The 
self is then said to determine its own actions. But it is a 
self, a rational ego, only in name; in reality the self is 
reduced to the tendencies which it possesses. If we would 
reserve for the self its proper place in volition, and think 
clearly about the relation of character and volition, we 
must remember that just as it is the self which wills, so it 
is the self which owns and exercises those tendencies we call 
its character.
To return now to the question before us, let us note 
first the part played by character in our free volitions. 
This can be expressed in the statement that character condi- 
tions choice. There are two ways in which this conditioning 
activity operates. In the first place, character conditions 
free volitions by making them possible. There would bejno 
freedom, but for the fact that we are sometimes faced by 
genuine alternatives. But the existence of alternatives is 
due to our character, in which there are conflicting elements, 
These set up a tension within the self, in the form of com- 
peting tendencies or desires, each of which points toward 
some action, which, if the situation permits^ becomes an open
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possibility for the self. Now in a person whose character 
was completely formed, i.e., in whom no diverse tendencies 
existed, there could be no alternatives in conduct. To a 
perfect knowledge and will there would be no alternative to 
the best, while to a perfectly evil character there would 
likewise be no alternative to the bad. It iathanks to our 
character, which, in regard to some things, is only partially 
formed, that we are ever confronted with alternatives at all. 
The very existence of freedom is dependent upon character. 
To take the position that to a perfect knowledge and 
will there would be no alternative to the best, is to admit 
that God's volitions are determined. The question will 
naturally arise,- and let us pause here to notice it,- 
whether this ifc not to commit the fallacy of the infinite 
regress. This fallacy, however, applies only to that theo- 
logical system in which transeunt causation is exalted as a 
universal principle. In such a system, not only God's voli- 
tions, but God's very existence must be accounted for by an 
antecedent cause. Inhere spontaneity is admitted, however, 
we are at liberty to stop with God, and look upon Him as 
first cause and self-existent. We need not attribute His 
existence to anything beyond Himself, although the explana- 
tion of His existence of course transcends our capacities. 
God's existence is of course a unique factor and we do not 
intend to suggest that it is of the same order as a spontan- 
eous volition. mat we can insist upon is that the admission 
of spontaneity, and the consequent denial of universal, se- 
quent causation, frees usjfrom any logical necessity of
/
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assuming that God's existence requires a previous cause,- as 
Edwards, consistently, is bound to assume. Now given God's 
existence as an eternal perfect Being, it will follow that 
there has never been an evil alternative confronting Him. 
Thus God's volitions are determined, a fact which we need 
not hesitate to recognize. We may nevertjtieless hold God 
responsible for His volitions, inasmuch as, being the First 
Cause, He must be regarded as responsible for the character 
which gives rise to His volitions.
As we were saying, character conditions our free voli- 
tions by making feeedom possible. The second way in which 
its conditioning activity operates is by limiting the alter- 
natives open to us. The self's volition must consist in the 
choice of one of the alternatives occasioned by the tenden- 
cies within its character. We never choose anything for 
which there is no inner tendency,- such a thing never becomes 
a possibility for us. There may at any time be conceivable 
alternatives other than those which are real for us, but 
i,hese are definitely blocked out by our character. In this 
sense freedom of choice is limited. We are never free to 
choose "anything under the ifcm", but find the range of our 
choices definitely determined by the nature we have inherited
and developed.
In speaking of the influence of character in determin- 
ing the alternatives before us, it is not meant to exclude 
the part played by environment. (The term is used here in 
its broadest possible sense, as referring to everything out- 
side the self, including objectively apprehended values.)
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The environment limits the possible alternatives before us 
at any given time, before the character further limits them. 
This limitation by the environment consists first of all in 
a restriction of our "natural ability". In any particular 
situation certain things are physically impossible. But al- 
so, within the range of the physically possible acts at any 
given time, the environment plays a further part in the final 
determination of the alternatives. A certain possible act 
can be made, by its environmental setting,more appealing at 
one time than at another. For instance, the strength of the 
temptation in the thief to steal will vary in proportion to 
the danger involved. The environment may, in fact, deter- 
mine on the ob£ ctive side very largely the capacity of a 
physically possible act to appeal to our desire on the sub- 
jective side. Circumstances alter cases, and hence an act 
for which we have the natural ability may in a certain situ- 
ation become an alternative of choice, while in another situ- 
ation it may have so weak an appeal to us as even to fail of 
becoming "morally possible". This effect of environmental 
factors upon the appeal to us of physically possible acts is 
what we mean by the term, influence. By way of recapitula- 
tion, we may say then that the conceivable alternatives in 
any given situation are limited in three ways: (l) by the 
environment, in limiting what is possible from the standpoint 
of our natural ability, (2) by the environment, in influencing 
the appeal certain physically possible acts make, and (3) by 
the character, in determining finally which of these acts 
shall become genuine alternatives. It is thus correct to say
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that the alternatives before us are limited by our character 
in relation to the environment. But in the process charac- 
ter is the more fundamental and important.
Mien the alternatives in any given situation are final- 
ly established, our freedom to choose any one of them is 
complete. Even though the tendency toward one alternative 
is "stronger" than to another, with the result that the 
former is easier to choose than the latter, the self yet has 
the power to choose either. We cannot, of course, properly 
apply physical conceptions to the tendencies within the 
self, and do not mean by speaking of one as "stronger" than 
another to imply that they are analogous to physical forces 
directed upon the self. As we have seen, the self owns its 
character, and its divergent tendencies issue from it. How- 
ever, in case of a conflict between two desires, one may be 
more intense, with the result that the tendency toward the 
act which will satisfy it is in a sense "stronger" than the 
competing tendency. In the case of tension between a natu- 
ral desire and the tendency to the right, physicayanalogies 
are totally misleading, there being no common measure to es- 
timate the weight of such a desire against a tendency in- 
volving a judgment of worth. The point to be insisted upon 
here, however, is that, whatever may or may not be said about 
the strength, intensity, or worth of a tendency, the self is 
at liberty, once this tendency has established a certain 
volition as "morally" possible, to exert the volition.
This account of the relation of character to free voli- 
tions makes it clear that in any choice character is ex-
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pressed. The element in our character giving rise to the 
alternative chosen, while not determining the choice, is 
nevertheless bodied forth in the act. Its nature is ex- 
pressed by the whole self, which, after deliberation, with 
Eur^ose and intention, freely elects to identify itself with 
the tendency giving rise to the alternative chosen. Any 
free choice expresses not only something of the self's char- 
acter as built up in the past, but also what the self is in 
the moment of willing,- what use the active self makes of its 
freedom.
Having seen the part which character plays in volition, 
we may now briefly point out that the relationship is recip- 
rocal. It is a matter of common experience that volitions 
affect character, modifying it in every instance. That ele- 
ment of character expressed in any volition is thereby 
strengthened, and those elements left unexpressed are weak- 
ened. So generally is this recognized that we need not labor 
the point. Such modification of our nature by our conduct 
is not only a matter of common experience, but it is essen- 
tial if either moral development or degeneration is to be 
possible. Granted this modification, both development and 
degeneration are accounted for. Either the better or worse 
elements of character are strengthened, and the individual 
grows in the direction of moral perfection or degenerates in 
the direction of complete corruption.
This alteration in character implies that it is pos- 
sible for the areas of free and determined acts to shift. An 
act which, at one time and in a given environment, is free,
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may become at another time and in the same environment, de- 
termined, and vice versa, (assuming for the sake of argument 
that a situation can be exactly duplicated). A free act may 
become determined by virtue of the fact that the element in 
our nature expressed in it may become, through our conduct, 
so strong in relation to the competing tendency that the lat- 
ter is entirely lost,and ceases to give rise to an open 
possibility for our conduct. It is more difficult to see how 
an act,at one time determined, may in a like situation be- 
come free. The very fact that it is determined rules out 
the possibility of our directly willing the existence of a 
genuine alternative to it. Nevertheless, within the realm 
of our freedom, we may, by our conduct, so strengthen the gen- 
eraitendency in the opposite direction, that when the situa- 
tion again arises, there will be an alternative to the for- 
merly determined act. For instance,- to use the time-worn 
illustration of the drunkard who is offered a drink in a 
public house,- it may at one time be impossible for him to 
decline, but after taking the drink on this occasion, he may 
set about a general moral reform and strengthening of his 
self-control, with the result that, a year later,when he is 
offered the drink, his declination may be a real possibility. 
It is thus open to us, morally speaking, to develop either 
side o^our nature. Our ideal, in the light of this possi- 
bility, ds to become perfectly good, so that evil acts are 
no longer "morally" possible to us. This is the ideal which 
we find actualized in the character of God.
The development of the good character is well described
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by Professor W. R. Sorley: "Man is thrown into the midst of 
competing interests and values or apparent values, and he is 
left to make his own choice among them....No causal neces- 
sity compels him to take the way he ought to take. But, if 
he does so choose, and if he accustom himself to will the 
higher values in spite of the attractions of other interests, 
then he achieves in this process a higher value than any 
other - that of the good will of a free man.
irWhen, if ever, this character is firmly established, 
the need for repeated conflict in order that the good may be 
chosen disappears; the warring elements in his nature are 
brought into order, the hostile forces into subjection, and 
the good will ceases to display the struggle between higher 
and lower principles with which we are familiar. Goodness 
achieved through freedom, if completely realised, would ex- 
hibit to the observer a uniformity similar to th>:<t of the 
necessarily connected processes of nature; but the principle 
of action would remain different. It would be external in 
the one case and internal in the other. The free man may
achieve uniformity through his freedom; upon the unfree man
14 it would have to be imposed."
Having now set forth the relationship between char- 
acter and choice, we have completed a theory of volition 
which seems to meet all the demands that can be made in the 
name of moral agency. We have seen that man is capable of 
genuinely free volitions, in which he exercises the power of
14
W. R. Sorley, Moral Values and The Idea of God, pp 444-445.
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contrary choice. We have seen that these choices are also 
purposive, and that they proceed from the self as a whole, 
so that the self is granted its important role in conative 
activity. And finally, we have recognized the place of char- 
acter in the volitional process, and indicated the manner in 
which it influences, and inWn is influenced by, our acts 
of choice .
Not only does this theory establish a basis of moral 
responsibility, but it accounts for the plausibility of the 
deterministic position. That element in the agent's charac- 
ter which is expressed in an act of free choice exists before 
the act, and thus, in retrospect, the connection between the 
character and the volition may be construed as a causal one. 
The simple fact that there is a sequence makes it easy to 
identify the antecedent tendency of character as the effi- 
cient cause of the act. As William James points out, an act, 
after it has taken place, even if it be held to be due to 
chance, will appear a^/well connected with the past as if it 
were determined. Bergson has also shown that all acts looked 
at after their occurrence must appear determined, this being 
true because the retrospective view necessarily omits the 
real/choice, which, as we have seen, can be experienced only 
iii tlie moment o£ choice. Now determinism, in view of its 
fundamental assumption, gives an account of volition after 
it is passed, the causal connection being taken for granted, 
and the real choice being ignored. Hence the apparent suc- 
cess with which it applies the objective, analytic method of 
empirical science to the exposition of volition.
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We are able to see also, in the light of what has been 
said about the relation of character to volition, why it is 
possible for prediction of conduct to be brought to such a 
high degree of accuracy. The simple fact that the majority 
o^our acts are determined will explain this in large mea- 
sure. The further fact that the alternatives are very defin- 
itely limited by the agent's character will account for a 
comparatively high degree of accuracy even in regard to free 
acts. The possibility of prediction in the case of a large 
number of human acts cannot therefore be urged as a proof 
of the deterministic position. But a further consideration 
is relevant. The determinist accounts for his mistakes in 
prediction on the ground of his ignorance of the character 
and circumstances of the individual. Undoubtedly this is a 
satisfactory explanation in many cases, but there are also 
those cases in which a person, whose character is well 
known, acts in a manner contradictory to the prevailing tem- 
per of that character as we know it. In such cases the de- 
terminist is faced with the dilemma of acknowledging that he 
was completely mistaken in his appraisal of the individual, 
an acknowledgment which by definition is ruled out, or of 
admitting that the act was determined by the "weaker" element 
in the agent's character, which is not determinism. Such 
cases can therefore not be accounted for with any plausibil - 
ity unless we recognize a genuine freedom,- a freedom enabling 
the agent to select, if he chooses, the alternative occasioned 
by the "weaker" element in his character. Any true theory 
must account not only for the cases of accurate prediction,
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but also for the marked failures.
IV. The Limits of Moral Responsibility 
Man is to be held morally responsible for his free 
volitions and their consequences. There is of course no 
question but that, so long as there are real alternatives, 
we are responsible for our choices. But our responsibility 
cannot stop there,- we are likewise accountable for the 
consequences of our choices. This we may accept as an axiom 
of the moral consciousness. It means that we must take the 
responsibility for the effects upon our character resulting 
from our free volitions. Any strengthening or weakening of 
character resulting from the use of our freedom is charge- 
able to us. And when the individual, by a continuous ex- 
pression of one characteristic, strengthens it and weakens 
its contrary to the point that the contrary no longer offers 
an alternative, he is responsible for the volitions deter- 
mined by this element of his character in so far as its 
strength has been voluntarily built up. This is only to say 
that acts due indirectly to the use of the agent's freedom, 
as well as free volitions themselves, are to be considered as 
falling within the limits of his^responsibility. But beyond 
these limits responsibility ceases.
A question will afcise, however, in regard to character- 
istics inherited, or due to environmental influences. Ob- 
viously, according to definition, we are not responsible for 
them. Shall we ssgr , then, that no moral quality attaches to 
them at all? The answer is that moral quality and moral
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responsibility are not coterminous. Moral quality attaches 
to all the elements in our character and to all our voli- 
tions; moral responsibility, on the other hand, belongs only 
to our free volitions, our genuine choices, and their conse- 
quences. There may be good and bad elements in our character 
for which we are not responsible, but we cannot regard these 
characteristics as non-moral, so long as we retain the moral 
category at all. We cannot, for instance, regard an inherit- 
ed tendency to evil as merely a pathological phenomenon, and 
thus as amoral.
In connection with the idea of responsibility, it should
out
be pointed/that the merit or demerit of a free act is de- 
termined by its difficulty. The guilt of a sin is in in- 
verse proportion to the temptation, and the virtue of a good 
act in direct proportion to the strength of the evil tendency 
overcome in the performance of it. No certain application of 
this fact can be made in theology. We have a right to be- 
lieve that God deals with men in accordance with their light 
and their situations. If this is true, it may be plausibly 
argued that those,for instance, who never hear of the gos- 
pel, will be given a chance in the future life, or that their 
disability will in some other way be taken account of. Such 
conjectures, however, are highly speculative. One thing is 
certain, that, regardless of the amount of merit or demerit 
of any act,we are, within the range of responsibility, 
fully responsible.
411 
V. Freedom and the World of Science
It may have "been noticed that in the establishment of 
our view of human freedom no appeal has been made to the 
fact that a "principle of indeterminacy" is now held by some 
very influential thinkers to exist in the natural world. 
This omission has been deliberate, influenced by certain 
very definite reasons.
In the first place, it has been felt that the evidence 
given of the reality of contrary/choice on psychological, 
moral, and theological/grounds has been sufficient to estab- 
lish the thesis we have been supporting. Not only so, but, 
in our own view, it is the only legitimate type of evidence 
we have. ¥e cannot make unguarded inferences about the nat- 
ure of the world of mind from the nature of the outside 
world. Nothing is more unwarranted, for instance,than the 
widespread tendency to regard scientific determinism as im- 
plying determinism all through the spiritual realm. This is 
not logic; it is mere assumption, and assumption taken in the 
face of the fact that, if there is a noumenal realm at all, 
it is vastly different from the phenomenal realm. By the 
same token,there is no justification for the conclusion, 
that indeterminacy in the natural realm implies the same in 
regard to human willing. To be sure, it might and does/es- 
tablish a strong presumption in favor of such a conclusion, 
but presumption is not proof. W. P. Bridgman, in an article 
on the unpredictibility of small scale phenomena, issues a 
timely warning: "Many will be tempted to see a connection 
between the question of the predictibility of the behavior
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of organic systems and the questions which have always ex- 
ercised the human race, determinism and free will. It seems 
to me that there is no connection. The former is a question 
of physical fact, while the latter are primarily questions 
of a subjective character, which involve those emotional ex- 
periences which the subject goes through when on the point of
15
making a decision." The only valid knowledge of a meta- 
physical reality like human volition will come from a study 
of the spiritual realm to which it belongs, not from a study 
of the natural world, the realities of which are essentially 
different. It might be added that religion and morality are 
in a positionat once more dignified and impregnable, when 
they "stand on their own legs" and do not appeal to physical 
science in support of their views.
Even if we could legitimately infer the power of con- 
trary choice from the fact of indeterminacy in the natural 
world, this would still be a most precarious support for 
our belief in human freedom, owing to the weight of opinion 
and evidence against the reality of such indeterminacy. It 
may be true, as Dampier-'Whethain writes, that "Scientific de- 
terminism has broken down, and broken down in the very cita-
"Lfi
del of its power - the inner structure of the atom." But 
the same writer goes on to give the following caution: "It 
is possible that at some future time a new theory of mechan- 
ics may be developed, and individual molecules, atoms, and
15W.P.Bridgman, The Recent Change of Attitude Toward the Law
: of Cause and Effect, Article in Science, May 22, 1931. 
16¥illiam Cecil Bampier Bampier-Whetham, A History of Science 
and its Reltaions with Philosophy and Religion, p. 476.
413
electrons become determinate. But as yet there is no sign 
of such a theory...The uncertainties hitherto described 
might possibly be due to ignorance, and might pass into de- 
terminism again as knowledge increased. It is dangerous to 
build on them a philosophy of free-will." 17 Over against a 
postulate of a "principle of indeterminacy" such as Edding- 
ton seems to make, we have the extremely significant insist- 
ence of scientists like Einstein and Planck on the fact that 
science can never give up its postulate of universal neces- 
sity. To quote Planck: "Of course it may be said that the 
law of causality is only after all an hypothesis. If it be 
an hypothesis it is not an hypothesis like most of the others, 
but it is a fundamental hypothesis because it is the postu- 
late which is necessary to give sense and meaning to the/ap- 
is 
plication of all hypotheses in scientific research." By
"the law of causality" Planck means that law as science 
states it,- i.e., like cause like effect, and elsewhere he 
makes it abundantly clear that he believes in the law not 
merely as a regulative concept, or methodological procedure, 
but as expressing a causal nexus which is objectively real. 
The fact that the causal hypothesis is, as Planck states, 
not on the level with other scientific theories, but the 
very basis of its whole procedure, makes it more likely that 
it will be clung to,despite science's present ignorance of 
the causes/behind the behavior of small scale phenomena, than
17W.C.D.Dampier-Whetham, op. cit., p. 473. 
18Max Planck, Hi/here Is Science Going? p. 150.
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that it will be laid aside while that ignorance is made the 
basis of belief in a "principle of indeterminacy". Now it
is on the assumption thai/determinism must always reign
been 
supreme in the world of science that we have/proceeding in
the development of our theory of volition. Whatever be the 
truth in the matter, the uncertainty of founding human free- 
dom on scientific indeterminism should be obvious.
In this connection, however, a further question arises. 
While belief in human freedom cannot be based on a supposed 
principle of indeterminacy in nature, will not such a theory 
follow as a corollary of belief in freedom? The theory we 
have adopted implies a relation between the noumenal and 
phenomenal realms which will permit of free causes in the 
former producing effects injthe latter. The Kantian anti- 
thesis between the two realms is rejected. The phenomenal 
world is not held, as he conceived it, to be a closed system 
in which no event may take place not produced by some pre- 
ceding event in the same realm. On the contrary the physical 
event expressive of a responsible moral choice must be 
traceable directly to that choice, which means that the ante- 
cedent physical process must be such that it does not de- 
termine whether the event will occur or not. This being true, 
it may appear that we have rejected scientific indetermin- 
ism as the basis of our belief in freedom only to assert it 
as the corollary.
This, however, is not the case. Indeterminism may 
mean two things, chance and spontaneous causation. Now the 
theory we have adopted does not assert the existence of
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either of these in the natural world. It does not imply 
the existence of chance, because the physical events re- 
ferred to free volitions do not come about without cause, 
but are caused by volitions. How they are produced we can- 
not say, but we are in the same predicament with regard to 
how any cause produces its effect. Again, the position 
adopted doeshot attribute spontaneous causation to any 
physical event or cause. The events in question are the re- 
sults, of spontaneous causation, but this spontaneity exists, 
not within the worldyif science, but in the noumenal realm. 
Physical events are not only held to be/caused, but produced 
by preceding causes, as science demands. We have not, there- 
fore, contradicted the position that determinism must hold 
supreme in the scientific world.
It is, of course,true that our position implies the 
unpredictability of the physical consequents of free voli- 
tions, not only from the practical but also from the theo- 
retical standpoint. Now in the case of any physical/event 
except one referable to a spontaneous non-physicaiycause, 
an admission that it was even in theory unpredictable would 
be tantamount to asserting that it was not determined. Hence 
science in the name of its causal law claims the theoretical 
possibility of predicting all natural events. Now while 
this claim has to be relinquished in the case of those events 
expressive of free volitions, it does not involve any sacri- 
fice of scientific principle, because the determined charac- 
ter of those events is not thereby denied. It is still pos- 
sible for science to uphold its nrinciple of transeunt caus-
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ality throughout the natural realm. The indeterminism v;e 
assert "belongs not to the realm of science, "but to the voli­ 
tions lying outside of it. If, on the ground of the univer­ 
sality of transeunt causation, the spontaneity of volitions 
is denied, itmust "be remembered that this cannot legitimate­ 
ly "be done in the name of science. As far as science is con­ 
cerned, the scientific form of the causal principle is lim­ 
ited to the natural world, and its extension "beyond the con­ 
fines of the natural realm is a philosophical assumption.
CHAPTER XIV 
THE ORIGIN AND PROPAGATION OF SIN
We have up to this point undertaken to deal with the 
question of God's purposes and decrees in the world, and to 
develop a theory of human freedom. The task now confronts 
us of accounting, consistently with the positions we have 
assumed, for the appearance and spread of sin in the world.
I. The Origin of Sin
Let us turn first to the question of how sin came 
into the world. If we find ourselves compelled to reject 
the artificial conception of original righteousness and the 
traditionalfform of the fall doctrine, with all the fatal
I »
objections attaching to it, what account can be given of the 
origin of sin?
To "begin with, there are tv/o positions, now generally 
accepted, which we must recognize as presuppositions of any 
account of how sin came into the world. The first of these 
is that the first thre/e c hapters of Genesis are no.t to be
"C—L,,,,
taken as literal history in every detail, and in all proba­ 
bility were not meant to be so taken by their author or 
authors. That God created the heavens and the ea.rth, that 
He revealed Himself and His holy will to man, that man on
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his own responsibility disobeyed that will, and that there 
is in some sense a racial solidarity in sin and its conse­ 
quences,- these are the salient truths in the first chapters 
of Genesis. To attempt to fix upon them an elaborate doc­ 
trine of original righteousness, original sin and guilt is,
as we have already seen, as exegetically unsound as it is 
psychologically 
/and ethically untenable. The second presupposition we must
accept is the evolutionary account of the origin of man. 
That is to say, we must accept it in principle,- we must 
regard man's present condition as the result of a gradual 
development from humbler beginnings. The idea of such a dev­ 
elopment is in harmony both with the theistic hypothesis and 
with the first three chapters of Genesis, interpreted in a 
non-literalistic fashion. This point of view, it might be 
held, commits us neither to a single nor multiple origin of 
the race.
With these positions as a background, an account of the 
appearance of sin can be constructed which is in accordance 
with the findings of science, the facts of the ethical life, 
and with Scripture.
According to such thinkers as Pfleiderer and F. R, 
Tennant, there was a state at which man was a non-moral 
creature. At this stage, there being no consciousness of the 
moral law, man was purely a creature of impulse, directed in 
his conduct by the animal tendencies which held sway in him. 
These instincts, appetites, and impulses, belonging to man 
as God made him, it is held, were not, and are not in them­ 
selves evil. They were non-moral and indifferent. In fact
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they were the primal drives in the individua^enabling him 
to maintain life in the struggle for existence, and are the 
dynamic behind much of human progress. Their strength was 
thus developed through ages largely because they serve 
necessary and useful ends. While not in themselves evil, 
these tendencies, Ward points out, led to acts which were 
objectively, evil, even in the pre-moral stage. The end of 
this pre-moral stage took place with man's dawning conscious­ 
ness of the moral law.
This theory of a pre-moral stage in man is both 
scientifically and ethically tenable, but it is not demanded 
by either science or ethics. On the other hand, it is more 
in keeping with Scripture, and the general tenor of Christ­ 
ian thought, to regard man as having been, from the time he 
became man, a moral creature. And there is no scientific 
nor ethical objection to this view. Man can still be re­ 
garded as having come into being with highly developed nat­ 
ural tendencies, either directly created in him by God or 
inherited from pre-human ancestors. It is not essential to 
allow a period for their development after his creation. 
These tendencies, as on the theory of a pre-moral stage, can 
be regarded as having been in themselves non-moral, and as 
directing themselves unconditionally and without any limita­ 
tion to the satisfaction of every impulse, however and when­ 
ever arising. Instead, however, of thinking of man's con­ 
sciousness of the moral law as a delayed phenomenon, we can 
think of it as dawning when man became a human being, in 
fact as having a part, along with his rational nature, in
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Constituting his humanity. This view certainly does no 
violence to the facts of the moral life, nor can it be crit­ 
icized in the name of evolution, for on any theory the ap­ 
pearance of the moral consciousness must be regarded as a 
special endowment on the part of God. Christian theism can­ 
not accept a purely naturalistic account of the origin of 
moral distinctions. No matter how rudimentary it was in the 
beginning, man's awareness of the moral law cannot have been 
produced by the preceding evolutionary process, however long 
the process or gradual the apprehension of the law. The ap­ 
pearance of the moral law signalized the emergence of some­ 
thing new in the process, and required a special interven­ 
tion of God to account for it. It follows then, that this 
divine act might, as far as the theory of evolution is con­ 
cerned, have taken place as easily at the beginning of the 
human race as later on. While, therefore, we must regard 
both conceptions as tenable, the weight of Christian testi­ 
mony should incline us to the view that man was moral from
the first.
What may have been the nature of the act or acts en­ 
joined or forbidden by the law as apprehended by man at the 
beginning cannot be said. To say that it appeared first as 
the prohibition against eating certain fruit is a too-literal 
reading of Genesis. Nor is there any unanimous testimony on 
this point by psychology or anthropology. On one point, 
however, Scripture and Christian thought are clear: when man 
apprehended the moral law, he apprehended what he felt to be 
the will of God. We cannot, of course, obtain from psychol-
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ogists and anthropologists an undivided opinion in corrobo- 
ration of this view. As far as the scientific study of 
primitive man can reveal, his morality was largely custom 
and taboo. This we are not concerned to deny. But it does 
not bring us to the bottom of the question. If vre go a step 
further, and ask what custom is, we find that it is conduct 
which is not merely "customary", but "customary" because 
felt to be obligatory. How, then, does one line of conduct, 
rather than another, come to be felt obligatory before it 
has become customary? It cannot be because the consequences 
are found to be better, for this would simply prove one line 
of conduct more expedient, and the binding character of cus­ 
tom is more than a feeling of its expediency. It cr.nnot 
either be due to social pressure, for this arises only after 
the conduct has become a matter of custom. We are therefore 
led to conclude that it is because one line of conduct, and 
not another, is adjudged to be the will of the divine power. 
It could not have been a judgment of the mere Tightness of 
an act, for primitive man did not distinguish between ab­ 
stract morality and the will of God. This distinction was 
not even drawn by the Hebrew prophets,- it is, relatively 
speaking, a modern distinction of the sophisticated mind. 
Custom, therefore, finds its origin in God's revelation of 
His will to man, nor does the fact that God's will, and even 
God Himself, may have been at first very imperfectly appre­ 
hended, alter the fundamental position we are here/i efending.
The moral law, as man conceived it, at least infaany 
cases, placed a check on his natural impulses, thus giving
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rise to a conflict between impulse and itself. Or, to speak 
more exactly, the conflict arose between the impulses and the 
newly evoked tendency to obey the law. For when man appre­ 
hended the law as moral, he apprehended it not merely as 
that which is in itself right but with a correlative inner 
tendency to follow it. There was, in addition to the moral 
judgment of the 'oughtness' of the law, a strong inner motive 
prompting to it. In other words, when God revealed the law 
to man, it excited his moral tendency, a tendency belonging 
to him as much as his natural impulses, and which gave rise 
to motives toward the right. The gift of this tendency to 
its expression, excited by the moral law, was the first 
motion of God's grace in aiding man to attain fellowship with 
Him. Strictly speaking, it was this "moral nature", or ten­ 
dency to the right, within man, that came into conflict with 
his natural impulses, and not the law considered objectively. 
This nature, let us note, is as native to man as the natural 
impulses which oppose it, and its expression enhances its 
strength, as is the case with them. Nor does its transmission 
by heredity involve the doctrine of the transmission of ac­ 
quired characteristics.
Along with the awareness of the moral law, and the 
correlative tendency to follow it, man was endowed with free­ 
dom. He came to possess from that time forth the power to 
choose between alternatives of right and wrong. Over and 
above the conflicting urges of the tendency to follow his 
natural appetite and the tendency to follow the good, he 
had the capacity to elect which tendency he would express in
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action. Without this capacity to obey it,- implying the 
like capacity not to obey it,- the law would not have been 
a S2£ai. law. Its requirements, at least when man first be­ 
came moral, did not extend beyond the sphere of his freedom. 
Man did not feel himself obligated to any action which was 
beyond his power.
He was, at this point, a fully moral creature. He 
possessed natural impulses conflicting with his desire to 
obey an objective law apprehended as right, and he had the 
freedom to follow the law or not as he chose. The natural 
impulses, while not in themselves evil, nevertheless in 
their conflict with the tendency to the right, gave rise to 
a temptation/bo sin.
In man, having reached this state, there were all the 
possibilities of sin and righteousness. It was a matter of 
his own free choice whether he would follow the moral law or 
the s£u&citations of natural impuOfes. The first sin consist­ 
ed in his voluntary choice to follow his natural impulse 
in disregard of the law. This was not due to the fact that 
the natural impulse was stronger, although following it was 
the easier course. We have seen that natural impulses and 
the tendency to the good cannot be properly compared as to 
their respective strength in the manner that physical forces 
can be compared. The first sin is accounted for simply by 
virtue of the fact that, given the factors making man a moral 
creature, he deliberately chose to sin.
It has been argued by some who hold the theory of a 
pre-moral state in man that we cannot properly speak of a
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first sin. The transition from the natural to the moral 
state is so gradual that it would be impossible, it is held, 
to fix exactly the boundary between action which is natural 
and morally indifferent, and that which is moral and involves 
responsibility. This view would not have been suggested ex­ 
cept on the hypothesis of a pre-moral stage. But even on 
this theory it does not hold. It could not, of course, be 
said at exactly what point in the life of the race the boun­ 
dary between the non-moral and the moral was passed. But 
nevertheless the boundary must have been there, no matter 
how slow man's moral evolution may have been, and it must 
have been crossed at some point. An act which, for the first 
time was apprehended as contrary to the dictate of conscience, 
and the will of the divine power, was committed. Certainly, 
its sinfulness may have been very faintly discerned, but it 
was none the less there.
Since we do not know exactly what action was commanded 
or prohibited by the moral law, we cannot say what the act 
was which constituted the first sin. We may be sure, how­ 
ever, that the first sin was different from what the tradi­ 
tional doctrine of original sin represents it to have been, 
in this particular, that instead of being the most, it was 
in some respects, the least heinous of sins. For it was 
committed when the moral consciousness was least developed, 
when the sense of Tightness and wrongness was least clear, 
when their significance was least appreciated, and the ten­ 
dency to the right least strong. It had back of it no 
moral experience to enhance man's sense of the heinousness
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of sin, and to teach the consequences of sin. It was the 
expression of natural tendencies not in themselves wrong, 
in the formation of which no previous moral choices had 
played a part, and for which man was therefore entirely un- 
responsible. After the first sin, the heinousness of sin 
would gradually increase as the moral consciousness was 
heightened and the moral experience of the race extended. 
Further, in its consequences the first sin was infinitely 
less grave than it was represented as having been according 
to the traditional fall theory. It could not have plunged 
the whole race into depravity and guilt, and been the cause 
of all subsequent sin. Its effects were no different from 
the effects of any other sin. From the standpoint of the 
moral life, it derived its greatest seriousness from the 
fact that it was the first sin, the first movement from 
purity to corruption.
Again, the theory we have advocated represents the 
first sin as preceded, not by a state of moral and spiritual 
perfection and consummate fellowship with God, but by a 
state of moral innocency. There is a vast difference be­ 
tween these two states. Moral innocency, however, does not 
mean non-moral innocency, the innocency of the creature who 
is unaware of the distinction between right and wrong. It 
means, rather, the innocency of a person who is conscious of 
moral distinctions, but who has not yet yielded to tempta­ 
tion, and who enjoys fellowship with God to the degree that 
his moral/and intellectual development permit. Nevertheless, 
even at its best, such a state would still be far removed
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from the moral and spiritual perfection attributed to Adam 
by the doctrine of original righteousness, a perfection 
which meant that his moral consciousness was not in a rudi­ 
mentary, but a completely developed form, that his will was 
ruled by a perfectly holy disposition, and that his relation­ 
ship with God was one of Christlike fellowship. Adam was, on 
this theory, a paragon of virtue and holiness, while accord­ 
ing to the view here advanced, man possessed only the inno- 
cency of a babe in the moral life.
In view of what has just been said, we obviously can. - 
not speak of the first sin as "the fall" in the traditional 
sense. As we have seen, there were some respects in which it 
was even less heinous than the sins which followed. And it
was not a fall from a state of perfect holiness to a state of 
utter depravity, but only from a state of innocency to the state 
of guilt and moral weakening which follows from any sin. Its
consequences, furthermore, were nothing like the supposed 
effects of the fall of Adam,- it did not plunge the whole 
race into depravity and guilt, nor cause its complete alien­ 
ation from God.
Nevertheless the seriousness of the first sin must not 
be minimized. As the Bible suggests, and as we have stated 
above, whatever the particular act was which constituted the 
first sin, it was an act of conscious opposition to the will 
of God and to God's ideals for man. In this respect its 
gravity cannot be overemphasized. It meant a deliberate 
choice on man's part to abuse the freedom which God had given 
him. It meant that man, while enjoying an unimpaired har­ 
mony with God, '- with the prospect of a fellowship of in-
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creasing richness, elected to place above these spiritual 
treasures the base and selfish pleasures which lured him. 
The first sin was of unique seriousness because it marked, 
as no subsequent sin has done, the transition from a state 
of unbroken harmony with God to a state of alienation. Be­ 
cause of the fact that it was rebellion against God, and the 
first act in this rebellion, it may rightly be called a 
"fall", and will always stand as a matter of the most serious 
moment in the history of the race.
II. The Propagation of Sin
Since, as we have seen, we cannot refer the prevalence 
of sin to the first sin as its sole explanation, how then 
shall we account for the propagation of sin in the race? If 
our account of the origin of sin is valid, the answer to the 
question is not difficult. The conditions which gave rise 
to the first sin, namely, the conflicting tendencies/in man 
and freedom to choose between them, also account for the 
universality of sin in the race. All men inherit the natural 
impulses which occasioned the first sin. Given this, with 
the capacity to give expression to those tendencies, and the 
prevalence of sin is easily understandable. Sin exists be­ 
cause man, tempted by his natural impulses, freely chooses 
to sin. Beyond this we do not need to go.
That this is a sufficient explanation it would seem 
hard to deny. But that to some minds the deterministic ac­ 
count will seem more satisfactory can also not be denied. 
The deterministic theory enables us to posit an efficient
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cause for every sin, a cause from which but one effect is 
possible. On the other hand, to grant man real freedom is 
to assert that sin might not have been. Edwards 1 argument 
that the universality of sin implies an evil tendency in 
human nature which necessitates sinful volitions is undoubt­ 
edly impressive, as we have recognized. And when confronted 
by it we can only reply that we have given an explanation 
which also is perfectly adequate to account for the moral 
evil of the world. If the deterministic explanation seems 
easier to some minds, it must be remembered that determinism 
leads to other positions which are utterly untenable.
The strength of the temptation to sin has undoubtedly 
grown greater in the case of some individuals. We have seen 
that the expression in action of an aspect of our nature 
strengthens it. It follows that indulgence in sin in the 
lives of some has strengthened their natural impulses lead­ 
ing to sin. Further, their offspring, inheriting these 
strengthened natural tendencies, have started with greater 
handicaps than their parents. Thus, while in some members 
of the race the tendency to good may have been strengthened, 
in others the opposite effect has taken place. This heredi­ 
tary tendency to sin is strong enough in some individuals to 
determine them to evil conduct. We shall discuss the ques­ 
tion of the responsibility for this presently.
In addition to this strengthening of native impulses, 
and their transmission in strengthened form, there has been 
developed in the race a habitual inclination to rebel against 
the moral law as such. Pfleiderer felt that this began to
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develop before man recognized the moral nature of the law. 
Whether this is the case or not, there is certainly in man 
a rooted antipathy to the requirements and restrictions of 
the law, a factor which lends added impetus to the natural 
impulses in their war against the right, and which is in 
itself evil.
It might be objected that this antipathy to law is an 
acquired characteristic, which could not be handed down from 
one generation to another, but which can be developed only 
in the individual through his experience of conflict with 
the law. Whether this objection can be sustained depends 
upon whether this spirit of opposition to the law is to be 
classed as an acquired characteristic, and whether such 
characteristics can be transmitted. This is a psychological 
problem, however, we shall not discuss, for the prevalence of 
sin can be accounted for without postulating either the ex­ 
istence or the transmission of this disposition. It is 
probably well to point out here that the account we have 
given of the propagation of sin does not involve the trans­ 
mission of acquired characteristics,but only of those physi- 
ca]/and psychological passions which are natural.
These native hereditary impulses, which are against 
the moral law, constitute largely the "evil disposition" 
with which man is born. The antipathy to the ri^it as such 
is a relatively minor influence to sin. In the recognition 
of an hereditary tendency to evil we are at one with the 
determinist in his doctrine of original sin. We cainot go 
the length of asserting that this constitutes a "total de-
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pravity" which determines all individuals to sin, but we can 
recognize that it constitutes a race-solidarity in respect 
to the propensity which gives rise to sin. To this extent 
the individual is, by virtue of being a member of the race, 
liable to sin. And we have recognized that in the case of 
some individuals certain evil conduct may, by virtue of 
their hereditary propensity, be unavoidable.
No complete account of the propagation of sin could 
fail to take note of the influence of the social environment 
upon the individual, a factor which was recognized by the 
Arminians and which has been reemphasized by Schlejjtmacher and 
Ritschl. The tendencies against the law in our nature are 
always affected by the environment. Environmental condi­ 
tions favorable to their expression strengthen their influ­ 
ence in any particular case. The influence of the race's 
example in sinning upon the individual is of the greatest im­ 
portance in accounting for the prevalence of sin. This is 
of course not an independent cause of sin, but one of the 
subordinate causes which has developed out of the fundamen­ 
tal conflict between our unbridled natural impulses and the 
moral law. It is another aspect of race-solidarity as to the 
conditions of sin. No member of the race escapes the im­ 
press of this social example on his moral nature. And in 
the case of some members the environment, in conjunction with 
their native tendency to sin, may be the major factor in de­ 
termining certain evil actions.
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III. God's Relation to Sin
In the light of the account we have given of the rise 
and propagation of sin we can deal with the question of 
God's relation to it. We have taken the position that He 
could he justified in permitting it, on the ground that its 
permission was necessary to the realization of His worthy 
purpose. Let us now examine more carefully what is involved 
in God's permission of sin.
To begin with, He makes sin possible by endowing man 
with freedom. Now we saw in connection with the question of 
freedom that it is conditioned by man's possession of a 
nature with opposing tendencies in i*. Speaking in moral 
terms, the power of genuine choice between right and wrong 
must be conditioned by tendencies in man to the right and to 
the wrong. To'say that God permits sin, then, involves the 
recognition that He endows man with tendencies which, in 
conflict with the tendency to the good, give rise to tempta­ 
tion, and become the occasion for sin. However, the natural 
impulses which occasion sin are not in themselves evil, but 
really non-moral,- they are evil only in relation to law. 
As we have seen, they are simply the impulses belonging to 
man on his animal side, and which are essential to the pre­ 
servation and development of life. Allowed to express them­ 
selves for their proper purposes and in moderation they do 
not lead to sin. They are the morally indifferent raw mater­ 
ials of human nature, which condition wrongdoinglonly as
s
moral man, in the exercise of his freedom, deliberately 
chooses to misuse that freedom and commit sin. As Tennant
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has well put it: "The most clamorous passion which invites 
to sensual indulgence is just as little to be described as 
evil in itself as the sublime work of art which may goad a 
man to extravagance and debt. It is equally non-moral and 
indifferent. No natural impulse, then, is itself sinful, 
unless present through our volition, and therefore through 
our fault. It is the deliberate refusal to reject the im­ 
pulse, the wilful surrender of the government of conduct to 
the non-moralised sensibility, in which evil takes its 
rise." God is not responsible, it follows, for moral evil 
either in the form of an intrinsically evil disposition or 
of sinful acts. Let us bear in mind, too, that God is not 
responsible for all the full strength of the tendencies to 
evil in us. This inherited nature has been developed 
through the generations by man f s choice of the wrong. Further, 
God indeed gave man the power to resist the influence of his 
temptations, and in the solicitations of conscience seeks to 
persuade him to the good. He has thus done all that He could 
do to prevent sin, consistently with His gift oyfreedom to
man.
N.P.Williams, in The Ideas of the Fall/and o£ Original
/ 
Sin, one of the most recent works on this subject, criticizes
the type of theory we have advanced on the ground that God 
might have created man with a/conscience intull control of his 
natural impulses. If, as seems apparent, Williams meant He 
might have given man such control as to make it certain his 
natural impulses would be restrained, this would have been
^-F. R. Tennant, The Origin and Propagation of Sin, pp 101-2.
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determinism, with all it involves. If, however, he means 
simply that God might have made full control possible, the 
reply is that He did. Man might have resisted the tempta­ 
tions of his native impulses. Hence God can be abundantly 
vindicated for endowing us with a nature which contains 
within itself the possibility of evil. It is, in fact, not 
nearly as difficult as to reconcile His holy nature with the 
existence of natural evil. The possibility of sin was es­ 
sential to His great purpose of creating morally perfect 
beings. Seen in this light, we can reconcile it with God's 
character.
A further problem arises as to God's relation to those 
sins which may be determined by heredity or by environmental 
conditions, or both. That certain sinful acts may be soAe- 
termined we have recognized. Now this might appear to be a 
case of sin for which God is responsible, since, as we have 
seen, the individual is not responsible for that which is 
beyond his power to control. (In view of this, it is proba­ 
bly more correct to speak of wrong acts determined by hered­ 
ity or environment as being evil than as being sins, for the 
term sin usually implies responsibility.) We must admit 
that God is responsible for the laws of heredity and of in­ 
fluence by which the sins of the parent and of the race lead 
to moral evil in the offspring. But the responsibility for 
the evil in an individual which is necessitated by his her­ 
edity or environment lies with his progenitors or with the 
individuals composing his environment, whose sins are the 
real causes of his wrongdoing. The natural law by which the
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child inherits its parents 1 weaknesses, or the individual 
is affected by his environment, is no different from the law 
by which the results of a volition are connected with the 
volition, or the law by which the character of a person is 
affected by his actions. Yet we do not hold God responsible 
for murder which was freely willed by the murderer, even 
though it was made possible only by the laws of nature con­ 
necting his volition with the death of the victim. So we 
cannot hold God responsible for the evil in a child which 
results directly from the sins of his parents, or of society. 
The evil in the child is only a part of the consequences of 
the sin of the parent and of society.
The laws of heredity and of social influence are them­ 
selves as non-moral as any other natural or psychological 
laws. They may be used for evil or for good. Just as our
good volitions may, by virtue of the natural laws connecting 
them with their results, be used for good, so the laws of 
heredity and social influence may be used for good. In fact, 
they are indispensable to the propagation of righteousness 
in individuals and society, and are thus essential to God's 
purposes. If the moral level of the race is to be lifted, 
these laws must be utilized in so doing. God is not to be 
implicated in sin because His laws, owing to the sins of men 
for which He is not responsible, are made the instrunerts of
evil.
This account of the origin and propagation of sin,
while taking account of the facts to be explained, in partic­ 
ular the fact of race-solidarity with regard to sin and the
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reconciliation of this with individual responsibility, is 
also consistent with the great religious values wdhave 
recognized as essential, in enabling us to see how sin took 
its rise without being referred to God as its author, it is 
in keeping with our demand for a morally perfect God. God 
is indeed responsible for the possiblity of moral evil, in 
endowing man with his native impulses and the freedom to 
give them expression in contradiction to the moral law. But 
this we have seen to be compatible with His holy purpose. In 
freeing God from the authorship of sin we have likewise con­ 
served another essential religious value, by ascribing to man 
a genuine freedom and real moral responsibili ty. While God 
is responsible for the possibility of sin, man is responsible 
for its actuality. As he is its free cause, sin is refer­ 
able directly to him. That the solution we have offered of 
the coming of sin into the world and its spread is the sim­ 
plest and most obvious should not prejudice the mind against 
it, however wary we should be of reaching our conclusions too 
easily. The true solution may often be that which occurs 
most readily to the man in the street.
CHAPTER XV 
GRACE AND FAITH
We are now in a position to approach the question 
of the relationship between the divine, and the human will 
in the experience of conversion. What part is played by 
God, and what by man, when a sinner is reconciled to the
Father?
seen 
We have/reason for rejecting the view that the
transformation from the wrong, to the right relationship 
with God is effected solely by divine grace. Our religious 
experience, which to say the least is not inconsistent at 
this point with Scripture, testifies to the fact that the 
human will plays more than a passive role when faith is born. 
This, however, does not contradict the two fundamental 
Christian truths that (l) man is utterly unable to win his 
own salvation, and (2) the saving initiative is entirely with 
God. In our study of Edwards on original sin we recognized 
the fact that sin is universal. All men have sinned, and 
therefore all stand condemned in the eyes of God. Nothing 
that man is able to do can remove this condition which 
alienates him from God. As Emil Brunner says: "Man can do 
nothing to remove guilt. The personal relationship ca*n be 
destroyed from the side of man, but it cannot be restored by
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ljn. The man who has broken his relation to another, has 
brought in/something between himself and that other which he 
can no more remove. If that is true between man and man, 
much more is it true between man and God. Once emancipated 
from the hand of God, we cannot restore communion with Him." 1 
Even though a man might possess all the moral ability a 
Pelagius would assign him, and even though he might "improve" 
this to the extent of reforming and living in perfect accord 
with God's will, he could not thus remove the guilt of past 
sins. Nor could he in any wise obligate God to restore the 
broken fellowship with Him. This is a fact consistently 
overlooked by Edwards when he insists that the Arminians 
place man f s salvation wholly in his own hands. But the truth 
is that man is far from possessing the moral ability which 
the Arminian ascribed to him. We all sin, and in the course 
of our sinning develop tendencies to sin which, in many 
cases, attain sufficient strength to become determining in 
our choices. Even within the sphere in which we possess the 
freedom of alternative choice, there are tendencies to sin 
so strong as to render our sinning a practical certainty. 
In short, we must grant that all men have sinned, and that, 
while theoretically possible, it is from the practical stand­ 
point out of the question that an individual should ever 
arise who would turn completely from his sin and follow per­ 
fectly the will of God. We can thus insist with all the con­ 
viction of Paul that without grace man is lost.
Emil Brunner, The Word and the World, pp 50-51.
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It follows as a corollary of this that the saving 
initiative is with God. If man, who in himself is helpless 
to accomplish it, is to be brought back into fellowship with 
the Father, the first and chief move must be from God down­ 
ward. This truth has been clearly expressed by Professor 
A. E. Taylor. "The initiative in the process of 'assimila­ 
tion to God 1 must come from the side of the eternal; it must 
be God who first comes to meet us, and who, all through the 
moral life itself, 'works in us 1 in a sense which is more 
than metaphorical. Our moral endeavors must be genuinely 
ours, but they must be responses to intimate actual contacts 
in which a real God moves out to meet His creatures, and by
the contact at once sustains and inspires the appropriate
o 
response on the creature's part." Let us now ask what is
the nature of this divine activity.
I. The Grace of God
It was its connotation of active favor, says Professor 
Moffatt3 , which made the term 'charis' so attractive to Paul. 
It signified to him not only God's favor but a favor which 
acted upon men and moved out in the life of His people. We 
cannot offer a better definition of grace than that which is 
contained in the two words "active favor".
The grace of God consists primarily in His self- 
revelation through Jesus Christ. This is the Pauline teach-
2A. E. Taylor, The Faith of a Moralist, Vol. I, p. 223. 
Sjames Moffatt, Grace in the New Testament, p. 25.
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ing, and indeed that of the New Testament as a whole. God 
in Christ, holding out the right hand of reconciliation to 
man, is grace in its supreme form. Yet it must not be lim­ 
ited to this special activity, but includes all that God 
does to further His purpose of fellowship with man. It in­ 
cludes man's creation as a moral being, with the gift of 
freedom to choose the right, and thus the capacity to respond 
to the gospel. It includes the inner tendency prompting him 
toward the right, a sense of 'oughtness' in the presence of 
the good, a tug toward the ideal. It includes, as a part of 
his freedom, the capacity for exercising faith. It includes 
the revelation of God in nature, in the lives of human be­ 
ings, and through the voice of the prophets. Everything 
that is done to lift man toward Himself is a part of God's 
active favor. Nor must theweight attached to the revela­ 
tion in Christ be allowed to minimize the significance of 
these other aspects of the divine favor, which are indeed pre­ 
requisite to the efficacy of Christ's soteriologicaHJwork.
Having recognized these other gifts of grace, however, 
let us repeat the New Testament conviction that grace is 
supremely manifested in and through Christ. Here God most 
completely unveils His face, here His love is epitomized, 
here the forgiving spirit expresses itself to the sinner 
through the vicarious suffering produced by his sins, here 
the forbearing Father makes His greatest appeal to His way­ 
ward children. That God in Christ should give Himself for 
us,- this is grace in its consummate form.
.And this gift is God's urging Himself; upon us. Nothing
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is so potent to convict of sin, nothing so moving in its ap­ 
peal to the errant child, nothing so challenging to the 
highest in man as the cross of Christ. It is God's coming 
to us in this way that does most to bring the sinner to re­ 
pentance and faith. This is the great persuasive, the dynam­ 
ic influence, to which those who name His name ascribe their 
conversion to Christ.
It is not a forcing of our wills, it is not a contriv­ 
ing to have us "do as we please", in Edwards 1 sense: it is 
rather an appeal to us to yield in the exercise of God-given 
freedom. We have seen how a change in our environment may 
influence the appeal a certain contemplated act makes to us. 
When God in Christ breaks in upon the world, the environment 
of our life is radically altered. To set eyes upon Jesus is 
to have the heart strings tugged at by God in an entirely 
different way and with new force. God does not destroy the 
citadel of our freedom, but He does immensely strengthen the 
tendency to yield to Him. We are drawn by grace, but we 
follow in freedom.
The fact that we are free to exercise faith or not 
makes God's grace in sending Christ far more significant 
than it would otherwise be. On the deterministdview the 
gospel can have no effect on us. Its appeal is all for 
naught, for we are utterly incapable of responding to the ap­ 
peal. So far as the sinner's turning to God is concerned, 
the coming of Christ into the picture makes no real differ­ 
ence. The sinner ispot thereby influenced in any effective 
way. The gospel represents God's active favor, to be sure,
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"but it is no more than a demonstration of that love, for it 
cannot possibly change an individual. For this reason grace 
is fundamentally and almost exclusively, with the determin- 
ist, the efficacious action of God's Spirit upon man, in 
which he is led to accept the gospel. Only if a man is free 
can the gospel he what it was intended to be, the prime fac­ 
tor in wooing lost man back to God.
Now although we must deny an efficacious action of 
God's Spirit upon man, which determines his will, we do not 
thereby deny the work of His Spirit in man's heart. God 
does more than seek to influence man through the appeal of 
the gospel. He approaches him directly through the inward 
action of His Spirit. The sending of Christ is an object­ 
ive act of grace,and operates upon man indirectly through 
an environmental change. On the other hand, the action of
the Spirit upon the heart is/immediate. This action begins
1 I 
with the moral life, when God places in man ^tendency toward
the values he apprehends, a movement in contradiction to the 
natural tendencies inconsistent with the good. This tenden­ 
cy, which is a movement of God's Spirit upon man, continues 
through his whole life. Regardless of what his moral con­ 
duct, or spiritual attitude may be, it never entirely leaves
him. . . . . ., ,This movement of the Spirit upon man is strikingly ex­ 
hibited in the strengthening of the tendency toward higher 
values which follows any right choice. The fact of this 
strengthening is recognized, and that it requires something 
more than a physiological explanation fully to account for
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it must also be admitted. Growth in the moral life is not 
merely an alteration in the "brain; it is a change of charac­ 
ter. The Christian expresses this in religious terms,- it 
is the increasing indwelling of the Spirit, it is progress in 
"being possessed by Christ. The greatest strengthening comes 
when a free, unreserved surrender to Christ is made. Then 
moral and spiritual resources are made available in new abun­ 
dance and richer quality, then the highest fellowship is en­ 
joyed; and theirelationship, if allowed to progress to its 
fullest, culminates in an experience which is perhaps ade­ 
quately suggested only by the language of the mystic: "I live 
yet not I."
This strengthening of character as a result of the in­ 
ward action of the Spirit does not destroy man's freedom. 
His nature is altered by the immediate influence of the 
Spirit, it is true, but this transformation takes place only 
when he freely yields himself to the good and thus wills that«
it take place. He does not lift himself by his own boot­ 
straps, but he places himself in a position, by his own free 
choice, to be helped by God. It is like stepping into a 
lift,- we do so of our own volition and energy, but then, 
without further effort on our part, the lift carries us to a 
higher level. So, by the grace of God, in the form of a 
direct movement of His Spirit upon us, we are elevated to a 
higher moral level upon the occasion of a right choice. This 
gracious assistance places us in a position where further 
good choices are made easier, but they do not necessarily 
thereby become determined. Freedom in any particular instance
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is lost only when, as a result of repeated right choices, the 
evil alternative disappears. And such is the desired con­ 
summation of the moral struggle.
We cannot draw a distinction "between different forms of 
the divine grace comparable to that drawn by the determinist 
"between common and efficacious grace,and this for several 
reasons. In the first place, there is no grace which is ef­ 
ficacious in the sense of operating arbitrarily in contraven­ 
tion of natural law, and thus no distinction on this ground 
is possible. In the second place, grace in no form is 
determining,- it ismever the sole and sufficient cause of 
faith, although grace in all its forms plays a part in any 
conversion. Again, there is no limitation of special grace 
to a particular group of individuals entirely independent of 
their own conduct. Efficacious grace for the determinist is 
given only to the elect, but the gospel, the ministrations 
of the Spirit, the gift of freedom, etc.,are for all. Grace 
can thus not be distinguished according to its supernatural 
character, its special efficacy, or its limited application, 
but only according to the various ways in which it expresses 
itself.
II. Faith.
God having taken the initiative in His graciouskd- 
vances toward man, the latter responds in the act of faith. 
God offers the boon of salvation; man accepts it.
In the exercise of faith man is free. When he accepts 
the gospel, he makes a genuine choice, deliberate,and with-
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out any constraint within or without, electing to place his 
trust in Christ. That this is a worthy and commendable act 
is not to be denied. It represents indeed the noblest act 
of which sinful man is capable: the acknowledgment and con­ 
demnation of his sins, the recognition of his ill desert, 
and the trusting appeal to Christ for forgiveness. Were 
faith not such an act, it would not be an appropriate res­ 
ponse to the gospel.
On the other hand, faith is not a meritorious 'work 1 
to which salvation is granted as a reward. It is the ex­ 
press repudiation of all merit, of all ground of boasting, 
of all claims against God, of all self-sufficiency. As W.A. 
Copinger well remarks, "If it be thought that here there is 
entrance for self-sufficiency, at least in the case of the 
man who turns to God, let it be remembered/ihat the only 
mode of his righteous action is by self-renunciation and 
faith towards God, and this can leave but little room, if 
any, for self-righteousness." Faith is the humble accept­ 
ance of a gift, an acceptance which, by its very nature, 
testifies to the agent's inability to win, by his own 
strength or desert, the gift being freely given. As a free 
response to the gospel faith is itself an affirmation of the 
truth of salvation by grace.
Since it is not a work of merit, but the acceptance of 
a gift, it is impossible for the fact that faith is freely
4W. A. Copinger, A Treatise on Predestination, Election, and
Grace, p. 299.
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exercised to limit the sovereignty of God in the salvation 
of men. God is completely free in His election, i.e., in 
His determination to bestow salvation, and to bestow it 
upon those who respond to the gospel in faith. Nothing in 
man, either existing or foreseen, constrains or obligates 
Him in any way in this determination. Barth rightly says: 
"We count upon God's grace. But it is not our own! Every- 
thingr depends upon that gracei But we do not bring it into 
being by any magic turn of our dialectic. He i£, and he 
remains free; else he were not God." 5 Although God foresaw 
those who would have faith, He foresaw their faith as a res­ 
ponse to the gospel, and thus only as an acceptance of the 
gift He was sovereignly offering, not as an obligation upon 
Him to make the gift, or to make it to those particular in­ 
dividuals. The fact that faith is the condition of salva­ 
tion, and that man is free to meet the condition, in no wise 
detracts from God's sovereignty in the bestowal of eternal 
life. For it is God who decides the condition and who freely 
determines to bestow His blessings in this way. To exercise 
faith is simply to receive salvation as a gift, and to re­ 
ceive it in the way God has chosen to give it.
It is appropriate here, before leaving the question of 
faith, to advert to the problem raised by the fact that faith 
may be impossible to certain individuals. We have seen, in 
connection with the idea of freedom, that the sphere in 
which there are real alternatives before an individual is
5Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, p.. 178.
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determined by his character, and that the number of choices 
open to him is therefore limited. Now it may be that for 
some persons the acceptance of Christ it not an open choice, 
the possibility of this act being ruled out by an evil char­ 
acter. A problem is created by the existence of this possi­ 
bility alongside our rejection of determining grace. US/here 
the evil character which makes faith impossible is not due 
to the individual's abuse of his freedom, but to his heredity 
or environment, or both, we have apparently a case of uncon­ 
ditional reprobation as genuine as that of the determinist. 
Two things may be said in answer to the difficulty. First, 
we must remember that God deals with an individual on the 
basis of the latter 1 s opportunity. We cannot conceive of a 
just God's damning a creature, who, through no fault of his 
own, is unable to accept Christ. Second, it is not incon­ 
sistent with Christian theology to suppose that, for such in­ 
dividuals, an opportunity may be given after this life to 
receive the gospel. To postulate this as an explicit part 
of Christian teaching is of course out of the question, but 
it is certainly within the spirit of that teaching. Whatever 
be our solution of the problem, the great fact on which the 
Christian can rest is the character of the loving Father. 
What we have said of there who lack ability will apply also 
to those who lack light,- i.e., to those who never hear the
gospel.
In connection with this question of the possible exis­ 
tence of those who are unable to accept Christ, it may be 
argued that,by parity of reasoning, we may suppose that there
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are some whose acceptance of Him is determined "by factors 
beyond their own control. To endow these with salvation 
on the basis of a determined choice would seem as unjust as 
to deny it to others on the same "basis. This, however, is 
an hypothetical problem. The existence of persons who can­ 
not but receive the gospel is conceivable in theory, but it 
is not thinkable in actual fact. The act of faith, with all 
that it involves of self-condemnation, of purity of motive, 
and of high aspiration, is the noblest choice a man can make. 
To suppose it impossible for certain individuals to avoid 
this choice is to take far too exalted a view of sinful man. 
We have recognized the truth of the Pauline dictum that "all 
have sinned, and fall short of the glory of God." 6 While 
from time to time there arise some saintly individuals, it 
must be remembered that they are born of sinful parents, and 
dwell in evil surroundings, even when both heredity and en­ 
vironment are of the best. It is true that many evil deeds 
are impossible to the highest characters, but there are none 
so pure as to face no alternative to the noblest moral act 
which can engage the powers of man.
^Romans 3. 23.
CHAPTER XVI 
THE PERSEVERANCE OF BELIEVERS
Let us now "briefly consider the question of the. 
Christian's perseverance in his faith. Edwards and his Cal- 
vinist associates were right in insisting that persevering 
faith is essential to salvation. This proposition need not 
"be labored,- obviously, if a man loses his faith, he is no 
longer in the right relationship with God, no matter how 
vigorous his faith may have been at a previous time. Per­ 
severance in faith of course does not necessarily imply a 
perfect faith, in which there are no falterings, but rather 
a conscious, continuing allegiance to Christ.
Now however essential it may be to his salvation, no 
man can be certain that he will persevere in his faith. To 
recognize his freedom to exercise faith or not is to adroit 
the possibility of his defection. Perseverance is a matter 
of human choice, and whether or not faith will continue 
nothing can determine, and only God can foresee. Edwards 
was right in insisting that only determining grace can guar­ 
antee that a man will not fall away. And this is true how­ 
ever genuine his faith may be at first. The idea that there 
is a difference in the quality of the faith that perseveres 
and the faith that does not is purely imaginery. Undoubtedly
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there is a difference in the depth and intensity of faith in 
different individuals, but the weaker faith may grow strong­ 
er and persevere, while the stronger may weaken and finally 
fail.
To deny the certainty of perseverance is neither to 
run counter to Scripture nor to turn a deaf ear to the de­ 
mands of the religious consciousness. The belief in the 
final perseverance of the saints appealed to the reformers 
because it presumably enabled the believer to feel assured 
of salvation. But, as we have seen, this view gives him no 
more and no less assurance than the view we have advocated, 
and that for the reason that no man, however strongly he may 
believe in the doctrine of perseverance of true faith, can 
ever be certain that his is of that kind. Besides, the as­ 
surance desired by the Christian, and which Paul was most 
concerned to emphasize, is the assurance that God's saving 
grace is constant, that His love never falters, that He is 
always accessible to the appeal of faith.
The assertion that man can never be certain of his 
perseverance requires to be in a degree qualified. While it 
is true on the whole that faith is a matter of free choice 
and therefore subject to change, it is not impossible tat 
that in certain instances it may be removed from the sphere 
of contrary choice. We have seen, in noting the reciprocal 
effect of character and conduct upon one another, that char­ 
acter may be developed in such a way that an act at one time 
a matter of free choice may become determined. By persist­ 
ently following the good, and thus strengthening the tenden-
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cies to the good, as we weaken those to the evil, we may 
progressively eliminate the alternatives to the good. In 
this way Christian faith may come to be a determined act, 
an habitual practice. There may be, and perhaps are, 'saints 1 
of whom it is true that they are morally incapable of fal­ 
tering in their faith. For this they deserve full credit, 
seeing that the inability results from the right use of 
their freedom. Even here, however, their perseverance is 
to an extent uncertain, for, as we have seen, acts at one 
time determined may become free. Some radical environmental 
change, or some deterioration of character,beginning in 
another department of the moral life, might eventually re­ 
open the alternative to faith, and thus make defection pos­ 
sible. Only in the life to come, where we shall see Him 
'face to face 1 , can we be certain that the evil alternatives 
will finally disappear.
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